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
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VOLUME II

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ANNEX A

RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE SURFACING OF COMMUNISM

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ANNEX A

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE SURFACING OF COMMUNISM

Introduction

An historical trace of the surge of nationalism and communism in Vietnam surfaces certain insights which can assist in any assessment of the present-day crisis and its possible aftermath. Nationalism is possibly the most important single force influencing the Vietnamese people. Both the GVN in the South and the DRV in the North attempt to use it as means of polarizing the minds and actions of the Vietnamese people. It is the force that the Communists captured in the 1930s and used as a motivational device ultimately to end French domination. Today they use it to nurture what is becoming the most extensive war of insurgency in recent history.1/

A trace of these developments in time is critical to understanding the scope of the US-GVN task at hand. Beginning with anti-colonial activities directed against the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it is significant to note how these early efforts to expel Westerners changed direction and thrust. Next, descriptive annals of the developing Communist Party in Vietnam offer important description of the circumstances under which they were able to capitalize on the weakened status of the political opposition thereby seizing the dominant position in an anti-colonial, nationalist campaign. Finally, an appreciation of the role of nationalism in development of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, as well as that of the DRV, is central to understanding the present and forecasting the future. It is paradoxical that both Ngo Dinh Diem and Ho Chi Minh perceived themselves as the leaders of the true nationalist cause -- both depending on it, at least initially, as a primary control mechanism.

The Base of Vietnamese Nationalism. Many students of Vietnamese political history suggest that Vietnamese nationalism began during the Chinese occupation of Nam Viet in the early centuries of the Christian era. While resistance to Chinese domination and incursions by neighbors is evidence of a people who detest foreign domination, the concept of an independent Vietnam as a member of the international family of nations did not emerge until 1884 when French occupation was completed. In fact, French imperialism aroused the forces of nationalism which eventually contributed to the French withdrawal. The new ideas, techniques

and instrumentalities introduced by the French acted as a catalyst for the emergence of national awareness and the development of national loyalties. The center of efforts against the French did not as a rule stem from the Emperor's court or the politically unaware peasants who were bound in imperial court tradition with its trappings of authoritarian rule. It was led, over the long haul, by those of the intellectual community who were exposed to Western ideas through education and travel and were dissatisfied with their homeland's progress toward modernization and independence. One of the principal difficulties faced in these efforts was a lack of unity among the nationalist leaders -- a disunity resulting from an ideological dispute between communism and non-communism and a basic, almost characteristic, inability to solve internal differences for the well-being of the struggle for independence or for the nation. The history of the nationalist movement is replete with evidence of individual, regional and religious issues overriding national loyalties. The French, as will be shown, fully appreciated this vulnerability and capitalized on it in the suppression of nationalistic activities.

Vietnam, theoretically, should be populated by a highly nationalistic people, the potential is evident. It has a long, heroic history which has been passed through the centuries as a continuous struggle against foreign encroachment and of expansion for the welfare of an aggressive and dynamic people. The people are conscious of their territory and are aware of the historical threats of China and Cambodia. There is a common culture, greatly influenced by China, but unique in Vietnamese eyes owing to its synthesis of Chinese, and to a lesser extent, Indian (due to Cham and Cambodian contacts) cultural habits. There is a common language used by over 80 percent of the population. The country has a homogeneous ethnic group in that over 80 percent of the population consider themselves as "lowland Vietnamese." In spite of these impressive facts, however, history indicates that there is no overriding acceptance of national loyalties when a choice must be made. It must be recognized that, in many instances, disagreements emerged along ideological lines (communism and non-communism); but as a generalization, the record suggests that conflicting loyalties (personal, religious, regional) too often take precedence over national loyalties. A survey of VN history which gives the base of the development of nationalism is included as APPENDIX 1. It is against this background that review of the rise of nationalism and the accompanying emergence of communism must take place.

Early Nationalist Activities

The Monarchist Revolts. The first open resistance, known as the Monarchist Revolts, broke out against the French within a year after

conclusion of the 1884 treaty signifying French domination in Vietnam. The movement title derives from the fact that its leadership was provided by a number of mandarins who used "the monarchy" as their principal rallying point.^{2:103/} These interrelated revolts were designed to force the French out by military action but were doomed to failure. The leadership lacked military expertise; they had few weapons that compared with those of the French; and most importantly, they had little popular support. Broad-base support may have been estimated to be an unattainable short-term goal, as the people adhered to the tradition of "leaving the destiny of the country to the monarch and his court."^{3:15/} Thus, potential public support was left largely unexploited, and the revolts remained strictly the preserve of those members of the elite who foresaw the dangers of foreign domination.

The very nature of, and lack of backing for, these revolts suggests that they were continuations of the resistance to French domination by the Emperor rather than truly nationalist movements. Nevertheless, they had distinct nationalist implications. Several of the leaders (Emperor Ham Nghi, Phan Dinh Phung and De Tham) gained fame as revolutionary heroes, and Vietnamese emphasis on historical tradition led subsequent nationalist leaders to associate their activities with these early revolutionaries and their campaigns. Their names remain in the legends of today. They are especially venerated by the Communists.

It is important to note that the French used a technique, not unlike that of present-day "pacification" to destroy the revolutionaries. Complete authority (military and civil) in an area was given to the French military. French troops were deployed around key communications and supply centers with strict instructions to acquire the confidence of the local populace. When confidence was won and security conditions permitted, the Vietnamese were entrusted with their own defense, and French forces were moved to the outer edge of the secure area. This effort was augmented by a French-Chinese border agreement which denied the rebels a sanctuary. The French also capitalized on the lack of unity among rebel leaders. They collected information concerning tensions, jealousies and feuds; these cleavages were then exploited to disrupt and discourage rebel activities.

By 1897, armed resistance -- with the exception of De Tham's guerrilla band which was not destroyed until 1913 -- had been dispersed except for minor disturbances around local administrative centers in Annam and Cochinchina.

Influence of the Russo-Japanese War. Traditional Chinese influence on the Vietnamese society led mandarins and scholars to adhere closely through the centuries to the thought that Chinese culture and

education were unimpeachable. This philosophy so permeated Vietnamese thought that the country refused to consider or accept the progress of science and technology being developed by the "outside world." Japanese defeat of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1905 initiated the breakdown of this parochial view. The Japanese, an Oriental people, were the first to defeat an Occidental power, and it was accomplished by adapting Western technological advances in their own system. This instituted a wave of solidarity among the Vietnamese; the beginnings of hope for independence emerged in terms of obtaining the guidance of a modernized Mandarin leadership began to realize the advantages of Western education which also had a catalytic effect on nationalism. At approximately the same time, Sun Yat-sen was organizing and conducting revolutionary activities in southern China; his influence spread to Vietnamese intellectuals. This led to the exodus of a number of nationalists, led by Phan Boi Chau, to China and Japan. They formed the "Association for the Restoration of Vietnam," with headquarters in Canton, which included a series of clandestine cells in Vietnam proper. A number of its members matriculated at the Japanese Military Academy, Waseda University in Tokyo and the Whampoa Political and Military Academy in China.3:17/ During this early period of contact with the Japanese, reports indicate that some Vietnamese intellectuals were exposed to their first socialist ideas.4:107/

Chau's organization adhered to a concept of independence through violence; it sponsored a number of minor actions in Tonkin and Cochinchina which never really challenged the French position but, nevertheless, demonstrated the violent course of action that was available.

World War I. Events during these war years also impacted significantly on Vietnamese nationalism. The French recruited some 100,000 Vietnamese for service in Europe. The impact of the transition these people experienced is impossible to quantify, but it is evident from subsequent events that it was considerable. While in France, they were exposed to an advanced stage of Western technology and standards of living which influenced their value system. Upon return to Vietnam, they must have recognized, perhaps for the first time, the real dimensions of achieving both living conditions and a social structure in their homeland that could approach those of a West European nation.

Many of those serving in France also were exposed to the teachings of the Socialist Party which, at that time, was the leading advocate of an altered French colonial policy. This was attractive to the Vietnamese who also were impressed by socialist assurances of rapid economic development. As a result, many returned to Vietnam with the desire to alter the existing order in favor of independence via concepts learned in France.5:132/

The Beginnings of Communism

French Socialist Influences. From 1900-1920, a number of Vietnamese nationals residing in France began anti-colonial activities which were encouraged by the French Socialist Party. The most famous of these, Nguyen Ai Quoc (later known as Ho Chi Minh), became an active member of the party and a frequent contributor to socialist publications. It was through this association that he attended the 1920 Socialist Party Congress in Tours where he voted for communist affiliation. Thus, Ho Chi Minh became one of the founding members of the French Communist Party. As a member, he attended the Fourth and Fifth Communist Internationals in Moscow where he gained influence and became an advocate of strong action in colonial affairs. In 1924, he presented a series of proposals for French Communist Party action in support of Vietnamese anti-colonial policy. These suggestions, however, were not taken seriously by the French party which discredited it in the eyes of the ardent Vietnamese anti-colonialists. This development occasioned Ho's exodus to Moscow.

During 1924 and 1925, Ho studied in Moscow at the Eastern Workers University until he was sent to Canton, ostensibly as Borodin's interpreter but actually to introduce communism into Southeast Asia.^{3:40/} From there, he began organizing the communist movement in Indochina.
6:21:22/

In recent years, certain sectors of the US intellectual community and the press have portrayed Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist-patriot who merely uses communism as a vehicle to further his nationalist cause. Evidence does not substantiate this thesis in its entirety. It is true that he became an anti-French revolutionary early in life and, on his father's advice, went to Europe to further the anti-colonial cause. His socialist relationships and his initial work with the Communists can be viewed as being inspired by his anti-colonial sentiments. However, his training in Moscow and his subsequent activities with the Communist Party substantiate the fact that he is a Communist, dedicated to the Party and its objectives, a fact which is constantly overlooked by critics who look only for evidence which supports their positions. This is borne out by his 1960 statement in Echo du Vietnam, a Paris communist publication.

"In the beginning, it was patriotism and not communism which induced me to believe in Lenin and the Third International. But little by little, progressing step by step in the course of the struggle, and combining theoretical studies of Marxism-Leninism with practical activities, I came to realize that socialism and communism alone are capable of emancipating workers and down-trodden people all over the world.

"There was in Vietnam, as well as in China, the legend of the magic bag; anyone faced with a great problem would simply open the bag to find a ready solution. For the Vietnamese Revolution and people, Marxism-Leninism is not a magic bag, or a compass, but a real sun which lights the road to final victory, to socialism and communism."7/

It should be recognized that this was written for a communist publication at a time when Ho was soliciting support from the Communist World. Nevertheless, it sustains evidence stemming from a trace of his activities -- evidence which unequivocally proves his ties with international communism.

Failure of Vietnamese Reform Nationalism. Within Vietnam, meanwhile, new ideas of liberalizing French rule were sweeping the politically aware communities. Sufficient impacts shaping these concepts included: the Sun Yat-sen revolution in China; the Japanese victory in 1905; the return of the Vietnamese who spent part of World War I in Europe and the shift of the Vietnamese educational framework from the mandarin to the French system (around 1917). All of these factors generated forces within the country which demanded an extension of the educational system, more representation in government administration and equal rights for Vietnamese. The impetus of this drive came from a new and politically articulate group that had developed over the period of French occupation and had replaced the pre-French mandarin class. It consisted primarily of civil service workers, professionals, white-collar workers, students returned from abroad and certain skilled workers.2:112/

This group was motivated toward nationalist goals primarily as a result of French rule. Those who had traveled to France experienced the more open society of a developed Western nation, thus becoming aware of the freedoms which were not available in their native land. Those working for the French administration became increasingly sensitive to the discrimination they faced within the colonial system -- the most important jobs going to French nationals and Vietnamese concept of unequal pay for comparable work. Finally, there were no institutions through which they could express their views with any feeling of satisfaction.2:112/ These nationalists, therefore, attempted to obtain reform from the colonial administration; but, with their vested interests tied to the French, they chose to obtain reform without challenging colonial authority. This effort was highlighted by the formation of the Constitutionalist Party, founded in Cochinchina in 1923. Efforts to obtain reform were accompanied by a period of relative liberalization on the part of the French. This stemmed from election to power of the Leftist Bloc in France during 1924 and the appointment of socialist Alexandre Varenne as Governor-General of Indochina. French reforms included the use of larger numbers of Vietnamese civil servants and the authorization of more extensive administrative assemblies in Annam and

Tonkin. However, these policies, with their concomitant collaboration by this new group of intellectuals, were short-lived. French colonialists, becoming suspicious and fearing loss of their positions, demanded and achieved the recall of Varenne in 1927. Refusal of these "colons" to recognize the reform movement in Tonkin and Annam provided a signal to the Vietnamese that collaboration was not a valid strategy. The anti-colonialists, especially young Vietnamese intellectuals, moved promptly into a number of new underground groups that were being organized to move anti-French efforts along a more militant path.

French success in blocking Vietnamese attempts for real reform resulted from tactics which were again based on "the fomenting of regional and personal rivalries and on the suborning of individual nationalists, who were in no position to resist the threats and blandishments of the French Security Service."4:77/

Although the reform movement nationalists did obtain some concessions through the socialist administration, their failure to obtain sweeping changes pushed the younger intellectuals toward the more militant strategy which, they believed, provided the best recourse for moving toward independence.

Revolutionary Nationalism. The principal organizations which resulted from, or were reinforced by, failure of the reform movement were the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD), the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League, the Nguyen An Ninh Association and the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party. All were formed either in Vietnam under constant French police threat or in southern China which was then a center of anti-French activity.

The VNQDD, founded around 1927 in Hanoi by a young teacher named Nguyen Thai Hoc, launched a platform reflecting Sun Yat-sen's nationalism, democracy and socialism. It was able to develop a fairly extensive net of clandestine cells throughout Vietnam with the goal of eventually staging a general uprising to rid Vietnam of the French. 3:22-23/

The Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League was founded in Canton by Ho Chi Minh soon after he arrived there as Borodin's aide. Its first years of operation were devoted to recruiting and educating its membership. While the league's principal appeal was based on nationalism, its Marxist foundations were clearly recognizable. Although Ho Chi Minh returned to Moscow in the Summer of 1927, the organization continued to expand its membership and influence. Its membership grew in all three politico-geographic divisions of Vietnam.2:118/

The Nguyen An Ninh Association and the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party were founded in Vietnam under the hardships imposed by severe police repression; this duress was intensified by individual personal

differences and regional animosities. The primary cohesive force was the desire for national independence. While both organizations were initially anti-colonial and nationalist in nature, they soon were swept into acceptance of communist concepts as a result of the Revolutionary Youth League's expanding membership and increasing influence.

In their earlier days, the relationship of the communist-led Youth League with other nationalist organizations was based on the communist principal that a two-phased revolution was required. These phases consisted of a bourgeois-democratic revolution which would lead to national independence and socialist revolution which would lead, ultimately, to the world communist federation.^{8:96/} The Communists believed that non-communist nationalist organizations could assist in providing the revolution for national independence and, at the same time, gradually become imbued with Marxist ideology. With this in mind, the non-communist organizations were accepted as a means of achieving the short-range goal. An exception to this stratagem emerged after the 1929 Youth League Congress in Hong Kong, during which policies were adopted which "brought the organization in line with the decisions of the Sixth Comintern Congress." This shift encouraged continuation of close relationships with the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party but cited the need to "wage a struggle" against the VNQDD, possibly because of its strong nationalist views and its links with the Chinese Kuomintang.

At this stage in its development, the Youth League itself was not without the same internal disagreements which affected all Vietnamese revolutionary organizations. At the 1929 Youth League Congress, one section split away and, with the Annam and Tonkin regional organizations, formed the Indochinese Communist Party. By late 1929, the Annam Communist Party and the Indochina Communist Union had been formed; now, three communist groups were competing for recognition from the Third International. This split was reportedly solved when Ho Chi Minh, who had returned from Moscow by late 1929, summoned representatives of the three groups to Hong Kong. The differences were resolved, and the Vietnamese Communist Party was formed. Its name was redesignated as the Indochinese Communist Party in 1931.

The end of the first period of "revolutionary nationalism" began with the Yen Bay Mutiny which took place on 10 February 1930. This mutiny, sponsored by the VNQDD, involved the rebellion of an army battalion against its officers. Although the French police and military forces quickly killed the uprising at Yen Bay, ensuing revolts stirred other nationalist groups to take action against the colonials. In fact, the covert apparatus of the newly integrated Communist Party was in a good position to provide leadership and to profit from the unrest initiated by the VNQDD.

In opening the field for the Communists, the VNQDD suffered greatly. Its twelve principal leaders, including Party founder Nguyen Thai Hoc,

were executed; the remaining leadership escaped into Yunnan Province in southern China. Thus, the party disappeared from the scene not to appear again in strength until the end of World War II.9:20/

The Communists immediately proclaimed the need to end French rule. On this platform, they gained many new followers including some former VNQDD members who were greatly impressed by Communist Party unity and were anxious to continue overt action against the French. They were not motivated primarily by an ideological drive to join the Communist Party but appear to have seen it as an apparatus to further their drive for national independence. This rapid increase in membership had its disadvantages for the Communists. New members, primarily young people, pushed for action; the relatively inexperienced communist leaders, reinforcing these militant attitudes, were eager to emphasize active measures. Most had been trained in revolutionary tactics in China and were guided by the violent techniques used there. The world economic depression of 1930 also had a marked influence on the situation. The most serious was the effect on the peasant farmer who, having abundant crops, had no markets. Overseas trade was reduced, bringing extreme economical hardship to landowners and wage-earning peasants alike. Thus, the principal classes of Vietnamese society, except civil servants working for the French and some industrial workers, became both alienated and "more available" for recruitment into the communist-dominated nationalist program.3:48/ Civil servants and industrial workers remained relatively unaffected; they did suffer loss of income, but their income was continuous. The impact of the new Governor-General's philosophy was also being felt. Pierre Pasquier believed that "government by the natives must remain the chief aim of our (French) policies." He favored placing educated Indo-chinese in the administration where their best talents could be used thereby improving association and cooperation between Vietnamese and French civil servants. As a result, Vietnamese civil servants as a rule could not be recruited by the Communists for fear of losing their jobs and regular salaries. They generally rationalized their cooperation with the French as being the proper method of furthering the move toward independence, much as the reform nationalists of the late 1920s had done.10:106/

Regardless of this civil servant association with the French, alienated segments of the population were sufficiently large to give communist leaders the belief that they held sufficient strength to force a French withdrawal. The most important overt moves made by the Communists were the May Day demonstrations of 1930 and the establishment of the soviets in Nghe An Province.3:50/ Demonstrations were organized in villages which led to marches on administrative centers. Violence continued until administrative centers were looted, tax and land records burned and landowners and notables forced to vacate their lands.

The French reacted to these uprisings energetically and, by the end of 1931, public order was restored. Thousands were killed and imprisoned; the French police, now aware that the Communists were exploiting alienated

segments of the populace, focused their activities on disrupting the Party apparatus. They succeeded in arresting many of its key members and, thus, almost destroyed the party mechanism.

The period of revolutionary nationalism ended with the destruction of the VNQDD following the Yen Bay Mutiny and the reduction of the ICP to an almost ineffective organization. By the middle of 1931, non-communist nationalist opposition was almost dead; the Communist Party, although incapable of leading an overt campaign for the independence of Indochina, was the sole organization with sufficient stamina to pick up the reins of the revolutionary cause.

Rebuilding Anti-Colonial Policy

Communist Internal Difficulties. Lack of ICP success during 1930-31 generated sharp criticism of the organization. The Comintern rejected the use of "terror and pillage" as a violation of the principles of "organized violence" advocated by Marxist doctrine. Although the principle of "organized violence" had been fundamental to the training of Vietnamese communist revolutionaries, it could hardly be expected that ardent revolutionaries engaged in a struggle against hated colonialists would refrain from violent and often brutal tactics.

ICP leadership also came under attack for its poor execution of anti-colonial activities. The ability of French authorities to capture documents substantiating international support of communist activities was attributed to the failure of ICP leadership. This led to the capture of several key communist leaders by British and French authorities -- one of whom was Ho Chi Minh who was imprisoned in Hong Kong in 1931-32. The capture of key ICP leaders occasioned a loss of principal international Party contacts with the communist international apparatus at a time when the ICP needed all of the support it could obtain to rebuild its internal mechanism.

External criticism, coupled with key leadership losses, by no means defined the full extent of ICP problems. As had been the case in its early evolution, the ICP was torn by internal strife; disagreement during the rebuilding phase broke out mainly along Stalinist-Trotskyite lines.

The Trotskyites favored the theory of "permanent revolution" based on leadership by the proletariat. In their view, the petty-bourgeois class had been completely corrupted by association with the colonial power and was therefore unreliable and too weak to carry the burden. They charged the ICP with having been formed principally of peasants, low middle class and intellectuals, many of whom had rebounded from the now-defunct VNQDD and were not capable of leading the revolution. Although the Trotskyites were relatively few in number, they were able to

exert considerable influence on the demoralized leadership in 1932 and thereafter.

Stalinist leadership within the ICP recognized, in spite of considerable "infighting," that all groups shared a desire to oust the French. As a result, a "united Front" policy emerged; the Stalinists accepted this coalition to obtain short-term strength, but they were prepared to abandon such an approach at any time that it would further the long-term cause. 2:132/

The Popular Front. Kremlin leadership now faced with the rising threat of Hitler's Germany, called for adherence to Moscow policy. Berlin's anti-Soviet policy pushed the USSR toward closer relations with France as a means of furthering an alignment to oppose Nazism. Based on pressure from Moscow, the French Communist Party combined its efforts with those of the French socialists; this popular front combination was elected to power in France during 1935. The French Communist Party, thus, was placed in a position to increase its influence on French colonial policy. Meanwhile, Stalin charged the French Communist Party with responsibility for coordinating the activities of the ICP. This detracted from the nationalist appeal of communist activities in Vietnam by shifting the principal theme from anti-colonialism to anti-capitalism. This opened the door for closer cooperation with the colonialists.

The united front concept pushed by the Seventh Communist International appears to have been acceptable in Indochina as the Stalinists, Trotskyites and other revolutionary nationalists joined in a loose coalition entitled La Lutte (The Struggle). Their principal difficulty hung on accepting the new line of cooperation with the French administration. Moscow, on the one hand, was calling for cooperation while the Vietnamese Trotskyites believed that cooperation would lead to destruction of the party through "bourgeois opportunism." In 1935, the ICP affirmed its adherence to the Moscow line when, at a Party congress in Portuguese Macao, it formally accepted the order for all Communist Parties to join forces with non-Communists to defeat Fascism. This action coincided with the rise to power of the Popular Front in France. The new French Government immediately announced a policy of reform; and the repressive and unpopular Governor-General Rene Robin, who had succeeded Pasquier, was recalled.

The reforms which were granted merely led to additional demands on the part of the nationalists which influenced the French to set up a Commission of Inquiry to recommend improvements in the colonial system. The Popular Front government in France, however, began to feel the pressure of domestic political issues. It was faced with the desires of the French business community to derive the maximum economic benefits from the colonies, primarily because of the difficulties brought on by the world depression. Also, they began to fear that if Southeast Asian colonies were granted independence, Japan might well step in and assume control. In view of

these kinds of pressures, the reform program slacked off and, in the final analysis, the Popular Front did little to alter conditions. The Vietnamese did obtain some short-range advantages, but the bulk of their demands were not met. 11:91-92/

The Popular Front government fell in 1938; this forced the Stalinist-Trotskyite front in Indochina underground. French attitudes of cooperation shifted, and several of the Vietnamese Front leaders were jailed. The party did not suffer the fate of the early 1930s as its leadership capitalized on a strong system of underground cells and sympathizers that had been developed in the interim. This disruption enabled the Communists to shift their emphasis back along nationalistic, anti-French themes. They remained the best organized and trained anti-colonial group and again manifested themselves as "champions of nationalism." Almost by default, they were able to fill the gap left by the defeated VNQDD and other fragmented nationalist organizations. The mere fact that they were the only group surviving the 1930s with any organization capable of conducting significant anti-French activities accorded them dominant nationalist status. So, with the advent of the 1940s, the Communists controlled the cause and were well prepared to await the appropriate time for renewed overt operations.

The Viet Minh

Formation of the Viet Minh and Relations with the Kuomintang. Following the Communist shift to an underground status, ICP leadership moved into southern China. In May of 1941, Ho Chi Minh called a meeting of the Party's Central Committee in a small Chinese village near the Vietnamese border where the decision was reached to form the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Independence League) -- commonly known as the Viet Minh. This organization, a united nationalist front was designed to coordinate activities directed toward Vietnamese independence. Its membership included nationalist organizations consisting of peasants, workers and soldiers and a number of non-Communist, but anti-French, organizations. The leadership, however, was provided by the ICP; Ho Chi Minh was named the Secretary-General. 4:98/

Recognizing nationalism as the best issue available to rally the Vietnamese toward a common effort, the Communists played down Marxist-Leninist doctrine and stressed a platform advocating national independence. This platform advocated: (1) Vietnamese independence by elimination of the French and Japanese; (2) unification of all forces fighting the Axis; and, (3) establishment of a democratic republic. 10:95-96/

The Communist decision to abandon the Marxist-Leninist line temporarily was influenced by the fear that a large part of the middle class might support the Japanese and thereby influence the masses to follow suit. This

was consistent with Comintern policy which, at that time, advocated temporary abandonment of the "class struggle" in favor of nationalism. It was designed to "lessen or calm the fears of the anti-Marxists in China and Indochina," thus drawing them together in a united effort to defeat the fascists.13:97/

The Viet Minh, however, faced serious problems with the Chinese Nationalists whose area they were occupying. While the Chinese enthusiastically sought Vietnamese resistance groups to provide intelligence and to conduct military operations in Indochina, they feared the communist underpinnings of the Viet Minh. Also, other anti-French and anti-Japanese groups led by remnants of the VNQDD, were looking to the Chinese for support. This brought about formulation of a second united front, the Vietnam Revolutionary League, or Dong Minh Hoi, under Chinese auspices. This "league" included the Viet Minh as well as all Vietnamese refugee groups in southern China. It was dominated by Nguyen Hai Than, a former member of the Vietnam Nationalist Party, and called for "the liberation of Vietnam and close cooperation between independent Vietnam and China." 2:147/ The organization was designed to establish and operate a clandestine intelligence system in northern Indochina and, eventually, to establish control of Vietnam.

In the meantime, Ho Chi Minh had been arrested by the Chinese for reason of his communist background and activities; while the Viet Minh were affiliated with the Chinese-sponsored league, they ran separate operations in Vietnam under the supervision of Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap.

The Vietnam Revolutionary League was not successful in its intelligence effort, and the Chinese reduced their support to it. Its member groups were divided by personal rivalries and, as a result, were unable to generate the structure and competent personnel capable of providing the services desired by the Chinese. The news of this failure reached Ho Chi Minh in jail, and he sent word to the Governor of Kwangsi Province that the Viet Minh clandestine apparatus was available to provide the network required. The offer was accepted; Ho was released from jail and appointed leader of the Revolutionary League.4:114/

The Viet Minh gained considerably from this arrangement; they received direct monetary and technical assistance and were free to recruit from among all Vietnamese nationalist groups in China. As Viet Minh intelligence intensified under the Revolutionary League "cover," their strength and prestige grew. Recognizing this growing strength, the Chinese again attempted to bring together a unified Vietnamese organization over which they could exercise control. In March of 1944, a convention was held to establish a "Provisional Republican Government of Vietnam" in which the Viet Minh would hold a distinct minority. But, it was only this Viet

Minh minority that volunteered to return to and serve in occupied Indochina; the non-Communists chose to remain in China until victory was won and Allies returned. As the strength of the Viet Minh continued to increase, relations with the Chinese became strained and limited assistance was provided to them through US contacts in Kuming.

The Viet Minh operated in the northern areas of Indochina where a series of clandestine escape and evasion nets were established. They were careful not to deploy forces against Japanese or French strength but, rather, concentrated their efforts on the extension of political influence throughout the countryside. By 1945, Giap reportedly held a force of some ten thousand men in readiness for the Japanese capitulation. Giap's success stemmed from awareness of the value of support from minority groups. He recruited members of the Tho and other northern minorities which later proved very beneficial. In the meantime, the non-communist nationalist groups remained in China awaiting return to Tonkin under the protection of the Chinese. Thus, they were unable to capitalize on "anti-Japanese" activities as a means of achieving the popular base requisite to furthering their cause.

As the outcome of the Japanese war became obvious, more Vietnamese began to adhere to the Viet Minh cause. In December 1944, the "Vietnam Liberation Army" was formed to fight both the French and the Japanese and to prepare military and political bases for future use.

It was in this context that the Viet Minh, throwing off the overt signs of communism, guided nationalist activities during World War II. The record indicates that they made no substantive contribution to the Allied effort. Nevertheless, being the only activist group capable of organizing the people and obtaining the resources, they were ideally positioned to capitalize on the propaganda value of "leading the fight for freedom" against the Japanese.

Relations with the French. The French community in Indochina was divided. One section supported the Vichy French administration which the Japanese had allowed to remain in power. The remainder were either quiescent or supported the Free French. Viet Minh propaganda was designed, among other things, to gain French support for united effort against the Japanese. They were careful to keep abreast of European happenings and to associate their activities with the Free French in exile. Their propaganda attempted to present Viet Minh efforts as the "legitimate Indochinese representatives of the Allied fighting forces." 4:148/

The De Gaulle government, however, announced its Indochina policy in December of 1943; it was not to the liking of the Stalinist group within the Viet Minh. De Gaulle's statement declared support for

realignment of the economic system and political reforms and envisaged Indochina as an autonomous state within a French association of states and colonies. The Stalinists cited their willingness to combine with the anti-fascist French in Indochina in a campaign against both the French administration and the Japanese; however, this "combining" would be on the conditions that the effort would be jointly planned and that Indochina would be promised independence. They contended that the Gaullists had not lived up to their word; they called themselves "liberators" and then refused to recognize the independence of former colonies. In short, the Vietnamese Stalinists felt strongly that destruction of the Axis would indicate the end of colonial rule throughout the world.2:148/

The general Viet Minh position, on the other hand, did not adopt such a tough line against the Free French government. A united effort against the Fascists in Indochina was the central appeal. In spite of this, no significant cooperation between the Viet Minh and the anti-fascist French is indicated. Very few sections of the French community recognized the long-range impact of the war. Some established contact with US intelligence agencies in southern China and provided information to Allied forces, but it was not coordinated with either the efforts of the Viet Minh or the unsuccessful Revolutionary League. Thus, Vietnamese relations with the French remained basically unchanged during the war. While the Stalinist group of the Viet Minh had offered to cooperate with French resistance efforts in exchange for assurances of independence, the assurances were not provided; likewise, cooperation did not materialize.

Declaration of Independence

Japanese Assumption of Power. As the Pacific war progressed in favor of the Allies, an invasion of Indochina became a distinct possibility. Japanese occupation forces recognized this and learned through their intelligence system that, in such an eventuality, both the Vichy forces and the French community planned to assist the Allies. French intentions were sufficiently obvious to convince the Japanese that they should assume control of Indochina. They moved an army division from south China to positions in the vicinity of local French forces. Despite agent reports of the impending attack, the French, with the exception of certain forces in Tonkin, were taken by surprise when the Japanese moved on 9 March 1945. Within 24 hours, all effective French resistance was reduced except for a force at Lang Son and other small forces scattered throughout the country.

The Vietnamese appeared equally surprised. Emperor Bao Dai, who had been completely unaware of the planned action, was informed by the Japanese that the overthrow was intended to restore Vietnamese independence provided Vietnam would cooperate in the "Greater East Asia

Co-Prosperity Sphere." Bao Dai and his ministers agreed and abrogated the French-Vietnamese treaty of 1884 which, theoretically at least, made Vietnam an independent state. In spite of constraints imposed by the presence of Japanese troops, Bao Dai attempted to form a government with some semblance of popular support. His efforts to obtain authority were not completely successful, although he gradually gained nominal control over Tonkin, Hanoi, Haiphong, Da Nang and Cochinchina. The Viet Minh immediately branded Bao Dai as a Japanese puppet and called on the people to organize demonstrations, strikes and boycotts to discourage Japanese presence. In addition, the Vietnamese Trotskyites, whose organization had been badly disrupted by the French in 1939-40, began to reorganize. The International Communist League (ICL) was reconstituted and began to rally the Saigon urban masses for a coming uprising. The ICL called for opposition to imperialism through a united effort to establish a proletarian and peasant-dominated government.

At this same time, the non-communist nationalist leadership (organized as the Revolutionary League) was still in China making "long distance" preparations to assume the principal political role in Vietnam. Realistically, the time to move was long past; while the Revolutionary League planned in China, the Viet Minh, and to a lesser extent the Trotskyites, operated in Vietnam. This constitutes another example of the lack of organization and initiative which has characterized non-communist nationalist initiatives through time in Vietnam.

News of the forthcoming Japanese surrender reached Southeast Asia, and the Viet Minh were prepared to act with dispatch. On 13 August 1945, their military units moved into action, demanding that the Japanese surrender their weapons and relinquish their power. They convened a "National Congress" and formed a "People's Liberation Committee" which formulated a program designed to accomplish three primary objectives:

- (1) To disarm the Japanese before arrival of Allied forces.
- (2) To assume power within the country.
- (3) To be in the position of power when the Allies arrived.

By accomplishing these aims, the Viet Minh would be positioned as to facilitate Allied recognition of them as the legitimate government. Their efforts to rally support for their cause were highly successful in Annam and Tonkin. In fact, their success far exceeded their expectations. Japanese forces acceded to these demands, turned over their weapons and watched as the Viet Minh took over Hanoi.

On 21 August, Bao Dai was asked to abdicate the throne in favor of the Viet Minh; he promptly complied. This marked a great success for Ho Chi Minh; it "signified to the tradition-minded Vietnamese people that a great historical shift of power had taken place and that the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam now had the mandate of heaven." :153/ Bao Dai was accorded an advisory role in the new republic as a device to further the "legitimacy" of the new regime insofar as the tradition-minded Vietnamese were concerned.

Formation of the DRV. The political situation, during this period of the Japanese surrender, was chaotic at best. The Viet Minh had formed the People's Liberation Committee during a secret meeting held at Tau Trao on 16 August; the focus was fixed on developing a political organization under the pretext of a free and democratic system. They were careful to expound their effort as united and representative of the major political groups of the country. Hanoi was occupied, Bao Dai's abdication was accepted and the way seemed open to their acceptance as the legitimate government of Vietnam. On 2 September 1946, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was formally established.

In Cochinchina the political situation was confused; the available leadership was fragmented to such an extent that it was in no way prepared for independent rule. As a colony, Cochinchina had been far more subject to the disrupting effects of the French colonial system; as a consequence, a multiplicity of political and religious groups developed, each with individual designs on the colony's political future. The Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Trotskyites, Communists and other nationalist coteries were all dedicated to independence, but each in "their own way and in their own image." Not to be forgotten were the French who had remained throughout the war and anticipated a return to the French colonial system.

Soon after the fall of the Japanese and before Allied occupation troops arrived, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai formed their own states in the Mekong Delta and "peoples committees" began appearing in Saigon. Violence was prevalent in rural areas where village officials and wealthy landowners were assassinated. At the same time, the rather weak Viet Minh organization worked in the background and was able to gain strength from the "Advance Guard Youth" which had supported them during the Japanese occupation. To counter this growing strength a "United National Front" was formed by the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, intellectuals, middle class nationalists and Trotskyites with the objective of assuming control of Saigon. This front was dominated by the Trotskyites who, having a small following, were better organized and capable of exerting influence to a far greater degree than their numbers would indicate.

The Viet Minh moved quickly to set up the "Committee of the South" in an effort to subvert United Front influence. Their platform was based

on the assumption that, if law and order prevailed when the Allied occupation forces arrived, the United Nations would appreciate the ability of the Vietnamese to govern themselves and would recognize their independence. The rumor that British occupation forces were planning to sponsor the return of French rule aggravated the "climate." The Trotskyites publicly denounced the Committee of the South, thus prompting quick and efficient counteraction. This resulted in the eventual annihilation of Trotskyite leadership in the South.

Thus, the factionized nationalist movement came again under Viet Minh domination; the appeal now was for a moderate line instead of "class struggle" based apparently on the belief that such could gain the support of the existing social system. The Viet Minh oriented their program toward obtaining broad support. There was no mention of their communist affiliation. And, while there were obvious internal differences within the nationalist movement, the Viet Minh continued to work through the Committee of the South, as a means of presenting a unified effort for dealing with forthcoming British forces.

As events turned out, however, Viet Minh efforts were of little value. When General Gracey (Commanding General of the British forces) arrived, he refused to recognize the Viet Minh and immediately initiated actions to re-establish French control. On 23 September 1945, French troops marched on the public buildings and assumed control of Saigon. The Vietnamese responded violently, and Saigon remained a city in chaos for several days before the British (with the support of French and Japanese troops) were able to restore order. Finally, the end of September was marked by the introduction of French reinforcements; with them, came reimposition of French authority. French control of Cochinchina was consolidated by December; British forces were withdrawn and Japanese disarmed by the end of January, 1946.

The British were charged with reoccupation south of the 16th parallel, and the Chinese held occupation responsibilities north of this line. In this area, the greatest challenge to Viet Minh strength stemmed from Vietnamese nationalists who accompanied the Chinese. This opposition -- constituted from among the Vietnam Revolutionary League, the VNQDD and the Dai Viet -- had Kuomintang support; since Ho Chi Minh did not want to face a showdown with the Chinese, he turned to compromise. He convened a conference of the Indochinese Communist Party which (in order to show faith that the DRV was a nationalist government) announced its own dissolution. Subsequent events were to prove that this was dissolution in name only.

Pressure continued and the DRV was forced to agree to schedule promised national elections. Faced with possible disaster, the nationalist parties (with Chinese backing) negotiated 70 of the 350 seats

in the National Assembly. But, regardless of this 70-seat total, they were completely outclassed, and the Viet Minh were enabled to claim power on the basis of an overwhelming victory at the polls. This election, in the face of nationalist opposition, gave the Viet Minh the evidence they believed necessary to substantiate their proclamation that an open plebiscite had been held.

While the DRV was realizing this success, its leadership fully recognized that without foreign assistance, the country could not survive. It was also apparent that China was in no position to assist in this venture, and the US Department of State was reacting in a manner which cast doubt as to the prospects of US assistance. One alternative remained -- the French. Ho Chi Minh had been engaged in secret meetings with the French since September 1945; after months of discussion, he agreed that the Republic of Vietnam would be recognized (as a state belonging to the Indochinese Federation and the French Union) and that French troops would be allowed to reoccupy North Vietnam. This accord was signed on 6 March 1946. The French-Chinese "Chunking Agreement" had exchanged French extraterritorial rights for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Vietnam.

This agreement stirred considerable unrest among the population; as a result, Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh felt construed personally to express their rationale before the people of Hanoi. They explained the agreement in terms of short-term loss (French re-entry) to gain the time required to develop sufficient strength for the achievement of complete independence. This rationale was accepted by communist-trained members of the Viet Minh but was hardly acceptable to the non-Communists, both in and outside of the organization. Several factors, however, moved in favor of the Viet Minh. Withdrawal of the Chinese meant the loss of the primary source of support for the non-communist nationalists; arrival of the French forces enabled the Viet Minh to establish control over the northern area previously under control of committees established by the Revolutionary League and the VNQDD.

Ho Chi Minh had gambled on his chances for negotiation and compromise with the French. He knew he needed time for political consolidation and economic recovery; he saw no better alternative. He also needed time to assess the postwar progress of Mao Tse-tung. In any event, he was confident that, if later negotiations did not produce the kind of independence desired, he would be able to obtain that independence even if it meant war with France. He was aware of French political, economic and military weaknesses resulting from World War II and understood international attitudes toward colonies and the principle of self-determination. He was confident that French domestic problems and international constraints would prevent re-establishment of formal rule by means of force. A war, couched in "colonial" terms, would consolidate

the Viet Minh as the true nationalist leadership of Vietnam and would accrue dividends in terms of winning support for their cause.

Ho Chi Minh also recognized that he had lost ardent nationalist support because of the 6 March agreements. To assist in winning them back he formed a "popular national front" (Lien Viet) based on a platform of "independence and democracy." Its membership consisted of representatives of all classes, religions, ethnic groups and political parties including the VNQDD and the Revolutionary League. This provided the apparatus through which communist elements of the Viet Minh subjected the population to surveillance and nominal ideological indoctrination. Ministerial portfolios were also redistributed to include certain "cooperative" officials of the VNQDD and the Revolutionary League. Prime responsibilities, however, continued to rest with Huynh Thuc Khang and Vo Nguyen Giap, both long-time members of the Communist Party. The DRV also authorized formation of the Socialist Party with a charter equivalent to those advanced by European socialist parties. The important point here stems from the fact that the party was welcomed as a legal party to further the notion of "democratic" government; actually, it was admonished to maintain its purposes within strict limits imposed by the DRV. The Socialists have consistently supported DRV leadership; its existence has provided the Viet Minh with added substance for perpetuation of the "coalition" facade of the DRV.

Cochinchinese Separatist Movement. While efforts in Hanoi centered on the consolidation of Viet Minh power under the guise of a popular coalition, the French sought to continue their long-established tactic of "divide and conquer." The 6 March agreement specified that a referendum would be held in Cochinchina to determine whether it would become a part of the DRV. In an attempt to circumvent this referendum, the French sponsored a Cochinchina Government under the leadership of Dr. Nguyen Van Thinh and Colonel Nguyen Van Xuan, both French citizens (the latter a member of the French Army). The nature of this ruling body is suggested by the fact that seven of the nine cabinet members were French citizens. The French recognized this administration as the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochinchina" and, from the beginning, completely dominated it. The President was elected by the Advisory Council of Cochinchina (which itself was appointed by the French High Commissioner); the government was responsible to the Advisory Council. Actually, it was a French mechanism configured to exercise the equivalent of indirect rule and to undermine Ho Chi Minh's position in the ongoing negotiations (one of Ho's principal positions was unification of all of Vietnam under the DRV).

Breakdown of Negotiations. Details of the negotiations conducted between the French and the DRV at Dalat (April - May 1946) and Fontainebleau (July - September 1946) are not germane to the purposes of this

study. Attempts by Ho Chi Minh to obtain the concessions proved fruitless; his dependence on the French Communist and Socialist Parties for assistance proved to be a mistake. Both fell in line behind the French Government and left the Viet Minh with no alternative other than to press their claim by armed conflict. After the Fontainebleau Conference had adjourned with few agreements reached, tension between the Viet Minh and the French was exacerbated. In November of 1946, the DRV's National Assembly adopted a new constitution which failed to mention any form of associated statehood with France and included Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina as one political entity under the Hanoi regime. Thus, the two major issues that could not be resolved at the conference table were declared unilaterally.

The Summer of 1946 was used by Hanoi leadership to purge the ardent non-communist nationalists who served to undermine the communist effort. When Ho Chi Minh departed for the Fontainebleau Conference, he left Vo Nguyen Giap in charge and Giap set about to consolidate communist control of the country. Although the Lien Viet had been founded as a broad coalition within the DRV, many nationalists still believed the 6 March agreement constituted a great loss; they set the remnants of their forces in motion to achieve an objective that was both anti-French and anti-communist. When French forces arrived in Tonkin, they found that they were opposed by the forces of the Revolutionary League and the VNQDD. This set the stage for a temporary alliance between the French and the Viet Minh who, by then, were beginning their campaign to exterminate the nationalists. With French assistance, Giap conducted an intensive campaign which destroyed the forces of the Revolutionary League and the VNQDD despite the fact that both parties remained nominally represented in the Viet Minh government. This campaign marked the elimination of major opposition to Viet Minh control in the north. Giap also used this period to improve his land combat force primarily through arms purchases from Chinese Nationalists. By the time Ho Chi Minh returned from the negotiations in France, Giap had consolidated Viet Minh political control. Withdrawal of the Chinese forces who had supported their rivals, coupled with their temporary alliance with the French, had provided both the long-awaited opportunity and the essential support.

The War of Resistance

The Outbreak of Hostilities. By the time the Viet Minh had destroyed opposing nationalist organizations, there were approximately 60,000 Viet Minh troops and an additional 40,000 irregulars under arms. Upon Ho Chi Minh's return from France and the National Assembly's expression of dependence through adoption of the new Constitution, Viet Minh forces were prepared to fight. The course of events which followed was such

that war could not have been prevented unless one side or the other had reversed its position on the basic issues.

In November and December of 1946, conditions progressively worsened and, on 19 December, the Viet Minh staged a general attack on French garrisons throughout Vietnam. The Viet Minh evacuated Hanoi and all major cities; base operational headquarters were established in the rural areas, and the Communists set out to develop and expand their hold on the rural peasantry.

Declaration of war against the French solved many of Ho Chi Minh's political problems. His principal source of opposition had come from vociferously anti-French nationalists who based their criticism primarily on his dealings with the French rather than his communist background. It must be remembered that, since the founding of the Viet Minh in 1941, he had been careful to play down communist ties in favor of nationalist, anti-Japanese and anti-French themes. Nevertheless, he had dealt with the French through most of 1946 and was criticized as a collaborator who had "sold out" to the colonial power. Now, his critics held few alternatives. They could join the resistance, join the French or adopt an attentisme ("wait and see") attitude. Each of these courses of action held distinct disadvantages, but the fact remains that "French reliance on a military solution and the failure to provide a political solution acceptable to Vietnamese nationalism left the Viet Minh as the undisputed champion of national independence."2:162/

The Nationalist-Communist Dilemma. The Viet Minh continued its use of nationalist, anti-colonial themes as primary unifying forces for international as well as domestic purposes. On the international scene, Ho Chi Minh was careful not to antagonize Nationalist China or Thailand and pressed his explanation of the war in terms of a nationalist struggle against resurging French imperialism. As bipolarity developed in the sphere of international politics, Ho's government refused to express an alignment. Until 1949, he denied that the DRV was affiliated with the Communist Bloc despite his history of past relations with the USSR and the communist effort in China. Tactical flexibility of the Viet Minh was, and is, deeply ingrained. They were conducting a successful campaign against the French under an umbrella of popular support garnered by many non-Communists in Vietnam as well as non-Communists and anti-colonialists world-wide. The communist victory in China and French efforts to establish a rival nationalist government, however, influenced the Viet Minh to alter this policy abruptly. Chinese Communist victory provided a contiguous border which facilitated direct military and psychological support. US backing of the French-established government was answered by DRV announcement of its alignment with the Communist World. By February of 1950, its status had been recognized by communist nations. This indicates the transition point of the conflict, as

perceived by Western powers, from a "colonial" war to an "anti-communist" war.

On the domestic scene, the situation was somewhat similar. The Vietnamese people were faced with the alternatives of supporting the nationalist, but communist-dominated, war of resistance or supporting the French who represented the colonial regime that was inherently detested. The Viet Minh presented a platform which was revolutionary in character. It called for universal suffrage; civil liberties; a campaign against illiteracy, opium, gambling and drinking alcoholic beverages; abolition of forced labor; and, tax reforms -- all of which were primary public grievances. To assuage the politically aware, the platform stressed national independence. These themes appealed to all classes as well as to religious and ethnic groups. The Viet Minh were cognizant of their utility in marshaling a unified effort against the French.

By 1949, the French appear to have recognized that military solutions alone were insufficient to successfully conclude the war. They reasoned that, since the Viet Minh movement included many non-communist nationalists, it would collapse if the non-Communists were drawn to the side of the French. Furthermore, nothing less than the promise of independence would be sufficiently appealing to foster this shift in loyalty. The French were able to convince the then-exiled Bao Dai to return to his country as a rallier with the promise of independence (within the restricted terms of the Elysee Agreement). This tactic had fateful shortcomings. The terms of the Elysee Agreement granted Vietnamese independence as an Associated State within the French Union, but France was to maintain responsibility for Vietnamese defense and foreign relations. Such restrictive conditions could only fail to attract uncommitted non-communist nationalists, much less draw revolutionaries from the ranks of the Viet Minh. Many nationalists, by this time, were confident of Viet Minh success and believed that, after victory, they would be able to wrest control of the DRV from the Communists. Moreover, Bao Dai (as a member of the Nguyen Dynasty which the French mistakenly believed to be a rallying symbol) had seriously compromised his credentials in the eyes of both communist and non-communist nationalists. He had served as Emperor under the French and, although attempting to implement reforms, soon reverted to the traditional puppet role under tight colonial domination. In March of 1945 when the Japanese assumed control, he continued to pursue the pattern of puppet ruler. When petitioned by the Viet Minh to abdicate in favor of the DRV, he complied and accepted the position of political advisor to the DRV. Finally, he had left the country in an apparent surrender of political ambition. Now, he was returning to rule under the auspices of the French. These political facts suggest that the French actually had slim chance of success in their endeavor and events proved this correct. The Bao Dai government was unable to rally the non-Communists from Viet Minh ranks, and the

war continued until the French political position, both in Indochina and in France, deteriorated to a point that the Battle of Dien Bien Phu became the manifestation of failure that hastened the settlement at Geneva. With this settlement, a violently anti-communist and anti-French regime directed by Ngo Dinh Diem emerged. His leadership was unsullied by cooperation with the French and unbending in its opposition to the Communists.

Termination of the War

The Anti-Communist Republic of Vietnam. Two events occurred in July of 1954 which marked the beginning of independence for Vietnam. On 7 July, Ngo Dinh Diem was installed as the Prime Minister of the Bao Dai government, a position he was willing to accept only with assurance that France would accord Vietnam a dominion status similar to that of Great Britain's former colonies, India and Pakistan. Actually, France had even promised to recognize Vietnam's withdrawal from the French Union if desired. In addition to French assurances, Bao Dai had promised Diem full civil and military powers. The second principal event was the signing of the Geneva Agreements which ended the Indochina war and seventy years of French domination of Vietnam. The DRV was recognized by the signatories as the government of the territory north of the 17th parallel. This agreement also signified French recognition of the failure of the "Bao Dai experiment" -- the effort to rally nationalist support from the Viet Minh by installing a former Emperor as the Chief of State. Formation of the Diem government signified another major turning point in Vietnamese politics. Prior to this point in time, the only native governments recognized were those whose leaders were willing to accede to French authority or, as in the case of the DRV, to engage in open warfare.

There are few who question that Ngo Dinh Diem encountered a monumental task in attempting to mold the various Vietnamese groups into a viable political entity. During the war, the nationalists yearned for independence, but the course of politics and conflict imposed severe restrictions on their efforts to unite. If they supported the Viet Minh, they faced the prospects of eroded individualism under communism. If they supported the French in hope that independence would be granted at the end of the war, they were perpetuating the very colonial power which they wished to expel. Many, therefore, remained uncommitted -- apparently waiting until the winner could be determined. This situation persists in 1966.

Vietnamese desires for independence and their anti-French sentiments stand out sharply over the course of the French colonial period; however,

the question as to whether or not a true national feeling ever has surfaced remains valid. Even Ho Chi Minh's charismatic leadership and his demands for unconditional independence, proved insufficient to the task involved in unifying the Vietnamese nationalists. His communist philosophy and the belief that a guerrilla army offered slim promise of success when arrayed against a modern Western military force undoubtedly constituted divisive influences. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of nationalist activities indicates that a strong sense of unity was lacking. Diem was forced to contend with this lack of national unity when he formed his government.

Diem appears to have been a candidate qualified to weld the divergent groups of South Vietnam into a governmental system. He had gained considerable experience ~~as a district chief~~, as a province chief and as Minister of the Interior in the French colonial administration, although he severed relations with this administration in 1933 when recommended reforms were not instituted. His abrupt resignation and subsequent non-affiliation solidified his position as an ardent anti-colonialist. He refused to become a part of the Japanese administration during World War II, thus avoiding the stigma of association with Axis collaborators. In 1945, the Viet Minh arrested him and followed this up with the offer of a high-level post (Minister of the Interior) which he refused. This refusal established him as an anti-Communist. He again refused association with the French when he spurned Bao Dai's offer of the premiership in the French-dominated government in 1949. Regardless of these qualifications, he mirrored certain divisive characteristics which cannot be discounted. His Central Vietnam origin, mandarin background and Western religion under-cut his popular acceptance in South Vietnam.

He was born in Central Vietnam and received his advanced education in Hanoi. The differences in customs, traditions and dialect between people of central and southern Vietnam are important enough to cause an inherent scepticism between the people of the two regions. Secondly, Diem's father was a well-educated mandarin who believed in independence, achieved by surrounding himself with a personally loyal Vietnamese elite and discounted the need of mass support for a government. Third was the question of religion -- Diem was a deeply religious Roman Catholic. While the Catholic minority comprises the core of South Vietnam's militant anti-Communists, non-Catholic Vietnamese association of Catholicism with French colonialism confirms church membership as a divisive factor in Vietnamese politics. In spite of these drawbacks Diem appears to have possessed the best credentials available to develop a non-communist government.

Regardless of Bao Dai's grant of full power, problems still faced the new Premier. The Army was controlled by the pro-French General Nguyen Van Hinh, the National Police by the Binh Xuyen bandit group and much of rural South Vietnam was under control of either the politico-religious sects or the Viet Minh. Diem moved quickly to forestall any

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anti-government activity on the part of the sects by naming four members of each to his Cabinet. This gave him time to consolidate his control over the Army. By November 1954, he had achieved this control by replacing Hinh with a loyal appointee and, with US diplomatic assistance, persuading the sects and the Binh Xuyen to provide a temporary display of support. However, by March of 1955, the principal leaders of dissident groups formed a united front and demanded that Diem reorganize the government. He refused, but by this time held sufficient power to overcome them by force, if necessary. Through a series of political and military moves, he destroyed the Binh Xuyen and effectively eliminated Hoa Hao and Cao Dai opposition to the central government.

His next step hinged on overthrow of Emperor Bao Dai, the Chief of State still living abroad. This task was not difficult, since Bao Dai's power rested with the Binh Xuyen and the religious sects whose power had been curtailed. Diem planned a national referendum. On 23 October 1955, he received the electorate's overwhelming support. This signified completion of Diem's consolidation of power. He still was faced with the refugee resettlement program and with loosening the Chinese grip on the economy, but neither of these challenged his power position to any great extent. To the contrary, the predominantly Catholic refugees represented a group of militant anti-Communists who became a definite source of support for the government.

Diem was a vociferously anti-communist nationalist who sponsored "personalism" as an official political philosophy. This philosophy embodied the reshaping of institutions and traditions to build a democratic, nationalist society within which each human being would have certain rights and associated duties. It stressed the importance of the individual and the value of his contribution to society. Likewise, the nation of Vietnam was to make an original contribution to the world but only after colonialism, feudalism, communism and corruption were eliminated from the social-political structure. Strongly nationalistic, Diem saw no need for the features of an open society in implementing his philosophy, although he professed a regard for economic security, justice and the opportunity for the individual to develop his place in society.14:23-24/

To Diem and his close associates, "personalism" was an alternative to communism which emphasized human dignity in modern society as contrasted to communism's submergence of individuality in the masses. Diem attempted to employ his concept to garner public loyalty; however, it was at best a vague, poorly articulated concept. While it may have been understood by an elite who could adopt its generalizations to preconceived ideological notions and spiritual beliefs, it was deficient in terms of providing the people with a new national "formula." The

communications links between the government and the people were not sufficient to develop understanding and acceptance.15:20-64/

In his early years of rule, Diem was able to enlist support of the intellectuals and the non-communist politically aware; but, as the reality of independence began to surface, these groupings found themselves insufficiently included in governmental affairs. The government became very sensitive to opposition and, consistent with Diem's mandarin philosophy, instituted measures which tightened controls and led to further disaffection on the part of the intellectuals. Systematic curtailment of freedom of the press, coupled with swift, often brutal, action against those critical of the government, increased disaffection. Many fled the country; many were silently imprisoned; and many others resorted to the incipient "wait and see" attitude.

In addition to alienating the politically aware whose vested interests did not attach them closely to the bureaucracy, the government was unable to root itself firmly throughout the countryside. Diem's national programs either were poorly planned or were too poorly carried out to arouse positive purpose among the rural population. It is hardly possible to develop a sturdy society without a broad political base that is cemented by an active mass allegiance and individual political involvement.

Diem's theme of national unity shifted heavily toward anti-communism as insurgency began to break out in 1957 and 1958. At this same time, the insurgents highlighted nationalism by capitalizing on Ho Chi Minh's image and by stressing reunification, social and political reform as well as overthrow of the US-backed Diem government. Although Diem was anything but a puppet in the view of the United States, his activities were open to such criticism from a Vietnamese standpoint. His association with the US, when linked with the massive military and economic aid programs being pumped into the country, tended to validate the accusation. The truth is not relevant; if outward appearances suggested that Diem was highly tolerant of US interference, little difficulty would be experienced by the insurgents in convincing the politically inarticulate that it was true. Thus, the communist-backed insurgents, initially careful not to associate their cause with communism, were, and have been, able to capitalize on nationalism as the prime theme for rallying public support. They stressed that the GVN was little better than the Vietnamese civil service that worked for the colonial administration prior to the 1954 settlement. This appealed to many and contributed to the deteriorating security situation with its concomitant erosion of the political and economic situations. In the face of such developments, the US presence necessarily burgeoned and further subjected the Diem regime to propaganda couched in nationalistic terms. As long as the insurgents avoided associating their cause with communism and stressed continuation

of the anti-colonial war, they could capitalize on the nationalistic sentiment of those who are not aware of the consequences of government under Ho Chi Minh.

It is not to be inferred that nationalism, as discussed in this study, is the only motivational tool used by the Viet Cong to gain support. However, the fact remains that the Communists again were able to capture the nationalist movement as they did in the 1930s. Even though Ngo Dinh Diem was an ardent, almost fanatic, nationalist, he was unable to gain the willing support of his people even with the assistance of massive US economic aid. Such aid, in a materialistic sense at least, had much more to offer than the vague promises, couched in nationalistic terms, peddled by insurgent agit-prop teams.

One of the first public indications of the lack of support for Diem came in November of 1960 when the ARVN airborne brigade staged an abortive coup d'etat. While it was planned and executed by a small number of military and civilian conspirators, it was a positive indication that there was increasing public disillusionment. Indications are that considerably more of the Army opposed the coup than favored it; however, civilians in the lower-level civil service, students and small businessmen appeared to support it.

Nationalism is but one of a number of polarizing influences available for use by a government, a leader or even a demagogue to control public reaction. While Diem publicly supported the concept, he was unable to develop and use it to the advantage of his nation. His negative "anti-communism" concept proved ineffective when the insurgents were able to dodge affiliation with communism to associate with a nationalistic hero (Ho Chi Minh) on a platform for reunification coupled with social and political reform.

Ngo Dinh Diem never was able to regain the thrust of a nationalist cause; this fact contributed to the increasingly serious security condition of the country.

The Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Recognition of DRV control over the northern half of Indochina provided the springboard for Ho Chi Minh's total communization of the north. Popular acceptance of this program could be attributed, at least partially, to the Communist Party's ability to dominate the Vietnamese nationalist movement throughout the preceding two decades. The Party had demonstrated that it was the "most cohesive, best disciplined, and most experienced" political organization. It bent every effort to ensure that the Vietnamese were fed communist goals and international affiliations couched in nationalistic

terms. The DRV has continued this practice by subordinating, at least publicly, doctrinaire communism to "the struggle for reunification" and more recently, "the destruction of US imperialism." Military victory over the French also boosted communist stock; it provided concrete evidence that, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Vietnamese could defeat modern European military forces with indigenous manpower. That success established confidence at the grass roots level that a national heritage had been regained; it served as a galvanizing agent for the North Vietnamese society.

Review of recent Western literature on North Vietnam indicates some popular resistance to communization of the social, economic and political systems as well as the countersubversion control apparatus of the government. These have a bearing on Vietnamese nationalism, since they help shape the attitudes of the people toward their government, thus influencing national values; however, their analysis lies beyond the scope of this annex. The important question is: Has the DRV depended on nationalism to influence or control its people? The answer is clearly affirmative.

Nationalism and Ho Chi Minh are closely associated. While there are those who question whether his communist values or his national values take precedence, there are few who deny that he has both. His leadership in the fight against the French substantiates his nationalist sentiments; even to many ardent non-Communists in South Vietnam this fact is clean-cut. Therefore, Ho Chi Minh's mere presence as Chief of State serves to summon nationalist sentiment in order to obtain consensus and adherence to governmental law and order.

Additionally, the Constitution of 1960 is worded in distinctly nationalistic terms. The lengthy preamble assumes the appearance of an essay on the history of Vietnam's struggle for independence. It refers throughout to the notion of "one Vietnamese nation" and the objective of reunification. By the same token, it leaves little doubt as to the imposition of socialism. The communist ties of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV actually have gone publicly unbroken since 1950 when China and USSR recognized his regime. The physical and psychological support provided by the communist countries clearly underscore this point. Although the DRV has unequivocally supported the Viet Cong in the South, initially it did not publicly announce that support; DRV sympathies were carefully couched in nationalistic, rather than socialistic or communistic terms. The peasantry of North and South Vietnam know little about the implications of communism, but the appeal of nationalism and anti-imperialism were (and are) far more easily understood and have excited a more positive response than Communist Party economic, social and political doctrine.

So, in the final analysis, the DRV has continued to employ nationalism as a primary control mechanism while undergoing communization. Additionally, efforts have been made to see that the Viet Cong use it as a primary theme to obtain and maintain support for the "Liberation Front."

Conclusions

Principal Influences on Vietnamese Nationalism. The principal external influences on Vietnamese nationalism during the first two decades of this century were the Japanese defeat of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, the revolution led by Sun Yat-sen in southern China and Vietnamese participation in World War I on the side of the French. The Japanese success marked the first instance of an Oriental nation defeating a Western nation through the use of science and technology. This strengthened Vietnamese national consciousness and encouraged the Vietnamese elite to consider Western science and technology; in the past, they had depended on traditional Chinese teachings as their education basis. The revolution conducted by Sun Yat-sen pointed the way for Vietnamese revolutionaries to organize for active resistance against the French. World War I influenced nationalism by subjecting some 100,000 Vietnamese to the realities of Western technology and living; it exposed some of them to their first taste of socialist philosophy.

Absence of a Unified Effort. The Vietnamese nationalist movement has been characterized by the absence of a unified effort. From the early Monarchist Revolts through the establishment of the two governments following the Geneva Conference of 1954, Vietnamese nationalists have been unable to subordinate individual, regional, religious or ideological differences to achieve a unified effort for overall benefit of the Vietnamese nation. Prior to World War II, the French successfully capitalized on this characteristic to reduce nationalist resistance. In other cases, French efforts were unnecessary: a lack of unity disrupted organizational activities as well as cooperation among organizations.

Communist Control of Nationalist Movement. The Communist Party captured leadership of the nationalist cause following the unsuccessful revolutionary activities of 1930 and 1931. The Communists maintained that leadership and, under the direction of Ho Chi Minh, waged a "war of resistance" against the French, initially behind the mask of a nationalist front organization, the Viet Minh. The Communists have been able to capitalize on the accomplishments they directed (anti-Japanese activities and war against the French) in order to rally Vietnamese sentiment to their cause.

Shifting Communist Policy. Communist policy in Vietnam has displayed a remarkable degree of tactical flexibility in that it has maintained its sensitivity to shifting domestic and international conditions. Following the Yen Bay Mutiny, the Party received many new members and took up active anti-French activities. This policy was altered to reflect the Soviet policy of cooperation (both with the Trotskyites and the French colonial administration). This changed back to active, although clandestine, resistance after the fall of the Popular Front in 1938. The Communists, contrary to USSR instruction, joined forces with "national bourgeoisie" to further their drive for independence. They were willing to go into this alliance when the Viet Minh Front was established. Further, after World War II, Ho Chi Minh was willing to maintain silence about his connections with the Communist Bloc as long as it was to his advantage. He did not hesitate to announce his allegiance, however, when the usefulness of nonalignment had waned. The evidence shows that flexibility was demonstrated by changing alignments when the accrual of clear-cut advantages was apparent. Important in this shifting policy is the fact that they maintained their allegiance and communication links with the International Communist Party.

French Failure to Rally Nationalists. The French conclusion that the war could not be won until the non-communist nationalists were weaned away from the Viet Minh may well have been sound. But, their plan for attempting this rally of support around the compromised Emperor Bao Dai was unsound. Events proved that he was unable to draw the loyalty of those with a "wait and see" attitude, much less those who were aligned with the Viet Minh.

Use of Nationalism as a Control Mechanism. Both the GVN under Ngo Dinh Diem and the DRV under Ho Chi Minh have attempted to employ nationalism essentially as a popular control mechanism. Diem's adaption of nationalism, as expressed in the philosophy of "personalism" was neither widely understood nor accepted. In the North, the DRV has depended on it and with success. It has been one of the primary and continuing mainstays of the Viet Cong in rallying support for their cause.


APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: A SURVEY

Chinese Domination of Nam Viet

Chinese Occupation. Vietnamese history prior to Chinese domination is based principally on legends passed from generation to generation through folk tales, songs and plays. These legends point to Vietnamese descent from the intermarriage of local Tonkin tribes with an otherwise unspecified mongoloid people who migrated to Indochina, through the Yangtze Valley and the southern provinces of China, in prehistoric times.


In 208 BC, Tonkin and northern Annam united with China's Kwang-tong and Kwang-si to form the independent kingdom of Nam Viet. (See: Figure A-1-1) The kingdom was recognized as autonomous but remained under Chinese suzerainty, a relationship which existed until early years of the 2d century BC. 16:183-184/



A-1-1

About 111 BC, the creator of Chinese imperialism (Emperor Wu-ti) dispatched an army in search of a land route to India. En route they defeated Nam Viet forces, and the kingdom was annexed to China as the province of Giao Chi. (See: Figure A-1-2) From this time until 929 AD (except for a two-year period of independence), Nam Viet remained part of China. 17:501/

FIGURE A-1-2



When China assumed control, the Nam Viet politico-administrative apparatus was strictly feudally based. Hamlets and villages were governed by hereditary rulers who were vassals of province chiefs who, in turn, owed personal loyalty to the king (in many cases, through blood relationship). Village loyalty appears to have been strong, but the absence of a willingness to unify groups of villages in any common effort reduced effective resistance to the Chinese. Initially under the Chinese, the Nam Viets functioned without much interference. Their "country" amounted to a form of protectorate with a Chinese military governor loosely controlling each of the three regions (Tonkin, Thanh Hao and North Annam). This relationship shifted between 1 and 25 AD when economic difficulties forced many Chinese to move south. This migration initiated sinicization of the administrative system and exacerbated Chinese-Viet relations. The Trung sisters emerged, staged a successful

revolt and won Nam Viet independence in 39 AD. They ruled jointly for two years before the return and reimposition of Chinese rule. The Chinese then moved purposively to install their comparatively sophisticated administrative system.

This "mandarin system" was instituted to provide trained officials as civil servants, the higher grades serving as region and subregion chiefs. It was easily imposed, since most of Nam Viet's feudal nobles had been killed or fled with the Chinese return. Village chiefs generally remained; along with Chinese immigrants, they became the local leaders who accepted Chinese central government. Replacement of the feudal system has been credited with providing the Viets with the means of resisting Chinese attempts to dominate and sinicize them completely. This more centralized form of administration permitted more concerted effort when invasion threats occurred.

The Chinese-dominated administration also brought such material benefits as routes of communication to China, irrigation projects and improvement of harbors. Chinese agricultural techniques, including the iron plow, were introduced; the Viet subsistence pattern thus was changed, population growth was influenced and living patterns were shifted. 8:3-41/

Through these centuries of occupation, the Vietnamese accepted Chinese rule but not without opposition. A series of armed insurrections were staged and legendary heroes emerged for veneration in varying degrees by today's Vietnamese. First were the Trung sisters whose brief rule was ended in suicide by drowning on the return of Chinese invasion forces. The second martyr-producing revolt also was led by a young woman (Trieu Au) who today is venerated as Vietnam's third (the Trung sisters being the first two) Joan of Arc. Her suicide ended a five-month campaign which failed owing to inability to muster mass support. Though of lesser importance, Ly Bon was fourth in the chain of insurrectionary leaders. In 541 AD, he "liberated" and ruled a small area for about three years before the Chinese reclaimed it and put him to death. The most successful revolutionary hero was Ngo Quyen. He took advantage of anarchy in China (938 AD) and staged a successful revolt which culminated in establishment of the Dai Viet kingdom; this marked the onset of Vietnam's first and lasting era of independence.

Chinese Influence. During the Christian era's early centuries, Confucianism and Taoism were slowly accepted by the Viet elite. Chinese and Indian Buddhism also flourished. The Chinese form appealed to civil servants and merchants; Indian Buddhism with its "aura of tenderness," exerted a strong appeal among the masses.

The Viets incorporated many features of Chinese terminology into their language but managed to maintain its distinctly Vietnamese substance. Original reduction of the language to writing through use of Chinese characters influenced the development of a class of Viet intellectuals who were closely associated with Chinese literature, culture and ethics. Chinese technical education, particularly in the agricultural field, was equally imported. Some historians argue that, by the end of Chinese rule, their culture had penetrated only upper levels of the society while "pre-Chinese" culture persisted at village level. There is considerable evidence, however, demonstrating that Chinese influence permeated all levels of society. The theory that village society could remain unchanged by the introduction of Chinese customs, ranging from agricultural techniques to religious practices, is by no means substantiated by the deep-rooted Chinese kinship system evident in today's SVN.

Chinese cultural and social penetration, however, does not refute the notion that the Vietnamese are distinctly different from the Chinese. Substantial Chinese influence was absorbed without the Vietnamese being absorbed in the process. This is an important factor in the study of present-day Vietnamese society. At once, the Vietnamese are both keenly aware of Chinese cultural influence and sensitized to their retention of status as a separate people.

Early Independence

Revolt Against the Chinese. Chinese occupation survived chronic instability within the Han Dynasty. When it ultimately fell in 618 AD, its successor (the Tang Dynasty) pushed development of the Red River Delta and villages fanned southward to make room for an increasing populace. Giao Chi Province was renamed Annam (Pacified South) and declared a protectorate-general, but a decline of the Tang Dynasty provided an awaited opportunity to the Vietnamese. In 938 AD, a Vietnamese general (Ngo Quyen) drove Chinese forces of occupation out of the country, and independence was realized. Their attempts to retake the territory were successfully opposed, and the first indigenous dynasty (Ngo) was empowered to rule for the ensuing 30 years. This period of Viet independence was to endure, except for one 20-year period of Chinese reoccupation, from 938 AD until the French colonized Vietnam late in the 19th century.


Independence and Expansion. Political instability in Vietnam was the norm rather than the exception following expulsion of the Chinese. The newly independent territory now called Dai Co Viet (Great Viet State)

was to be plagued by a lack of central direction until one of some dozen autonomous rulers (Dinh Bo Linh) defeated his contemporaries and established the Dinh Dynasty. Dinh was sensitive to Chinese power and dispatched representation to obtain recognition of his control over Dai Co Viet. This set a lasting precedent for relations with China. The Chinese agreed to recognize Dinh as a vassal king in exchange for his payment of triennial tribute to their court.

The Dinh Dynasty, however, was unable to maintain firm control; the throne was usurped by the Ly Dynasty (1009-1224) which concentrated on administrative service, public revenues, irrigation and land development. It was during this period that the Dai Viet capital was moved and centered in the most productive agricultural area at Hanoi. The army repulsed a major invasion attempt by China in 1075 and beat off minor attempts by Champa and Cambodia.

The Ly, as had been emphasized by previous dynasties, continued to encourage Buddhism. Classical Mahayana Buddhist texts had been imported; Buddhists as well as Taoists had been incorporated in an administrative hierarchy. This marked establishment of the Dai Viet official religion. Thus, Mahayana Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Taoism were welded onto the thriving native cults.

Two prime phenomena stemming from this period suggested the future course of Vietnamese history: (1) the need to defend against Chinese expansionism into the Red River Delta; and, (2) the need to provide arable land for the expanding Vietnamese population. The land to the south (See: Figure A-1-3) was suitable but under belligerent Cham control; this generated a series of wars, from the 10th to the 17th centuries, which ended in annexation of the Kingdom of Champa and destruction of the Chams as a threat to the Viet expansion.



The Tran Dynasty usurped (1225) the Dai Viet throne and held it for 175 years of virtually continuous conflict with the Chams punctuated by Mongol invasions. Although the Tran initially concentrated on administrative reforms and irrigation system expansion, fear of Kublai Khan hordes forced them to develop an army and fleet. Their fears were justified; a Mongol army invaded (1257) the Red River Delta and destroyed Hanoi. They returned (1284) but were unable to consolidate their gains and withdrew to China. When they tried again (1287), Dai Viet General Tran Hung Dao decisively defeated their force at the battle of Bach Dan Giang. To this day, he is eulogized by Vietnamese when the important happenings in the development of their country are related. Following the Mongol army defeat, the Vietnamese again sent an envoy to Kublai Khan as a means of re-establishing peace and again acknowledging tributary status to China.

Throughout the 14th century, the Dai Viets and the Chams engaged in continuous conflict which enabled the Vietnamese to annex the territory north of the present autonomous city of Da Nang. The Chams invaded Tonkin twice; resulting dissatisfaction provided the Ho Dynasty with its opportunity to assume the throne, and the ritualistic request for Chinese recognition was dispatched and granted. When a pretender representing the Tran also asked for recognition, China was accorded again the rationale to intervene directly in disordered Vietnamese affairs.

Chinese Reoccupation. Dai Viet was re-invaded by China in 1406; occupation was complete by Spring of the following year. The territory was administered by administrative bureaucrats who were anxious to impose Chinese customs, laws and even language on the Vietnamese. Their harshness and corruption aroused popular resentment and provided the foundation for a broad based insurrection with a Thanh Hoa landowner, named Le Loi, providing the leadership.

Le Loi's insurgents established their operations base in the jungle and avoided contact with strong Chinese forces. The war continued for nearly ten years; with the assistance of other anti-Chinese guerrilla bands, the Le Loi forces gained sufficient strength to surround and attack Chinese units that had retired to Hanoi. The Chinese attempted to strengthen their garrison, but the 5,000-man reinforcing unit was routed in Northern Tonkin. A 120,000-man force which followed also was attacked and destroyed in the Chi Lang area of Tonkin. Facing tremendous losses, the Chinese gathered their administrative workers and withdrew. Despite this single victory, the new Dai Viet Emperor (Le Loi) pursued the traditional response pattern and dispatched emissaries to China to obtain recognition of his rule and to pay the triennial tribute deemed essential to forestall future Chinese moves toward Dai

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Viet. The Vietnamese elite remained the cultural dependents of China; in fact, by this time, Dai Viet had completely adopted Chinese-type administrative and political institutions.

Le Loi established the Le Dynasty which held power from 1428 until 1786. He lived only five of these 358 years, but his military, diplomatic and administrative abilities are commemorated in Vietnam today. He is revered as "the Peace-making King" for his postwar reduction of a 250,000-man army to provide a disciplined 150,000-man base for agriculture and other nonmilitary activities. He reorganized the country's administrative divisions; established an educational system at district level; and broadened the examination system for entrance into the civil service.17:216-20/

Development of the Administrative System. Political and administrative systems adopted by the Le Dynasty remained until the French conquest of the 19th century. The Dai Viet Emperor, an absolute monarch, was accepted as the representative of the divine power ("Son of Heaven") and was obliged to act for his people as guardian or protector. While demanding their unquestioned obedience, he was responsible for all natural and political crises -- most of which were attributed to some defect in character or improper action on his part.

Six executive departments (personnel, finance, rites, justice, armed forces and public works) served the Emperor under mandarins who were selected by competitive examinations based on Chinese classics, humanities and basic bureaucratic competence. The mandarins were supervised by a tribunal of censors ("super grade" mandarins) who were chosen for their personal integrity and morals. These censors also brought grievances of the people to the attention of the government and were accorded the power to rebuke administrative officials, to include the Emperor, if there was evidence that Confucian principles had been violated.

The authority of the mandarins, excepting the censors, was fairly limited, since they were employed above village level. Villages were authorized to manage their own affairs under a Council of Notables which was responsible for law and order, for accomplishment of executive orders, for tax collection and for maintaining records on the local population relevant to tax assessment and mandatory military service. Conscripts were afforded the option of joining the local militia or recruitment in the Imperial Guard which was led by a professional corps of military mandarins selected via competitive examinations covering mental requirements and physical ability.


Expansion Southward. As the Dai Viet population expanded, the need for new land grew more acute. The best route lay to the south; hostile Thai tribes and heavily wooded mountains discouraged surge to the west, and Chinese presence ruled out northward movement. Initially, expansion was accomplished by peaceful infiltration of settlers into Cham lands. Villagers organized pioneer groups, consisting of the landless adventure seekers and undesirables, to form new villages complete with cleared land. When a new village became sufficiently developed, it received "xa" status from the Emperor.

As migration continued, war with Champa was continuous, and the Chams were rolled back inexorably. The Vietnamese overran their capital in 1471, and Champa was reduced to a few districts ringing the present town of Phan Rang where Cham rule was maintained until the late 17th century. The farther south these settlements extended, the more independent they became from central authority and the more their settlers differed from the people in the North. Northerners generally maintained loyalty to the Le Dynasty, while the Southerners supported another, the Nguyen. The divided loyalty which had its beginning then seems to have remained through the years.^{19:21} Expansion continued and, around 1757, the Vietnamese controlled territory as far south as the present border.

Divided Rule. Following the death of the Thanh Tong in 1523, the North's Le Dynasty declined in power due to a succession of incompetent rulers. As a result of a series of court intrigues and power plays, among which six districts were ceded to China, the country was divided into two parts in 1620; the North was controlled by the Trinh family and the South by the Nguyen. (See: Figure A-1-4) Rivalry between them was such that over half of the 17th century was devoted to open conflict. The Trinh were better equipped, having received more weapons from Western (Portuguese) traders; the Nguyen, who fought mainly defensive battles, had popular support. The Trinh concentrated on consolidating their control over the people, while the Nguyen continued expansion into the South's arable land. This expansion continued until the Vietnamese controlled today's boundaries to the south and southwest.

The 150 years of compartmented rule ended when the Tay Son uprising (1786) brought defeat to both the Nguyen and the Trinh. The resulting divided loyalties of the people, however, reinforced regional differences which have persisted and increased through the years.^{17:296-322}

FIGURE A-1-4



Early Western Contacts. The first Europeans to reach Vietnam were Portuguese who dominated the trade for nearly a century. The Trinh-Nguyen war provided a lucrative market for weapons sales. The Dutch, arriving in 1636, also marketed arms; however, such trade fell off after 1700 without lasting influence. The first missionaries were Catholic and entered during the 16th century. Although generally unsuccessful, some remained in-country; it was their influence which led to romanization of the Vietnamese language. Alexander of Rhodes, a French missionary, first translated the Catechism in Vietnamese; through Rhodes French missionaries became interested in Indochina. These missionaries encouraged French conquest, and it was their persecution that stirred French military intervention during the 19th century.

The most important early missionary in Indochina was the Bishop of Adran. His provision of the advice and support necessary for refugee Prince Nguyen Anh to gain the throne from the Tay Son stands as the first instance of a Vietnamese ruler accepting Western guidance in assuming control and maintaining stability. Nguyen Anh was established as Emperor Gia Long in 1802; with the conditioned response of his predecessors, he dispatched envoys to Peking with alacrity to announce his victory and request recognition of his "Vassal King" title. Under Chinese suzerainty, and with a capital established at Hue as well as governor-generals maintained in Tonkin and Cochinchina, Gia Long was the first ruler to refer to the country as "Vietnam." Gia Long's rule

was marked by continuation of the development pioneered by Le Loi four centuries earlier. Gia Long constructed a 1,300-mile road from Hanoi to Saigon; recruited a messenger service to Hanoi and Cochinchina; and, of particular significance, constructed large and elaborate forts to guard strategic towns. A country that had known war throughout its history was evidently preparing for more.

French traders visited Vietnamese ports in the early years of the century with considerable success, but this drastically changed when Gia Long died in 1820. Minh Mang, Gia Long's fourth son, and successor, held a much different view of Europeans. Although Gia Long had not become a Christian, he remained sympathetic toward all religious beliefs. Prior to his demise, he requested Minh Mang to recognize the religions being practiced in the country. Minh Mang was a believer in Confucian ethics and a great admirer of Chinese culture; although there was opposition within the court, he reversed Gia Long's policy and reinstated the 18th century policy of persecution of Christians.

Consideration of this religious situation is relevant, since Vietnamese persecution of French missionaries generated strong French reaction. The Emperors maintained a firm stand against missionaries, condemning them to death if captured, and attempted to shield Vietnamese from missionary proselytization. Actually, this Vietnamese policy appears to have given the French the form of excuse they had sought for expanded politico-economic influence in Asia. This does not suggest that, had the Vietnamese not been oppressive, the French would not have colonized the country; rather, it opened the door for incursion and domination.

French Domination of Vietnam

French Occupation. The conquest began with a combined French-Spanish attack on the city of Da Nang in 1858; despite the city's capture, the Vietnamese refused to surrender. The French then altered their objective, believing that Emperor Tu Duc could be forced to terms if Cochinchina (which was providing 80,000 tons of rice per year to Annam) could be occupied. Da Nang was evacuated and Saigon captured in 1859. Due to a delay stemming from French involvement in China, expansion of Cochinchina's occupation was not accomplished until late 1861. Facing a revolt in Tonkin during the Spring of 1862, Tu Duc pressed the French for terms. The ensuing treaty ceded to France the three eastern provinces of Cochinchina (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh and Dinh Tuong); accorded an indemnity to Paris which was payable in ten years; opened three major ports to French trade; and provided assurance that no territory would be ceded to any other country unless France was consulted.

The French continued to explore the concept of expanding their influence in Cochinchina while the Vietnamese conducted almost continuous guerrilla-type operations against them. Evidence indicates that these operations were not planned by the Court of Hue; rather, they were the acts of local resistance elements and were mounted principally from adjoining provinces. Nevertheless, their frequency increased, and the French were goaded into occupying the three western provinces of Vinh Long, Chau Doc and Ha Tien. This expansion provided the base on which the French built their empire in Indochina. They set out to consolidate the territory and to explore the Mekong River as a possible route to southern China. The expedition up the Mekong proved fruitless, but, on return, its French commander learned of a series of waterways that connected Yunnan Province in south China with the Red River in Tonkin. With this information, French interest spread to Tonkin.


In November of 1872, a group of French gunboats arrived at the mouth of the Red River and requested permission to sail upstream to Yunnan. Permission denied, the commander disregarded the authority, sailed up the river and delivered a consignment of weapons to the Chinese. On return to Hanoi, he announced his intention to return to Yunnan with a consignment of salt (a product which had long been a monopoly controlled by the mandarins). The Court of Hue appealed to the French Governor of Cochinchina for assistance; rather than assisting the Vietnamese, he dispatched a naval force to "protect commerce in opening the country and its river to all nations under the protection of France." 16:620/

The force commander, after a disagreement with the mandarin authorities, stormed the Hanoi citadel and captured a series of delta towns. This conquest was executed on the initiative of the officer in command, and it alarmed Emperor Tu Duc to the extent that he signed the 15 March 1874 agreement which established "an ill-defined form of French protectorate" and reaffirmed French sovereignty over Cochinchina. This loss of prestige ultimately vitiated Tu Duc's meager control in Tonkin and, believing Vietnam still to be a vassal of China, he appealed for assistance from the North. This brought regular Chinese troops into the border provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Thai Nguyen and Bac Ninh; in turn, French troops responded. The following year (1885) a settlement was reached with China (the Convention of Tientsin) which provided for Chinese recognition of the French protectorate over Vietnam and the withdrawal of Chinese troops. Annam was to maintain a measure of autonomy; Tonkin was to be governed by the existing indigenous system with French residents providing guidance and supervision. This agreement proved unsuitable to the Vietnamese who, by now, had a new Emperor, Ham Nghi.

The new ruler, supported by mandarins and scholars of the court, planned and launched an attack which failed to destroy the French in Hue but did permit the royal family's escape to the hills where they conducted an unsuccessful guerrilla campaign until captured in 1888. (See: ANNEX A) The Emperor's flight was significant on two counts. First, it marked the departure of the last of the Vietnamese rulers who were other than "installed" by the French; second, it signaled the advent of a general massacre of Christians throughout Annam (they were accused of assisting the French by providing information and acting as guides). The French installed Dong Khanh who became the first of five emperors of the Nguyen Dynasty who were powerless to exercise authority within a framework of French control over the political, military and economic systems.10:36-51/

French Administration. Under provisions of the several agreements signed by the Vietnamese, Chinese and French, Cochinchina became a French colony; Annam and Tonkin became French protectorates. (See: Figure A-1-5) Initially, the former was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Colonies in Paris; the latter were managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was changed in 1887 when all three areas, under the central authority of the Governor-General, were placed under administration of the Ministry of Colonies.

FIGURE A-1-5



Ruled by a governor, Cochinchina was administered directly by French civil servants; no separate Vietnamese administration existed. Annam and Tonkin, being protectorates, maintained their native administrative system only in theory; French administrators paralleled native administrators and retained the real power. In spite of the differing "status" of the regions, the power of the province chiefs did not vary much from region to region. Even in the protectorates, the French administrators dominated relations between provincial, district, canton and village institutions. This interference impacted even on court ceremonies in Hue where former court rituals declined and lost their significance. High French officials assumed and maintained true authority (to include the budget); Vietnamese administration, while remaining intact in Annam and Tonkin, withered in terms of authority and responsibility. 21:8-13/

The new administration, as well as economic and cultural factors, began to evade the traditional pattern of local isolation and self-sufficiency. A new economy, reflecting French settlers' interests, was superimposed on the wet-rice agricultural society which operated principally at the village level. Rubber plantations, as well as mining and textile industries, were established. Additionally, the Vietnamese people felt the new government's impact through added taxes and an increasing requirement for labor to further new economic endeavors. The communications system was improved and contributed to the changing social pattern. This influx of foreign influences acted as a form of catalyst for the development of nationalism. The Vietnamese began to recognize that this imposition of French rule underscored a basic popular weakness; elements, particularly intellectuals, began to seek ways and organizations to redeem freedom from foreign domination. "French domination became the transcendent issue in the political thinking of the Vietnamese people." 2:106/ ANNEX A traces this most significant evolutionary development -- the rise of nationalism and surfacing of communism -- in Vietnamese history. Its significance magnifies when weighed in terms of today's situation and the possibilities of a tomorrow of freedom and independence for a South Vietnamese nation.

Japanese Occupation. The end of French control over Vietnam began in June of 1940 when the Vichy French Government signed an armistice with the Third Reich. This signified, among other things, that Vietnam could no longer expect any assistance from Free France. A vague defense agreement had been signed by the British and the French, but British forces were in no condition to provide an adequate defense of SEA. The US, the last nation capable of providing even basic support, maintained a policy of noninvolvement. The Vichy Government signed an agreement with the Japanese (30 August 1940) recognizing their dominant position in the Far East and granting Japan certain

transit facilities. The Vichy French were to remain in control of Indochina; the Japanese would occupy three airfields in Tonkin, maintain a maximum of 6,000 troops, and have no more than 25,000 troops in transit status at any one time. While the French were permitted to maintain their colonial administrative system, French domination clearly was on the decline.

In spite of waning influence, the French reportedly recorded some solid achievements in Vietnamese political and social development. A "Youth and Sports" movement provided heretofore unavailable disciplinary training; elementary education was improved; the University of Hanoi broadened its base of facilities; and, Vietnamese art was stimulated. Mandarin cadres in the protectorates received pay increases, and salary differentials between French and Vietnamese were reduced. Also, as import-goods replacements became necessary, more local production was generated. Limited production of rice-alcohol compounds replaced gasoline; palm oil products replaced petroleum lubricants; drugs were produced locally; and cotton mills switched to local fibers. The first in-country wet-cell battery plant opened in 1942; a blast furnace and tire factory began operation the following year. After the war, however, the import of less expensive Western goods led to deterioration of these improvised industries. 12:40-59/

In reality, the decline of French power was not widely recognized by the Vietnamese; the French Administrative Service continued functioning, and French troops sustained traditional garrison duties. Moreover, the Japanese were seldom seen in urban areas.

French civilians, on the whole, adjusted to the new set of relationships. They were not greatly affected by the food and clothing scarcity. Additionally, the so-called "National Revolution" program of Vichy was accepted with alacrity, since they basically approved of its authoritarian techniques of governing. There was some persecution of Jews, Masons and acknowledged De Gaullists, but the French Community in general adapted with minor adjustments. 18:101/

French administration continued through 1944. As the war in the Pacific progressed in Allied favor, in-country Japanese officials recognized an invasion of Indochina as a mounting possibility. Their intelligence network reported that Vichy forces and the French community planned to assist the Allies. The Japanese were convinced of this danger to the point of executing a coup de force on 9 March 1945. French forces were overcome, and, with the exception of scattered French elements, the Japanese assumed control of the country. (See: ANNEX A)

The Japanese offered the Vietnamese independence under Emperor Bao Dai who had been sponsored by the French. This was contingent on cooperation with the Japanese-sponsored "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

The offer was accepted, and Bao Dai attempted to broaden his base of popular support. His efforts to muster sufficient authority to control the country were not effective, although he gradually gained nominal control of Tonkin, Hanoi, Haiphong, Da Nang and Cochinchina.

During the months immediately preceding Japanese capitulation, Vietnam slowly drifted back into a state of anarchy. The process was speeded by Allied air destruction of communications and by the state of disrepute of the Mandarinate under French control. The inability of the Bao Dai government to assume the authority of the French was borne out by its inability to collect taxes and to rally the support of a middle class that insisted on protests and demonstrations. The administrative system was breaking down; monarchy helped "open the door" to Viet Minh takeover. 18:108/ The DRV was formed in September of 1945.

Participants at the Potsdam Conference in the Summer of 1945 agreed that the British Army would occupy the area south of the 16th parallel and the Nationalist Chinese north of the 16th. The British favored the return of French forces to Indochina, since opposition would suggest that the UK re-evaluate its colonial policy. The US, on the other hand, did not support French re-entry. The British, French and Dutch moved to re-establish their empires as the war drew to a close, and the US found itself opposing basic objectives of its closest Allies.

British forces occupying Cochinchina refused to recognize Vietnamese representatives who were pressing for recognition as a government. Vichy French soldiers were released from internment, and the British assisted them in setting up an administrative system; the entry of French reinforcements was authorized in September of 1945. The Chinese, occupying north of the 16th parallel, were willing to negotiate with the French for withdrawal of Chinese troops. As a result of the Sino-French agreement of 28 February 1946, France relinquished its pre-war extraterritorial rights in China in exchange for this withdrawal.

The return of French troops to North Vietnam signaled French re-establishment of its colony. Ho Chi Minh, President of the newly established DRV (See: ANNEX A) still worked to achieve recognition of his government. The series of conferences in Dalat (April - May 1946) and Fontainebleau (July - September 1946) produced nothing. A signed French-Vietnamese modus vivendi specified the resumption of French economic and cultural activities, acceptance of the Indochinese piaster and the DRV joining the Indochinese Customs Union. In return, the French agreed to assist in the re-establishment of law and order throughout Cochinchina and southern Annam and to introduce an administrative system in the South based on democratic principles. All acts of hostility and violence were to cease. 23:43-45/ Nevertheless, this agreement did not fulfill basic desires of the Vietnamese. Vietnam had not been granted

independence, and DRV authority was not recognized in Cochinchina. Inability to arrive at a satisfactory political solution led to the inevitable -- war between the French and the Viet Minh. Initiated as a colonial war, it would end seven and one-half years later as an anti-communist defeat.

The war evolved through three phases basically following the communist protracted warfare design. During its first three years, the French maintained the initiative and forced the Viet Minh on the defensive. In October of 1949, Chinese Communist defeat of the Nationalists brought Mao's troops to the northern border of Vietnam in a position to support the Viet Minh. Improved Viet Minh capabilities had pressed the French onto the defensive within four months. In the final phase, the Viet Minh concept of mobile warfare dominated. Throughout the first phase, the US maintained a "hands-off" attitude in view of its policy toward colonialism and the right of self-determination. The French therefore set out to defeat the Viet Minh militarily without US assistance.

French offensive actions to clear the Hanoi-Haiphong area gradually expanded their control along the main roads to the Chinese border. The Viet Minh refused to fight on French terms; conducted a rear-guard campaign while establishing base areas; politically consolidated the countryside; and sustained the recruiting, training and equipping of their forces. The French confined operations to areas in the vicinity of the rural areas. The French attempted some "oil-spot" pacification techniques which were combined with offensive operations intended to destroy Viet Minh forces and leadership. Desired results were not achieved. While French reports of enemy casualties painted the facade of victory, neither Viet Minh combat formations nor the political apparatus were destroyed.

Chinese Communist manning of Vietnam's northern border provided the sanctuary essential to Viet Minh training and logistics. The result of infiltration and strength increases forced the French to consolidate around major areas of influence and shift to the defensive.

During the second phase, the Viet Minh inexorably wrested the initiative from the French. Increasing enemy strength and declining support from Paris forced the French Commander-in-Chief to further consolidate his forces. In 1951, the Viet Minh launched a general offensive; Viet Minh General Giap mistakenly believed he had the strength to engage the French in large unit operations. From January through June, he launched three multidivision operations; French firepower inflicted heavy casualties on each. Giap's main forces were badly mauled; he withdrew to regroup and adjust tactics, but this did not forestall the continuation of guerrilla operations which were continued with alarming success.

By early 1952, Viet Minh formations had been built back up, and strategy shifted to a form of mobile warfare which increasingly forced

the French on the defensive. Their activities slowed appreciably due to the illness and subsequent death of the Commander-in-Chief, General de Lattre de Tassigny, who departed Indochina in December of 1951 and was not replaced for three months.

Meanwhile, development of a Vietnamese national army was progressing slowly. Its creation had been agreed in December 1950; a four-division force was to have been developed by the end of 1951 through transfer of Vietnamese battalions serving in the French Army to Vietnamese control. French reluctance to relinquish these battalions, lack of cadre for training and equipment voids virtually stifled the program; the battalions continued to operate under French control.

This began to change at the onset of 1952. Although sufficient Vietnamese enlisted personnel were serving with French Union Forces, Vietnamese officers were in drastically short supply. Recruitment was hampered by the unwillingness of many of the educated to become associated with an army so closely identified with the French. Moreover, when the Vietnamese resorted to conscription many of these officers displayed a disdain for the peasant soldiers they were expected to command. The attitude of these officers toward the poorly armed paramilitary forces was also a recurrent cause of friction and resentment. Many of the paramilitary officers, in spite of proven military ability, were unable to achieve regular army status due to lack of educational background.

During the war's final phase, the Viet Minh were able to sustain initiative via attacks, in up to division strength, at times and places of their choosing. French spoiling attacks were of little lasting value; they were unable to remain and pacify the areas captured due to insufficient troop strength.

General Henri Navarre, appointed Commander-in-Chief in May of 1953, reappraised the situation and surfaced two key factors: (1) the incapacity of Paris to frame an adequate policy necessary to successfully prosecute the war; and, (2) the unusually large number of troops employed in a purely defensive role. In the latter case, although there were more than 100,000 French Union troops deployed in 917 defense posts in the Red River Delta, Viet Minh forces were relatively free to infiltrate. To remedy this situation, he appropriated a plan which had been drafted by his predecessor (General Salan) which became known as the Navarre Plan. It was designed to create, with massive support from the US, an operational force more powerful than that of the Viet Minh and possessing equal mobility. This was to be accomplished by increasing the armies of the Associated States (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and by assigning them the defensive responsibility that had been borne by the French Expeditionary Corps. Assumption of this responsibility was not contemplated

until specific regions had been cleared of large Viet Minh units by the more experienced and better equipped Expeditionary Forces.

This plan was based on three assumptions. First, decisive engagements with the Viet Minh would be avoided until the Associated States could recruit and train their national armies; second, the US would provide massive military assistance to equip them; third, large-scale reinforcements would be available from Paris to meet the Viet offensive scheduled for the rainy season of 1953-54. When General Navarre's performance requirements were presented to Paris the political situation was such that they were scaled down on grounds of inability to support commitments in Europe and North Africa. His request to increase the size of the national armies was approved provided the US would supply the necessary support.

The plan, however, was never completely carried out. French Expeditionary Forces were unable to avoid decisive combat with the Viet Minh, and pressure to end the war became so great that negotiations at Geneva were agreed and signed before the national armies could be recruited, trained and equipped. Current critics often suggest US strategy failure because of some similarities to the Navarre Plan. They fail to recognize publicly, however, that the latter was never fully executed.

This is not to suggest that, if the plan had been properly carried out, the war would have been won. It was lost politically in Paris where a series of shaky governments proved unable to develop the clear-cut policy necessary to gain the support of the French people and the non-communist Vietnamese. Thus, the French entered negotiations at Geneva having lost the military and political battle in Paris. Loss of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was merely a form of capstone testimonial to long-evident deterioration and defeat.

Post-Geneva Independence

The Geneva Conference. The deteriorating military and political situations in Indochina combined to exert such added pressure on the French Government as to generate the convening of a multinational conference which opened in April of 1954 at Geneva. Delegates in attendance represented: the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (cochairmen); the United States; France; South Vietnam; Cambodia; Laos; Communist China; and, North Vietnam.

Conference proceedings were influenced, from their inception, by the symbolism of the French loss of Dien Bien Phu on the day prior to conference consideration of the Indochina question. The psychological and political impact of this loss only underscored French official intent to achieve some form of honorable way out with minimum delay. The victory gave the Viet Minh the psychological advantage that many analysts believe was care-

fully designed once the possibility of negotiations surfaced. Dien Bien Phu stands as a definite tactical defeat, but the battle itself represented commitment of only 3 to 4 percent of the French Union force manning level in Indochina. It disproved a French theory that the Viet Minh could be defeated once drawn into conventional battle where superior French weapons and air power could be brought to bear. Events proved that French Union supply lines were too long and insufficient reserves were available to influence the defenders' actions. 24:56/

Meanwhile, the conference in Geneva continued. Agreement, reached on 21 July 1954, established the ensuing main provisions relevant to Vietnam: (1) Vietnam would be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam; (2) the introduction of fresh troops, military personnel, arms and munitions, as well as the establishment of new military bases would be banned; (3) country-wide elections, leading to reunification of North and South would be held by 20 July 1956; and, (4) an International Control Commission would be established to supervise execution of the agreements. Neither the US nor South Vietnam were signatories; however, the US issued a unilateral declaration stating that it would: (1) refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreement; (2) consider any renewal of the aggression, in violation of the agreements, as seriously threatening international peace and security; and, (3) continue to seek to achieve unity, through free elections supervised by the UN, to ensure they were conducted fairly. 25:2/

The International Control Commission (Canada, India, Poland) was charged with ensuring execution of the cease-fire, as well as with monitoring the movement of Viet Minh troops north and French and non-communist Vietnamese troops south. They also were to supervise the demarcation lines between regroupment and demilitarized zones; control the release of PWs and civilian internees; and surveil execution of the ban on the introduction of personnel and equipment. This instrumentality's ineffectiveness was built into its charter; it was authorized to settle major issues by unanimous vote only. Violations or threats of violations which might have led to resumption of hostilities were considered major and therefore required unanimity. Ideological difference among the Commission's member nations inveighed against agreement on such issues. Throughout its early years of operation, on minor issues which tended to increase tensions, India either refused to vote or demanded major issue status. Further, if North and South Vietnam failed to accept any given recommendation, the Commission could but refer its case to the Geneva Conference cochairmen (UK and USSR) wherein another ideological split further reduced the chance of agreement.

The cease-fire adequately covered the prohibition of hostilities by regular forces, but irregular forces were not specifically mentioned. The Viet Minh thus were afforded the opportunity to exploit the classic tactics of communist insurgent war. Regroupment areas also favored the Communists; the four designated areas south of the 17th parallel were large and had

been controlled by the Viet Minh for years. They became the base areas in which arms were cached and cadres were left for the initiation of such future subversive activities as might be designed.

The elections scheduled to be held by 20 July 1956 did not materialize. Violations of the agreements by the DRV and the tight control apparatus in Hanoi organized a GVN basis for refusing to participate. SVN not being a signatory to the Geneva Accords, Diem announced (16 July 1955) that the GVN was not in any way bound by them; according to the GVN President, the accords were signed against the will of the Vietnamese people.^{23:226/} In spite of shortcomings, however, these accords did provide the opportunity for the formation and development of the non-communist government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

The New Regime. In June of 1954, while the Geneva Conference was in session, Emperor Bao Dai offered Ngo Dinh Diem the post of GVN Prime Minister. When he arrived to form the government and shortly thereafter, the situation was chaotic at best; the French were withdrawing; the government of Ho Chi Minh was assuming legal control north of the 17th parallel; and there was little agreement among the people or factions as to how the government should be run and who should run it. The Army was not wholly behind Diem. The Binh Xuyen bandit group in Saigon-Cholon dominated the Saigon police and managed legitimate businesses as well as vice in general. The Hoa Hao and Cao Dai politico-religious sects were unwilling to unify under national government direction. In addition, Diem faced the settlement of nearly 900,000 refugees from the North -- in itself, a monumental task for a new and inexperienced government with a countryside and economy in shambles after nearly eight years of war.

Diem moved to solve national problems with aggressiveness and a remarkable ability. He first gained support of the armed forces which he estimated as the primary step in power consolidation. Then -- in varying combinations of bribery, double dealing, political daring and combat -- he moved to overcome both the Binh Xuyen and the politico-religious sects. By the Spring of 1955, these goals were accomplished. Meanwhile, with the assistance of Washington and Paris, northern refugees were being processed and resettled with notable efficiency considering political and economic situations that prevailed. Resettlement was completed by mid-1957, and the last official governmental assistance to these refugees was terminated.

The cardinal importance of this refugee movement stems from its physical demonstration that a sizable number of North Vietnamese were willing to abandon their homes, businesses and farms to avoid life under the Viet Minh Communists. This has been termed "voting with their feet." The successful resettlement program represented a further consolidation of Diem's control over the government. The psychological effect of its

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accomplishment imparted confidence to those who doubted GVN ability; but, more importantly, the refugees themselves constituted a militant anti-communist group upon whom Diem could depend for support. Among them were civil servants, many of whom were integrated into the governmental structure. In spite of its successes, resettlement entailed certain detrimental political consequences. First, it introduced a significant number of Northerners into an area where the deep-rooted anti-North convictions of native Southerners served to reinforce further divisive tendencies. Their Catholic religion added fuel to divisive fires. These impacts, when linked to refugee resettlement in village groups, led many Southerners to distrust Diem out of fear that he might attempt to establish a Christian state.^{4:345/} Whether Diem had such visions or not is irrelevant. The fact that the threat was perceived, even by a portion of the population, operated to his political disadvantage. Also, although the integration of Northerners into GVN service reinforced anti-communist administration capabilities, their presence as GVN representatives did not reinforce or encourage southern peasant recognition of the Diem regime as truly representative of the South.

The final step in Diem's consolidation of power came on 23 October 1955 when the electorate overwhelmingly voted in favor of a "republic" with Diem as President. In spite of many pressing problems, Diem's government enjoyed considerable support, both foreign and domestic, throughout 1955-56. US economic and military assistance appeared to be sustaining a GVN heading toward a period of relatively stable government. The Geneva Agreements, however, had called for elections in 1956; South Vietnam now refused on grounds of being a nonsignatory. When the carefully staged opportunity for peaceful takeover did not materialize, Hanoi resorted to the form and substance of insurgent warfare for which the foundation had been designed prior to the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Threat to the Peace

Insurgent War. There is reason to believe that Ho Chi Minh was confident that the North would win the proposed referendum. When Diem announced his refusal to participate, Ho pressured the GVN without success. This influenced North Vietnam to re-evaluate its policy; the exact date of the firm decision to reunify Vietnam by force is known only in Hanoi, but it must have been early in 1956.

The period 1956-57 was addressed primarily to the tasks of reorganizing and rebuilding the communist apparatus in the South. In 1957, small-scale terrorist activities were initiated, particularly in the populated provinces in the Mekong Delta. Insurgents concentrated on recruiting the peasantry through propaganda and extending their influence over the government leadership at hamlet and village levels. By 1959,

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the level of violence had increased materially; the insurgents (by then called Viet Cong) concentrated on acts of terrorism, small-scale harassment and sabotage. By mid-1960, with armed strength increased to a reported 5,000-man level, their activities began to shift toward the central and northern provinces. Montagnard grievances were exploited to obtain recruits and intelligence support; more importantly, infiltration routes through Laos and Cambodia were developed.

Placed on the defensive by this rising tide of subversive activity, the GVN became increasingly authoritarian and farther removed from its people. Ordinances such as 6/56 (authorizing confinement without right of trial of persons suspected of being a danger to the defense of the state) and 10/59 (authorizing military courts to try and imprison Communists without counsel or right of appeal) tended to sharpen Diem's isolation. Operation of the Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party (Can Lao) as an intelligence net within the bureaucracy; the secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu; tight control of the National Assembly; and rigorous press censorship -- all widened the gap between the GVN and popular support. Thus, rather than pressing for broader-based support in order to thwart the development of the VC political apparatus, the GVN tightened its control thereby furthering the communist effort. A prime example of this growing disaffection is evident in the abortive coup staged by the airborne brigade in November 1960. (See: ANNEX A)

In December of 1960, the Communists formed the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam with the announced policy of establishing a "national democratic" government in SVN. With this formal announcement guerrilla activity levels mounted; VC units were enlarged and demonstrated an increased willingness to engage ARVN units. Meanwhile, in spite of contrary recommendations by MAAG, the ARVN persisted in maintaining a basically defensive posture which allowed the VC to strike on terms and at times and places of their choosing.

Deterioration of the security situation prompted a visit by then Vice-President Lyndon Johnson in April of 1961. He reaffirmed US determination to support GVN; based on his recommendations, the Staley Mission (June-July 1961) surveyed and recommended necessary financial and economic measures. General Taylor followed in October, surveying the politico-military situation and recommending an improved counterinsurgency program (including military, political and economic measures) with more US participation. Soon after General Taylor's visit, the first US Army and Marine Corps helicopter companies arrived to mark the beginning of a significant military support build-up. In February of 1962, MACV was activated; the US military advisory effort rose to 1,601 (an increase from 685 in 1960). By early 1962, ARVN military strength had increased to 187,500 from 151,000 in July of 1961.

Despite US-GVN efforts, the security situation did not improve in 1962 and early 1963. During this period, the counterinsurgency program

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centered on the construction and development of strategic hamlets with disappointing results. While the combined US-GVN resources appeared adequate, the VC had improved their position (especially in the Mekong Delta). VC units controlled the countryside at night, interdicted major roads and canals almost at will and launched battalion-size attacks with continuing success. VC-initiated incidents rose from about 1,200 to 2,000 per month; armed attacks mounted from 160 to 560 per month during the period January through September of 1963.

Meanwhile, reports through the first half of 1963 indicated 66 percent of the hamlets completed and 82 percent of the population under GVN control. The apparent inconsistency between VC freedom to operate and the population percentage allegedly under control prompted a Mekong Delta progress evaluation in October of 1963. It concluded that: (1) the hamlet program must be slowed to permit the development of existing hamlets; and, (2) other military and nonmilitary facets of the counterinsurgency program must be intensified.

Failure of the counterinsurgency effort through the end of 1963 is further evidenced by the estimated increase of VC Main Force strength from 18,000 in July to 23,000 (with a guerrilla force numbering around 80,000) by the onset of 1964. Concomitantly, VC intelligence and logistical systems improved; their ability and desire to fight, even during daylight, increased appreciably.

Coup d'Etat. GVN difficulties increased in May of 1963 when the previously quiescent Buddhists exerted strong anti-government political pressure. Action was initiated in Hue when demonstrators, protesting a GVN ban on displaying the Buddhist flag, were fired on by the ARVN. The incident was promptly magnified by the Buddhists who had become increasingly alienated by GVN which (in their view) favored Catholics in higher government positions, governed arbitrarily and employed police-state techniques.

Diem's inability or unwillingness to work out a satisfactory solution led to the phenomenon of self-immolation by several bonzes accompanied by massive street demonstrations. Through the Summer of 1963 absence of suitable accommodation exacerbated tensions until GVN troops attacked key pagodas in Saigon and other major cities. In response, students and anti-Diemists of varied political backgrounds joined the Buddhist opposition; what had originated as a religious issue by this time had become a major political issue. The US attempted to disassociate itself from GVN action against the Buddhists. Ambassador Lodge replaced Ambassador Nolting, and statements were issued that were openly critical of Diem, Nhu and Nhu's wife.

With a deteriorating security situation and the surfacing of public hatred for the Diem regime, a number of key military leaders (led by Generals Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don and Ton That Dinh) planned and

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carried out a coup on 1 November 1963.

Public announcements by President Kennedy and members of his administration in September had made it clear the US had reservations about the ability of GVN to successfully prosecute the war unless drastic reforms were instituted. US subsidies for GVN Special Forces and Vietnamese imports were suspended. These initiatives served to underscore US disapproval of GVN activities; they undoubtedly influenced coup plotters in the belief that the US would not oppose a change of government. 26:1-9/

With careful planning, the coup was initiated during the afternoon of 1 November. The following morning Diem and Nhu were captured and murdered. The weak threads of legitimate civilian government in SVN were broken. The coup leaders established a provisional government with former Vice-President Nguyen Ngoc Tho as Premier. The Constitution of 1956 was suspended and the National Assembly abolished. Tho appointed a mixed civilian-military cabinet; shortly thereafter, the US recognized the new government. With this came reinstatement of the suspended Commodity Import Program.

Succeeding Governments. The overthrow of the Diem government marked a turning point in Vietnamese politics. President Diem had ruled for over nine consecutive years; had survived one major coup attempt but otherwise maintained firm control over the government. This type of continuity departed with him. In the following months, a series of different governments -- each isolated from real association with the people -- assumed control of national affairs with an ineffectiveness that substantiates VC propaganda.

Minh (Nguyen Ngoc Tho was Premier) was ousted on 30 January 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh who remained in power or as the power behind the GVN until the Armed Forces Council demanded his resignation in February of 1965. During 1964, the facade of new government was attempted in several forms but Khanh maintained "power from behind." In February of 1965 the military turned the government over to Pham Huy Quat, a quiet and competent civilian. Nevertheless, difficulties arose almost immediately when the military elite refused to support him in time of political crisis. In June of 1965, Quat invited the military to form a new government, and the stage was set for the naming of Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky as Chief Executive. 25:15-18,233/

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A

NOTES

1. Historical research findings on Indochina are extant and abundant. Their weight in the main, however, stems either from French direct development or acquired data -- a definite French bias thus reflected. More importantly, much of the research has centered on subjects such as legal history and archaeological interpretation; as such, the issues critically relevant to PROVN have not been addressed historically. Historical summaries, therefore, must be used as a base for the form of research needed to view today's SVN situation in historical perspective. The summaries of public domain authors deemed most reputable and authoritative today, therefore, comprise the principal references used in this annex.

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ANNEX B

THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS

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ANNEX B

THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Introduction

The principal formal religions in South Vietnam are Mahayana Buddhism, Catholicism, Hoa Haoism and Cao Daiism. There are in addition significant numbers of Theravada Buddhists (principally Khmer), some Protestants, a fledgling Baha'i movement and a few Hindus and Muslims. The Chinese in SVN are nominally Mahayana Buddhists, but they maintain their own pagodas and are not intrusive on the Vietnamese scene through their religion. Their impact as an ethnic minority is through their role in the economy and is considered under that heading.

Due consideration must be given to the basic elements of Animism, Confucianism and Taoism which have a decided influence on all Vietnamese regardless of the formal religious affiliation of the individual. The latter two are a direct result of Chinese influence through conquest and cultural diffusion, and the impact of Chinese culture has clearly been predominant in SVN. The Vietnamese, however, have been dramatically eclectic and syncretistic, and Vietnamese culture today represents a fusion of many diverse elements, perhaps most clearly and vividly exemplified by Cao Daiism. The Animistic beliefs are essentially pre-Chinese and have been noted extensively in Southeast Asian cultures subjected to far less direct Chinese influence than that of the Vietnamese.

The organization of Vietnamese society is loosely Confucianist in origin, but the nonmaterial world is viewed by the individual in a mixture of Taoist and Buddhist terms, reinforced heavily by indigenous Animism and modified in part by the formal religious beliefs which he may nominally recognize. To say that a Vietnamese is either a Buddhist or a Catholic or a Protestant is misleading. Some undoubtedly have acquired a sound knowledge of Buddhism, are devout, and have shed many if not all of the other religious beliefs typical of the culture. There are many who are essentially agnostic. In between these two extremes -- which encompass only a minority -- is the mass of the population which has acquired a melange of religious bits and pieces. Though as individuals all Vietnamese may profess a nominal adherence to one of the major religions, in reality most are not firmly committed to any.

Most Vietnamese, not otherwise affiliated, if required to express publicly an affiliation for a formal religion, will respond with "Buddhist." Since the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and ethnic Chinese are also

frequently included in the Buddhist category, this has been the source of the statement that "80 percent of the Vietnamese population is Buddhist." Such statements are manifestly inaccurate if meant to imply that 80 percent of the population is uniformly and homogeneously aligned in support of the Buddhist "movement."

Since the Diem regime ended the major religions have provided the most widely spread, clearly articulated and effective political vehicles. The underlying religious complexions of these movements have provided an element of "familiarity" which has aided in their attracting individual supporters and adherents. Conversely, the effectiveness of the religious organizations in articulating and championing the political interests of the people has also increased religious participation. Such political and religious commitments are probably transitory. The lack of consensus regarding the basic political aspirations of the people and the tradition of individualism in politics militate against the development of a viable secular, nonideological (in the communist sense) political organization with a broad base of support. In the foreseeable future only those organizations which have fundamentally nonpolitical reasons for their existence would appear to have sufficient internal cohesiveness to remain viable. Only the various religious groups have been able to demonstrate these qualities in Vietnam.

Animism. Animism is the belief in the existence of a separate soul-entity which is potentially distinct and apart from any concrete embodiment in a living individual or material organism. It is, in short, the belief in spirits. Moreover, it is usually implied that these spirits can actively intervene in everyday events as causative factors - for better or for worse.

The spirits of Vietnamese Animism are primarily those of departed ancestors who remain to "haunt" the current generation. This belief lies at the basis of Vietnamese ancestor worship, which has been given essentially traditional Chinese forms of expression. In Vietnamese beliefs there are also spirits (other than those of the ancestors) recognized by the population at large. These may be of human origin or may take the form of ogres or other mythological creatures. It follows that the spirits can be malevolent or benevolent. The wise man propitiates accordingly those spirits which he believes may have an influence on him. One thing in man's favor, the Vietnamese believe, is that spirits are essentially naive, like children, and usually can be fooled. Equally, however, they can be capricious. While the "appropriate" propitiation is frequently successful, at times it may fail miserably. This subtle blend of usual success with unexpected failure has led the Vietnamese to exhibit the joint, yet seemingly contradictory, characteristics of a cautious willingness to "try" and a resigned "fatalism" in the face of adversity. The Vietnamese definitely

does not view the natural world as something that can be manipulated with certainty, and failure in execution is frequently rationalized on basis of capricious spirits rather than human ineffectiveness.

Closely allied with Animism, especially in Vietnam, and frequently referred to under the same label, is Animatism. Animatism denotes the belief in the habitation of natural objects by impersonal supernatural forces rather than spirits. In a technical sense Animism is a religion, while Animatism lies within the purview of magic. Vietnamese culture exhibits a significant infusion of both.

The Vietnamese belief in Animatism has reinforced the fundamental cautiousness derived through Animism: impersonal forces, with which the world abounds, must be in one's favor, or any action is preordained to failure. Thus, astrologers are consulted regarding propitious days for specific actions, geomancers regarding the most appropriate geographic location and orientation for buildings and activities, and any of a variety of soothsayers for an interpretation of the essentially preordained (except for the unpredictable intrusion of spirits) future.

Vietnamese vary greatly concerning the degree to which they hold these various beliefs. However, even the most "rational" Vietnamese is likely to exhibit significant traces of Animatism (the more tenacious) and Animism. The more sophisticated and Western-educated Vietnamese usually rationalize their remnant beliefs by saying, "After all, you never know for certain; besides, it does not pay to take chances."

The most important nonpersonal spirit is the patron spirit of the village. Traditionally the patron spirit was personally appointed as guardian of a specific village by the emperor, and it was the formal designation of the spirit which signaled the granting of juridical personality to the village. Each village has a dinh (vaguely synonymous with temple, but also used for other than religious purposes) wherein the patron spirit is honored at appropriate times and propitiated as deemed necessary.

There are many other spirits of considerable importance -- particularly those which supposedly influence such natural phenomena as the rain and the wind. These vary greatly in detail from region to region, and even from village to village. The Montagnards, whose sole religion -- except for those few converted to Protestantism -- is Animism, have generally the most complex system of spiritualist beliefs and practices. Even here specific beliefs vary considerably from tribe to tribe and only the grossest of generalizations is possible.

Buddhism. Buddhism is Indian in origin -- it was founded in the 6th century, BC -- and was first introduced into the Vietnamese

culture (in its Mahayanist form) through China more than one thousand years ago. It apparently won rather wide and rapid acceptance. The vast majority of Vietnamese who profess to be Buddhists are adherents of one of the several "schools" of Mahayana Buddhism which have evolved in Vietnam in their present form largely since the early 1930s, at which time a religious revival was underway.

Mahayana Buddhism is to be contrasted with the older and more orthodox Hinayana ("lesser vehicle," now considered pejorative) or Theravada ("of the elders," now preferred) Buddhism. Theravada is the basic religion of all other mainland Southeast Asian countries, except predominantly Muslim Malaya, and that of the remaining Vietnamese Buddhists and the Khmer minority. "Mahayana" means "greater vehicle," indicating the belief that there are several distinct but equally valid "paths" or "ways" (each represented by a separate "school") to the attainment of Nirvana -- roughly the Buddhist equivalent of "Heaven." Nirvana is more accurately translated as "nothingness" (the precise meaning of which is much in dispute), implying the cessation of all sensations equivalent to human sensory perceptions and thought. The latter are viewed by Buddhists as the source of all pain in an essentially cruel and hostile world. The essence of Nirvana, and thereby the fundamental basis of all Buddhist thought, is perhaps best grasped through an understanding of "The Four Noble Truths":

(1) The Noble Truth of Pain (or suffering): all existence is, in the last analysis, pain.

(2) The Noble Truth of the Cause of Pain: pain is the result or reflection of unsatisfied human cravings.

(3) The Noble Truth of the Cessation of Pain: pain will only cease when human craving ceases.

(4) The Noble Truth of the Path that Leads to the Cessation of Pain: this is "The Noble Eightfold Path" which consists of "The Right View," "Thought," "Speech," "Action," "Livelihood," "Effort," "Mindfulness" and "Concentration."

Both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism ascribe to these basic teachings. All also accept the essential elements of the "Wheel of Rebirth": every living "consciousness" is destined to pass through an unpredetermined series of rebirths at varying levels of existence -- from that of the lowest, most despicable creatures (e.g. insects) to that of the highest celestial beings. The cycle may be stopped only by "achieving" Nirvana. One's position on the Wheel -- specifically the level of one's current existence -- is determined by the net balance (over the totality of all past rebirths) of one's accumulated "merit"

reduced by the sum of one's bad deeds -- the law of Karma. "Merit" may be earned by properly following The Noble Eightfold Path. Bad deeds are the result of the converse. There is, in fact, a significant parallel between The Noble Eightfold Path and The Ten Commandments.

The Theravadan school (or, "interpretation") applies a rather strict and simplified (in practice) interpretation of these beliefs. While merit is earned through all "Right Actions," the giving of contributions to the church is the most common one. The usual method is the daily distribution of food to the monks (the monks do not "beg"), although larger contributions may be given on certain religious holidays and at significant times in the life of the individual, e.g. at marriage, at the birth of a son, or in old age. The Theravadans stress deep knowledge of the teachings of Buddha as a means to "Right Action." It is the function of the monkhood (sangha in Pali, the sacred language of Theravada Buddhism) to impart such knowledge, in conjunction with which the monkhood historically has operated in Theravadan countries an elementary school system teaching such secular subjects as reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and history.

The less orthodox Mahayanist branch has spawned a number of different "schools." Distinctions among the schools are largely the result of emphasizing one or a few of the individual elements of The Noble Eightfold Path (more specifically, of the canons) to the relative neglect of the remainder. Varying interpretations as to the meanings and ramifications of the eight elements also enter into the equation, and some Mahayanist schools are radically different in their interpretation of the universe and man's relationship thereto. Several of the Mahayanist schools have reinterpreted Gautama Buddha (the founder of Buddhism) as one of a number of bodhisattvas, or god-like saints, who have at great self-sacrifice refused to pass into Nirvana so that they can help the rest of mankind along The Noble Eightfold Path. Once all mankind has reached the limits of Nirvana, then all will pass (as bodhisattvas) into Nirvana together. In Theravada beliefs there are no pantheon, and Gautama Buddha has become one with Nirvana. Essentially, the Mahayana form is more altruistic and reformist than the Theravadan which emphasizes personal salvation.

Implicit in Mahayanist teachings is the belief that the bodhisattvas are active, rather than passive, deities. Prayers are addressed to the bodhisattvas, individually and collectively, and the act of prayer is itself a means of earning merit -- prayer (and votive offering) having among most Mahayanist schools replaced the daily offering to the sangha as the primary means of accumulating merit. The Mahayanist is left intentionally much to his own religious devices and is perceptibly less ascetic in his approach to daily life. Too, since

there is far less need for it, the sangha is generally less well developed in Mahayanist countries than in Theravadan, and until recently this was particularly true of Vietnam.

Buddhism has shown an impressive vitality throughout the centuries, and many observers agree that the religion has been undergoing a significant revival (since the end of the 19th century) greatly influenced by nationalism. Important in this regard is Buddhism's ideological flexibility -- less true of the Theravadan branch than of the Mahayanist. All branches of the religion are currently attempting to adjust their teachings to conform to the needs of the modern, technological environment. This effort was perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the Sixth World Buddhist Conference, held from May 1954 to May 1956 in Rangoon, which was ecumenical in spirit and reformist in approach.

Confucianism. More than a religion, but also less than one, Confucianism was (and is) a code of ethics, a way of life, a weltanschauung or "conception of the world." Similar to most modern ideologies Confucianism attempted to provide an appropriate answer for most of the major questions: the "proper" relationship of man to his fellow man, man to his state and man to the universe. Confucius accepted the prevailing spiritual beliefs of the Chinese, largely Animistic in content, as valid, for he was intent only upon fashioning the ideal social order, with emphasis on the optimum form of government. His relative weakness on the spiritual side was later exploited by such philosophical schools as Taoism. Yet, this apparent weakness was one of the fundamental strengths of Confucianism. Not tied to any specific spiritual conception of the world Confucianism was compatible with most. Thus, Confucianism and Taoism, seemingly contradictory, could exist side by side for centuries in China, each preeminent in its own field.

Confucius viewed government as basically an ethical problem which was to be solved by "right conduct" on the part of all members of the society. Primary among the various principles of Confucianist "right conduct" were:

- (1) chih = uprightness or inner integrity
- (2) i - righteousness
- (3) chung = conscientiousness toward others, i.e. loyalty
- (4) shu - altruism or "reciprocity" -- the equivalent of the Christian "Golden Rule":
- (5) jin = love or humanheartedness -- most important, in that, without true compassion the other principles are likely to be applied mechanistically.

The "proper man" should also possess wen (culture, polish) and li (proper etiquette or decorum). Wen and li are most commonly interpreted by Westerners as a combination of outward passivity (even in the most emotion-laden situations), a very complex and accentuated regard for "face," and a generally stoic approach toward the vicissitudes of the real world. Westerners, unfortunately, seldom penetrate beyond the "external polish" to the "inner virtues" of the complete Confucian man. Many significant features of Confucianism remain in SVN. Pre-colonial administrative and social structure, for example, was largely Confucian in origin, with relative local autonomy realized below province level. Village government was conducted through a council of elders (notables), and contact with the central government was usually limited to taxation (generally paid in kind), corvée and conscription. In return the villagers received security, justice and relief during calamities: the essential (and only) responsibilities of a "just" Confucianist government. The French changed but did not eradicate these concepts, especially in the south. The "mandarin" (now pejorative) concept of the civil servant was also Confucian, and much of the "mandarin" attitude remains. More important, the aggravated respect for education in general and traditional education in particular, as well as the emphasis upon filial piety, respect for the elders and superiors and distaste for manual labor are all part of the Confucianist heritage.

It is also frequently suggested, although there is little concrete evidence to support the contention, that the penchant of Vietnamese for overthrowing governments by force is Confucian. The Chinese philosopher Mencius, expanding upon Confucius, taught that the emperor had a mandate (heaven sent) to rule, but that a bad emperor no longer retained that mandate. The loss of the mandate was symbolized in practice by, and confirmed only by, a successful revolution -- the accepted manner of replacing tyranny with benevolence. An unsuccessful revolt, on the other hand, indicated that the emperor had not lost his mandate and was, by definition, fully deserving of continued veneration.

Despite the influence of decades of French colonial rule and 20 years of war, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the rural Vietnamese continues to view the proper order of society in roughly the terms sketched above. This attitude is changing, however, and the current conflict in the countryside has undoubtedly accelerated the rate of change. Yet, the Confucianist conception of the social order remains valid as the necessary starting point for any thorough understandings of Vietnamese society.

Taoism. Taoism was never a homogeneous philosophy in China, for, like most Chinese schools of thought, it went through an extensive period of evolution and varied interpretation reflecting the imagination and genius of Chinese scholarship. There are, however, certain basic features of Taoism which thread their way through all the various

schools and which are important for an understanding of Vietnamese religious thought and practice.

Intellectually, Taoism was a rebellion against, if not the antithesis of, Confucianism. In practice it provided a relief valve for the individual by presenting a rationale for acquiescence in, and a spiritual alternative to, the authoritarian Confucianist structure of society. Taoism means, literally, "Road" or "Way." Whereas Confucianism was intent upon the task of defining man's relationship to his fellow man. Taoism was concerned with showing the individual the "path" to harmony with the universe in a nonmaterial sense. Mysticism was an essential aspect, if not the core, of the entire philosophy. Frequently, for example, the Taoists would resort to trance as a means of creating the transitory communion of the individual with the "powers" of the "impersonal natural order." In such practices the Taoists built upon and reinforced the traditional Animist beliefs and practices of the people.

It was believed by the Taoists that man's efforts to change or improve the material environment would only destroy the essential harmony of the natural order and produce chaos. Thus, in Taoism the "key" to merging with the "way" of nature lies in the doctrine of wu-wei, or "doing nothing." The wise man knows the essential harmonies of nature and attempts to blend into them but never interferes. This aspect of Taoism is reflected in the characteristic of attentisme exhibited by the Vietnamese under conditions of stress or adversity. The Taoist concept of "Primitivity," or simplicity, is another expression of the Taoist view of nature. Similar to Rousseau's logical abstraction of the "State of Nature," "Primitivity" implies that those things found directly in nature are far better (less dangerous) than the contrivances of man, which in effect interfere with the "normal" operation of nature. Thus, the Taoist would praise the farmer who carried water up from the well on his shoulders rather than utilize a water wheel, which should be considered as an ingenious device that could lead to a devious mind. Herein lies potential reinforcement, for, if not the seeds of, the basic conservatism usually ascribed to the peasant in a traditional society. It should be noted here, however, that the Vietnamese, despite their Taoist heritage, are less resistant to technological innovation than the peasants of most traditional societies, providing the material advantages of the innovation are clearly evident.

The Buddhists

Schools and Sects. The Noble Eightfold Path of Mahayana Buddhism is represented in Vietnam by at least eight "schools" (district philosophical or procedural practices) and at least 16 sects (organizations).

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The sects reflect the organizational structure of the religion at the rice roots level, and they are much more important than the distinction of philosophical schools -- concerning which Mahayana Buddhists are, by definition, most tolerant -- for political purposes. The sects have been formed for geographical and, especially, political reasons. They dissolve almost as easily as they are formed, and a change in the number and influence of the various sects is an important yardstick of nonreligious forces at work within the Buddhist community.

The initial period of proliferation of sects, from 1929 to 1940, clearly reflected the growing political turmoil and economic discontent of the period. Among the determining factors were the example of the very active political involvement of the sangha in Burma beginning in 1920, the rise of nationalism and anti-colonialism throughout Southeast Asia following WW I and the depression of the early 1930s. A recent example of sect formation is that of the Co Son Mon sect of the "Pure Land" school which was allegedly created on the initiative of Diem as a counter to Buddhist opposition during the 1963 crisis.

There are three Theravadan schools, of which only Lust Tong, the "Disciplinary School," is important. This is the school of orthodoxy and claims the vast majority of Theravadan followers, both Khmer and Vietnamese.

As with the Mahayanists, the Theravadans are represented by several sects. There is a lay sect paralleling each clerical sect.

Buddhist Organization - Its Historical Development. The proliferation of Buddhist sects in Vietnam soon developed a countervailing force in the demand for some form of central organization as a means of offsetting the weakening aspects of fractionization. A major impetus to both was provided by the Viet Minh who encouraged the religious movements, attempting to gain their support against the French. This was especially significant in North and Central Vietnam where the confrontation with the French was concentrated. The three leading Buddhist bonzes on the current political scene (Tri Quang, Tam Chau and Thien Minh), for example, are Northerners who worked with the Viet Minh from 1945 to 1951.^{1/}

In 1951 several highly politicized, but anti-communist, bonzes established the General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists (GAVB) at Hue. By 1962 this organization had grown to include some 600 nuns, 3,000 bonzes and 1,000,000 lay members, of which 70,000 - 90,000 were in youth groups.^{2/} Until its replacement the GAVB was the primary, and almost sole, Buddhist multi-sect organization of any political importance. It was organized regionally with one sangha and one lay group for each of the three principal regions of Vietnam: North, Central and South.

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Individual members were allowed to retain their sect and philosophical school affiliations.

It was the GAVB which initiated and led the protest movement against the Diem regime. Shortly following the May incident in Hue, the GAVB established an "Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism," headed by Thich Tam Chau. This was clearly the turning point in the Vietnamese Buddhist movement, and Buddhist political activity and organization thereafter increased rapidly in both quantity and effectiveness.

It was the expressed desire of the Buddhist leadership to create a truly mass movement devoted to achieving a social revolution.^{3/} Ideas for further expansion and consolidation were articulated by Tam Chau in early December 1963, and included: (1) the development of new sources of financial support (e.g., lay-managed real estate companies); (2) the establishment of health and first aid facilities in the pagodas; and, (3) the setting up of a temporary Buddhist "liaison bureau" to take action on a number of key proposals. The latter included the improvement of contracts between the Inter-Sect Committee and provincial Buddhist leaders, better liaison with foreign Buddhist organizations, closer relations between local pagodas and youth, the founding of a daily Buddhist newspaper, and the establishment of social welfare organizations to improve the lot of the people. Active membership, however, was largely urban in content, although 14 of the 16 recognized Mahayana sects belonged to the GAVB by 1 November 1963. It should be noted that the two sects which did not belong to the GAVB, the Co Son Mon and the Trinh Do Ton, represented (on their claims) well over two million of the Vietnamese Buddhists. 4:27/5/

The emphasis on youth organizations is of special importance. A Buddhist Student Association had existed for some years in both Hue and Saigon, and it was this group which had provided the core of the demonstrators which had been so successful against Diem. The Buddhist leadership had quickly recognized the potential of the students, and in mid-December of 1963 the Buddhist Student Association was instructed to send several members on a tour of the Central Lowlands to organize high school students for Buddhist purposes. Not only are the high school students more numerous than college students, but the demonstrations against Diem proved that the former were far more active politically and easier to organize. The GAVB also conducted programs for students, workers and women in Buddhist doctrine and (political) policy, administration and propaganda techniques.

A four-day "national" convention of Buddhist leaders was held in Saigon from 30 December 1963 to 2 January 1964. Attended by some 500 Buddhist monks, nuns and lay leaders representing the major Buddhist

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sects, the convention had the goal of unifying all Vietnamese Buddhists. Thich Tam Chau set before the Convention three tasks: (1) to review the results of the Buddhist struggle against religious discrimination; (2) to establish a unified Buddhist organization; and, (3) to determine a plan of future action.^{2:5/} The move for a unified organization was quickly seized by Thich Tri Quang, chief of the Central Vietnam section of the GAVB and leader of the more radical younger bonzes during the 1963 crisis.

The new Buddhist organization, the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA), was launched on 3 January 1964. Only 11 of the Buddhist sects joined immediately as the smaller sects, especially the Khmer, preferred a weaker organization. Nevertheless, by the end of 1964, 14 had joined, as well as the four clerical and lay Theravada sects including those of the Khmer. The UBA not only subsumed the dissolved GAVB but created two entirely new organs. The first of these, the High Clerical Council -- Vien Tang Thong (VTT) -- or Institute for Religious Affairs, is in theory the ruling body of the UBA. The head of the Council, Thich Tinh Khiet, is the Supreme Bonze (appointed to a four year term) and the titular head of all Buddhists acknowledging the UBA. The Council was originally composed of eight of the older, more conservative bonzes. These were equally divided between the Theravada and the Mahayana sects and between the "older" bonzes (those over 60 years old) and the "superior" bonzes (those 40 to 60 years old). The Council limited its overt interests almost exclusively to religious affairs, formally leaving the political arena to the second body, the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma -- the Vien Hoa Dao (VHD) in Vietnamese -- which is also known as the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith or the Institute for Secular Affairs. The formal responsibilities of the VTT are to regulate the religious life of the bonzes and nuns, advise the VHD on matters of doctrine and elect the Supreme Bonze.^{6:7/}

During the December 1965 biennial conference of the UBA, the VTT was "strengthened" by the addition of an advisory synod of 60 bonzes and a general secretariat selected by the Supreme Bonze on the advice of the VHD. The Synod will be composed on the same basis as the VTT, and the membership will be for life and self-perpetuating within the body itself. The Synod's responsibilities will be similar to those of the VTT, but it will also include that of proposing candidates for election to the VHD Steering Committee (also established at the December 1965 conference) at each biennial conference.

Because of the Synod's size and its control of the composition of the new VHD Steering Committee, some observers see a significant shift in effective power from the VHD to the VTT, or, more specifically, to the Synod. This was clearly the opinion of Thich Tri Quang, who is reported to have said that the Synod will effectively have the right to compel the VHD to reconsider matters to which the Synod might take exception.

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Others believe the Synod will restrict its interests to religious affairs. Thich Tam Chau is among this group.6/

The VHD has assumed the responsibilities and activities formerly pursued by the Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism under the GAVB. Thich Tam Chau, chairman of the Inter-Sect Committee, was elected the president of the VHD from its founding in 1964 and was re-elected to that post in December 1965.

The VHD was organized initially on the basis of a governing body and six general commissions which administered the functions of religious personnel, propagation of the faith, rites, finance and reconstruction, layman's affairs and youth. At the 1965 biennial meeting, the Commission of Rites was eliminated and its functions divided into two new commissions, those for education and social-cultural affairs. Moreover, the Commission of Finance and Reconstruction was subdivided into a separate commission for each function. Each commission is headed by a leading bonze and has several clerical and lay members.

Under its original charter, the VHD was headed by a "cabinet" composed of the Supreme Bonze, the Secretary General of the VTT (Thich Tri Quang) and the chairmen of the original six commissions. Under the revised (December 1965) charter, the VHD will be headed by a steering committee composed of the top 12 VHD officers. As indicated above, their appointment will be effectively controlled henceforth by the Synod.6/

There has been an amazingly rapid growth of ancillary organizations under the UBA since its founding. A comprehensive knowledge of these organizations, and the degree to which they reach the hamlet level, is essential to any appraisal of Buddhist political power. The following data was current as of 1 December 1964 and has been updated as indicated:8/

(1) Mien Organizations. These are local organizations under the control of the VHD. They are well organized in the Coastal Lowlands and in the urban areas.

(2) Educational Institutions.

(a) The Institute for Higher Buddhist Studies. This organization is affiliated with the VHD and is now the Van Hanh Buddhist university.9:13-14/

(b) Clerical Schools. There are two Buddhist academies, a refresher school for clerical personnel and a training center to provide primary and secondary education for priests and nuns. There is also a judo school in Saigon with an enrollment of over 3,000. There are now over 30 Bo De schools throughout Vietnam which provide both primary and secondary education to children. The Bo De High School in Saigon has an enrollment of well over 5,000 students.

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(3) Other Organizations.

(a) The Thich Quang Duc Group. This body was established in March of 1964 as a means of uniting Buddhist lay intellectuals with the Buddhist movement. It operates under the VHD and apparently acts as a political "brain trust" for that body, although its ostensible purpose is "to promote the study of Buddhism."9:15/ Thich Quang Duc was the first suicide by fire.

(b) The Phu Giao Vu, or Chaplain's Corps. Founded on 1 July 1964, there are now over 40 Buddhist chaplains serving with the RVNAF.

(c) Groups. These are the most numerous and are designed to support the Buddhist schools as a means of reaching the youth of the country. Their total membership allegedly approaches one-half million.

(d) Other Groups. There are a number of minor organizations, such as the Vietnamese Buddhists Overseas and the Buddhist Women's Group.

(e) The Inter-Faith Liaison Committee. This organization, founded by Thich Tam Chau, represented the UBA, the Catholics, the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao and the Baha'i World Faith. It was the forerunner to the official GVN Committee for Religious Liaison which has recently been renamed the Council of Religions. Buddhist membership in the latter is now limited to the General Buddhist Association (GBA). The Committee for Religious Liaison is now headed by Father Van Vui.

More recently there has been a movement toward the formation of a Buddhist lay political party, and the proposal was approved at the December 1965 meeting of the UBA. The party, to be named the "Vietnamese Buddhist Forces," will be headed by laymen Nguyen Duong and Tran Quang Thuan.10/ Both are close to Tri Quang, and it may be expected that he will retain considerable influence in the organization.

The contemporary involvement of the Buddhists in politics may be dated for convenience from 8 May 1963. It was on this date that Major Dang Sy, commanding certain security forces in Hue, allegedly ordered his troops to fire on a crowd of Buddhist demonstrators who were in the act of protesting the Diem government's ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag on the latter's birthday. The Buddhists interpreted Diem's proscription, embodied in the notorious Article 10, as religious persecution. Those who died in the Hue "massacre" -- there is still some question as to exactly what happened -- became martyrs. Although the incident was tragic in its own right, its real significance lay in its being the catalyst that changed latent Buddhist hostility and discontent into an active political movement. Viewed by the Buddhists as the latest, and worst, of a long series of real and imagined slights perpetrated by the Catholics, the incident at Hue was the figurative straw that broke the camel's back.

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Historical Buddhist-Catholic enmity is an excellent case study of the alienation of a minority. A vicious spiral of events developed in which each act by one group elicited a countermeasure by the other, each mutual exchange widening the chasm between the two. During the precolonial and early colonial years, the Buddhists -- or, more accurately, the ruling Confucianist-Buddhist emperor of the day -- viewed Catholicism not only as a foreign religion, but as a means of foreign political intervention.^{11:7/12:48/} One of the more romantic examples of such intervention is that of Father Pigneau de Behaine who was instrumental in returning Prince Nguyen Anh to the Nguyen throne in the latter part of the 18th century. Moreover, it was on the pretext of rescuing persecuted Catholic missionaries that the French began their final intervention in 1856. Catholics were persecuted at frequent intervals. Alexander of Rhodes, for example, was expelled from Tonkin by Trinh Trang in 1630, and a sizeable number of Catholics, including several missionaries, were massacred in 1834 by Emperor Minh Mang (1820-41). The "Fete des Saints Martyrs" is a principal holiday of the Vietnamese Catholics today. Minh Mang's son and successor, Thieu-Tri (1841-47), was even more harsh toward the Catholics.^{12:409-611/}

During the colonial period Court opposition gave way to popular resentment as economic and social factors came into play. The Vietnamese Catholics, by virtue of the French-supported Church schools, received not only a better but a more appropriate -- i.e., French -- education than did their Buddhist countrymen under the relatively lethargic village bonzes. The Catholic advantage in education led in turn to social and economic advantages, either in the colonial administrative system or in the economic sector. Some Buddhists did achieve recognition under the French, but the percentage of Catholics in the civil service, for example, exceeded the Catholic proportion of the population significantly.

As the tensions of the anti-colonialist struggle increased, the Vietnamese Catholics generally came to be viewed as "collaborationists."^{14/} There were notable exceptions, of which Ngo Dinh Diem was an outstanding example, but nationalism necessarily widened the gulf between the two groups. Beginning in 1945, moreover, the question of collaboration took on an entirely new dimension. The Viet Minh were recognized by many Vietnamese Catholics, partly as a result of French publicity, to have a strong element of communist influence. Even more than their European co-religionists the Vietnamese Catholics have been violently anti-communist, and many who might otherwise have joined the Viet Minh against the French were driven to collaboration by communism. Conversely, because many joined the Communists against the French, the Buddhists are viewed by the Catholics as being "soft" on communism. Further, some 600,000 of the 860,000 refugees who moved south after the Geneva Conference of 1954 were Catholics with a particularly vehement anti-communist outlook. The fact their Buddhist countrymen largely preferred to remain in the North gave further substance to Catholic suspicions of Buddhist complicity and perfidy.

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The northern origins of the Catholic refugees has added an additional element to the already complex religious situation: regionalism, long an important cultural and political factor in Vietnam. (See: Chapter 1) The Catholic refugees brought with them their pride as Northerners and their disdain for the South. They were viewed in turn by both Southerners and Annamese as aggressive carpetbaggers who had arrived to extract from the South what they had abandoned to the Communists in the North.

There were some grounds for the Buddhist fears. Aside from a small elite group, most of the Catholic refugees that came south were from the "two semi-autonomous, semi-theocratic, and tightly organized Catholic enclaves" of Bui Chu and Phat Diem. They had organized their own military forces to fight against the Viet Minh and had largely retained this organizational solidarity when they fled the North. It was, "primarily, these northern Catholics, transplanted almost physically into South Vietnam, primarily along the central coastal region, especially Phu Yen province, which (could) . . . readily provide, on very short notice, well organized mass demonstrations and even, as in late August 1964, armed bands."14:4/ On the other hand, it should be emphasized that southern Catholics, in contrast to their northern and central coreligionists, have generally maintained good relations with the Buddhists. This has served to exacerbate the regional aspect of the Buddhist-Catholic controversy by dividing the Catholics internally, although the southern Catholics are becoming increasingly politicized along northern Catholic lines.

The Diem regime exacerbated all of these divisive factors. Diem was a Catholic, and a certain amount of favoritism was natural. "Partiality toward Catholics was more a matter of atmosphere, of an unofficially approved attitude, than an avowed policy of the Diem regime . . ."11:1/ Diem had sought -- within the parameters imposed by the need to ensure personal loyalty -- the best educated, most capable, most experienced, most anti-communist Vietnamese he could gather to staff the government. Inevitably the group he selected was heavily weighted in favor of northern and central Catholics of French educational background and, frequently, administrative experience within the colonial bureaucracy.

Although the Buddhists claim with some validity that they are without religious prejudice, they remain sensitive to direct interference with their own beliefs. In his search for a formula that would aid in welding together a "national" entity in Vietnam, Diem adopted the concept of "Personalism" which he hoped to make the national philosophy. Personalism was initially a curious blend of Catholic morality and existentialist philosophy which had originated in France during the 1930s under the direction of Emmanuel Mounier and a small host of French intellectuals. The Buddhists resisted Personalism as an alien ideology and viewed Diem's efforts -- his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was actually the driving force behind the program -- as another attempt at Catholic domination.

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One of Diem's most outstanding successes was the efficient resettlement of the northern refugees in the South. However, the refugees were settled in some instances on land taken from Southerners with little or no compensation. Moreover, the aid which was given to the refugees, most of whom were Catholic, was usually funneled through the village priest, highlighting the religious character of the refugee villages. As the Buddhists were quick to point out, such aid on occasion continued long after the need for it had ended.

One of Diem's four brothers, Thuc, was Archbishop of Hue. As such he was alleged to have developed quite blatant forms of illicit aid to the Catholics, as, for example, funds and material for the construction of the Hue Cathedral.^{11:2/} This ensured the enmity of the Annamese Buddhists. The fact that another of Diem's brothers, Duc, was the province chief of Thua Thien (the province in which Hue is situated) lent substance to these charges and added new ones. The Buddhists viewed this as deliberate favoritism and discrimination. The Catholics, regardless of individual political preferences, became identified as "Diemists" and with the secret Can Lao party which was run by Diem's brother Nhu. Even today the Buddhists refer to Catholics, especially those suspected of wanting to reinstate the favored positions that Catholics enjoyed under Diem, as "Diemists" or "Can Laoists," although both terms are no longer accurately descriptive. As the Buddhist position hardened after May of 1963, the Catholics were driven closer to Diem. The Hue "massacre" of 8 May 1963 confirmed all Buddhist suspicions of Catholic perfidy and all Catholic fears of reprisals. The issue, now political and economic as well as religious, was openly joined in the political arena.

The Buddhists greatly outnumbered the Catholics, and the scope of their influence was sufficient to redress the official balance of privileges significantly. During the period immediately following the downfall of Diem there were numerous Buddhist-Catholic incidents, particularly in the Central Lowlands.^{16:2/} Catholic homes and stores were looted and burned, religious images and altars destroyed and Catholic bodies exhumed and desecrated.^{17/} Observers believed that the Viet Cong instigated many, if not most, of these acts, but there was fertile ground for VC manipulation. In Phu Yen Province, where the friction perhaps was greatest, it was claimed in early May of 1964 that the oppression of the Buddhists had begun in 1963 and was still continuing. Catholic district chiefs were allegedly discriminating against the Buddhists, and some Buddhists had been mistreated physically. Catholics were also believed to be secretly working through such "national" political parties as the Dai Viet to restore their power. However true the claims of discrimination and physical abuse may have been, the labelling of the Dai Viet as a pro-Catholic party was unjustified.

The Khanh government moved after the 30 January 1964 coup to ensure the support of the Buddhists. Many Buddhists were appointed to government posts, and the government gave financial support to build a national

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pagoda, created a chaplain's corps, executed Ngo Dinh Can, tried and sentenced Major Sy and jailed many of the police officials of the Diem regime. As the Catholics were levered out of power, their resentment naturally increased.

Buddhist support for General Khanh evaporated rapidly, however. Despite the numerous concessions that he had initially made, Khanh found it necessary to move Catholics into certain critical positions. Moreover, Khanh's "Vung Tau Charter" concentrated all power in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Council -- dominated, the Buddhists believed, by Catholics. "An enthusiastic Catholic reaction in favor of the Charter tended to confirm Buddhist suspicions that it represented the return to power of the Catholics (or Diemists or Can Lao)."19:8/ The US was caught in the middle, for it had helped Khanh write the Charter. On the other hand, apparent US support of Khanh in his concessions to the Buddhists branded both Ambassador Lodge and US policy as pro-Buddhist, if not actively anti-Catholic, in Catholic eyes.19:9/

In sharp contrast to what had gone before, Buddhist opposition to the Huong government was only very slightly, if at all, religious in nature. Rather, questions of personality, basic loyalty and political power were at the heart of the confrontation. As active discrimination and favoritism have receded in fact, religious feelings of oppression have become latent, but they are not very far below the surface. In referring on 3 September 1965 to the province chief of Quang Tri Province, with whom there had been obvious popular dissatisfaction, Thich Tri Quang said: "Tru is a Dai Viet and a Catholic and can never be in sympathy with the predominantly Buddhist population of the province or the Buddhist dominated council."15/

Personalities and Policies. There are few valid generalizations which can be applied to the interrelated questions of personalities and objectives within the Buddhist movement. Leadership, especially, has remained highly competitive, with primacy shifting back and forth among a relatively small number of younger bonzes who have been with the movement since its inception. Tactics, too, have varied, as the leadership has attempted to orchestrate such successful techniques as demonstrations, press releases, speeches, fasts and the use of students. The question of the precise objectives of the movement is probably the most difficult, for objectives have varied widely in the short run and have been but vaguely stated with reference to the long run. The only definitive trend has been the shift from more or less explicitly religious objectives to those that are political in the broadest sense.

Actual political power within the UBA does not closely follow the formal lines of authority described above under organization. Rather, the political loyalties and allegiances -- the informal power structure -- which existed within the GAVB have been carried over into the newer and more comprehensive organization. Of crucial importance are the rem-

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nants of the lay and clerical associations of the GAVB for two of the three regions of pre-1954 Vietnam. Thich Tam Chau and Thich Tri Quang, leaders of the Tonkin (North) and the Annam (Central) regional associations, respectively, have retained their old following largely unchanged. Their factions are the primary contestants for political control of the overall movement. In contrast the Southern Region has had little direct impact, for there is considerable truth in Phan Huy Quat's statement that: "Politically active Cochinchinese do not exist, since political Southerners had either joined Viet Minh or had been eliminated by communists or French."20/

The Buddhist View of Its Role in Politics. Buddhist political involvement is rationalized by the political activists among the Buddhist hierarchy essentially on the erroneous grounds that "Buddhists represent 80 percent of the population and therefore the fulfillment of the people's aspirations is the legitimate concern of the Buddhist leadership."21/ In reality, devout Buddhists number considerably less than 80 percent of the population -- probably fewer than 30 percent -- and the hierarchy controls only a minority, largely urban, of these.22/ Nevertheless, the Buddhist leadership believes with considerable justification that the revolt against Diem was primarily their doing and that they have the duty to preserve and to complete the revolution.

Both principal factions have varied, usually alternately, in their positions as to the degree to which the UBA should be directly involved in politics as opposed to purely "religious" affairs. Since early 1964 there has been a call for a "secular," or lay, Buddhist political party. It is reasonable to presume, however, that the prominent religious leaders anticipate playing a significant behind-the-scenes role in policy determination should such a party be established. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a fundamental belief among the Buddhist hierarchy that it is "improper" for the UBA to be directly involved in politics. The parallel with the attitude of the Catholic Church toward political involvement is striking and has been noticed by several observers.

The "Centralist faction" is currently in the ascendancy. Tri Quang has used his position as Secretary General of the VTT as a springboard for his political activities. While it is the VHD which is specifically charged with the responsibility for secular affairs, Tri Quang has direct personal access to the leading personalities in the VHD, and several of his principal lieutenants have responsible positions within that organization, perhaps most notably Thich Thien Minh who holds the politically crucial position of Chairman of the General Commission for Youth. Tri Quang also has a powerful weapon in the newspapers that he controls: the official Buddhist weekly, Hai Trieu Am; the Saigon daily newspaper, Ngay Nay, and, especially, the Hue weekly journal, Lap Truong.

The Centralist faction is generally believed to be the more militant (Tam Chau says that "they enjoy being chiefs"23:1/) which stems in part

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from the important role that student groups, such as the Hue Buddhist Students Association under Buu Ton, play in Tri Quang's power base. Although student support is probably not as complete as Tri Quang boasts, there are a number of associations which recognize his authority and leadership. The militancy of this faction has been accentuated, moreover, by the Buddhist-Catholic controversy which has been largely focused on the Coastal Lowlands and which Tri Quang and his supporters have at times exacerbated in an effort to achieve their ends.

It was Tri Quang who took the initiative in attacking the Khanh government in mid-May of 1964 over that government's Buddhist policy. Shortly after this, however, Tri Quang apparently was turning toward the view that the UBA should not be directly involved in politics. In October of 1964 it was rumored that he had "been active in trying to set up a new movement in the Mekong River Delta" supported by certain "opportunistic" Buddhist lay politicians, particularly Le Khac Quyen.^{24:1/} This movement, the People's National Salvation Council (PNSC), became increasingly radical and infiltrated by Communists. It was squelched by the VHD in mid-October of 1964. Within a few weeks another group of politicians appear to have persuaded Quang that, with his tacit support, a political grouping could be formed which would run the country in accordance with Buddhist principles and allow the Buddhist clergy to return to their religious and nonpolitical concerns. During this period Quang continually spoke of his plans to retire from the scene at least temporarily after the new government had been formed, "perhaps by traveling abroad."^{25/}

Tam Chau had also been active in trying to create a political party based on Buddhist lay support since early 1964 or even earlier. On 16 December 1963 a representative of his together with the Secretary General of the Cao Dai, Le Trong Kim, was reported to have indicated that they were going to present an ultimatum to the MRC demanding a new cabinet under the premiership of Phan Khac Suu. Such a cabinet, it was suggested, would be in the "spirit" of the Dai Viet Party, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai. During the spring of 1964 Chau developed further plans for such a movement whose ostensible leadership was to be in the hands of such civilian politicians as Phan Khac Suu, Tran Dinh Nam and Nguyen Chu. The party had been initially envisaged as an opposition party which would maintain a clandestine understanding with the government leaders.

The Buddhist re-entry into active politics occurred against the Huong Government in October of 1964 and lasted until the following December. This time the roles of Tam Chau and Tri Quang were reversed, for it was Tam Chau who initiated the opposition to the Huong government. On this occasion he acted in cooperation with Father Quynh, the highly political leader of the northern Catholic refugees. Tam Chau's inept political tactics and weak leadership, however, led Tri Quang to believe Tam Chau was placing the UBA in danger, and the former took full command of

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the opposition movement. An analysis as of 26 November 1964 is instructive as to the nature of Buddhist political involvement:

"The present Buddhist involvement in political strife has none of the religious rationalization that characterized previous Buddhist struggles. ... Rather, the Buddhists appear to have been dragged rather unwillingly at first into a purely political affair, though they have no one to blame but themselves for allowing outside political groups and forces to manipulate them. ... Buddhist leaders have tried to disclaim responsibility for violence, but at the same time they have added fuel to the fire by inflammatory public manifestos and communiques, of which the most important is the November 24 letter to the Chief of State and the High National Council siding with the demonstrators and asking in effect for a change in the Huong government. Thus, while selfrighteously abhorring violence, Buddhists have nevertheless encouraged it by offering political protection for those who indulge in it, including some of the worst hoodlum elements."26/

In mid-March of 1965 the VHD formally addressed the question of the propriety of political activities by members of the hierarchy. Tri Quang called "for a return to emphasis on religious matters."27:1/ He was joined by Thich Tam Chau, and the VHD finally "agreed that the hierarchy would avoid political involvement unless Buddhism was threatened, a compromise formula which has essentially been the movement's formally stated policy since its campaign against the Diem regime."27:1/ It was becoming increasingly evident that an explicitly political party separate from the VHD and its ancillary organizations should be created to sponsor Buddhist political objectives.

The decision to establish a Buddhist political party, supported by the VHD, was apparently made on the weekend of 4-5 December 1965 by the principal religious and lay leaders of the Buddhist movement. The new party, to be called the "Vietnamese Buddhist Forces," will be headed by Tran Quang Thuan who was Minister of Social Welfare in the Quat government. It was reported that the Buddhist newspaper "Dat To" would be the party organ and that the Buddhist university, Van Hanh, would be used to train political cadre. Moreover, direct support would be given by such ancillary organizations of the UBA as the Bo De school teachers, Buddhist provincial and district representatives and the Chaplain's Corps of the ARVN.

The VBF, in building upon the foundation of the UBA, should prove to be a strong and viable political factor in Vietnam. It is only to be hoped that party objectives will be directed toward the interests of all Vietnamese rather than toward those explicitly Buddhist.

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The Buddhist Attitude Toward the War. Tri Quang and many of his more prominent followers have been inclined in the past toward a neutralist and, in some respects, anti-American program. Tri Quang's anti-Americanism first became clearly evident during the Buddhist confrontation of the Huong government, when he stated that the struggle against Huong was really against the Americans because Huong "was an American puppet."^{25/} Recently Tri Quang has been more solicitous toward the overall US presence, but he remains ready to castigate the Americans.

Allegations that Tri Quang is a Communist (the matter of his past relations with the Viet Minh is another story), however, are undoubtedly unjustified. Recently, for example, Tri Quang attacked both communism and "capitalist-lackey governments" as enemies of Buddhism in an introduction to Buddhism and Marxism.^{28/} On the other hand, Tri Quang's overriding concern for peace -- which is echoed by many in the Buddhist movement -- has caused him to express his anti-communism, like his anti-Americanism, in rather muted tones. Moreover, he has criticized Tam Chau's more militantly anti-communist public statements as being "too warlike." Increasingly members of the Buddhist hierarchy have made it clear, either publicly or privately, "that they feel the war in South Vietnam has gone on too long and should be brought to an end as expeditiously as possible."^{27:1/} Some, including Tri Quang, have appeared "confident that they can counter the communist threat more effectively than either the United States or the Vietnamese governments it has supported in the past, suggesting that the Buddhists feel that they could control a political coalition arrangement that might be reached with the Viet Cong...."^{27:1/}

The Northern faction is generally conceded to be more actively anti-communist than Tri Quang and his followers. Thich Tam Giac, a Tam Chau associate and Chief of the Buddhist Chaplain's Corps, for instance, is adamantly anti-communist. Tam Chau most recently, however, has been moving somewhat toward the more neutralist stance of Tri Quang and his followers. During the 1965 biennial UBA conference, for example Tam Chau called for peace, although he prefaced his remarks with the caveat that the Buddhists "... will not accept enslaving ideologies which are opposed to the nation, the people or religious beliefs."^{29/}

Buddhist Views of the "Proper" Form of Government. While the above illuminates some of the more important differences between the two principal factions in the Buddhist movement, it should be clearly recognized that the similarities that do exist on basic policy issues are more important than the differences. Many of the apparent differences in objectives and tactics between the two factions are largely surface reflections of the competitive milieu within which they operate. All of the Buddhist leaders, for example, are essentially united in their call for democracy in Vietnam and in their fundamental opposition to continued rule by the military. Tri Quang usually expresses this opposition along the lines that, while it is not in principle bad to have the military in

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power, in practice it allows the civilians to criticize the government irresponsibly, while the quest for political power divides the military leadership just at the time when unity in the military high command is especially necessary. He opposes the development of an appointed Consultative Assembly and believes, instead, that elections can be held now, at least in secure areas, for a National Assembly which would have the responsibility for drafting a new constitution.

Tam Chau, far more than Tri Quang, has made a serious effort at maintaining good relations with the military. It is reported, for instance, that he is in almost daily contact with Prime Minister Ky and that he meets frequently with the Commander of the Capital Military District, Brigadier General Le Nguyen Khang, and with National Police Director, Colonel Pham Van Lieu.

A principal grievance articulated by Tam Chau (and Father Quynh) against the Huong government was that Huong built his cabinet from non-political civil servants, i.e., from people the Buddhists could not manipulate. Huong had repeatedly stated that religion and education should be separated from politics -- a policy which the Buddhists both feared and resented. Moreover, Huong had authorized the legal formation of a rival Buddhist organization, the General Buddhist Association, which the UBA viewed as a direct threat intended by Huong to divide and weaken the Buddhist movement. Northerners such as both Tam Chau and Father Quynh were also sensitive to the preponderance of Southerners which Huong had included in his cabinet.

Buddhist Attitudes Toward Other Religious Groups. Tri Quang's attitude toward the Catholics could until mid-1965 be defined as aggressively negative. He continuously equated Catholic, Diemist and Can Lao -- an excellent example of the manner in which the religious and the political have become combined in the motivation of the Buddhist movement. He and his followers have adamantly claimed that the "remnants" of the Diem regime (i.e., the Catholics) who still held power in local areas must be removed. Tri Quang frequently adds that "almost all Catholics are bad."16:4/

More recently Thich Tri Quang has been relatively moderate in his actions and pronouncements with reference to the Catholics. In a draft speech he was to deliver to the UBA on 11 December 1965 Tri Quang strongly advised "the Buddhists of Vietnam to unite with Vietnamese of other faiths and consolidate the internal Buddhist organization."29/ It would be a serious error, however, to assume that the Catholic-Buddhist controversy has been permanently laid to rest in Tri Quang's political armory. Much will depend on the composition and policy of future Saigon governments. Recently, for instance, Tri Quang allegedly has been criticizing the Ky government for the appointment of three Catholic generals to key positions. It is only prudent to expect that Tri Quang will resuscitate the Catholic

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issue if and when it suits his purpose. On the other hand, the fact that the controversy is subject to periods of quiescence indicates that the issues are capable of solution.

Tam Chau has long taken a more moderate view of the religious situation. While he does assert that some "unreconstructed" Catholic priests and "Diemists" continue to hold positions of authority at local levels, he cooperated with the Catholics in North Vietnam before 1954, especially those surrounding Father Quynh, and he has maintained a very conciliatory attitude.^{6:4} He was, for example, the author of a recent (4 July 1964) VHD official statement that read: "The unchanging policy for the... /VHD/... is to sincerely maintain friendly relations and alliances with all other religions."^{11:10}

The overall UBA attitude toward religions other than Catholicism may best be characterized as relatively unconcerned. The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao were requested to join the UBA and participate in the ancillary organizations. However, the principal Mahayana Buddhist leaders have done little to encourage their participation.

The UBA's current opposition to the GVN Council of Religions (Committee of Religious Liaison) largely reflects the division between the Tri Quang faction of Buddhists, which was able to draw the entire UBA with them, and the Father Quynh faction of Catholics. The Council of Religions' membership includes Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, GBA Buddhists and Father Quynh's Catholic group.

Relations with International Buddhist Organizations. As South Vietnamese Buddhist organization and political participation have expanded and matured, the Buddhist hierarchy of the UBA have made significant efforts to establish and develop relations with Buddhist organization throughout the world. It is anticipated that a delegation will attend the United World Buddhist Association Conference in Ceylon in January 1966. Not only are such meetings designed to further explicitly religious goals, but layman Tran Quang Thuan is reported to intend using the conference as a vehicle for contacting Buddhist politicians in Ceylon, India and Burma. Thuan is currently in the forefront of the drive to establish the VBF.

Members of the VHD also attended the "World Chinese Buddhist Conference" in Taiwan in early November 1965. The Vietnamese delegation, headed by Thich Tam Chau, also included Kim Sang, a Khmer, who represented the Vietnamese Theravadan sects. The attendance of the Vietnamese delegation in Taiwan is indicative of the ostensible efforts among all Buddhists toward closer cooperation. This ecumenical spirit, if carefully nourished, may well provide an effective vehicle for drawing all Asians closer together.

Appraisal in Terms of Divisive and Cohesive Factors. To date the Buddhists have been viewed as a significant divisive factor in the South Vietnamese society, both with regard to the GVN and with regard to the

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religious minorities throughout the country. Moreover, the evolution and strengthening of the UBA, while exacerbating the above, has also served to perpetuate and intensify certain divisions within the Buddhist congregation itself.

The operating divisive factors introduced by the Buddhist movement may be categorized as follows:

(1) Those within the movement:

(a) The competition for power among the various leaders and factions within the UBA.

(b) The aggravation of internal divisions through regionalism, as reflected in Tri Quang's base among the Centralists at Hue and Tam Chau's base among the northern refugees and certain southern groups.

(c) The refusal of the Co Son Mon and certain small sects to participate in the UBA, as reflected in the existence of the GBA.

(d) The fundamental religious difference between the Mahayana majority and the Theravadan minority (exacerbated by the Khmer ethnic background of most of the latter), and, moreover, the differences among the Mahayana schools themselves.

(e) The political ideological differences within the congregation, particularly with reference to the war, which are accentuated by regionalism.

(2) Those without the movement:

(a) The continuing Buddhist suspicion of the Catholics.

(b) The tendency to ignore the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao.

(c) The willingness of Buddhist leaders to involve other religious groups, especially the Catholics, in their intramural strife.

(d) The fundamental Buddhist hostility toward any government not established on their terms.

Counterbalancing these significant divisive forces, however, are many of a cohesive nature. There are indications that the cohesive factors are gaining in importance and may now be predominant.

(1) Those within the movement:

(a) The creation of the Synod, which may well provide an element of moderation in all Buddhist activities.

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(b) The creation of a Buddhist lay political party, which may reduce the specifically religious element of Buddhist politics.

(c) The growing organizational strength and sophistication of the UBA which is reducing the intensity of internal divisions and may serve to make Buddhist political activities less radical and extreme as confidence is achieved.

(d) The increasing cooperation of northern and southern Buddhists within the UBA.

(e) The increasing moderation of Buddhist leadership, especially that of Thich Tri Quang, although this may be tactical.

(2) Those without the movement:

(a) The growing interest of Vietnamese Buddhists in the international aspects of Buddhism, with its increasing emphasis on an ecumenical spirit and tolerance toward other religions.

(b) The increasing tendency of some Buddhist leaders to cooperate with the other religions, especially the Catholics.

(c) The evidence of a more cautious and patient attitude toward the GVN, with a moderation of Buddhist demands concerning the future form of the SVN political system.

Any policy designed to deal with the Buddhists, therefore, must take due cognizance of their increasing organizational strength and attempt to encourage those factors which improve the quality of political and social responsibility and cohesiveness.

In this regard, it would appear particularly effective to:

(1) Encourage Buddhist nonpolitical activities such as the various educational institutions and charitable works.

(2) Assist and encourage Buddhist contacts with international Buddhist organizations.

(3) Encourage the return of the bonzes to purely religious affairs through acknowledgment of the Synod and legalization of the Buddhist lay political party, the "Vietnamese Buddhist Forces."

If properly motivated and led, the increasing dynamism and effectiveness of the Buddhist movement will prove to be a potent vehicle for the pacification and long-term development of South Vietnam.

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The Catholics

Geographic Concentration. The number of Catholics in SVN is variously estimated as approximately two million, or some ten percent of the population.^{30/14:5/} The Catholics themselves claim 2,036,851 as of late 1965.^{31/} It is estimated that the 600,000 refugees from the DRV in 1954-55, together with their children born in SVN, now number nearly one million, or about 50 percent of all Catholics.

Many of these refugees settled along the Coastal Lowlands from Phu Yen to Quang Ngai on land provided by the Diem government. Others settled in the Delta provinces of Dinh Tuong, Kien Giang and Kien Hoa. In fact, these latter two have a preponderance of South Vietnam's Catholics, both indigenous and refugee. A number also were settled in the Central Highlands in the Land Development Centers established there, and a significant number are to be found in and around Dalat.

Divisions and Sects. There are four factions among the Vietnamese Catholics, reflecting the regional and political differences of the congregation. The largest faction is composed of those who were resident in the South prior to 1954. These indigenous Catholics were, until quite recently (1963-64), exposed less to the rigors of the war and, hence, were less adamantly anti-communist than their Northerner coreligionists. Moreover, as indigenous residents of the South, they share the regional characteristics of the southern Buddhists, thus avoiding one of the factors exacerbating relations between the Buddhists and the northern Catholics. The southern Catholics have been relatively inactive politically, although this is beginning to change as the tempo of the war increases in the South.^{32/}

The refugee Catholics provide the other three factions which are distinguished primarily on the basis of the degree of their political activism. Recent events, however, are rapidly blurring the validity of this distinction, and what appears to be emerging is more akin to a continuous spectrum than three distinct groups.

The majority of the Catholic refugees look to Father Hoang Quynh and several of his close associates for leadership. Father Quynh has long been militantly anti-communist, and this issue currently provides the central motivation for their political activism. Father Quynh and his supporters are also motivated by fear of Buddhist repression -- a reflection of the Buddhist-Catholic controversy -- and continue to press for a non-Buddhist oriented regime. Father Quynh, however, has been described as "the most moderate of the fanatics,"^{11:12/} and he appears to be clearly aware of the importance of avoiding any sharp and permanent division between Catholics and Buddhists, which could benefit the Communists or irreparably injure the Catholic community. Rather his efforts have been

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defensive and are directed as safeguarding essential Catholic interests against further Buddhist encroachments. Many Catholics recognize they are made more secure through co-operation with the Buddhists, and Father Quynh, in fact, is currently engaged in attempting to bring all of Vietnam's various religious groups closer together.

The second Catholic faction is represented by those northern refugee Catholics who have not become significantly active politically. They are a rather small minority, and efforts by such Catholic leaders as Father Quynh, plus the heightening tenor of the war, has served to reduce their ranks perceptibly.

There is also a small radical fringe, perhaps best exemplified by Father Mai Ngoc Khue, which is rabidly anti-communist and views many of the leading Buddhist personalities to be basically "neutralist," if not pro-communist. They also view the Buddhist as a direct political threat to the Catholic minority and are more aggressive regarding Buddhist "rights."

Organization. The country has been divided into two archdioceses, one headquartered at Hue and the other at Saigon. The archbishops are Nguyen Kim Dien and Nguyen Van Binh. respectively. There are in addition 9 dioceses and 774 parishes. It is also reported that there are (or were) five vicariates.

Statistics recently published by the Apostolic Delegate, Monsignor Palmas, show that there are: 33/

Priests assigned to parishes	:	1,636
Priests of various orders	:	374
Brothers	:	973
Seminaries:		
Pontifical:	:	1 with 130 seminarians
Large	:	3 with 580 seminarians
Small	:	13 with 2,549 seminarians
Schools:		
Primary	:	1,037 with 209,283 students
Secondary	:	145 with 62,324 students
College	:	1 (the University of Dalat) with 1,500 students

In addition, the Church sponsors a very significant number of charity institutions, to include 46 hospitals (6,567 beds), 286 dispensaries, 33 maternity clinics and 50 orphanages.

The political activities of the Catholics have spawned a number of ancillary organizations, of which the most important is the Archdiocesan Liaison Office of the southern (Saigon) archdiocese. It is through this

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office that such politically active priests as Father Hoang Quynh operate to control the political activities of the "moderate" wing.

The Church hierarchy is formally connected with the Vatican both through the Chancellor of the Archdioceses, Father Nguyen Van Thuan, and through the Papal Nuncio (Apostolic Delegate) Monsignor Palmas. Their influence is considerable, but it is far from complete.^{34/}

The catalogue of semi-official political organizations is small but important. In late 1963 Father Quynh organized the "Central Committee to Guide Demonstrations." He was at that time also reportedly forming a lay Catholic association designed to provide political--primarily anti-Communists--instruction. This latter organization, now named the "Greater Catholic Union" or "Greater Anti-Communist Union," is currently the most important on the Catholic political scene (it was also once called the "Central Movement of the Catholic Struggle.") Membership figures are not available, but it would appear that many of Father Quynh's followers have joined. In June 1964 he was able to mobilize some 50,000 Catholics for a demonstration in Saigon. It was this demonstration, in fact, that led Father Quynh to establish a permanent organization. The formal initiation of the "Greater Catholic Union" occurred on 6 October 1964 at a general convention of Catholic clergy. The convention authorized both laymen and priest to join the movement, and the response of the Catholic community was apparently immediate and significant. It should be noted that the tradition of hierarchical discipline among both priests and laymen is an important factor of strength in their favor and something the Buddhist moderates do not possess to the same degree.

More recently Father Quynh has sponsored a "Front of Citizens of All Faiths," or "Inter-Faith Good Will Delegation," which was ostensibly designed as an effort to promote cooperation between the CBH Buddhists and the Catholics through the auspices of a "Round-the-World" tour. The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao were included. Papal Nuncio Palmas denied Father Quynh permission to participate, and the project folded.

The Catholic Church has also "sponsored" student organizations at the universities in Hue and Saigon and at the (Catholic) University of Dalat, under the overall direction of the Catholic Student Federation of Saigon University. Each of the universities has several Catholic student organizations, as exemplified by the Saigon Federation which coordinates at Saigon University alone the Catholic Student Youth, the Congregation of Mary and the Legion of Mary. Although nominally apolitical, these organizations have recently adapted themselves to the political milieu of campus existence.

In late 1964 it was reported that there existed a Catholic "Inter-Faculty Student Forces" organization specifically intended to oppose the Buddhist youth groups. The alleged supervisor of this militant Catholic student organization is Father Mai Ngoc Khue. Moreover, the "Student Forces" have reportedly absorbed the "High School and University Students

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for the Protection of Pure Education," also a Catholic body, which was organized by Father Quynh to oppose the now defunct "Struggling Student Forces" of the neutralists, Buddhist-supported "People's National Salvation Council."^{35/}

There are also a number of strictly lay organizations, of which one of the better-established is the "Progressive Catholics." Further, during the past year there have been a number of reports that, as individuals, the Catholics have been moving toward support of the Dai Viet political party as a means of expressing their political interests and demands.

Like the Buddhists, the Catholics also control several newspapers and journals. Thang Tien is a weekly journal which has, in fact, been recommended by the Buddhist lay politician Mai Tho Truyen as "expressing the real feelings of the Vietnamese people..."^{21/} Xay Dang is a daily newspaper published by Father Nguyen Quang Lam. This paper does not reflect the general Catholic suspicion of the present GVN, however. Rather, the paper is pro-government--specifically, pro-Ky--inasmuch as Lam is reputedly a very close friend of the Prime Minister. Hanh Trinh is a Catholic-oriented, but anti-American, magazine that is published by a small group of Diemites who are currently very much in opposition to the GVN. Hanh Trinh is symptomatic, perhaps, of the radical fringe.

Policies and Personalities. While the fundamental orientations of each of the factions has been described above, that of the politically dominant faction centered on the Saigon Archdiocese Liaison Office deserves further elaboration. On 1 November 1965 this office published a "Communique" which purported to speak for the Catholic community as a whole and which clearly stated the Catholic position regarding the GVN and the political situation in general. Specifically, the communique emphasized that:^{34/}

- (1) The GVN should move toward democracy.
- (2) Basic freedoms, especially that of the press, should be respected.
- (3) The GVN should not neglect political, economic and social problems.
- (4) There was a danger of "the authorities in friendly nations" violating the sovereignty of the RVN.
- (5) "National solidarity" had not increased during the Ky government.
- (6) Catholics should be especially careful not to damage "inter-faith harmony."

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(7) Corruption is an increasing problem.

(8) Catholics should assist "war victims."

Not all Catholics agree fully with the sentiments of "Communique #4," as it is called. A prominent Catholic layman, Mr. Nguyen Cao Thang, for instance, insists that authors Father Quynh and Ho Van Vui spoke only for a minority of the community and that, while they were supported by Father Lam, they were opposed by Father Thanh of the Redemptorist Order. Father Thanh is significant as one of the primary personalities working toward greater cooperation with the Buddhists. Father Thanh, however, categorically excluded the GBA from his proposed "Interfaith Group." (See: Page B-34)

The "Communique" was reinforced early in December 1965, at the time of Senator Mansfield's visit to SVN, by the Liaison Office's issue of a "Memorandum." Also written by Fathers Quynh and Vui, the latter essentially confirmed the position of the communique. However, the new memorandum specifically emphasized the question of SVN sovereignty through saying, "no settlement of this conflict can be considered valid without the participation and consent of a government representative of the South Vietnamese people."^{37/} The Memorandum also called upon the US to pay particular attention to:

(1) The regionalist sentiment of people native to the South and who form the majority of the population.

(2) The popular aspiration for justice.

(3) The religious sentiment which inspires the large mass of the population and can create a spirit of enthusiasm in support of a policy which truly serves the interests of the lower classes.

With reference to point (1) it is important to note that the US Embassy in Saigon interpreted it as being "one more evidence of the close political cohesion now existing between northern refugee Catholics, who have borne the brunt of Catholic political action in the past, and southern Catholics who have traditionally been more passive."^{37/}

Relationship with GVN. At the time of the Diem regime's demise, approximately three-fourths of the cabinet and 14 of 17 generals were Buddhist; and among government civil servants in the Delta Region 25 percent were Catholics, 31 percent Buddhist and 42 percent "Confucian" (i.e., of no formal religious affiliation) in late 1963.^{4:19-28/} Nevertheless, the Catholics occupied far more than their proportional share of high government offices, and there were sufficient signs of favoritism -- Diem, for example, dedicated the entire country to the Virgin Mary in 1956 -- to support Buddhist beliefs that discrimination did exist.

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Following the 1 November 1963 coup Catholic fortunes ebbed, and the employment of Catholics in the government remains a serious source of contention. The Buddhists, for example, have recently (October of 1965) protested the appointment of several Catholic generals to critical positions. Nevertheless, a number of prominent personalities in the government are Catholic, and the realities of power as well as Prime Minister Ky's insistence on appointing individuals on the basis of ability rather than religion (or any other descriptive characteristic) should ensure that they so remain.

Most recently there is some evidence that Prime Minister Ky may be moving closer to the Catholics as a means of gaining political support against a possible coup, but there is little hard evidence to support the assertion. An example of such evidence is the report that on 8 December 1965 Prime Minister Ky suggested that Vo Long Trieu, a lay member of the Liaison Bureau of the Saigon Archdiocese, be made Deputy Secretary of Youth. One interpretation is that Ky hopes thereby to separate the Catholic youth groups from the northern refugees who are "strongly" influenced by Fathers Hoang Quynh and Nguyen Quang Lam. On the other hand, it is reported that moderate Catholics are beginning to view Prime Minister Ky in a more favorable light. Also, General Thieu, the Directorate Chairman is allegedly organizing seven Catholic special Civil Guard companies. Two are to be stationed at Dalat and five in the vicinity of Bien Hoa. These companies, supposedly, will be responsive only to him.

The rapprochement between the Catholics and the GVN has been, however, far from complete. On 1 September 1965 the GVN extended juridical status to the UBA, the GBA, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. On approximately 18 October 1965 the Saigon Archdiocese requested the GVN to confer similar status on the Catholic Church. To date the GVN has failed to act. While the explanation given by the Secretary General of the Directory for this lapse appears reasonable, many of the Catholics apparently believe that the GVN is discriminating against them. General Chieu's explanation was to the effect that the foreign religious missions in South Vietnam had been extended juridical status about 1919 by the French and retained that status. Moreover, he added, to renew the status now would possibly create misunderstandings and lead to interpretations of "partisanship." ^{36/}

An issue of considerable currency between the Catholics and the GVN is the continuing imprisonment of Can Lao and Catholics (some individuals were, indeed, both) who had been involved in the coups of 13 September 1964 and 19 February 1965. Dr. Quat has suggested that a "special commission" of respected individuals be appointed to review their cases, with the implication that those accused of no "crime" other than coup participation be released.^{37/} While there is much to recommend such a move from the point of view of removing religious grievances, it has the decided disadvantage of further legitimizing coup plotting -- a most undesirable side

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effect in politically unstable South Vietnam.

In July of 1965 the GVN arrested Huynh Van Lang, President of the "Catholic People's Front." The "Front" was one of three Catholic lay organizations which were in the forefront of the opposition to Quat in June. Tran Van Huong, who replaced Lang in the "Front," was arrested on 8 November 1965. In both instances the individuals were arrested on charges going back to the Diem period, but the Catholics view the arrests as efforts by the GVN to eliminate an effective Catholic opposition.

The Catholics also believe that they are being discriminated against by the GVN through its apparent refusal (simply by inaction) to grant legal recognition to "Caritas-Vietnam," the local branch of International Catholic Relief. The request for such recognition was made in September 1965.

Relationships with Other Religious Groups. Despite the recent bitter history of the Buddhist-Catholic controversy, there is a growing recognition by the more moderate religious and lay leaders on both sides that a healing of the breach is essential if the war against the VC is to be won and if the nation is to develop. In the past year and a half these feelings have increasingly been given substance through concrete acts of co-operation.

It is clearly evident that the Catholics, in particular the northern refugees associated with Father Quynh, have tended to woo first the Buddhist religious organizations most distant from the heart of the UBA, and, specifically, most distant from Thich Tri Quang. Thus, Father Quynh has tended to support -- roughly in order of priority -- Mai Tho Truyen's Buddhist Southern Studies Association (which was legalized by the Huong government, partially as an intended counterbalance to the UBA) the GBA and the UBA. Regarding the UBA, Father Quynh is far closer to Thich Tam Chau than to Tri Quang; in fact, Tam Chau is about the limit of Catholic penetration.

This "selective" ecumenical movement can be interpreted as a policy of "Divide and Conquer," with the isolation of Tri Quang as Quynh's prime objective.

Father Huu Thanh, a member of the Redemptorist Order and a confidant of Archbishop Binh, has also been active in attempting to bring the various religious groups closer together. Father Thanh has made a proposal to establish a separate religious liaison group for the Buddhists and for the Catholics. Under his proposal, the two groups would meet together in frequent plenary sessions. Father Thanh's proposal made to the Tri Quang faction is to exclude both Father Quynh and the GBA, thus forming essentially two Catholic-Buddhist poles of conciliation: Father Thanh and the UBA versus Father Quynh and the Buddhist fringe groups. As of mid-November of 1965 this effort at "reconciliation" was still in the

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formative stage, but some reports indicate that progress is being made.

The radicals in the Catholic community remain adamant in their opposition to the Buddhists and continue to suspect their political leanings as being pro-communist and favoring "a neutralized or communized 'SVN' along with the withdrawal of US Forces.^{38/}

Appraisal in Terms of Divisive and Cohesive Factors. The Catholics are divided among themselves. The more activist northern refugees are the most important politically, and among these the more "moderate" faction, perhaps best represented by Father Quynh, clearly remains dominant. There is considerable evidence, however, that the southern Catholics are becoming more active and are drawing close to the Quynh faction. If true, it represents an important consolidation of Catholic strength. The key to the future significance of the consolidation of Catholic strength lies in the success or failure of the various efforts now underway to build a bridge of cooperation with the Buddhists and especially with the dominant UBA. That such movements are underway is encouraging, and both the GVN and the US should make every effort to support them. The GVN, however, will continue to have reservations concerning the political wisdom of Buddhist-Catholic cooperation, because of the formidable potential political opposition this represents. Rumors that Prime Minister Ky has been trying to woo the radical Catholics to his side against the Buddhists is symptomatic of the urge of the leadership of the GVN to control the religious movements through a policy of fermenting and perpetuating divisions.

The Hoa Hao

Origins and Development. The Hoa Hao sect was founded in 1939 by Huynh Phu So of Hoa Hao Village, Chau Doc Province. The spread of the new faith during the first few months of its existence was phenomenal, and within one year So could claim over 100,000 followers. Currently the Hoa Hao are variously estimated as encompassing anywhere from several hundred thousand to nearly 3 million adherents, with one million probably more nearly correct. The Hoa Hao, like the Buddhists, tend to count all people in their geographic area of influence who are not otherwise formally committed to another religion as being within their congregation.

The exact reasons for the considerable appeal of So's teachings are not clear, but the simplicity of the dogma, with its relief of the peasant from the onerous financial burdens of the full spectrum of his traditional religious responsibilities, undoubtedly contributed. So preached an eminently practical code of social reform along with the essential tenets of salvation. Monies which would otherwise have gone to support the pagodas, for example, So preferred to place in schools

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or similar projects which had an appeal to the people. Perhaps equally important was the personality of the founder. So was extremely zealous, practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine and the student of a widely known sage. He was of the stuff from which prophets are made.

On the outbreak of war in 1940 the Hoa Hao movement received a number of very important stimulants, of which the most important was the near martyrdom of So. The French, fearful that the Japanese would organize the Hoa Hao for use against them, first exiled So from his home province and then, in August of 1940, placed him in a mental institution. So and his followers were infuriated and promptly joined the Japanese upon his release in 1941. Nearly three years of military organization and training under the Japanese gave the Hoa Hao coherence and strength, as well as a political-military orientation. An already rapidly growing movement, they quickly earned an awesome reputation as bandits.

The Viet Minh, like the Japanese, tried to use the Hoa Hao against the French, but with disastrous consequences. In an effort to bring the Hoa Hao under their control the Viet Minh attempted to strip the movement's generals of their power. The net result was an attack by some 15,000 Hoa Hao on the Viet Minh garrison at Can Tho. The poorly armed Hoa Hao were massacred -- and a number of their leaders later executed -- leaving a reservoir of hate for the Viet Minh within the movement. Nevertheless, when the Viet Minh attempted in early 1946 to draw all the Vietnamese religious and political groups together in a "National Unified Front," So actively participated. The Front was shortlived, however, and So went directly into politics in September of 1946 through his founding of the Viet Nam Social Democratic Party (Dan Xa). The party platform was both anti-communist and anti-French. From this point forward the Hoa Hao were as political as they were religious. On 16 April 1947 So was assassinated by the Viet Minh. This was the last straw. Infuriated, the Hoa Hao joined forces with the French as they had the Japanese under roughly similar circumstances six years before. The assassination confirmed the Hoa Hao visceral hatred of the Viet Minh, which to some extent has now been transferred to the Viet Cong.

The death of So removed the central unifying force which had given the Hoa Hao its fundamental strength and purpose. The Hoa Hao generals, in their scramble for power, quickly split the movement into four essentially autonomous and mutually antagonistic factions -- shades of the warlord period in China. At the end of the Indochina War the leaders of two of the factions read the handwriting on the wall and moved to support the new government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The remaining two dissident groups were defeated by Diem in March and April of 1956, and only a small guerrilla force, operating in An Phu District of Chau Doc Province, continued in active opposition under General Truong Kim Au. On the death of Diem all factions of the Hoa Hao began actively supporting the GVN against the Viet Cong.

Hoa Hao Beliefs. Ostensibly a reformed or "purified" Buddhism, the Hoa Hao religion is in fact a vastly simplified and reinterpreted version of carefully selected fundamental Buddhist beliefs. Thus, Hoa Haoism is best viewed as a separate religion rather than a reformist sect or "school" with which Mahayana Buddhism in South Vietnam already abounds. Those Buddhist rites retained -- even the pagodas and the monkhood were discarded -- consist essentially of offerings of water (cleanliness), flowers (purity) and incense (to chase away the evil spirits) before a simple altar, usually that of the ancestors, in the home. Prayers are to be said four times each day directly (and only) to the Deity, the ancestors and certain national heroes. Aside from its appeal of simplicity, which must certainly have struck a responsive cord, Hoa Haoism has the added virtues of remaining both sufficiently Buddhist to appear familiar to the people and sufficiently flexible to allow full play to the traditional Vietnamese superstitions and Animist beliefs.

The Deity of the Hoa Hao is not the Gautama Buddha of Buddhism. Rather, it is Phat Thay Tay An, the Pacifier of the West. Huynh Phu So, the founder, is the only "pope," and his mother, Mrs. Huynh Cong Bo, is the current spiritual leader of the movement. Still residing in the village of Hoa Hao, Mrs. Bo is charged with only nominal ceremonial duties, although in September of 1964 she was asked to arbitrate a jurisdictional dispute between two major factions.

Geographic Concentration. The followers of the Hoa Hao are regionally localized and are to be found mostly in the Delta area adjacent to Chau Doc Province. The percentage of the Delta population converted to the religion declines perceptibly as one moves radically away from Chau Doc.

Current Divisions and Sects. Except for their spiritual leader the Hoa Hao claim no formal religious hierarchy beneath the supreme office of the Ho Phap. All adherents are considered religiously co-equal. Organization at both the national and local levels has been left since the death of So to the military leadership and the politicians. This leadership has been particularly strong at the village and hamlet level, which accounts, in part at least, for the fundamental cohesiveness and strength of the movement. Secularly oriented and actively engaged in the social and economic improvement of the congregation, Hoa Hao village councils parallel -- and in reality replace -- the official government councils where they exist.

At the inter-provincial level, however, factionization has been the rule. In December of 1964 at least seven factions were momentarily identified in a constantly changing milieu. Despite the fact that over the past two years a number of significant efforts have been made at unity. The first attempt, remnants of which still remain, was the founding in early 1964 of the Unified Hoa Hao Group. The Central Standing Committee of

the Group was chaired by Luong Trong Tuong who was a member of the High National Council under the Khanh government. He remains the most highly respected of the various Hoa Hao leaders and is currently considered the primary political spokesman for the movement as a whole. In October 1964 a more explicitly political effort at unification was made when the major factions of the Unified Group revitalized the Vietnam Social Democratic Party under the secretary generalship of Phan Ba Cam.

Now in opposition to the Unified Group is the Vietnam Dan Chu Xa Hai Dan under the leadership of Tran Quoc Khanh, Nguyen Giac Ngo and Luong Trong Thuan. If the past history of the Hoa Hao movement is any guide, the future will see continued factionalization of the movement and intramural competition for power.

Relationship with GVN. All governments and contenders for political power in South Vietnam, including the French, have recognized the value of the Hoa Hao as an armed force to be used against "the other side." All parties, however, have also recognized the potential dangers of building an autonomous armed force with self-seeking as well as criminal tendencies and have attempted the essentially self-contradictory practice of trying to limit the power of the various Hoa Hao factions while at the same time arming them. The GVN has been walking this tight rope unsteadily.

The history of Hoa Hao relations with the GVN has certainly not been one to inspire the confidence of any government in their loyalty. The two major factions which Diem found it necessary to subdue with force form the background of GVN distrust, but the subsequent activities of several small dissident groups have done much to reinforce GVN attitudes. In 1957, for instance, a rebel band of Hoa Hao formed a terrorist sect dedicated to the practice of a cult of assassinations built on the superstition that a Hoa Hao millennium was about to arrive and only those who had killed 100 men could be saved from a fiery hell. Moreover, on 20 July 1962 members of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao organized the "Front of the National Union" which was as anti-Diem as it was anti-Viet Cong. And in 1963 a dissident group of Hoa Hao and Cao Dai were organizing in Cambodia. Some 200 of the Hoa Hao in the latter group, under the leadership of Nguyen Trung Hieu and Huynh Cong, returned to Vietnam on 9 November 1963 at the invitation of the MRC.

It is also reported that the Hoa Hao have devised and disseminated among their leadership a plan to establish an autonomous region within the national boundaries of SVN should an auspicious situation present itself. It is probable, however, that the present generation of Hoa Hao leadership does not view this as a realistic goal for the movement. The pragmatism of the younger generation would also suggest that the current anti-VC orientation of the Hoa Hao is due more to a realization of the potential consequences of VC domination than an emotional reaction to the Viet Minh assassination of So (whom the older generation believes will

in any case, through reincarnation lead the movement).

There are certain facts which lend some support to the thesis that the Hoa Hao (and the Cao Dai, for that matter) do exhibit certain patriotic and nationalistic allegiances. In January of 1948, for instance, Hoa Hao representatives met in Hue with members of the Cao Dai and other groups to formulate their political demands against the French, whom they were concurrently supporting militarily. The Hoa Hao demands were as fully nationalistic as those of any anti-French group: full dominion status, political independence, control of foreign relations and all internal economic matters, and a national army. In view of the evidence to date, it is best to view the Hoa Hao as an opportunistic ally and a dubious asset should an attractive alternative be open to them. With the Hoa Hao, as with most Vietnamese, loyalties begin with the individual and grow progressively weaker as the focus of interest moves outward through the family, hamlet, village and religious group toward the national government, where loyalty is tenuous at best.

Regardless of the balance of positive and negative factors, the requirements of prosecuting the war forced the GVN to seek Hoa Hao support. In November of 1962 it was finally decided at an inter-ministerial meeting to recruit the Hoa Hao into Self Defense Corps units, recognizing that some had already been recruited the previous August -- through a failure in the screening process -- into the SDC of Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien and Kien Hoa Provinces. Ngo Dinh Nhu, however, remained adamant in his opposition and was able to block any further arming of the Hoa Hao during the Diem regime.

By December of 1964 there had been formed some 41 Hoa Hao Regional Force companies scattered throughout the heavily Hoa Hao provinces. And by December of 1965 some of these had been "exported" to essentially non-Hoa Hao provinces, e.g., Bac Lieu. In October of 1964 the GVN even went so far as to authorize the formation of Independent Regional Mobile battalions in addition to Regional Force companies. Several rapid changes of government ensued, however, and it was not until late 1965 that these were organized, with one in Chau Doc and one in Vinh Long Province.

The GVN has been virtually unable to draft Hoa Hao from the predominantly Hoa Hao provinces into ARVN. While the Hoa Hao leaders in these areas insist they are quite willing to assist the government with troops, they are equally adamant that Hoa Hao soldiers should fight in Hoa Hao units under Hoa Hao officers. Recent reports indicate that the Hoa Hao could mobilize considerable forces if requested to do so, and they probably have a number of companies organized on an on-call basis that are not formally authorized by the GVN.

The Regional Force companies do not in themselves explain the full extent of current Hoa Hao power. Contrary to the severe factionalism characteristic of Hoa Hao politics, the Hoa Hao military are now apparently fairly unified, on an informal basis, which heightens the danger

of further organizing and arming the group. Currently (late 1965), Hoa Hao military officers are province chiefs in An Giang, Chau Doc and Kien Phong, and other Hoa Hao officers are in charge of some 20 districts in 7 Delta provinces. The most prominent of the Hoa Hao military is Lt Col Tran Van Tuoi, Province Chief of An Giang, while Lt Col Ly Ba Pham is probably the second-ranking Hoa Hao military leader as Chief of Chau Doc Province. Other prominent leaders are Major Trinh Huu Nghia, Deputy Province Chief of Chuong Thien -- admired by some US advisors for his military capabilities -- and Major Doan Van Cuong, Chief of Kien Phong Province.

As Hoa Hao political and military power increases, so does the magnitude of the task of integrating them satisfactorily into society once the conflict in South Vietnam abates to a manageable level. The GVN, meanwhile, perches high on the horns of a dilemma.

Relationships with Other Religious Groups. The Hoa Hao have remained very "clannish" and have either ignored non-Hoa Hao Vietnamese or simply terrorized them off land coveted by the movement. In Bac Lieu Province, for instance, the Hoa Hao RF companies have shown little regard for the local (i.e., non-Hoa Hao) population and mistreat them frequently. At the national political level there have been sporadic attempts at cooperation with other religious groups in furthering a common policy against the government of the day or a mutual enemy. The National Unified Front sponsored by the Viet Minh in 1946 has already been mentioned, as has the Front of National Union of 1962. The Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai and the Binh Xuyen formed a similar group in September of 1954 to oppose Diem, but this, too, was short-lived, dissolving with the defeat of the last of the major dissident forces in early 1956.

The "Caravelle Group," which formed in 1960 in opposition to Diem, included Hoa Hao political leaders as well as those of the other major religious groups. It is significant that what cooperation has occurred among the religions in South Vietnam has been based on political opposition to the GVN -- as continues to be the case.

In 1964, in an effort to increase the degree of their political influence in Saigon, certain of the Hoa Hao factions established ties with the major Mahayanist sects through the agency of the UBA. When the UBA initiated the formation of the GVN Committee for Religious Liaison, the Hoa Hao were authorized two delegates on the Representative Committee on the same basis as the UBA, the Catholics and the Cao Dai. On the other hand, as Buddhist (i.e., UBA) organization and influence increases, the other religious movements such as the Hoa Hao may well be forced into increasing competition with the Buddhists for political power.

Appraisal in Terms of Divisive and Cohesive Factors. The situation presented by the Hoa Hao is as serious as it is difficult. They are quite loyal -- perhaps a tribute to the organizing ability of their

leadership -- to the movement and are sufficiently unlike the Vietnamese Mahayana Buddhists to consider the latter outsiders. Moreover, the trace of past events has left the Hoa Hao highly politicized, with the leaders of the movement anxious for power and protective of their prerogatives. Complete integration of the Hoa Hao into the rest of society will be extremely difficult if not impossible.

In the short run, at least, it will be necessary for the GVN to ensure the Hoa Hao equal political rights within those areas in which they have a majority and to ensure that GVN officials at province level are at least predominantly Hoa Hao (the GVN practice of appointing a nonsectarian deputy to a Hoa Hao province chief should be expanded). Moreover, it will be necessary to ensure that the movement receives at least nominal -- although not expressly Hoa Hao -- representation in the government in Saigon if and when the GVN moves toward a more representative form. In fact, most of the various governments since, and including, Bao Dai's have explicitly recognized this necessity. The Khanh government in January of 1965, for instance, proposed that the Hoa Hao be given two representatives on an equal basis with the other three major religions in a military-civilian council of 20 members (including 6 military representatives and 2 from each region).

The Hoa Hao religion is dynamic and appealing, and the movement will undoubtedly continue to expand its influence in the Delta. Any effort of the GVN designed to retard the spread of the movement would likely meet with active opposition, if not armed hostility. The best policy would appear to be to allow free reign to religious proselytizing by the movement and to move toward political representation on a provincial basis, rather than by religious groups, as soon as is politically feasible, keeping in mind the short-run requirements for political recognition outlined above.

In view of the past history of the Hoa Hao movement, it would also appear to be unwise to foster any sizeable increase in Hoa Hao military forces beyond those already in existence. Rather, efforts should be increased toward recruiting individual Hoa Hao directly into ARVN units on an integrated basis. This will support the current GVN program of fostering the concept of a "nation," as opposed to regional or minority loyalties. This program, in view of the firm resistance of the Hoa Hao to such recruiting, must be handled carefully so as not to engender added fears among the Hoa Hao leadership. Very important in this regard is the granting of assurances of minority religious rights. The granting of juridical recognition to the Hoa Hao on 1 September 1965 (along with the Cao Dai and the UBA) by the Ky Government was a positive step in this direction.

It should also be emphasized that the loyalty of the present Hoa Hao leadership to the GVN is based on tacit agreements with the current officials. Should a change of GVN leadership occur, the new regime would

most probably have to begin anew in mending fences with the Hoa Hao and the other minorities whose relationships with the GVN are on similar terms.

Demobilizing the Hoa Hao RF-PF companies will undoubtedly prove to be very difficult. A first step would be to integrate these directly into ARVN as complete units under Hoa Hao officers, and then to gradually disband or demobilize the companies as political realities allow. In the last analysis, the ability of the GVN to demobilize Hoa Hao will depend upon whether or not the Hoa Hao leadership believe their rights are protected. This political accommodation must come first.

The Cao Dai

Origins and Development. The Cao Dai religion was "initiated" in 1919 by Ngo Van Chieu, a member of the French Intelligence Bureau and a spirit medium. Highly syncretic and eclectic in form, Cao Daiism has brought together elements of all the major philosophical and religious forces in Vietnam: Buddhist, Catholic, Confucianist, Taoist and Animist. The movement grew slowly at first until, on his third "appearance" shortly after Christmas of 1925, the spirit, Cao Dai, "appointed" a wealthy former mandarin, Le Van Trung, as the leader of the new religion. Trung organized the movement along rigidly hierarchical lines -- probably a reflection of Catholic influence -- and the congregation began to increase rapidly. Cao Daiism has undoubtedly benefitted from its appearance of having "something for everyone" and from Trung's "miraculous" personal reformation from a profligate and opium smoker to something akin to a saint. The followers of the sect now number somewhere between 500,000 and two million.

Although relatively tightly organized as a religion, Cao Daiism did not exhibit an overtly political aspect until the beginning of World War II. With the rise of anti-French feeling among the Vietnamese at that time, the Cao Dai joined forces with the nationalists and sought the support of the Japanese following the exile by the French of Pham Cong Tac, the Cao Dai Ho Phap or Superior. The Japanese responded with arms and training, although the absence of the Ho Phap and his staff led to factionalism among the Cao Dai generals. After the war the Cao Dai joined forces with the Viet Minh against the French, an alignment that lasted until the Cao Dai senior commander was captured. He subsequently negotiated a truce whereby the Cao Dai would cease operations in return for the freeing of the Ho Phap. Viet Minh military actions against their former allies drove the Cao Dai into active support of the French, and certain of the Cao Dai leaders were allowed to carve out large territories under their direct control. The Cao Dai did not vigorously oppose the Diem regime and was formally integrated into the nation's administrative structure where they more or less remain today.

Beliefs. Perhaps the most important aspect of Cao Daiism, in that it explains in large part the hold which the leaders of the movement exert on the rank and file, is the dominance of spiritualism -- practiced through the medium of the cult's leaders -- upon which all Cao Daiists depend for fundamental guidance. Westerners are usually more impressed by the eclectic aspects of the religion, particularly the pantheon of saints which includes such disparate figures as Jeanne d'Arc and William Shakespeare, not to mention Sun Yat-sen, Trang Trinh (a highly venerated Vietnamese philosopher and spiritualist), Victor Hugo and Li Po (a famous Chinese poet).

Cao Dai is considered the one creator and is symbolized by the -- "all seeing eye of God" -- and the Trinity, or Triangle, of Sun Yat-sen, Trang Trinh and Victor Hugo. The Creator is viewed as having previously descended to earth in the successive forms of the great prophets of all religions: Buddha, Lao Tse, Jesus, Moses. Moreover, the Cao Daiists believe there will be one final reincarnation of Cao Dai in the form of the Messiah -- another aspect of the Judeo-Christian foundations of the religion. While Cao Dai formerly (during the first two "amnesties of sin") expressed himself through the prophets, it is believed that the Creator now articulates his guidance (the third amnesty) through seances, whereby the religion derives its alternative title of "The Third Amnesty of God." Cao Dai is not, however, the only spirit that can be evoked, and at midnight in the Cao Dai temples, mediums frequently call upon one or more spirits as the highlight of very impressive ceremonies.

Geographic Concentration. Tay Ninh Province is considered the cradle of Cao Daiism, or the "Holy See," and the principal cathedral is to be found in the provincial capital, Tay Ninh City. Converts to the religion are largely concentrated in that province (some one-third of the province population) and in the contiguous districts of adjoining provinces. There are, however, significant groups of followers in at least 13 provinces, with Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong containing the most after Tay Ninh.

The religion has an international cast. There is a cathedral in Phnom Penh, where the communicants number about 3,000, deriving from the days of exile of the Ho Phap. Believers are to be found in all Southeast Asian countries as well as in France and in the United States.

Divisions and Sects. Despite its formally centralized and articulated organization, which includes an executive corps, a legislative corps and a charity corps, the congregation of the Cao Dai is represented in practice by quasi-autonomous organizations in each of the provinces where a significant following exists. This provincial near-autonomy in religious matters has exacerbated otherwise derived divisions on the political side as well. Political factions within the movement are numerous and are more a reflection of personalities than of programs, which are, in fact,

poorly articulated. Since political factions and personal loyalties within the movement are constantly shifting, the following is at best approximate.

For the convenience of analysis five categories of political factions can be identified on the basis of either significant similarities or some element of internal cohesion:

(1) The Traditionalists. Led by Cao Hoa Sang, this group is the least articulate politically and the most devout. Sang was one of the founders of the religion in December of 1925, and he and his followers are primarily concerned with ecclesiastical matters and with retaining their increasingly loose control of the church hierarchy. Their power stems from the fact that, as the embodiment of orthodoxy, they can bestow or withhold authenticity when laymen seek to represent the Church in secular affairs.

(2) The Nationalists. The "Nationalists" are the most important political faction of the Church. They are largely laymen with, it appears, a nationalist rather than a separatist orientation. The two primary leaders are Tran Quang Vinh and Brigadier General Le Van Tat, both of whom have had considerable experience in Vietnamese politics and government since 1945. Vinh is an archbishop in the Church (by virtue of his earlier career). His father is head of the charity corps -- now largely defunct. During the latter part of the Diem regime Tat was in exile in Cambodia. Returning shortly after the November 1963 coup, he was instrumental in negotiating the integration of Cao Dai forces into the RVNAF. In return, Tat was made province chief of Tay Ninh Province in February of 1964. He was relieved of that position in September of 1965.

In policy the "Nationalists" are essentially anti-communist and pro-GVN. Their day-to-day interests are concerned with improving their own political following and their influence in GVN circles. Tat's influence lies primarily with the older, now retired or exiled, group of generals such as Minh, Khanh and Don. It is significant that among Tat's four closest political advisors there is only one Cao Daiist. Of the other 3, 2 are Buddhists and one is a Catholic. Neither Vinh nor Tat apparently view separatism as having any future, but this must be considered as essentially a pragmatic appraisal rather than a matter of deep conviction.

(3) The Opportunists. This group is actually a collection of mutually antagonistic factions whose one similarity is their tendency to use Cao Daiism primarily to further their own personal goals. Most prominent in the group is Nguyen Thanh Phuong whose Vietnam Restoration Association (VRA), or Association for National Reconstruction, is the only formal political party -- although with little following -- representing specifically the Cao Dai. Phuong has also published the Thoi Dai (Era) newspaper in Saigon since March of 1964.

Phuong was once a major general and Commander-in-Chief (like Vinh) of the Cao Daiist forces. He was, in fact, the one who first negotiated with the Diem Government in 1954. Cao Dai faithful have charged Phuong with having engineered the GVN occupation of Tay Ninh City, which resulted in the flight of Pham Cong Tac to Cambodia. Some reports indicate that there is a certain degree of cooperation between Generals Phuong and Tat, although there is little factual data to support such a contention.

(4) The Peaceful Co-Existence Group. This is a very small group which represents only a minute fraction (one report suggests six percent) of the Cao Dai. Most accounts of the policy of this group are contradictory, although the center of gravity of the evidence suggests that there is some collusion with the VC. One faction, reportedly led by a former Cao Daiist major named Huynh Thanh Mung, has allegedly joined forces with the VC and acts as a source of support from among the Cao Dai. There is no indication, however, of the degree of support Mung has been able to provide, but it is presumed small.

Another "neutralist" is Ho Tan Khoa who is currently in exile in Cambodia and is receiving some support from Sihanouk. Khoa apparently wished to establish a "United Peace Forces Front" which will bring together both VC and GVN in a coalition government. Like Major Mung, Khoa has enjoyed little if any success.

(5) The Provincial Branches. As indicated above, each province has autonomous church organization despite the theoretical hierarchy based on Tay Ninh City. The most important of the provincial branches are apparently those of Ben Tre, My Tho, Can Tho and Bac Lieu. Together they probably outnumber in terms of total adherents those communicants who are responsive directly to the Holy See. Nevertheless, the Holy See retains certain elements of control through its seniority, its theoretical hegemony and its usual role as initiator of projects for sectarian unity. Moreover, the Holy See is the sole authorized locus of the "duck-billed basket" which is used in seances for communication with Cao Dai, the Deity, on matters of grave ecclesiastical import.

Relationship with GVN. At the present time the principal political faction -- "the Nationalists" -- of the Cao Dai is operating in support of the GVN, and the old separatist objectives have lost any significant following. Intramural political infighting among all other factions has reduced them to near impotence.

The Cao Dai are less suspected by the GVN than the Hoa Hao, although the Government undoubtedly maintains a careful watch. The Cao Dai have been allowed to recruit Regional Force and Popular Force units, especially in Tay Ninh Province, as there is no longer a military structure to direct an independent military force. As long as ARVN remains strong this situation is likely to continue.

Some Cao Dai have achieved considerable national stature as politicians, including Le Van Hoach, a former prime minister, and Pham Khac Suu, President during the period of the High National Council. These could conceivably serve as the focus for future political groupings, although their individual followings are quite small and their performance while in office would not appear to suggest much future strength.

Relationship with Other Religious Groups. The Cao Dai, perhaps as much because of their broadly syncretistic dogma as because of the realities of Vietnamese politics, have been ecumenical in their relations with the other religious groups. Their United Front activities have been chronicled above. Most recently they have actively participated in UBA activities and in the GVN Religious Liaison Committee along with the Hoa Hao.

Appraisal in Terms of Divisive and Cohesive Factors. The Cao Dai like the Hoa Hao have developed an inner cohesiveness and an exclusiveness which sets them apart from the non-Cao Dai population of the areas in which they live. The relatively fewer separatist tendencies exhibited by the Cao Dai may be ascribed to the more important role religion plays in their cohesiveness relative to politics, and, conversely, to the lesser degree of political organization and solidarity that is to be found. The Cao Dai are also internationalist in their religious orientation, which has resulted in a lesser degree of communal exclusiveness among the group and a greater recognition of the necessity of living peacefully within national boundaries. Moreover, a number of Cao Daiists have achieved national prominence in the political arena. The Cao Dai are also spread more evenly, and at the same time more thinly, throughout the Delta region and the remainder of South Vietnam. Nowhere do they constitute a provincial or significant local majority which would be essential to any serious demand for regional autonomy.

Summary

On the South Vietnamese political scene the religious groups represent a significant -- in fact, second only to the military -- political force. This force is growing in potential, although the current relative quiescence in political activity tends to belie the important accretions of power which have been taking place. Not only are the organizational capabilities of both the Buddhists and the Catholics expanding, but each of the two groups is showing increasingly internal cohesiveness.

The growth in power of the religious groups need not be a critically divisive factor on the political scene, however. In both major religious groups the "moderates" remain in a position of ascendancy. Moreover, although serious differences, both latent and articulated, do exist between the two, there is clear evidence that the Catholics and Buddhists are be-

ginning to seek means of cooperation toward their mutual objectives. These objectives remain essentially those of winning the war against the Communists and building a free, prosperous society.

It is imperative that US policy, both in its direct relations with the religious movements and in its relations with the GVN, be designed to support those forces tending toward conciliation and cooperation and to discourage those elements -- both among the religious radicals and in the GVN -- which are pursuing a contrary policy. In this regard many things can be achieved, a few of which are suggested below:

(1) The US should make clear:

(a) Its stand for religious freedom and rights, to include a guarantee of those rights as a sine qua non for effective US support of joint US-GVN objectives.

(b) Its understanding that religious issues do and will continue to feature in the politics of South Vietnam, but that the major religious organizations themselves should acknowledge that the church as an institution should not be directly involved in the by-play of politics.

(c) Its wholehearted support of any and all efforts designed to bring the various religions in South Vietnam closer together in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and singleness of purpose toward the greater interests of the nation.

(2) The US should tactfully, but firmly, counsel the GVN against either repression of legitimate religious interests or the temptation to manipulate the religious groups for political purposes.

(3) The US, through the GVN, should encourage and impartially assist all the religious groups in South Vietnam to strengthen their ties with international religious organizations, so as to foster a sense of dignity, responsibility and achievement through religious rather than political activities.

(4) Moreover, as a means of de-politicizing the religious groups in South Vietnam, while at the same time ensuring that their legitimate religious grievances may be clearly and effectively articulated, efforts should be made to encourage the establishment of a national "Commission on Religious Affairs." Such a commission would be composed of the leading personalities in each of the major religious groups, and it would serve as a vehicle for dignifying collectively the religious movements. While it is inevitable that such a commission would also constitute a sounding board for political grievances, it is believed that not only is it desirable to have a mechanism for clearly and responsibly articulating these grievances, but that such a commission, by constituting a focus for the

articulation of grievances, would make far easier the joint task of the GVN and the US for counseling moderation and responsibility and for responding rapidly to legitimate grievances where they are shown to exist.

The above recommendations are not considered as exhaustive, and both time and experience should point the way to many additional measures which will prove effective in achieving the desired goals. What is essential is a positive, forward policy on the part of the US designed to elevate and draw the religious groups together in the religious field through the auspices of the GVN and to progressively discourage the active participation of the religious groups in the political process. With skill, tact and candor, and with adequate resources, such a policy should prove feasible and rewarding.

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ANNEX C

THE VIET CONG

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ANNEX C

THE VIET CONG

Introduction

On 21 December 1965, the National Liberation Front's (NLF) clandestine radio announced its plans for 1966. In this broadcast marking the VC political arm's fifth anniversary, a focus on political and terrorist -- rather than big battle -- fronts was proclaimed. The need to underscore this statement of intent is clear-cut. The VC have yet to fail in expressing their goals simply and with candor. For coordination of their own effort as well as for enemy and fence-sitter consumption, VC leaders submit a plain and unequivocal signal. The specifics of their 1966 design, together with the reported GVN official interpretation, follow:

(1) NLF -- Strive for a "neutralist" SVN by "appealing for greater union" among political parties, religious communities and others in all "walks of life" to combat US imperialists and "their lackeys." (GVN -- "Neutrality" for SVN may soon replace VC emphasis on "nationalism.")1/

(2) NLF -- Return to guerrilla warfare to "erode McNamara's plan" to bring the VC into an "open fight." (GVN -- The US military build-up's scope has made battalion-size operations too dangerous; therefore, a return to "harassing" tactics is dictated.)2/

(3) NLF -- Start a new campaign by "inciting legal demonstrations" against the US presence in SVN, the draft, the high cost of living and large military operations. (GVN -- The VC will exploit the fact that SVN is in deep economic, inflationary trouble; this should be blamed on the Americans in-country.)

(4) NLF -- Mobilize VC manpower to "consolidate the countryside, the villages and the hamlets." (GVN -- The VC is making no headway in the cities and must rely on exploitation of rural population for rapport.)

(5) NLF -- Strive for "better relations" with "progressive Americans, Cambodians, the Pathet Lao, Latin Americans and Africans." (GVN -- The VC will intensify its search for support from non-Vietnamese having serious reservations about the war.)

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The Situation and Background

The Extent of Control Today. To estimate the practicality of announced NLF strategy for 1966, and particularly in light of its fourth "consolidate the countryside" aspect, data on the status of current VC holdings are germane.

As of 25 November 1965, USMACV reported the following "control" picture (See: Figure 1-1) with respect to the stated 14.8 million people resident in SVN: (1) VC control: 22.5 percent; (2) contested: 25.7 percent; and, (3) GVN-dominated: 51.8 percent. The latter two figures include the over 1.76 million people estimated as residing in SVN's five autonomous cities. Various agencies have produced other statistics. However, a more realistic statement is that the VC control or influence two-thirds and GVN control one-third of the population. The Secretary of Defense told the President on 24 January 1966: "Prime Minister Ky has stated that the GVN controls 25 percent of the population and it will take two years to raise the control to 50 percent."

More optimistic than pessimistic, and based upon population data of questionable validity, such comparisons fail to reflect the intrinsic facts of the VC control pattern in SVN. The degree of control imposed in areas dominated by the VC is much tighter than that in GVN-held areas. Contested areas, variously labeled as "cleared" or as "undergoing pacification," are largely dominated by the VC at night; virtually all require some show of force measure to enable GVN or Free World forces movement by day. The VC form of control permits their: (1) rapid movement as individuals and units; (2) necessary logistical support, almost at will, on the ground; (3) effective restriction of much of GVN-US movement to air travel and resupply; (4) extensive control of an indeterminate (but significantly large) portion of SVN's natural and economic resources by such devices as hijacking, requisition, appropriation and taxation; and, (5) collection of timely detailed and accurate intelligence on US-GVN movement.

The Infrastructure of Control. For all practical purposes, VC military forces are the advance guard of the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN). The NLF constitutes a direct and purposive extension of the Lao Dong (Worker's) Party which was Communist-established in NVN on 4 March 1951. Politically and militarily linked from national level down through military regions, provinces, districts, villages and local hamlets, the VC structure is designed to consume the populace of SVN. Its roots, since the new label "Viet Nam Cong San" was affixed in Hanoi late in 1954, have taken hold to the degree that there well may be "an element of VC in every South Vietnamese."

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To its opposition, VC infrastructure is highly efficient, disciplined and invisible. The attainment of increasingly close ties between the movement's political and military action arms appears to have been the main objective of VC policy shifts since 1960. Wherever the VC political component is strong and well organized, its armed running mate exhibits identical attributes. Organizational and operational secrecy is maintained as a matter of priority concern for the political side of the structure; the VC have not matched this security level within their military organizations. Guidance and orders for the political component emanate from the Lao Dong Party headquarters in Hanoi. Party control echelons include the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). An intelligence net is intertwined throughout this structure's full range.

VC installations development in rural SVN has mushroomed; the thoroughgoing effectiveness of their political organization is estimated to have registered at virtually all levels of Vietnamese society. Every political echelon down to village level includes its military counterpart consisting of a section, a committee or a member. Each political headquarters exercises varying degrees of control over VC agencies, military units and other organizational forms. Conversely, every military headquarters and unit contains its political staff or member. This technique serves to subordinate the military to the politico and constitutes a means of unifying the total effort in support of the overall communist mission.

The North Vietnamese Government (DRV) is organized and directed by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Its political guidance is supplied to the VC through cadres of the "liberation" movement in the South. Figure C-1 depicts the subdivision, relationship and coordination of this extensive organization -- North and South. While carefully avoiding the establishment of any attributable, or otherwise direct and public, organizational ties with COSVN or NLF in the South, Hanoi has maintained control of operations in SVN via an exceptionally competent leadership chain and an effective communications net. Reportedly, all instructions to the South channel through the "National Reunification Department" of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee. Both agencies are headed by General Nguyen Van Vinh. Such an arrangement assures complete supervision, control and unity of effort along administrative, political and intelligence lines. A recent State Department cable quotes James Cameron as stating, "DRV officials have never made any effort whatsoever to hide the fact of DRV's complete control over VC."


The highest VC executive organ physically positioned in SVN is the COSVN. It is currently reported as operational "somewhere in Tay Ninh Province" where it was first implanted early in 1961. The realities of VC combat unit effectiveness were initially manifested in Tay Ninh (25

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Figure C-1



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January 1960) when an ARVN regimental headquarters was overrun and destroyed on a successful arms seizure mission.

Prior to the COSVN activation date, Hanoi had divided SVN administratively into two major zones -- the "Interzone of South Central Vietnam" (sometimes termed "Interzone-5" and the "Nambo Region." This simplistic split was erased with the arrival of COSVN. Today most in-country VC affairs are managed from Tay Ninh with SVN apparently viewed as a strategic entity. Figure C-2 shows the scope of its apparatus, as surmised. Operations are decentralized, and there are indications that COSVN staff elements remain constantly mobile rather than firmly fixed. Lao Dong policy is received and translated into concrete directives for lower echelon execution by this COSVN hub. Its components, to include subdivisions of both its military and political sides, are as shown in Figure C-3. This organizational pattern is duplicated in every VC "military region" and, in varying degrees, down through province and district levels. With its leaders known only by aliases -- and, from widely dispersed, well-hidden and continuously floating bases that are linked by both radio and covert routes -- over the years COSVN has been tailored:

- (1) To ensure the complete coordination of all VC activity throughout the whole of SVN.
- (2) To maximize both the efficiency and the use of available communist cadres in support of the total effort.
- (3) To serve as the nucleus for the eventual VC government, as an extension of Hanoi rule, in SVN.

To accord such an apparatus the necessary facade as a "true organization for liberation by an oppressed people," the NLF came to life officially on 20 December 1960, almost simultaneously with COSVN which was activated at the beginning of 1961. It performs as the "publicity-exposed" complement of VC fighting forces and serves as the "legal" front adjunct for political activities of COSVN in SVN. The Front maintains quasi-diplomatic representation in nine countries today. Endorsed for exposure in September of 1960 by the "Third International Congress" of the Lao Dong Party, the NLF declares its goals to be: (1) forming a national democratic coalition government in SVN which includes all political, religious and nationality groups; (2) maintaining respect for all classes; (3) establishing a neutral foreign policy; and, (4) normalizing relations with the North to reunify Vietnam.


Although rumored throughout 1961-62 to be charged primarily with seating itself as a provisional government in the Kontum area, no such dramatic turn of events materialized. Hanoi's early appeal for recognition of the NLF, as published in Peking and Moscow, omitted a passage

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Figure C-2




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Figure C-3



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alleging that the Front was both legal and representative. The Peking-published version of a follow-on "Fatherland Front" greeting failed to cite its "representative" character. Figure C-4 depicts the special zone committee for Saigon-Gia Dinh and C-5 depicts the NLF structure. Although many of its offices are either leaderless or manned by COSVN-Lao Dong personnel, its three political parties (Democratic, Radical Socialist, People's Revolutionary) and its well-organized propaganda organ ("Liberation News Agency") alone form a substantial base for subversion of the current GVN. There have been recent indications, however, suggesting that the VC have "failed to sell" the Front as a credible, quasi government capable of leading a popular movement in SVN. If true, it is probable that an overt manifestation of the "People's Revolutionary Party" would assume control of the political action pattern.

Although the fact-versus-fiction aspect is tangled, the actual PRP leaders constitute a second clandestine tier of professional revolutionaries behind the publicly acknowledged NLF leadership. Hanoi has carefully arranged to provide the PRP with a lineage tracing back to the Indochinese Communist Party which was in theory disbanded by the Viet Minh on 11 November 1945. Publicly resurrected on 15 January 1962, the PRP and the Lao Dong are one and the same entity; this was revealed in a "secret central committee resolution" recorded in November of 1961.3:7/ Its surfacing at this particular time is presumed to have served the Hanoi purpose of: (1) further reinforcing the "indigenous patriotic" character of the insurgent movement in SVN; and, (2) affording the communist NLF membership a voice in affairs at least equal to that of the non-Communists. Although initially quiet, PRP-attributed speeches have been published with increasing frequency since early 1964. Its organization is a precise duplicate of the Lao Dong Party; its "committees" exist at regional and provincial levels in SVN and, where possible, extend down into the rural hamlets.

Mechanism for the Social Assault


The Regional Structure. The VC have divided SVN into five "military regions" plus a "special region" encompassing the Saigon, Cholon, Gia Dinh area. (See: Figure 1-9) All, except MR V which is under direct control of Hanoi on matters pertaining to infiltration and military operations, are directly subordinate to the NLF. Each MR includes a main base area that was established and developed during Viet Minh operations against the French and reactivated (if ever actually inactivated) over the period 1958-59. Some of today's VC "war zones" circumscribe operational and support sectors that have served insurgent purposes in SVN at least as far back as 1946. Both these main installations and even the lesser facilities located in more remote and increasingly inaccessible areas, are composed of closely integrated villages or village complexes. Each is prepared for defense, shelters a politically indoctrinated populace and contains an administrative mechanism that parallels.

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
Figure C-4



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Figure C-5

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
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established lines of authority and control. VC military units assigned to operate in such prepared areas can be absorbed at will in the support matrix.

As Figure C-6 indicates, the perpetuation of communist politico-military duality is emphasized at military region level. Although the MR is a tactical headquarters, COSVN directives must be enforced. The military section, integral to the political side of each VC regional organization, ensures that political orders to military units are executed consistent with COSVN policy and maintains Party line vigilance over activities of the individual VC fighting man. While MR size in SVN varies and, to some extent, the number of VC units assigned is dependent upon this variety in size, the frame on which the organization is built does not vary. In addition to its assigned subordinate units (up to regimental size), the MR may directly control other allocated forces. Local and military units thus may respond to MR orders or may be attached temporarily to a VC Main Force unit for the duration of a single operation. This chain of subordination extends down through province into hamlet level.

Figure C-6




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The Provincial Structure. A varying number of provinces are included in the MRs. VC province boundaries do not totally square with those of the GVN. (See: Figure 1-9) Each VC province in SVN is governed by a provincial commissariat (committee) which is subordinate to the political component of the MR headquarters from which it receives direction. The provincial committee controls certain full-time military forces whose responsibility it is to protect the area. Such units usually conduct operations against GVN paramilitary forces. (See: Figure C-7) The 1966 NLF plan's Task-2 statement (return to "guerrilla" warfare) will impact strongest at this VC organizational level.


Figure C-7



The District Structure. Each VC district in SVN is governed by a committee which receives its orders from the provincial committee and controls certain full-time military forces of company or platoon size. These forces are primarily responsible for executing such special missions as sabotage, assassination and kidnapping, as well as for reinforcing the impact of provincial operations against GVN forces. (See: Figure C-8) The district committee probably is the key level of the total VC infrastructure configuration. It is responsible for consolidating VC gains and for introducing VC control into new territory. The prime link between the district headquarters and the populace is maintained by "mission" or "activity" teams with a total of no more than one team normally allocated to a village. These teams circulate throughout controlled areas, hold meetings and explain VC policies as well as propagandize and extoll VC activities. They also collect information which is passed into the intelligence system for evaluation and processing. There is no definite pattern of team organization evident. It is at this level that the 1966 campaign plan will be pursued with maximum effort.

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Figure C-8




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The Village-Hamlet Structure. The controlled villages and hamlets in SVN (See: Figure C-9) are governed either by a committee or an individual who is charged with raising paramilitary forces or militia. Such VC forces only operate part of the time, are partially armed and are responsible for defense of "hamlets." They conduct propaganda activities and harassment sorties and are called upon to recruit.

Figure C-9



Targeting

The VC are meticulous planners. Details appear to have a special meaning within their total-system approach; the individual representative

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in the society of SVN constitutes their finite target. The best estimates available cite total VC strength in SVN within 227,300 to 261,900 brackets (this includes PAVN combat elements). Included also in this estimate-span are almost 40,000 "political force" members.4:12/ One estimate recapitulates the "political force" focus as follows:

TARGET-LEVEL IN SVN	VC POLITICAL APPLICATION	REMARKS
2574 villages	24,155 individuals	
231 districts	8,830 cadresmen	
38 VC provinces	3,120 provincial committee members	Average strength of Province Party Committee is 80 individuals plus staff and support
6 VC regions	1,000 regional committee members	1962 estimate
COSVN	1,200 cadresmen	40 percent of 3,000 total estimate


The estimates above do not include the City (Party) Committee members whose strengths have never been assessed. Moreover, there are other NLF committee elements that are presumed to exist but, as yet, are non-estimable. One guess submitted in September of 1964 tabbed the total number of cadre, Party members and group members belonging to various organizations in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region alone at 19,994. That the present GVN itself has been penetrated, as well as influenced, by the weight of an effort such as this seems obvious. Although the data are unverifiable, elements of the greater Saigon net have been in place for a minimum of ten years. Within five years of the date (February of 1955) that Hanoi ordered rejuvenation of its insurgency mechanism in the South, VC terrorist activities had accounted for the murder of over 1,400 GVN local officials and civilians throughout SVN.

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The Intelligence System

The intelligence organization permeating all VC political and military groups is critical to the viability of the complete infrastructure. The key element of this structure is an elaborate organization (See: Figure C-10) which is located in Hanoi and labeled the "Central Research Agency" (CRA) or "Research Bureau." It concentrates its activities on SVN; however, the intelligence efforts of the Lao Dong Party on a world-wide scale are also managed as a secondary function.

Figure C-10



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When the two regional VC committees in SVN were disbanded in March of 1961 and the COSVN central command was established in Tay Ninh, the total intelligence organization also was altered. COSVN, under Lao Dong Party instructions, probably assumed authority over and responsibility for the in-country apparatus. Today, each of the six Regional Committees maintains a collection capability with a special technical staff directing the various phases of regional activity. Each such staff operates at the discretion, and under the authority, of the Committee Secretariat; its functions encompass finance, Party organization and cadre training of cadres as well as operational administration of Lao Dong Party organizations in the region. The Deputy Secretary-General of the Committee Secretariat is a deployed member of Hanoi's Military Intelligence Office and is charged with directing (as well as coordinating throughout all subordinate elements) espionage and covert subversive action.

These staff functions are duplicated on interprovincial, provincial, district and village levels; however, there is no executive arm for Lao Dong Party espionage below district level in SVN.

The VC intelligence system has developed an extremely effective scheme for the classification of native South Vietnamese; it serves as an instrument of increasing and personalizing communist pressure. For example, village chiefs are typed as to the relative degree of their cooperation with the VC, with the GVN or noncooperation with either. This VC classification is communicated directly to the individual concerned; the certainty of curtailed life expectancy is apparent to those whose real or presumed support of the GVN has been accorded the top VC terror list rating. This technique, coupled with the provision of guaranteed rewards for demonstrated VC support, has been used with signal effectiveness among rural teachers and other critical GVN civil servants at district and province levels.

The Dich Tinh is the primary executive arm for Lao Dong Party espionage in SVN; its activity components are implanted at each level of the VC structure down to but exclusive of district level. Its function is to collect information concerning GVN plans and capabilities; it directs all forms of terrorist activities against GVN officials. The Dich Tinh has its own private communications channels and sustains a continuous courier service to its elements functioning at lower levels.

The Binh Van component of the intelligence apparatus is a staff agency for both directing and guiding the demoralization, proselytization and penetration of the RVNAF. It also guides the highly mobile paramilitary force operations conducted against GVN units and installations. While some of its efforts may be duplicated at lower VC levels, the mobile paramilitary force guidance function seems to exist entirely at the higher echelon. Binh Van personnel assigned to intimidate and

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demoralize raw RVNAF recruits and to sow discontent at higher levels are believed to be technically well-versed military intelligence officers from Hanoi. Their prime objectives are: (1) gaining the support of families of military men; (2) disseminating propaganda; (3) recruiting penetration agents (both in the military and the government); and, (4) fomenting "struggles" within the GVN. This group of skilled propagandists also recruits critical military skills (primarily RVNAF officers) for integration within VC ranks and conducts detailed background investigations of both civil and military personnel in SVN. It is in charge of VC ideological indoctrination, personnel re-investigations, penetration agent movements and maintaining continuous contact links with deployed agents.

The clandestine Lao Dong Party also figures significantly in the overall intelligence effort via highly developed security techniques which are realistically adapted to the population and needs of the area in which it operates. Early in 1962, all of its security policy directives were reportedly revised, and the Party's internal security and counterespionage mechanism in SVN was overhauled. Acting through its Security Committee, the Lao Dong is responsible for the enforcement of strict security measures at provincial, district and village levels and throughout VC ranks. The civilian population, as well, is security enforcement indoctrinated "to prevent penetration from 'the enemy.'"


There are no confirmed data available as to the organizational specifics of this Lao Dong Party security mechanism. Presumably, Security Committee chiefs are directly responsible to Executive Committees at corresponding levels, with a vertical chain of command bringing lower unit response directly to the next higher echelon. There appears to be a general, but informal, practice of exchanging security and counterespionage information among all levels of the mechanism.

The ramifications of this intelligence organization are like the tentacles of an octopus (See: Figure C-11) reaching into the very smallest villages and hamlets of SVN. Part of its success is measurable by the patent impossibility, at this time, of estimating its manning level with any degree of validity. It is extremely efficient and has saturated the SVN countryside. It has yet to be operationally extended beyond its capacity, much less matched in the field.

Motivation and Training

Attitudes and Motivation. What factors have influenced Vietnamese to become VC standard bearers? 5/ There are today two generations of VC in being and in contest. Many of those over 30 years old may have belonged to the Viet Minh. They grew up under French domination, were

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


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Figure C-11



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sparked with the spirit of nationalism and participated in the movement which expelled the Caucasian colonialists and won independence for their country. Such men are proud of their revolutionary activities, have obtained prestige because of them and form today's leadership backbone of the VC. In 1954, they may have been members of either of two groups of Viet Minh: one was sent north as a component (between 90,000 and 130,000 men) of some larger communist military design; the other group (possibly 900,000) stayed in the South. Its members either joined a political Viet Minh cadre unit or returned to their prehostilities occupation. Because of their training and experience, many were used to disseminate propaganda and to organize political cells and units, as well as to rebuild the insurgency apparatus as directed by Hanoi. They view their present effort as a continuation of the fight against the French. Such a perspective, perhaps, is reinforced when today's GVN national colors (unchanged since the days when they were carried by French-commanded Vietnamese units) are exhibited and acknowledged as "the traitors' emblem."

The second generation of contemporary VC, who grew up after the French left, only knew the Diem regime. His apparent goal is to obtain a government in Vietnam that will free him from oppression.

Political indoctrination and, through this, dedication coupled with conviction as to the righteousness of his endeavor apparently are very strong forces influencing VC motivation. As in the case of Red China, self-criticism sessions have proved effective within VC ranks. Strong emotional ties within the VC unit, which are generated in the close supervision of younger members by group leaders, are reported also to be an important motivator.

Education looms as a major motivational ingredient. The promise of an education reportedly ranked first among the five stimuli within the Viet Minh group who moved north in 1955 -- the others were: (1) desire to travel and see more of the country; (2) posthostilities enthusiasm for the winning side; (3) fear of ill treatment (a prime theme propagated within the group) by the new SVN government; and, (4) protest against social injustice and living conditions in home villages. Uncounted thousands of children were sent north in light of Viet Minh promises to parents implying both education and the better way of life.

By 1960, when Hanoi decided to step up the insurgency, those VC who had gone north were already integrated members of an extremely effective and politically controlled mechanism. They were thoroughly schooled in military and security matters, well indoctrinated and anxious to go south. Many must have come to believe that this was a return home to free their people from oppression; this probably was an infiltration reinforced by revolutionary fervor -- surmounting hardships by exhibiting the ideals of self-sacrifice and stoicism. This was the source of cadres who worked to influence, organize and direct the VC in the South.

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At the same time, a large portion of the older Viet Minh located in southern rural areas must have become sufficiently antagonistic to the Diem regime to join fledgling VC organizations in being. Hanoi sent some of its older revolutionaries to serve as recruiters, activists and organizers in the South. Reportedly, their selection was based on "demonstrated ability to convince." Results demonstrate the care with which this group worked; the success of its populace-influencing methods; the thoroughness of the organization and indoctrination processes they developed; and, their devotion. Their avowed following achieved results which the GVN has yet to contemplate, much less match.

Motivation of today's VC youth often is the result of dissatisfaction with conditions in their villages. Some have not seen a GVN representative in their village for two years. Some have objected to the behavior of members of ARVN-RF-PF force structure who have treated villagers with insolence and brutality. Aerial attacks and artillery fire applied indiscriminately also have exacted a toll on village allegiance. Others resent having been forced by GVN to leave their areas, abandoning homesteads and ancestral shrines. For a number of Vietnamese, the choice lies between joining the army of a government they neither know nor respect (and which appears, to them, to represent solely a corrupt military clique and the rich) or enlisting in the Front organization which exhibits sensitivity to their aspirations, may have provided physical support to them and stands for a unified nation free of foreign domination.

The seasoned hard-line VC of 1966 fights to expel the "American imperialist" and wants to acquire the country's economic resources for himself. The fight is not for, or against, communism; it appears once again to be for the independence of all Vietnam in the face of foreign (Western) influences. On the other hand, the well-indoctrinated young VC fights for what he terms social and political justice, for redistribution of land (depending on the areas selected for "liberation"), and for promises of "the good life." Across the board during 1966, the Lao Dong Party-COSVN apparatus will ensure that the goals announced by NLF radio on Tuesday, 21 December 1965, reinforce VC attitudes and motivation. There is nothing fundamentally new in: (1) striving for a neutralist SVN; (2) appealing for greater union among groups in all walks of life; (3) combatting foreign imperialism and its in-country lackeys; (4) returning to guerrilla warfare to avoid an open fight; (5) inciting legal demonstrations against the foreign presence and conditions in SVN; (6) mobilizing revolutionary manpower; (7) consolidating the countryside, villages and hamlets of SVN; and, (8) striving for better relations with the world's progressives. Many of them have been deep-seated aspirations forming the attitude-motivation base of most South Vietnamese for two decades.

Training. As perpetrated by Ho Chi Minh throughout the spheres of Lao Dong Party influence, the three basic "rules" and eight funda-

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mental "remarks" of Mao Tse-tung serve as the foundation of VC training. They also constitute the crux of VC societal focus:

<u>RULES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
(1) All actions are subject to command.	(1) Close the door when you leave the house.
(2) Do not steal from the people.	(2) Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
(3) Be neither selfish nor unjust.	(3) Be courteous.
	(4) Be honest in your transactions.
	(5) Return what you have borrowed.
	(6) Replace what you break.
	(7) Do not bathe in the presence of women.
	(8) Do not search the pocketbooks of those you arrest without authority.

Such a simplistic creed demonstrates best the fact that VC training is thorough, simple, disciplined and politically controlled. "To train diligently" is the oath taken by every VC fighting man; that is exactly what he does. Whether hard-core regular, member of a Main Force battalion, or part-time village guerrilla, the VC is rehearsed and rehearsed until he knows exactly what he is supposed to do and precisely how he is supposed to do it: Training is continuous; no one is ever considered to be sufficiently trained.

The VC not only is trained militarily, but is indoctrinated ideologically to the point of conviction that the dedicated man "will sacrifice everything for the good of the cause" and "will fight resolutely and without complaint" -- vows taken by the regular as well as his guerrilla cohort. Although he will defect or surrender in time of stress, the VC is believed by US observers to be much less likely to do so than other Asian fighting men because of the simplistic thoroughness of his political training. The VC military training program is derived from a PAVN-formulated concept, allegedly consistent with Marxist-leninist doctrine, that establishes the following rules: (1) training is to be based on practical facts; (2) technical and political training must be conducted in tandem; (3) officer training is to be considered the principal training mission; and, (4) training derives from the

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actual situation confronting the troops, including the enemy and friendly situations, and on the battlefield's terrain features.

Emphasis is placed on the principles of strategic and ideological military leadership, as well as of continuing to train and study during combat. Courses usually are short, are conducted between battles and campaigns and entail critiques of past performance as well as new subject matter. Success or failure in battle is the gauge for both the control and estimation of training results. Political indoctrination on the job is emphasized but not at the expense or serious omission of military subjects. Techniques and ideology have a common purpose: destruction of the enemy. Officers and specialist training is paramount. The indispensable factor, apparently, in switching from the guerrilla warfare phase to that of mobile warfare and attack-on-fortifications is the availability of technical skills. Specialized training courses have received increasing attention, and cadre returned from regroupment in NVN have served as instructors for such VC courses. Although much of the advanced technical training is conducted at camps and schools in NVN, certain courses now are conducted by the transfer of instructor cadres from site to site.

Standard training phases conducted at VC unit level last from 10 to 30 days; technical courses can cover a span of months or more. Since 1963, a portion of every unit's training cycle has been devoted to food production. VC recruit training methods vary with locale and circumstances but are basically dependent on maintaining the security of the training areas in the face of GVN-US operations. Most VC training centers have been destroyed at least once by GVN operations; however, this has not stopped the VC from rebuilding and continuing the training process. In some cases, the more successful GVN raids have merely resulted in an emphasis shift from base-camp to on-the-job "battle drill" training in VC units. Figure C-12 shows the location and operational level of known training sites. These are not necessarily all in operation at the same time; each passes through cycles of use and disuse, depending on military exigencies.

The built-in capacity of VC training to accept and to develop the capabilities involved in achieving Hanoi-specified goals at the people level in SVN is evident in such selected course listings as follow; basic and individual aspirations are exploited:

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TRAINING LEVEL	MILITARY COURSE TITLE
Recruit-level:	(1) Squad leaders to Company Commanders (2) Weapons fabrication (3) Party cell leadership (4) The village party chapter (5) Rural administration (6) Civilian and enemy proselyting (cadre)
District-level:	(1) Guerrilla and Militia training (2) Rural administration (3) Village party member training
Province-level:	(1) District Committee Member (advanced course) (2) Recruit training (3) Midwife training (4) Assistant Squad leaders to assistant Platoon leaders
COSVN-level:	(1) Troop proselyting (2) Province Committee Member (advanced course) (3) The Military Region (4) Platoon leaders to Company Commanders (5) Platoon political officers

There is a definite enthusiasm for the equalitarian life in VC units. Also extant, however, is the efficiency of system control over the individual who knows that defection may bring severe reprisal against his family. In many instances, the VC must believe that he is a better and more capable fighter than the ARVN soldier. Good organization, a strong cadre of older experts, firm discipline, constant political education, fear of capture and resultant treatment at the hands of the GVN, are all factors which influence this man to fight.^{3/} In extension, he must be aware of the "win tradition" attacking his effort. Today's Main Force formations are linked to the "Viet Minh Chu-luc" (regulars) of 1954; today's District units stem from the "Dia-phuong-quan" (Regional forces) of 1952-54; today's guerrillas hold lineage with the "Du-kich" (militia) dating from at least 1950.

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The External and Internal Logistics

External Support. The NLF, although posing as the rightful governing body in SVN, has no seat of government and has been unable to achieve recognition as a government. Its representation, however, has been received and recognized in the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Algeria, Cuba, the Soviet Union and Communist China. VC supply stockage levels have been sustained by items produced in the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, France and Red China. The current record of assistance provided to Hanoi by communist nations, in terms solely of economic credits and grants, is shown below.

VALUE OF ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO
NORTH VIETNAM BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1955-64* (U)
(MILLION US DOLLARS)

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	Total 1955-64
Total	350.2	15.8	18.8	20.7	127.5	200.0	221.4	NA ^{1/}	- ^{2/}	-	956.4
Communist China	200.02 ^{3/}	-	-	-	100.04 ^{4/}	-	157.0	-	-	-	457.0
USSR	100.02 ^{5/}	7.5	11.8	20.7	25.0	200.02 ^{6/}	3.9	NA	-	-	568.9
European Satellites	50.25 ^{7/}	8.52 ^{8/}	7.0	-	2.5	Negl.	62.5	-	-	-	130.58 ^{9/}
Bulgaria	4.02 ^{10/}	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	-	-	6.5
Czechoslovakia	9.02 ^{11/}	-	-	-	-	-	7.5	-	-	-	16.5
East Germany	15.02 ^{12/}	-	-	-	-	Negl.	-	-	-	-	15.0
Hungary	2.0	-	-	-	2.5	-	7.5	-	-	-	12.0
Poland	-	7.52 ^{13/}	7.0	-	-	-	7.5	-	-	-	22.0
Romania	4.02 ^{14/}	0.82 ^{15/}	-	-	-	-	37.5	-	-	-	42.3

* Insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea.

^{1/} In 1962 the USSR extended a line of credit of unknown value for various engineering and industrial projects, machinery, and equipment.

^{2/} A dash (-) indicates that no extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.

^{3/} Grant.

^{4/} Including a grant of \$25 million.

^{5/} Including a grant of \$5 million.

^{6/} Including credits for \$16.1 million extended by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania in 1955 - the total amount extended by each is unknown.

^{7/} Extended for the period 1955-58.

SOURCE: CIA Intelligence Report. CIA/RR RR 655
April, 1965, p. 23.

During 1964-65, a total of 520 Free World ships, under contract to communist nations, engaged in carrying goods to and from NVN. Of the 119 so engaged in 1965, 107 flew NATO colors (67 from the UK).

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Internal Support. The People's Revolutionary Party is charged with providing funds for the VC war effort and for most of the essential nonmilitary goods consumed by the VC organization. A wide array of Front, Party and military elements accomplish the major tasks of production, acquisition and transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party, the Rear Services of the VC military organization and the various components of the NLF play key roles. The Party Finance and Economic Section is the basic economic organization of the VC and the source of almost all supplies provided internally as well as some of those provided externally.^{6/} It works closely with the Rear Services of the VC military units and with the various NLF organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services provides a channel for supplying military units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assistance in accomplishing economic tasks. The Section relies on such organizations to supply manpower for the Party's economic tasks and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian population by supplying the necessary goods.

Although support of VC operations in SVN is accomplished both by infiltration and from local sources, the bulk of VC manpower and supplies seems to be obtained internally. Within SVN, the VC transportation system and network of supply bases are estimated to employ 14,000 individuals on a full-time basis. Safe havens and bases are positioned in various strategic locations in each province (See: Figure 12); supply depots apparently have a capacity of from 5 to 10 tons of mixed supplies.

The VC depend on the infiltration of such materiel as heavy equipment, medical supplies, arms and ammunition. Infiltrators from NVN not only carry their own equipment and medical kits, but also carry a second load of specifically needed equipment. It is estimated that approximately 48,000 individuals have infiltrated from NVN between 1959 and September 1965; at least eight tons per day may have been transported via this dual-load technique. The largest quantity of supplies enter SVN through Laos and Cambodia over the Ho Chi Minh trail. These two governments either are unable or unwilling to control the infiltration route situation.

Sea routes played a very important part in earlier infiltrations since sampans could fully exploit the 1,500-mile coast line; combined US-GVN operations now appear to have curtailed this flow. The Lactian corridor, greatly improved, is the prime movement route for personnel and supplies. Elephants and oxen are used in highland areas. An average of 1,700 to 2,000 men maintain the transportation corridor through Laos; another 3,000 maintain the route in the northern portion of SVN.

VC-imposed taxation in areas under their control provides both cash and tangible goods support. Per Secretary of State Rusk, the VC are

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
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extorting some \$30 million annually from the South Vietnamese (about one-tenth of the GVN budget in 1965). Operative are an agriculture tax (probably the most important source), a plantation tax, the tax on commerce) taxes on GVN-controlled areas and transportation tax. VC taxation policy permits payment in rice; in addition to feeding the VC in the field, rice sales monies permit materiel purchases both from within and outside the country. The ensuing chart records VC annual tax rates applied either to various products or to commercial activities in SVN:7/

TAX TARGETS	TAX PERCENTAGES
AGRICULTURE (Rates based on farmer's estimated production rather than actual income): (1) Peasants (2) Middle-class farmers (3) Wealthy farmers	10 12 12-20
COMMERCE (Rates determined by amount of sales and profits): (1) VC-controlled areas: (a) Small business (b) Large business (c) Charcoal kilns (d) Rice husking mills (2) GVN-controlled areas: (a) Business earning profit from labor (b) Business earning profit from capital	2-5 10 10 10 5 (net profit) 10 (net profit)
CHARCOAL (Produced and carried to market)	5 (per trip)
FISHING: (1) Net men (2) Net boatmen	one-half day's salary per month 10


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


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
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In extension, VC taxes are collected on a per capita basis. Throughout the countryside in SVN, this arrangement falls into the following categories:8/

TAX CATEGORY	AMOUNT
(1) Agricultural (per year)	300-500 \$ VN
(2) Wood-cutting (per cubic meter)	200 \$ VN
(3) Sea and River products	10-30% of product value
(4) Rubber (per hectare, per year)	500-1000 \$ VN
(5) Tea, coffee, fruit (per hectare, per year)	1000-2000 \$ SVN
(6) Miscellaneous (levied on province road travelers; on farm products in market places; on merchandise at edge of GVN-controlled areas)	Unknown

The VC have long extracted "tax" payments from French plantation owners, as well as other foreign business firms (e.g., petroleum products distributors) operative in SVN. Moreover, VC bond drives and note issuances (for "post-liberation" payment) have been common. Clan-destine Front business organizations often are used in GVN-controlled areas.

The VC are dependent on the countryside and population for much of their food; in areas where it is not plentiful, VC food production units are fully and directly so-engaged. Until June of 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent of their own subsistence; now, solely combat units are relieved of this responsibility (provide 50 percent). The VC are forbidden to steal foodstuff from the peasant in VC-controlled areas; it must be purchased, either with cash or credit (for which receipts are given); in areas where VC control is not complete, food may be pilfered, captured or purchased from the local populace as well as from GVN sources. The significant VC requirement for salt is such that it often must be brought from the North; even VC troops cannot operate at top proficiency without salt in the hot, humid climate of the South.

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Vulnerabilities

The VC today stand as the prime obstacle to the development of responsible cohesion in SVN. This form of cohesion, in the final analysis, calls for reintegrating into Vietnamese society those VC who wish to remain in a free and independent SVN. Today, they are ideologically committed to communist -- labeled nationalist -- courses of action in varying degrees. They are well trained, carefully indoctrinated and dedicated to the achievement of NLF goals. In achieving these goals, they will "sacrifice everything for the good of the cause" and "fight resolutely and without complaint." This is a firmly disciplined, well-organized young force; among its leaders are older South Vietnamese who believe they fight for Vietnam and not for communism. The VC have a strong popular appeal in SVN. They are, themselves, Vietnamese; existing historical and family ties are used to reinforce their "nationalistic" appeals. The deep-rooted VC organization -- politically and militarily efficient -- has drawn public strength from the earlier weaknesses, inefficiency and often totalitarian behavior of GVN officials since 1959. In the very nature of the means whereby the VC have achieved their present degree of success, however, lies their vulnerability:

(1) As Vietnamese, their "outlook" or "national character" is much the same as fellow members of Vietnamese society. Hence, they are subject to the same South Vietnamese attitudinal problems that confront the GVN. (See: ANNEX I) Already, in VC-controlled areas, there is evidence of nepotism, favoritism, jealousy, clannishness, profiteering, extortion and conflict between VC civilian and military cadres. As Vietnamese and subject to a "bandwagon" tendency, the appeal of belonging to the guerrilla side that seems sure to win may drain off abruptly once US-GVN forces provide solid evidence of continued victory in battle and the evident momentum of VC military defeat replaces the earlier momentum of apparent early victory.

(2) The credibility of VC propaganda is sustained largely by the evidence of GVN weakness, inefficiency and totalitarianism. At such time as the GVN makes apparent a significant degree of strength, efficiency and adherence to democratic processes, the basic ingredient of VC propaganda will lose public credibility.

(3) Until recently, the VC have not attempted to discharge the responsibilities of governing portions of SVN. Recent reports from VC-controlled areas indicate that the practical problems of tax collection, providing work incentives and fulfilling the other requirements of responsible government have not been accomplished by measures more appealing to the public than those of the present GVN. Hence, the credibility of the earlier VC theme of "the better life" has been made suspect.

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(4) VC propaganda has painted an ugly picture of American self-interest and American troop behavior. Once the US and GVN have destroyed the false image of US national intent and set an example of friendly and helpful troop behavior, another aspect of VC credibility will be challenged. Not only will the theme itself be destroyed, but the very countertheme can be used to buttress the GVN position.

(5) Motivation studies indicate that Vietnamese join the NLF-VC for varied reasons: in social protest, to gain prestige, in hope of rapid economic improvement, in hope of peace -- or because they are compelled to join. Fortunately, the NLF has not stressed Marxist doctrine; instead, it has continued to reiterate themes of nationalism, unity, independence, democracy and peace. Hence, the GVN will acquire credibility, and destroy present VC credibility, when it can demonstrate:

(a) That the successive changes in government in Saigon represent a "genuine" spirit of Vietnamese "revolution," rather than the externally inspired "false revolution" in the North.

(b) That the VC do not, in fact, adhere to achieving unity of the peoples of SVN; their main thrusts have been directed toward widening the rural-urban gap and turning tenants against landowners, Montagnard against Vietnamese, and youth against elders. Rather than the VC, it is the GVN that is truly embarked on programs designed to achieve social cohesion in SVN.

(c) That constant VC military assault and terror tactics represent the real threat to the peace in SVN; it is the GVN that seeks peace and individual security rather than instability and terror.

(d) That the US is in SVN solely to help; that its representatives do in fact help the South Vietnamese people and that the US does not intend to remain in-country once the true independence of SVN is assured.

(e) That the VC cause is not a "popular revolt;" its real leaders and the actual stimulus for NLF and VC activities emanate from Communist China. It is the GVN, rather than its opposition, which is determined that SVN will not again be used by China for her own purposes.

There are specific means of controlling population and resources, as well as of interdicting personnel and logistical support, that can and should be employed to preclude a large measure of the present VC sustenance. (See: Chapter V) Of a more fundamental nature, however, is the fact that the purported VC aims represent the true goals of the GVN: national independence, unity, democracy, social cohesion, freedom, solidarity and peace. Once the GVN, with US support, effectively demonstrates that it can provide the best means of achieving these goals, the VC will have been discredited.

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NOTES

1. VC propaganda for the past 2-3 months has been concentrating on the nationalism aspects of the war. They are attaching the label of imperialism on the US and attempting to build popular opinion against the US in much the way the Viet Minh did against the French.

2. The pattern of VC activity has not changed since 1961. This VC statement is only a propaganda theme and does not in any way represent the COSVN Campaign Plan for 1966.

3. U.S. CIA. Memorandum. The Organization Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam, No. 2313/65, 7 September 1965 (SECRET).

4. VC Political Order of Battle, South of the 17th Parallel Prepared by Ministry of the Armed Forces High Command/RVNAF J-2. Saigon, 15 July 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

5. Rand Corporation. Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: A Preliminary Report (U). A Report Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs by John C. Donnell, Guy J. Pauker and Joseph J. Zasloff. Memorandum RM-4507-ISA, California, March 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

6. U.S. CIA. Infiltration and Logistics - South Vietnam. A Memorandum Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, Concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board USI B-D-24.7/4A, 28 October 1965 (SECRET - NOFORN).

7. Youngdale, C. A. (B.G. USMC). Viet Cong Logistical System (U). A Study Prepared by General Youngdale, Ser. No. 01788, 12 December 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

8. Saigon Post, "The V.C. System of Taxation," 20 Nov 65.

ANNEX D

THE VIETNAMESE LEGAL SYSTEM

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ANNEX D

THE VIETNAMESE LEGAL SYSTEM

Suitability of the Existing System

General. The stakes in SVN are too high, our efforts too costly, to allow continued disregard of the need for a responsive, functioning legal system. Governments must act largely through laws, using legal institutions as tools for implementing and enforcing their programs. Under an effective legal system, these programs are translated promptly into sound laws which serve to complement, and at times lead, efforts to solve national problems. If it fails in this responsibility, the system seriously inhibits the ability of national leaders to act in the public interest, and it erects major barriers to the achievement of both order and progress. In troubled SVN, the legal system is a particularly crucial institution which could severely frustrate otherwise well-directed efforts by the people of SVN and the Free World.

Just where does the legal system fit in the effort to achieve the goals of pacification and long-term development? Ordinarily, legal institutions are thought to bear considerably upon the long-range development of a nation but to have little concern with pacification. This remains true in the more conventional situation where pacification is an exclusively military matter. However, in SVN, where pacification demands a total government effort, the legal system can make a substantial contribution by helping to establish a stable government and by aiding the government in winning popular support.

The Vietnamese Legal System. The system in SVN is both French and Oriental. Its organization and structure are basically French, but the frame of reference is Oriental. While French-trained lawyers are much in evidence, the more subtle Oriental influence is equally strong. And, through it all, the people have developed their own unique attitudes and approaches by taking the best from the foreign cultures that have historically dominated them.

However, formal legal institutions exist only in the urban areas of SVN. Rural areas are hardly touched by these more organized institutions and, instead, still follow various forms of tribal and customary law. Out of these various influences has grown a legal system of fairly deep root and tradition. Whatever defects our Anglo-American point of view might find in this many-faceted approach, the fact remains that, throughout most of the past, it has sufficed to

serve the minimum needs and demands of the nation.

Today's Challenges to the Legal System. SVN now, however, is subject to pressures imposing increased demands upon the GVN and working drastic changes in the society. Laws and courts that once sufficed are inadequate to meet the complex demands of a nation involved in a struggle for life. The inability of the formal legal system to reach beyond city walls signals an increasing danger as the rural peoples become more worldly and the tribal and customary systems no longer meet their needs. The indifference shown by the public toward the legal system of the central government takes on vital significance now that the GVN must compete with communism for basic loyalties. Such challenges to the legal system must be answered if the people of SVN are to achieve orderly, reliable government capable of ensuring national security and supporting social and economic development.

Because of this crucial necessity, the Army's Judge Advocate General has undertaken a study of the Vietnamese legal system to ascertain its ability to contribute toward the goals of pacification and long-term development. The legal system is complex, but not significantly more complicated than our own. Some difficulty arises, since French and Oriental legal patterns are somewhat different from our common law approach. But these differences are not as great as popularly imagined and can be understood by Anglo-American lawyers, in principle, if not in detail. Actually, the primary obstacle to understanding the legal system in Vietnam is the difficulty of obtaining an accurate factual picture. It is nonetheless possible to arrive at certain conclusions:

-- First, the Vietnamese legal system is not responding sufficiently to the demands and needs of the nation and has provided insufficient leadership and help in the solution of national problems.

-- Second, the basic legal system, however, constitutes an adequate foundation that could be developed to perform its proper functions.

Three general problem areas must be attacked if the system is to be revitalized. These areas actually overlap in practice but, for purposes of analysis and organization, can be listed as: (1) substantive law; (2) legal institutions involved in the administration of laws -- courts, law schools, bar, police and penal system; and, (3) popular understanding and acceptance of the legal system.

Substantive Law. It is essential that GVN have a body of law responsive to the needs of the nation. This is a matter of both short

and long-term importance. For the short-term goal of pacification, more effective "emergency" type laws are necessary to better control corruption, black market operations and other monetary abuses. Further, better procedures must be established for disseminating emergency laws throughout SVN, especially to the police and judicial officials who must enforce them. The long-range programs in this area would involve the recodification and redrafting of the basic laws of the nation, a project which has already been under way for some time but which is in need of assistance.

Legal Institutions Involved in the Administration of Law. Efforts must be made to improve institutions upon which the effective administration of law ultimately depends. In particular, these are the judiciary, the law schools, the bar and the penal system. The initial step in this regard is a combined short and long-term effort aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of justice within the existing system. This must be done through efforts such as improving and expanding court operations; increasing the quality of law school instruction; developing more public action on the part of the bar and attracting more and better people to the many positions in the legal system. The second step in this area, that of extending the formal legal system beyond the city walls and down to village level is necessarily long range; it represents a "cultural" change and is feasible only as these areas are pacified and trained personnel become available.

Popular Understanding and Acceptance of the Legal System. It is not sufficient merely to establish an efficient, responsive legal system; the system must also have the confidence of the people. This is so fundamental that it is perhaps too easily overlooked. Popular support is the most critical need, without which the legal system can make no substantial contribution toward either pacification or development. Laws are often unfair to the poor, and the air of mystery surrounding courts and laws is a further barrier to these people. While most Americans are able to go into their courts with the conviction that they will be fairly heard, the peasant of SVN has no such understanding. Consequently, he finds it difficult to place trust or confidence in a system which he regards as a complete mystery, or worse, suspects of corruption.

The first step in establishing confidence in the legal system hinges on convincing the people that the GVN is committed to governing by just laws that are fairly administered; further, the people must be brought to understand the need for strict emergency measures and methods. Initially, this should be an essential part of the overall GVN effort to pacify the country and win allegiances. The second step, a more long-range project, is to get the people involved and closely identified with the legal system. This requires respect for law and order, a willingness to submit disputes to court procedures and a realization that wrongdoing will be punished. In urban areas where legal institu-

tions are sufficiently functional, this is essentially an educational effort that can be started at once. In rural areas, however, this is part of the "cultural" revolution that can be undertaken only in connection with the expansion of the formal legal institutions.

How Can These Challenges Be Answered? Many astute Vietnamese have considerable insight into the nature of the varied problems which limit the efficiency of their legal system; there is abundant evidence of sincere efforts to resolve these problems. Unfortunately, the day-to-day needs have a tendency to overwhelm attempts to make basic improvements in the legal system. Today, GVN's modest efforts are headed in the right direction and must be encouraged. However, the time has come for a more fundamental program aimed at achieving a broader understanding and acceptance of a system of law which reflects and is responsive to the best interests and aspirations of the people. The overall US support program can be successful only if the need for achieving an effective legal order is promptly recognized.

The discussion to this point has been by way of a diagnosis. The cure, a more difficult matter, must be performed by the Vietnamese people, since they are best able to understand and frame their own system. However, it becomes increasingly apparent that the Vietnamese must have help and, for the time being at least, this help must come from the US. Some aid can be given in the form of physical resources (e.g., money and books), but it must largely be through encouragement, inspiration and suggestion. We must not take over the Vietnamese legal system, and we should not impose our own system.

The US effort in SVN already exhibits some aid to the legal system. However, the MACV Staff Judge Advocate's Office is the only entity continually and primarily active in the legal sphere. That office has done considerable work in advising and assisting; but, necessarily, its responsibility has been mostly confined to those legal areas having a military impact. Other efforts have been at best occasional and impermanent.

Responsibility for designing and executing a unified, comprehensive program should be assigned to a central US agency possessing the authority to call on other agencies for necessary assistance. Setting up this program will first require considerable further study. Tampering with a legal system is delicate work that should be done only under the guidance of qualified experts.

Such a study can be accomplished most effectively by contracting with highly qualified legal groups such as the Institute for Judicial Administration, the American Bar Foundation, the National College of State Trial Judges or one of the many highly qualified university law faculties. These groups have available to them high-level intellectual

talent with considerable experience in the everyday problems of legal administration. This study will require experts in at least the following fields: judicial administration, civil law, criminal law, commercial law, comparative law, family law and procedure. They must either read and speak Vietnamese and French or be given highly skilled translators. Rough or approximate translations of laws are not sufficient and are in fact quite dangerous.

A U.S. agency responsive to the Ambassador as "Single Manager" in-country, should assume responsibility for coordination of the effort to aid the Vietnamese legal system. While the Army has done considerable work in this area, it would not be advisable to have the military head a program predominantly involved with aiding and developing a civilian legal system. A civilian agency can best approach the GVN legal system through all of its many levels and aspects. The Army should, meanwhile, continue its present efforts but focus on the establishment of a unified, comprehensive program addressing the roots of the legal system's inadequacies.

International Law. The conflict in SVN also offers a striking example of the increasing significance of international law. Enlightened opinion demands that, if war must be waged, it be done as humanely as possible. Indiscriminate use of bombing or artillery and mistreatment of captives are not only politically damaging but are violations of international law as well. The GVN and US, in order to preserve the good will of the world, must exercise increased prudence in such matters.

The realities of today demand that men give increasing attention to the accepted law of nations in conducting their wars and in developing their nations. As President Johnson said at the recent Washington World Conference on World Peace Through Law:

"International law has been primarily concerned with relations between states. In pursuit of justice, it must now concern itself more than in the past with the welfare of people."

Conclusion. A functioning legal system not only permeates the entire fabric of a society but also serves as the mortar holding the various elements of that society together. The point to be drawn here is quite simple; the Vietnamese legal system, a crucial factor in both pacification and long-term development, is not making a sufficient contribution and must be set on the right track if the US-GVN total effort is to succeed.

This diagnosis is drawn largely from a study of the Vietnamese legal history and system which the following portions of this annex

reflect in greater depth. The first portion is a critical examination of today's Vietnamese legal system which is based upon the best evidence that could be gathered under present circumstances. The second is a detailed description of Vietnamese military justice, which also sheds light upon the civilian legal system. As a supporting document (APPENDIX 1), a compilation of Vietnamese legal history -- a subject never before treated comprehensively -- is included.

A Description of the Legal System

General. The Minister of Justice is the executive head of the SVN legal system. In this regard he is responsible for organizing and supervising the courts, for administering the laws and for defining the regulations governing the legal profession and the practice of law. Within the Ministry, the Directorate of Criminal Affairs is responsible for the administration of criminal justice, the drafting of criminal laws and the operation of the penal system. The Directorate of Civil Law administers the courts, drafts civil laws and regulates the legal profession.

Courts. The courts of SVN which are operated by the Ministry of Justice are largely French in their structure and organization. A particular distinction between these courts and our Anglo-American courts is the separation between the judicial and administrative jurisdictions. The judicial courts hear the traditional criminal and civil matters while the administrative courts have jurisdiction over disputes between citizens and the state involving certain specialized areas of government action.

(1) Judicial Courts. There is one supreme court, the Cour de Cassation, which sits in Saigon. Below this court are two Courts of Appeal -- one in Hue and one in Saigon. They take appeals from Courts of First Instance, that is, the usual trial courts consisting of a magistrate, an examining magistrate and a prosecutor, or from Courts of Peace with Extended Jurisdiction, in which all of the foregoing functions are accomplished by one man. Below these trial courts are Courts of Peace, which handle the most minor cases. There is a Court of First Instance or a Court of Peace with Extended Jurisdiction in most provinces, but a few of these courts serve two or three provinces.

There is also a system of "specialized" courts. These include five labor courts to hear employee-employer disputes, a juvenile court, four agrarian courts to handle litigation arising as a result of agrarian reform and rent courts to govern disputes arising out of Ordinance No. 4, 2 April 1953, prescribing rights and duties of landlords and tenants.

The Cour de Cassation was organized in accordance with Ordinance No. 27 of 2 September 1954. The court's jurisdiction extends throughout SVN. It consists of one first president, one president of chamber and six associate judges. Public prosecution is vested in the prosecutor general who is assisted by a deputy prosecutor general. There is also a chief clerk and several assistants. This court is organized into two chambers: the Civil Chamber, presided over by the first president and two associate judges, which hears appeals in civil and commercial areas, and the Criminal Chamber, presided over by the president of chamber and two associate judges, which hears criminal appeals. The court has power to hear only those cases where the court below has abused its power, conflicted with the judgment of other courts in similar cases or made certain technical errors.

The organization and jurisdiction of the two Courts of Appeal are established by Ordinance No. 4, 18 October 1949. Each of these courts consists of one first president, one or two presidents of chamber and twelve associate judges. The prosecutor general is in charge of prosecution and is assisted by one or two deputies and several assistant prosecutors.

These courts have three chambers. The first chamber, presided over by the first president and two associate judges, is for hearing civil and commercial cases appealed from the Courts of First Instance or Courts of Peace with Extended Jurisdiction. The second chamber, the correctional chamber, presided over by the president of chamber and two associate judges, hears appeals in criminal cases. For felony cases two citizen assessors are added to the composition of the court. The third, the Chamber of Indictment, is presided over by the first president or president of chamber assisted by two associate judges. This chamber is a judicial bureau charged with examining felony cases; it is also empowered to rule on detention orders of examining magistrates.

A Court of First Instance, organized by Ordinance No. 4, 18 October 1949, usually consists of a president, a prosecutor, an examining magistrate and a clerk. If the court is busy, such as in Saigon, there can be additional judges and other officials. The trial sessions are presided over by the president. The examining magistrate conducts the investigations and the prosecutor is responsible for the preparation and prosecution of the case against the accused. The prosecutor also has control over the jail within the jurisdiction of the court.

The Courts of Peace with Extended Jurisdiction have the same competence as the Courts of First Instance but are actually less important. They are headed by a president but have no examining magistrate or prosecutor; therefore the president must perform all functions except in some cases where the prosecutor general of the Court of Appeals acts as prosecutor.

The Courts of Peace consist of one judge and a clerk. They try minor civil and criminal matters and sometimes assist in investigating more important cases.

(2) Administrative Courts. The theory behind separate administrative tribunals is that judges having specialized particular knowledge are more able to dispose of disputes resulting from governmental administrative actions affecting citizens. This administrative system consists of three bodies: the Council of State, which is the high court of the administrative system; the Administrative Court, which is the court of first impression regarding damage claims, challenges of administrative rulings and disputes over provincial, district and village elections; and Pension Courts, which consider complaints regarding veterans' allowances.

The Problems of the Judiciary. It is indeed difficult to assess the present effectiveness of the SVN courts. This is so partly because objective analysis is inhibited by language difficulties, the abounding historical and cultural obscurities and the present war and governmental chaos. But it is always difficult to judge a court system, even in the United States, for example, where such studies are made much easier by the easy availability of materials and the stability of institutions.

Historically, the SVN courts have been stronger in the urban areas than in the rural areas. The hostile control of numerous rural areas further deteriorates this situation. Presently in most provinces there is one court of general jurisdiction, usually sitting only in the largest town. Laws can have little or no influence on people who lack understanding and knowledge of the courts that enforce these laws. As events in pioneer North America illustrate, people cannot be expected to trust their fates to courts held by strangers in seemingly far-off places. Thus, even without the problems created by war, there is need to expand the judicial system to influence rural areas more adequately.

Further, it is not sufficient merely to bring the courts closer to the people. The courts must also make a good impression -- they must be efficient, fair and just. To achieve this requires competent judges and staffs. A definitive determination of the overall quality of the SVN judiciary has not been made; however, personal contact with SVN judges has shown that most are highly intelligent, well qualified and overworked.

SVN judges are basically civil servants who, unlike their US counterparts are not elected or appointed. Instead, lawyers aspiring to become judges must pass special examinations given by the Ministry of Justice; successful completion leads to assignment in the judicial system, usually as an assistant prosecutor in a lower court. From this

position a man must work his way to higher courts. Promotion, demotion and discipline are determined by the Ministry of Justice, theoretically with the concurrence of the High Council of the Judiciary, a body of judges designed to ensure judicial independence.

There are critics who feel that the judiciary under this system is not sufficiently free of governmental pressure. Certainly a judge is more likely to be influenced by executive policy when compatibility with that policy may determine his future in the judicial system. This is not to criticize the integrity of the SVN judiciary, for the system is quite natural to them. The Vietnamese have lived for centuries under authoritarian governments which have made no pretense at separation of powers. Historically, Vietnamese rulers have exercised by themselves the various legislative, administrative and judicial functions.

The spirit of this consolidation of functions has not yet been totally erased. In 1956 the Diem government promulgated a constitution purporting to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. However, in 1960 Madam Ngo Dinh Nhu openly asserted that one of her official functions was:

"To assist official agencies in the punishment of those persons who are convicted and to establish justice for those who are unjustly condemned, although these activities normally belong in the realm of the administration of the courts."

However, at this point it is not necessary to make a detailed appraisal of the courts and judges. Instead, it is sufficient to state that the SVN judiciary must be closely examined with an eye toward equipping it to meet more effectively the growing needs of the country. All civilized countries must be vigilant for improvements that can be made in their judicial systems, no matter how refined they may be. Judges and their methods must grow with their country.

A program for the improvement of the judiciary should aim at: (1) increasing the number of courts, particularly in rural areas, and making greater use of circuit courts; (2) achievement of a more independent judiciary; (3) establishment of further schooling for judges to keep them current and to encourage better court administration; (4) creation of a body, such as the Judicial Conference of the United States, through which the judiciary could speak collectively and indulge in professional discourse, thus serving as their own means toward judicial reforms and improvement; and, (5) improved training for court clerks, reporters and other administrative employees.

Lawyers and the Bar. The nearly 200 lawyers in SVN are concen-

trated in Saigon and a few other cities. All of these attorneys are members of either the Saigon or Hue bars. Most of the Saigon bar members have their offices in that city, with a handful having offices in Bien Hoa, My Tho, Can Tho, Long Xuyen and Long An. The few members of the Hue bar are evenly distributed among Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang.

To become a "regular" attorney one must: (1) graduate from the law school at either Saigon or Hue with a License in Law; (2) successfully complete a one-year course of study (generally taken simultaneously with law school) which certifies the student as technically qualified to practice law; (3) complete a three-year period as a probationary attorney in a regular attorney's office; and, (4) be 21 years of age and of good character. The probationary attorney is authorized to perform all the acts of a regular attorney, including court appearances, but all official papers and documents must be signed by a regular attorney.

At least one source reports that the average income for attorneys in Saigon is about 20,000 piasters per month. Some, however, are said to earn as much as 100,000 piasters per month.

The primary need of SVN lawyers is the attraction of more and better young people into the profession and development of a greater sense of public responsibility. There is no easy solution to the manpower problem at any time, and particularly not at a time when so many other demands are being made for young men. Today most recent male law school graduates are entering the Army where they are generally assigned to nonlegal duties. This limits the number of practicing lawyers and prevents young men from gaining needed experience in their most formative years.

A sense of public responsibility is not the sort of thing that can be easily instilled in the existing bar. It is not unfair to generalize by describing practicing lawyers as resistant to change. Therefore, it is mostly through the younger lawyers that a new spirit must be developed. This is as true in the United States as it is in SVN.

Well-trained, public-spirited lawyers are key persons in nation building. They have the technical skills and the abilities to convince and lead that are crucial to a struggling government. Considerable care must be taken not to sublimate this vital need to the often more apparent demands of immediate necessity.

The support of the SVN bar must be sought for all efforts to develop and improve SVN legal institutions. It is particularly important that the attorneys be made to realize that their assistance and talents are needed and wanted in these projects and that the bar stands to benefit from the success of these projects, both professionally and financially.

Consideration should also be given to expanding the Military Justice Corps so as to enable it to function throughout the entire spectrum of the many and varied fields of law associated with national defense. The GVN is presently considering implementation of a decree law providing military defense counsel for all accused in military courts which would justify an expansion of the Military Justice Corps. Not only would this provide a training ground for more young lawyers but it would also provide another vehicle for extending the influence of law and lawyers beyond the cities and into rural Vietnam.

Law Schools. As the intellectual training ground of both lawyers and judges, law schools hold the key to the foundation and development of the legal profession. For this reason, particular scrutiny must be accorded the SVN law schools.

Law teaching in SVN is performed by the faculties of law at the universities at Saigon and Hue. Large numbers of students undertake to study law, but very few complete the courses and are awarded degrees. From 1954 to 1962 approximately 10,000 students enrolled in the law school and only 424 were awarded the License in Law. The high number of enrollments is probably due to the very low tuition cost. The considerable attrition follows from this, since many of the students are not seriously interested in the study of law.

By Southeast Asian standards the law schools and SVN universities are above average quality. This is partly because they have developed in the French academic traditions and partly because many Vietnamese who have won academic distinctions abroad have returned to their native universities.

The law school curriculums appear to be fairly adequate and include both required and optional courses in constitutional law, public law, civil law, commercial law, criminal law, admiralty, foreign law, comparative law, jurisprudence, procedure and political science. Most of the law professors, many of whom are practicing lawyers, judges, and prominent government officials, are intelligent, learned men who are well respected by their students. There are criticisms, however, that some members of the law faculties do not keep their courses sufficiently current and thus teach outdated law.

Further, the SVN system of teaching law, largely adopted from the French, is almost totally a lecture method, with primary emphasis upon absorbing and remembering quantities of substantive materials rather than upon analysis and understanding. The lectures are commonly reproduced and sold so that many students need not even attend classes.

This lack of vigor is unfortunate because the most critical function of a law school should be to teach students to think and analyze in an ordered logical manner and to develop in them a critical apprecia-

tion of the judicial process. Experience in American law schools, which generally employ an intense socratic teaching discipline designed to achieve a thorough understanding through maximum student participation, has demonstrated that intellectual attitudes developed in the schools have substantially contributed to the pattern and quality of a man's future thinking. It is vitally important that improvements be made in the SVN system of legal education, which in its capacity as a training ground for national leaders must provide the ultimate in mental stimulation and development.

Efforts must be made to raise legal education to the highest possible level. A primary need in this regard is the instigation of more challenging and stimulating teaching methods. One step toward accomplishing this would be to offer graduate study in United States law schools for young Vietnamese who would return to teach in Vietnam. Professional exchange programs might also be explored.

The Substantive Laws of SVN. There are two types of SVN law that must be considered. First is the basic, day-to-day law that every political entity enacts for the purposes of achieving ordered existence. This can be referred to as "regular" law. In Vietnam there is a second type of law which is enacted for the sole purpose of resisting and discouraging insurgent activity. This law will be referred to as "emergency" legislation.

(1) Regular Law. The regular law of SVN is obviously not adequate for the needs of pacification. But it was never meant to be and the emergency laws are designed to fill this gap. The adequacy of the regular SVN law should only be judged for its ability to aid in the long-range development of the country.

The efforts now being made by the Ministry of Justice to recodify the penal, civil, procedural and trade codes should be aided and encouraged. This project has been under way for perhaps ten years and may be in need of overhauling. Recodification cannot be limited to a simple rewriting of existing laws. Rather, it must be a critical and creative attempt aimed at providing the nation with a code of law reasonably based upon its needs and traditions and sufficiently simple to be understood.

Such a project requires more than just technical redrafting by lawyers. The drafting of laws is creative work that requires men of diverse interests and talents; otherwise the resulting products may not be truly responsive to the national needs.

(2) Emergency Legislation. The GVN has promulgated a long list of emergency decrees, generally dealing with population and resource control. Some of this legislation has been developed through the instigation and

aid of MACV, but success in such matters is difficult to achieve. For example, it took over five months to put into law some fairly minor changes in the arrest, search and seizure law of GVN, even though the changes were substantially agreed to from the outset by all interested agencies.

There is also considerable imprecise language in much of the emergency legislation which has led to confusion, particularly in the more remote districts. A recent example is the decree promulgated in the Summer of 1965 creating the offense of "hooliganism," defining it in terms confusing to the lawyers and judges, since it appeared to duplicate several existing offenses. Emergency legislation can be effective only if it is understandable to those who must obey and enforce it.

Most of the problems concerning emergency legislation arise from the difficulties of enforcement and there are few complaints that the laws are inherently inadequate. However, further hard study must be given to this matter, particularly by those in the field who are in a position to observe the working of these laws.

The "Law for the Protection of Morality," enacted on 24 May 1962, gives considerable insight into the social pressures alive and competing in Vietnam although the law itself is no longer effective. Article 2 forbids providing tobacco and alcohol to minors. The most startling part of this law, Article 4, states: "It is forbidden to dance anywhere at all." In April 1963, this was expanded to include a ban on the singing of both sentimental songs and the more vigorous types of American music. Article 5 of the morality law forbids boxing and combat between animals, while Article 6 bans "spiritism and occultism," an impossible task in the supernatural-minded Far East. Article 7 deals with prostitution, uniquely defining a prostitute as "a woman surprised by police with three different men at three different times." Article 8 provides harsh measures for contraceptive practices. This law gave rise to considerable controversy, mostly because of the serious economic and moral problems that it failed to anticipate. In Vietnam many families depend upon earnings of women and children that these laws greatly limit. It had been regarded as a proper sacrifice, totally in accord with the Vietnamese tradition of family supremacy, if a girl took up prostitution to help her family in need.

A further restrictive measure was the Family Law of 29 May 1958, making divorce virtually impossible and declaring illegal hitherto legal polygamous marriages. This was a major catastrophe in a largely Taoist and Buddhist country where second wives were common. The new law declared the polygamous marriages illegal while at the same time it forbade their dissolution by divorce. Doubt was cast upon the legitimacy of numerous children. Fortunately, this law was abrogated by the decree of 23 July 1964.

These legislative efforts were publicly defended by the Diem government as being required to combat insurgency. They also reflect a nationalistic desire to preserve traditional mores in the face of strong foreign influences. In addition, it is impossible to overlook the fact that these laws, often contrary to Vietnamese practice and culture, were at times more consistent with the Catholic religion of President Diem.

Another example of nationalistically directed legislation is the 1956 decree prohibiting foreigners from engaging in commercial enterprises involving the trade and transportation of food, fuel and raw materials. The Chinese and French, against whom the decree was directed, were given one year to become Vietnamese citizens or to liquidate their holdings. Many of the French and Chinese sold their businesses to Vietnamese, helping to build a new merchant class.

Many other laws, more clearly directed toward combating insurgency, were, and are still being, enacted. These include laws controlling the press, forbidding or requiring permission for meetings (including certain family gatherings), enlarging government powers in search and seizure, regulating the handling and transportation of rice, punishing numerous acts determined to be subversive, punishing membership in the Viet Cong, regulating medical supplies and controlling the use of roads and transportation facilities.

Publication and Distribution of Laws. The statutory laws enacted by the state and Federal governments in the United States are collected in bound volumes that are easily supplemented and kept up to date. Complete collections of these laws are numerous and it can be safely said that every lawyer, public official and law enforcement officer in the United States has easy access to a collection of all necessary laws. This is far from true in SVN. For instance, as late as August 1964, formal queries to MACV and USOM-PSD from the II Corps Advisory Detachment revealed no knowledge of Decree Law 10/59 making it a crime to be a member of the Viet Cong. During the past year MACV has made efforts to relieve the acute problem for our own forces by distributing English translations of GVN laws. In the near future MACV hopes to also distribute the original Vietnamese versions of the laws. At the very least, each province chief should have a complete and current collection of emergency laws. These are at best only emergency measures and in the not too distant future a more reliable system should be established for compiling and distributing both the existing legislation and the new laws.

Confinements. As can be expected in such an atmosphere, thousands of persons are confined throughout Vietnam for a vast number of reasons, not the least of which are political. Thousands have been confined after being convicted, in courts after regular trials, as Viet Cong or for

other crimes against security. However, it appears that there are also vast numbers of prisoners, other than military prisoners of war, who have never been tried and who have no idea when or how they will ever be released.

Most of these prisoners have been confined at the instigation of the Ministry of the Interior, the powerful department charged with maintaining public order, pursuant to Ordinance No. 6 of 11 January 1956. The discretion that this ordinance gave to the Minister of the Interior in security matters is staggering:

"Until the complete restoration of security, those persons who are considered as dangerous to national defense and public security may, by an order of the President of the Republic acting upon recommendations by the Minister for the Interior, be detained in a prison camp, forced to reside at a specific locality, banished from a certain residence or locality or subject to administrative supervision."

The duties and functions of the ministry under this law were delegated for the most part to local security committees. Persons confined in this or similar manner are generally classed according to their suspected degree of subversiveness and sent to a re-education center. Theoretically, if one progresses properly through the stages of political re-education he will be released after a period of time. However, there are insufficient means for protecting those who are either held indefinitely or wrongly confined in the first place, and adequate statistics of confinement and releases are not available.

Conditions now prevailing in Vietnam certainly require stern measures, but placing all suspected dissidents in confinement and leaving them there indefinitely is no solution. Under the Anglo-American system the doctrine of habeas corpus protects persons who are illegally confined. Whatever protection of this nature might once have existed in Vietnam has either been effectively suspended by the establishment of a state of emergency or otherwise subverted. The establishment of adequate procedural protection against unwarranted wholesale confinement is a crucial problem that the Vietnamese Government must confront if it is to gain the full confidence of the people and establish a truly viable legal system.

Popular Understanding and Acceptance of the Legal System. The SVN legal system is in need of popular acceptance and understanding before it can become a meaningful force toward pacification and development. The peasant majority of SVN is almost completely unfamiliar with the

laws, the courts and the aims of the legal system in general. Before this system can have any influence upon these people they must acquire some idea of what their legal institutions are and what they are designed to do.

This does not require a legal education for all Vietnamese, for it is not necessary that a man's understanding of the legal system be detailed before he can understand sufficiently to embrace it. Rather, the goal must be to instruct the population to recognize the legal system as a reasonable means of achieving justice and good order.

The most obvious benefits of such a program are long-range respect for law and order; willingness to submit disputes to court settlement; an atmosphere of certainty for both commercial and private transactions; and a realization that wrongdoing will be promptly and fairly punished. These fruits of a sound legal system are essential conditions to promote national growth and development.

But a program of popular acceptance of the legal system will also have short-range effects, particularly through encouragement of greater confidence in the government that stands behind the legal system. The GVN's daily struggle to win the support of the Vietnamese people could be greatly facilitated if the people clearly recognized that the government was endeavoring to promote justice and fair dealing through its courts and laws.

A program should be encouraged to educate the Vietnamese as to the laws of the land and secure their support of these laws. Every possible means of communication should be utilized: radios, television (when available), newspapers, pamphlets, notices and posters in public places and speeches or informal talks by the public officials, leaders and members of the bench and bar. The Vietnamese people's love of the performing arts could be played upon by using traveling theatrical groups trained to present dramatization of the laws and their enforcement. This latter technique has the particular advantage of reaching the large numbers of illiterate persons through visual impression.

Members of the legal profession could also make a substantial contribution to such an educational program. In the early stages of our own nation, lawyers of considerable dedication to civic responsibility were a deciding influence in the adoption and acceptance of our constitutional and legal system. While transplanting of American institutions to SVN must be scrupulously avoided, now is the time for an undertaking not unlike the Federalist Papers. A corps of SVN lawyers, gifted with the ability to express themselves in clear, simple but inspiring words, could prepare a series of pamphlets explaining and justifying the legal system.

These could be given broad circulation, not by the GVN but by the authors in their professional capacities. One of the great appeals of the Federalist Papers was their fundamental understanding of the revolutionary currents then alive in the country. Similar, perhaps stronger, currents are swelling in SVN today. The Federalist Papers also had great popular impact because they distilled what were actually complex issues into a concise form that was clear and understandable to most men. Hopefully, if Vietnamese pamphleteers understand the revolutionary currents and frame simple understandable arguments around them, fruitful discussion and understanding might be stimulated among the population.

The GVN must also be encouraged to broaden, or institute where necessary, citizenship programs within the schools and through clubs and civic organizations. An understanding of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship is an essential prerequisite to an acceptance of the rule of law. Citizenship can be taught partially through the schools but it is more important that programs of civic action be established so that the youth of SVN can learn by doing. Organizations such as the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, and similar young people's groups are quite successful in this regard, particularly when they provide group projects for performing civic services such as clean-up campaigns, first aid courses or sanitation programs. These civic activities not only accomplish a needed purpose but they tend to instill in the participants at an early age a pride and identification with the community, which is an initial step toward acceptance of the legal system and the government in general.

Two Changing Worlds. In the early stages of development of any country it is common for the more densely populated areas to have different social, political and economic structures than the rest of the country. This fact becomes particularly evident upon examination of a country's laws, its courts and its systems of administering justice. In sparsely populated areas which were isolated from the rest of the world, there was little need for complicated codes of law and sophisticated legal systems with all their procedural intricacies. Customs handed down from generation to generation and administered by heads of families and local chieftains were generally adequate to meet the needs of justice. Primarily due to a lack of communication, people in these areas were content to live in small tribal societies, suspicious of strangers and different customs. Communities located on rivers, coastal plains and in other readily accessible areas usually grew more rapidly and attracted visitors from other areas of the world. The visitors came in varied and increasing numbers -- adventurers, missionaries, traders -- eventually followed by soldiers and colonists. As time went on, more complicated political and economic structures were transplanted from outside. In the process, small islands of a different and more modern civilization were carved out of the accessible coastal areas. Completing the change is a long and difficult pro-

cess that is still going on. The law of the cities was slow to penetrate the interior of the country. The rate and depth of such penetration was, of course, dependent upon many other factors, such as the climate, terrain and accessibility of the areas involved, as well as the various modes of transportation available. Other significant factors were the educational level of the people concerned, their past history, particularly that relating to colonial experience and previous contacts with outsiders, and their willingness to alter the ways of the past.

The Vietnamese people range from highly cultured and sophisticated individuals who dwell in the larger cities to tribal folk who eke a living out of the countryside by the most primitive of methods. Social activities likewise run from one extreme to another. For example, well-to-do Vietnamese in Saigon live in European-style homes, dress and entertain as do Westerners, and send their children abroad to school. Peasants may live in villages amounting to nothing more than collections of straw huts and have time only to support themselves and avoid the evil spirits. Throughout most urban centers French culture is at once apparent. Even though colonial control has vanished, the French language continues to be used by many of the better educated Vietnamese. Most administrative and educational practices of the former regime also continue in use. This influence wanes as one proceeds from the urban to the rural scene. This rural scene is the crucial focus point for some of the GVN's most demanding problems in combating the VC. For this reason, and also because no similar treatment is available elsewhere, it is appropriate to go into some detail in describing the legal system as it is found in the rural villages and among the mountain tribespeople. This description is not inclusive of all villages and tribes, but is sufficiently typical to provide a minimum background to the lawyer who is attempting to understand this complex jurisprudence.

Village Administration and Law in Vietnam. Vietnam has 43 provinces and four cities with provincial status -- Saigon, Hue, Dalat and Da Nang. Within the provinces are districts made up of several cantons which, in turn, are each composed of several villages, called lang. The villages are made up of hamlets (ap), which may be from a hundred yards to several miles apart. Administration of the village is in the hands of the Village Council and its representatives in each hamlet, the hamlet chiefs.

The role of the hamlet chief in the village has remained relatively unchanged over the years. He is selected by the Village Council, usually from a family of good reputation. The major function of the hamlet chief is to act as liaison between the Village Council and residents of his hamlet. When new programs are being implemented, the hamlet chief, either directly or through the heads of five-family groups, explains the aim of the program and the role of the villagers in it. Also, from time to time the hamlet chief organizes meetings of the five-family heads to disseminate any news or propaganda received from the village information agent.

The vested authority and responsibilities of the Village Council are derived from two sources -- administrative legislation and tradition. Delegated administrative functions depend on the place of the village in the larger polity -- the state or nation -- and owing to historical events these functions have undergone a series of changes. Traditional council functions, however, are rooted in the role of the councillors as leaders in village society and consequently are more conservative.

The old proverb "Phep vua thua le lang" (The laws of the Emperor yield to the customs of the village) is known by all Vietnamese, and in many respects it characterizes the village in Vietnam as a self-contained homogeneous community, jealously guarding its way of life -- a little world that is autonomous and disregards (if not disdains) the outside world. In southern Vietnam, historical events since the end of the nineteenth century have rendered the image implicit in the proverb less and less applicable to the village. The isolation of the village has steadily grown less, and the ways of the village have been more and more encroached upon by the ways of the world. Despite this fact, however, village methods for the administration of justice have changed very little in the last thousand years.

One of the most important functions of the Village Council is to maintain order in the village, and while this has been expanded to include matters of political security, traditionally it simply meant punishing the guilty and arbitrating disputes. Crimes are rare in the average village. Most disorders are torts, and there are numerous conflicts between individuals and families. In the traditional Village Council, justice was a matter for the Huong Chanh, the arbitrator of minor conflicts among villagers. The usual procedure was for the accused and accuser to swear to the truth of their statements before the altar of the Guardian Spirit of the Village. Each would have a live chicken, and as they made their oaths, they would cut or tear off the chickens' heads, begging the Guardian Spirit to strike them dead if they lied.

In the lowlands the district chiefs have limited judicial powers. When using their authority to gather evidence and to bring offenders to court, they function as assistants to the prosecuting attorney. They are not authorized to hold trials of any kind, but they may arrest anyone caught in a criminal act, interrogate witnesses and prepare an official statement for the prosecuting attorney. When a serious crime has been committed, the district chief makes a personal investigation on the scene and informs the prosecuting attorney of the facts. Where public safety or morale is involved, the province chief must also be informed. Village chiefs are authorized to mediate disputes between villagers, but criminal offenders are customarily turned over to the police for investigation to determine what further action is to be taken.

Most disputes in lowland villages are settled informally by hamlet chiefs or Village Councils. Many others remain unresolved because the

contending parties cannot afford to go to court. Differences between members of the same family are probably most often settled within the family to avoid the disgrace attached to airing family troubles in public. Angry villagers seeking a settlement of their differences commonly take their cases first to the head of their five-family group or to their hamlet chief. They then may go to the Village Council which serves as an informal court for petty offenses or minor litigations. Rarely is a case appealed beyond this level. Villagers fear having their problems presented to harsh or cold strangers at the district tribunal. The council also prefers to keep village problems from district authorities whose legal decisions are too rigid, and having disputes recorded there would cause the village to lose face.

The limited information available indicates that most complaints or infractions arise from quarrels within or between families, disputes over property ownership or damage, defaults in debts or services, altercations over the use of land or irrigation water, jealousy and marital infidelity.

The informal judicial role of the Village Council is an important means of preserving tranquility. Moreover, hearing cases enables the council to keep closely in touch with village attitudes and activities. Procedures are extremely informal, with no ritual and seemingly with no particular person in charge. The contending parties on entering the village hall may begin telling their stories to the first councilman they meet. The disputing parties usually stand on opposite sides of the room, and each presents his version of the case. Witnesses for either or both then are heard. Onlookers may interject statements and the councilman may make suggestions for settlement or refer the disputants to the police chief, who, though without specific legal authority, also acts as adjudicator in village quarrels.

In serious disputes, the entire council may meet and listen to the complaints of the parties. After questioning them, the council may ask their hamlet chief to investigate further, delegate the case to him for settlement or itself try to effect a reconciliation. It may also require indemnity for loss or damage, or levy fines or impose other sanctions such as contributions of labor to village projects. Unresolved cases are forwarded to the district chief for further consideration.

A threat to refer a case to the district chief, who may place it before a court, often brings a settlement. Village justice, which costs nothing, generally seems to be administered effectively and villagers prefer its relatively mild operation to the expense and possible severity of the regular courts.

Tradition called for ordinary villagers guilty of a legal violation to be beaten with a rattan cane; notables were fined. When the colony of CochinChina was established, the French administration forbade these

punishments as too harsh. Vietnamese officials, however, registered formal complaints, contending that this repression of power greatly diminished the prestige of the village leaders. As a compromise, in 1904, legislation granted the Village Councils the right to demand additional days of guard duty as punishment for males and the right to impose certain penalties for damage to public property or fraud relative to alcohol and opium regulations.

In Khanh Hau, a village of 3,241 inhabitants, located about 55 kilometers from Saigon, between August 1956 and May 1956, an estimated 60 to 90 cases -- three or four each month -- were brought to the Village Council for arbitration. For the most part they concerned marital relationships, family lands, irrigation problems, physical assaults, rent issues, and land use. 1:180-202/ Other complaints arise from disputes over property ownership or damage and defaults in debts or services.

Mountain Tribespeople. The Indochina peninsula contains about one million mountain tribespeople who are aborigines of great dissimilarity with a low level of civilization. An accurate census has yet to be taken, but as many as 700,000 of these people have been estimated to occupy the highland regions of South Vietnam.

One of the most extraordinary things about these tribesmen is their remarkable memory which has enabled them to pass down through the centuries oral epics and legal codes in poetic form. The Rhades, for example, have in their sagas a name for and description of the mammoth and the megatherium which have been extinct since prehistoric times. This unique memory has helped compensate for the fact that these people had no written language of their own until French and American missionaries began devising it, mostly during the last century.

There is not now and never has been a Montagnard nation. The social and administrative unit is the village, each one independent and governed by its own chief and council of elders. The village chief is selected by the villagers but is generally the wealthiest and most intelligent man in the village. He must be approved by the council of elders, a group of old, respected men selected by the villagers. The chief is responsible for all village affairs and must organize all village rituals. For purposes of illustration the legal concepts of one of the tribes, the Rhades, will be explored in greater detail.

A Rhade Village Trial. The village system for dealing with a thief is as follows. The person who has had property stolen comes to the Village Council house and asks one of the elders to question the suspected thief. If an accusation is then made against the suspect, the chief of the village is informed so that he may summon the suspect and set a day and place for trial. The trial is usually held in the house of the suspect, and the owner of the stolen property along with the village chief

and counsel for the accused, are present. The speaker for the accused is his counsel and speaker for the owner is the elder he has selected. The elder protests the action allegedly committed by the suspect with parables. If a judgment is made against the suspect, he must return to the owner three of whatever he has stolen, unless he is pardoned by that owner, in which case he might only return double or exactly what he has stolen.

In the past, local custom included trials by ordeal. First, a sacrifice was made and the spirits called. Then various methods of determining guilt were utilized. One method was for the accused and a champion selected by the villagers both to plunge their heads under water. If the accused was the last to withdraw his head, he was deemed innocent. Another method was to pour hot lead or pitch on the hands of the accused. It was believed that the spirits would protect him if he were innocent. Another alternative, which for obvious reasons was usually selected, was the wine-drinking test. Old belief provided that the innocent would be protected from becoming drunk or sick upon drinking the required three liters of wine.

Spirit World Concepts of Justice. Despite many differences, some basic characteristics are shared by almost all of the tribespeople. First of all, superstition and fear play a heavy role in their lives. Although Christian missionary efforts have made some changes, the great majority of tribespeople are animists or spirit believers. Followers of this ancient Southeast Asian religion believe that practically everything has its own spirit -- for example, a rock, a tree, thunder and flowing water. Most of the spirits are unfriendly, and tribespeople take elaborate precautions to avoid antagonizing them. In one case, a Vietnamese soldier washed his truck in a mountain stream and the spirit of the stream was much offended until appeased by a sacrifice.

The Montagnard's conception of right and wrong is actually a matter of what is expedient and inexpedient. He is concerned with policy rather than justice. Piety and fervor have no place in his ritual observations. He conceives his relationship to the spirit world as a contractual arrangement in which the spirits are strict and exacting creditors but who can be paid off by means of a ceremony. Broadly speaking, there is nothing either particularly benevolent or hostile in the attitude of these ghostly autocrats towards their human feudatories. Drought, deluge, epidemics -- in fact, disasters of all kinds -- are merely indications that the rites have been violated, and the only remedy lies in finding the offender and compelling him to put the matter right by providing the prescribed reparation.

All of the rituals require alcoholic consumption and as a result respectability and drunkenness are allied. The upright man gives evidence of his ritual adequacy by being drunk as often as possible; he is respected by all for his piety, a pattern held up to youth. The words "nam lu,"

uttered in grave welcome to the stranger in a Montagnard village and meaning "let us get drunk together," have all the exhortatory value of an invitation to common prayer. Passers-by are begged to join in the tribesmen's orgies of eating and drinking and it is bad taste -- offensive to the spirits -- to eat or drink less than is provided by the fearsome liberality of the hosts. To prevent any possibility of the visitor's unwillingly committing this kind of discourtesy, or remaining in a state of disreputable sobriety, an attendant squats at his side keeping a careful check on his consumption and ensuring that he drinks at least the minimum measure.

The system works out in practice much better than one might expect. Crimes against an individual, such as theft or violence, are viewed in terms of interference with one man's debts to the gods by another. The aggressor, however, is seen as no more than the instrument of one of the spirits who has chosen this way to punish the victim for some ritual inadequacy. The judge, therefore, reciting in verse the appropriate passage of customary law, abstains from stern moralization. Both sides are in the wrong, and rather illogically, it seems, the aggressor is sentenced to make material reparation and also -- what is regarded as far more important -- to provide the animals and liquor necessary for the ritual reparation to be paid to the offended spirits. The ritual reparation, of course, takes priority, and in cases of hardships may be paid for in installments. The offender is compelled by law to take part in this feast which provides as a secondary function the means of reconciliation of the two parties.

There is no distinction among the Montagnards between civil and criminal law and no difference is made between intentional and unintentional injury. If a man strikes another in a fit of temper or shoots him accidentally while out hunting, it is all the work of the spirits. No eyebrows are lifted. It is just another human misfortune to be settled by a drinking bout at which the whole village gets tipsy. The mountain tribesmen do not apply the death penalty, since otherwise the community would expose itself to the vengeance of the ghost of the executed man. Two of the greatest crimes are the theft of water and of rice, which are under the protection of powerful spirits. Owing to the sacrilegious nature of such an offense, which exposes the community to the resentment of the spirits involved, the offender in this case is banished for life.

Many tribes have witch doctors or shamans who advise them how to appease an angry spirit. In the process, the shaman interprets various omens and carries out cruel sacrifices on animals, particularly those of the bovine family. The shaman enjoys high esteem in Montagnard society and he interferes constantly in all activities, social, political and judicial. Each family pays him a tax in kind against future famine and towards the expense of community festivals. The shaman is popularly credited with the possession of uncanny powers and the destructive capacity of the most eminent members of this fraternity, the Sadet of War and the Sadet of Fire, who belong to the Jarai tribe, were formerly regarded with apprehension even by the chieftains.

The Rhade Legal Code. One of the most advanced groups of tribes-people is the Rhade, who live in the provinces of Darlac, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. Like other tribes that speak languages of the Malayo-Polynesian linguistic family, the Rhade have a matriarchic society. The woman proposes marriage to the man, and the eldest daughter inherits her parents' property.

The Rhade have a carefully thought out oral code of laws which is especially well suited to their way of life and passed down from generation in poetic form. Eventually, Sabatier, the French resident who came in the 1920s to administer Darlac Province, gave them a written language, a quoc ngu transcription of their dialect and prepared a written collection of their customs. 2:6-9/

Rhade Customs Relating to Marriage. The Rhade have a matrilineal kinship system, that is, the females own the houses and family goods. Males are, however, permitted to own weapons, elephants and bicycles. A girl is allowed to take a husband as soon as she is physically mature. The reasoning behind this custom is to prevent a young girl from having affairs and bringing shame on herself. Various family groups are prevented from marriage because of legend about kinship and pseudokinship. If two members of the same clan marry, this angers the spirits and a wild buffalo must be sacrificed.

When a girl comes of age, the parents hold an assembly and discuss the possibilities of a husband for the girl. Once a boy is selected, they call his uncles and his brothers into the assembly to see if his family agrees. If the brothers and uncles of the boy agree, they then meet with the boy and his parents. Provided the boy and his parents agree, a day is then set when everyone from the two families will meet at the boy's home.

On the day both families meet at the boy's home, the wedding ceremony takes place. The boy sits on one side of a mat and the girl on the opposite side. Each of them places a bracelet on the mat. If the girl likes the boy, she takes his bracelet from the mat, and if the boy likes the girl, he takes her bracelet from the mat. The families are witnesses, and wedlock is completed.

At the end of the bracelet ceremony the boy's parents ask for a dowry from the girl. She is expected to give in accordance with the position or wealth of the boy. If the boy is a state official, she might give one large flat gong which costs about 20,000 piasters; a lesser gift for a boy of good standing might be a buffalo worth 5,000 piasters. Dowry is usually given to fit the needs of the boy's family. If the girl has no family or cannot pay the dowry, the parents of the boy ask the girl to live in their house. If, at the end of 2 or 3 years the girl can pay the dowry, both families gather together again and an elder speaks for the marriage. A buffalo or pig is then sacrificed, according to the wealth of the young girl. Provided the girl has a family, the couple then moves to the home

of her parents, this being the rightful place of her husband, once the dowry is paid.

Should the marriage be broken at any time by the husband, he must pay his wife double the dowry she paid for him, plus a fine for each of the children he leaves her with. If the wife breaks the marriage, she must pay her husband the same dowry she gave his family for him. Divorce is rare among the Rhade, and it is even less seldom that both parties agree to divorce, since in such a case neither would pay the other.

When the wife dies, the husband returns to his family unless there is another free woman in the family for him to marry. In case he returns to his family, any children he has stay with another female member of his former wife's family. His former wife's brothers are responsible for their care. In the event the husband dies, the wife raises the children whether or not she marries again. The maternal uncle is responsible for his sister's children, should her husband die. Even if the father is not dead, the maternal uncle must pay any fines, should his nephew get into trouble.

Rules for adultery are included as a part of the marriage system. If the wife should catch her husband with another woman, she levies a fine against him according to the wealth of his family. The husband must then obtain this money from his family and give it to his wife. The wife is likewise fined for committing adultery, unless the man is unmarried, in which case he pays a fine to the husband. In any case of adultery, where both parties are married, a fine is levied against each. The man must pay his wife and the woman, her husband. In the case of the woman, the money must be given to the parents of her husband. Neither she nor her husband can use that money.

A man may take more than one wife if he is rich and if the brothers of his first wife agree. The wife's brothers also have the power of correction in all family matters. Women cannot marry more than one husband.

In the case where a boy and a girl have a private affair, a bracelet may be exchanged in secret. This provision ensures that a girl rarely becomes pregnant without having a husband she can lay claim to. It would be a rare case where the boy tried to deny the secret marriage, because he would be forced to pay a heavy fine.

Rhade Land Tenure. Land in the Rhade area is owned by the clans. This includes all of the land on which Rhade live and a clan may have one or more large tracts which it claims as ancestral land. For each tract there is a representative of the clan called the po lan who is considered the hereditary or appointed guardian of this land. The po lan is usually the eldest female of the eldest line in the subclan of each territory. Her duties and responsibilities are clearly prescribed by Rhade traditions.

The limits of the clan are well-marked by natural boundaries, such as rivers, hills, rocks or trees. A record of this boundary is passed by word of mouth from generation to generation. Under the po lan system, the po lan must visit the limits of the clan land to honor the souls of their ancestors who lie in the soil within each subclan area. The po lan must sacrifice a buffalo for the soul of each of the ancestors so they will bring rain. Sacrifice must also be made to approve the affronted ancestors if two members of the same clan marry, or marriage occurs between two clans not permitted to marry.

If anyone should violate the territory by practicing shifting agriculture or cutting the forest without the permission of the po lan, she can levy a fine against the offender. Parts of the forest are considered sacred and it is forbidden to cut trees there. If this is done, great misfortune will occur to the subclan that owns the territory and sorcerers must contact the spirits. The po lan receives 2 or 3 baskets of rice, pigs, chickens, cotton every seven years as a fee for her services. In addition to this, she receives free wine and food in places she visits.

As keeper and protector of the clan land, the po lan has no right to alienate it. Due to the marriage pattern of the Rhade, clan members are scattered throughout the area. It is likely therefore, that nonclan people will be cultivating clan land. This is done with the permission of the po lan.

In many instances the po lan does not live on the clan land. For example, the H'mok clan owns most of the land around the town of Ban Me Thuot but the po lan lives some five kilometers away. The clan elders and the po lan know the limits of their land. A few of the po lan have papers attesting their ownership, some of which are sets of undated, rather crudely drawn titles and maps issued by M. Sabatier.

In order to purchase land from the Rhade it is necessary to negotiate with the po lan, with those cultivating portions of the land and the notables of villages in whose territory the land in question is located. More than likely the individuals cultivating land are from the village concerned so the two latter parties can be dealt with together. In this case, it is a question of compensating them for the loss of cultivated land. Discussion with the po lan would have to be held separately. The major difficulty in such negotiation lies in the fact that the concept of transferring title of land does not exist among the Rhade. They are unfamiliar with money and it is very difficult to discuss cash compensation.

Formal Customary Courts. With the arrival of the French, an administrative organization was established for the entire High Plateau. Three provinces, Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum, were formed, each with a French resident. The provinces were divided into districts and the districts into

cantons. French policy was to utilize local leaders as much as possible and to train and use secretaries and assistants from the local population. Consequently, the clerical echelon in the provincial headquarters, the district chiefs and canton chiefs were practically all Mountaineers. There was no attempt to bring about any sweeping changes in the existing system of justice which was based on what could be called tribal law. Instead the French formed a tribunal coutumier at each province headquarters. This is a formal court intended to settle Mountaineer difficulties and generally mete out justice according to tribal customs. The tribunal is only intended to settle those cases which cannot be resolved by the village chief and Village Council.

The tribunal in Ban Me Thuot typifies the situation. The tribunal convenes for the first seven days of every month. The Mountaineers who have grievances gather and wait their turn to be heard. The chief of the tribunal is an elderly man from Ban Don, of Lao Mhong, origin. His uncle had been appointed the first tribunal chief by the French when the tribunal was founded. He inherited this role and it will be passed on either to his son or his sister's son. In judging the cases brought before the tribunal, the chief judge relies on the written collection of Rhade customs compiled by Sabatier.^{2/}

The tribunal has some cases concerning property disagreements. However, the most frequent difficulties concern adultery. The tribunal deals only with cases in which both parties are Mountaineers. Cases involving both Vietnamese and Mountaineers are the responsibility of the province chief. The chief judge is assisted by some Rhade leaders and there is a court clerk to record the testimony and judgments.

Other Matters Covered by the Rhade Code. Some of the concepts included in the law of the Rhade are quite sophisticated, even by present-day standards. For example, it states that madmen who commit crimes cannot be held responsible in the same way sane men can. It establishes procedures for selecting a new chief and for isolating lepers so they will not spread contagion. It prescribes penalties for hiding serious matters from the village chief and for starting fires in the village.

Some Current Problems on the High Plateau. Many have quite correctly described the present situation in the High Plateau of SVN as resembling that of the American West during the 19th century, when the westward movement of settlers gave birth to years of struggle with the Indians who sought to protect their ancestral lands. The Diem government encouraged large numbers of settlers to move into the High Plateau, resulting in many new villages and a substantial increase in population. The Mountaineers, just like the American Indians, regarded this invasion with fear and bitterness. The new settlers have often taken the Mountaineers' land and the merchants, plantation owners and military have exploited them. The Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group has collected numerous revealing incidents and statements by the Mountaineers such as:

"One man said he was very upset about his land. He had just cleared a rice field and a Vietnamese moved in and settled on it. He went to the authorities and received no help. When he went directly to the squatter and asked why he was there, the man retorted by threatening to burn his house.

"Several agreed that it was a common occurrence in the Pleiku market that if the Mountaineer would not accept the offered price for sale of his vegetables, the Vietnamese merchant would crush the vegetables, making them unsalable.

"Several noted that in the Pleiku market, the merchants often try to badger them into buying things. If the police are there, they try to help the Mountaineers, but when the police leave the merchants resume their pressure.

"The Vietnamese promise to pay them for working on the roads, but either they never receive the money or it takes a long time. They must work on the roads three times a year for a period of ten days each time. They must obey when they are called, for they are afraid of what will happen if they don't agree.

"The Vietnamese talk equality,' a group of Mountaineers agreed, 'but they don't mean what they say ... in their hearts, they want to dominate us. They are colonialists. The French were bad at the mouth, but in their hearts they were good. Things were better.' "3:34/

The reaction of these mountain people to such discrimination by the Vietnamese is one of deep frustration. Many have fled into the mountains but others have stayed to fight.

Today, as the modern world grows closer to the Highlands and other rural areas of SVN, the conflict becomes more and more crucial. The contrast of this 16th century civilization of the interior meeting the 20th century jet planes, helicopters and transistor radios of the outside world is fantastic and ominous. For years the mountain tribesmen were relatively isolated and thus could easily preserve their society in its fixed state. But with the coming of modern warfare the exposure to more dynamic external forces has increased at a dizzy pace. Today the mountain people are constantly faced with the outside world. Vietnamese and American soldiers live in their midst. Helicopters and the other machines of modern warfare mingle among the tribesmen with their elephants and medieval crossbows in the jungle and on the roads. The transistor radio,

and perhaps soon television, will leap the barriers of distance and illiteracy. Men who serve in the Army return home with new standards and new expectations. The Montagnards are experiencing a rapid cultural change of enormous significance.

The Potential Role of Law in the Highlands. Like the US experiences with ethnic minorities, the problems of the Montagnard's position in SVN are largely social or cultural matters. If, during the 19th century, the US had adopted a more enlightened approach to the problems of the American Indians and Negroes, much subsequent difficulty could have been averted. It would behoove the Vietnamese to learn from these experiences and undertake now to study and better understand the mountain tribesmen, their customs and their problems. The Michigan State University Advisory Group's study made several recommendations along this line which would be a sound starting point. 3:1-4/

Many of the difficulties of the mountain people in their encounters with the outside world result from what we would call in the United States denials of basic civil rights. These people are taken advantage of in land and commercial dealings -- their property is seized and taken from them; their labor has been extorted without just return. These discriminations and violations of basic rights are, however, curable through legal channels if the proper courts and laws are available.

The GVN must seek to meet this problem by enacting and enforcing effective legislation and constitutional guarantees which define and protect the rights of all individuals. Such action would respond to the real needs of vast numbers of mountain and rural people. If these laws were properly promulgated and enforced, they would be a major factor in winning the support of these people, not just for the legal system, but for the government as well.

Military Justice

General. Although the last direct participation by France in the SVN judiciary system ended on 16 September 1954, the legal procedures and, with relatively few exceptions, the legal concepts presently in force in SVN remain essentially French. This is also true of the SVN Code of Military Justice which bears a close resemblance to the French Codes de Justice Militaire.

On 14 May 1951, His Majesty Bao Dai promulgated the SVN Code of Military Justice. Despite the many violent changes which have taken place in SVN since that time, this code is still in effect and its amendments have been remarkably few. There are, however, very significant amendments in the making. Proposed decree law 11086 QP-HC-1-2 provides for some sub-

stantial reorganization of the military justice system including: (1) the replacement of the Military Tribunals and Military Field Tribunals with Corps Military Tribunals; (2) the establishment of a military appellate body to perform the functions presently assigned to the Civilian Court of Appeals; and, (3) the appointment of military defense counsel to represent all accused before the Corps Military Tribunals as well as on appeal. However, this proposal has not yet been implemented and the GVN is still studying methods of placing it into operation. Hopefully, these reforms, when and if put into operation, will help to bridge some of the gap that often exists between the military justice system on paper and its actual operation.

Since this study is prepared primarily for a military audience it is useful to describe the military justice system in some detail. Further, the procedures of the SVN civilian courts in criminal matters. For this reason, a detailed explanation is of even further value since it is equally useful in the study of both systems.

The Code of Military Justice is divided into two parts: Title I, entitled "The Judgment of Offenses Committed by Military Personnel or Assimiles," and Title II, "Military Offenses Committed by Military Personnel and Assimiles and the Penalties Applicable to Them."

Title I has thirteen chapters, the first two of which cover the organization and jurisdiction of military courts. Other chapters describe in some detail the various procedures for the preliminary investigation, the investigation by the examining magistrate, referral for trial and the procedures followed during the trial itself. Provisions are also included for appeals, requests for rehearings and execution of judgments.

The various military offenses are defined in the second chapter of Title II. Most of these offenses have a familiar ring to anyone who has ever been associated with the military. Heading the list, in Section I, are "failure to report for duty" and "desertion." Section II deals with such offenses as military revolt, rebellion, insubordination, and acts of violence, assaults and insulting behavior toward superiors. Other offenses covered in this section include abuse of authority, robbing military wounded and dead, the selling, buying, misappropriation, waste, loss, pawning, receiving and concealing of government property, pillage, voluntary self-mutilation and infractions of military orders. In SVN, as in France, offenses are ranked roughly in three classes:

(1) Less serious criminal offenses (contraventions de simple police), punishable by a fine and a maximum of ten days in jail.

(2) Offenses of moderate gravity (delits), punished by a fine and a sentence of imprisonment, as a rule not exceeding five years.

(3) The most serious offenses (crimes), which are punishable by death or imprisonment at hard labor for more than five years.

Only the last two classes are mentioned in the Code of Military Justice.

The first chapter of Title II deals exclusively with punishments. Article 104 of this chapter provides that the punishments for ordinary crimes are those set forth in the applicable civilian penal laws. Punishments for military offenses are found in the specific article dealing with each particular offense.

Military courts may, in addition to the punishments specified by the civilian penal law for crimes not of a purely military nature and by the Code of Military Justice for military offenses, impose accessory punishment known in French as degradation militaire. This punishment includes:

(1) Deprivation of grade and the right to wear the uniform and insignia.

(2) Expulsion from the Armed Forces and loss of civic, civil and family rights. (This exclusion extends as well to the enjoyment of pension rights and other benefits authorized by the legislation on pensions; the loss of family rights involves deprivation of the right to be legal head of the extended family, to serve on the family council and to share in the disposition of family property.)

(3) Deprivation of the right to wear any decorations.

All sentences involving degradation militaire are published in the orders of the day.

In the case of delits, military courts may impose the following punishments:

(1) La destitution. (This involves deprivation of grade and rank and the right to wear the uniform and insignia and, under certain circumstances, the right to receive a pension.)

(2) Loss of grade. (This punishment has the same effect as destitution except it does not effect the right to a pension and to recompense for past services.)

(3) Imprisonment.

Until fairly recently, the administration of military justice in SVN has been highly centralized. Article 20 of the code charges the Minister of Defense with the responsibility for investigation of all offenses falling under military jurisdiction and delivering the offenders to competent

Military Tribunals for trial. Although Article 20 has always provided for the delegation of this function to regional commanders, it was not until 1964 that any action was taken to implement this provision of the code. On July 27th of that year, the Minister of Defense authorized commanders of Corps Tactical Zones "to order the prosecution of civilians and enlisted personnel of the regular and regional forces before military courts for offenses committed in their respective Corps Tactical Zone." Further delegation was made in the decree law of 13 August 1965, which gave prosecutors the power to institute prosecutions for ordinary desertion. Approximately six months later, by Decree Law No. 001-QT/SL of 17 January 1965, the Chief of Staff of the RVNAF was also delegated authority to order prosecutions. However, the Minister of Defense retained the power to order the prosecution of commissioned officers before military courts.

The chief military figure in the administration of military justice is the Director of Military Justice, who reports directly to the Minister of Defense rather than to the Chief of Staff of the RVNAF. The director's mission, as set forth in Presidential Decree No. 332/QL, 11 November 1964, is to advise the Minister of Defense on all legal matters, to study and implement the organization, operation and administrative, of Military Tribunals, to recommend necessary amendments to the Code of Military Justice, to study all problems of national or international law concerning the RVNAF and to provide legal assistance. It is not yet entirely clear as to what the exact division of responsibility will be between the Director of Military Justice and the Judge Advocate, High Command, a position established by Ministry of Armed Forces Directive No. 1752, 11 November 1954. According to this directive, the Judge Advocate advises the Chief of Staff on all legal affairs, provides technical assistance in the preparation of documents, plans and programs, recommends amendments to the Code of Military Justice, controls judicial matters, conducts judicial investigations and prepares documents recommending prosecution.

Most of the business of administering the code is done by an autonomous corps of military justice officers, bailiffs and clerks. The Military Justice Corps is roughly the equivalent of the US Army Judge Advocate General's Corps but performs its functions on a defense-wide basis for all the armed forces. It has approximately 50 officers ranging in rank from first lieutenant to colonel (the rank held by the Director). These men are generally law school graduates, although some have not passed the probationary period required for admission to the bar as fully qualified lawyers.

Among the key jobs held by Military Justice Corps officers are those of commissaire du Gouvernement and juge d'instruction militaire. The commissaire du Gouvernement may be considered as the counterpart of our trial counsel or public prosecutor. The US Article 32 investigating officer is somewhat analogous to a juge d'instruction militaire. However, the juge

d'instruction is not a layman but rather a professional jurist with more extensive powers than our pretrial investigating officer. Perhaps the most aptly descriptive English title for this officer is "examining magistrate." His precise status will become more readily apparent after a detailed description of his duties during the pretrial procedures.

At each Military Tribunal are a government prosecutor who may have one or more assistants, an examining magistrate, and a chief clerk aided by one or more assistant clerks and process servers or bailiffs. The process server, in addition to serving various papers for the court, also assists the court president in maintaining order when the court is in session.

No military defense counsel is provided for under the code. However, an accused has the right to hire civilian counsel of his own choosing. If an accused does not have the means to pay for counsel, a civilian lawyer is designated by the head of the local bar association to defend him.

The Vietnamese place great stress on pretrial investigation and procedures. Only "judicial police" may conduct investigation of offenses preliminary to trial. This is true under the procedures followed by civilian as well as military courts. Within the Department of Defense authority to act as judicial police has been given to officers, noncommissioned officers and squad leaders of the Military Police Criminal Investigation Service. Until 1 January 1965, this had been a function of the GVN National Gendarmerie which was abolished on that date. The Gendarmerie personnel, cases and equipment were then divided between the National Police and the Military Police. About 300 gendarmes went to the Military Police, where for the most part, they now constitute the Criminal Investigation Service. The net result of this change is to give the Military Police fairly broad authority to make investigations, particularly in cases involving offenses against the security of the state.

SVN law now provides for only two types of military courts:

- (1) Regular Military Courts.
- (2) Field Courts.

Both of these courts are more or less comparable to the US general court-martial, particularly insofar as the punishment they may adjudge. The Vietnamese have no counterparts to the American summary and special court-martial.

SVN is divided into four Corps Tactical Zones and the Capital Military District at Saigon. Military courts usually sit in Hue for cases arising in I Corps, in Nha Trang for II Corps cases and in Saigon for cases from the remaining areas, except for those cases referred to the IV Corps Field

Court which sits at Can Tho. (If proposed Decree Law 11-86 QP-HC-1-2 is enacted these two courts will be replaced by a Corps Military Tribunal.)

Contrary to the practice in SVN civil courts of trying criminal and civil actions simultaneously, civil actions cannot be brought before military courts in SVN. However, after the military court has rendered its decision, a suit for damages may be adjudicated in the appropriate civilian court.

Regular Military Courts. A regular Military Tribunal is composed of a civilian president and four military members. The president is a civilian judge from the local Court of Appeals who has been assigned to duty with the military court, usually for a period of six months. However, on 30 March 1964, Decree Law 5/64 amended Article 9 of the Code of Military Justice to provide for two alternate presiding judges for each Military Tribunal, who may be selected from the field grade officers of the Military Justice Corps. The military members are selected from a roster of officers and noncommissioned officers from various units stationed in the area of operations where the court is sitting and are placed on call for such duty for six months. These personnel, who may be from any of the armed services (Army, Air Force, Navy or Marines), are recommended for this assignment by the military commander of the area. Generally, as in the case of US courts-martial, the grade of the military members selected to hear a particular case will exceed that of the accused. Furthermore, if the accused is an enlisted man or civilian, one of the four military members must be a noncommissioned officer. As has been previously pointed out, each military court has a chief prosecutor and an examining magistrate, both of whom have one or more assistants, plus a number of clerical personnel to carry on the day-to-day administration.

Military Field Courts. The essential and most characteristic feature of the Field Courts is that they may try only flagrante delicto cases arising during a period of emergency which involve: (a) personnel of the RVNAF or the Regional Force charged with committing offenses denounced by the Code of Military Justice, the Penal Code or any other current law; or, (b) civilians charged with committing offenses against the national security as stipulated in the Penal Code, Ordinance No. 47, 21 August 1956, and Law 10/59, 6 May 1959, and certain other offenses set forth in the Code of Military Justice where it is explicitly prescribed that civilian perpetrators are subject to military jurisdiction.

During the state of emergency the Field Courts have been empowered, by the decree law of 27 July 1965, to try both military and civilian defendants on numerous charges such as black marketing and dishonesty in office.

With the exception of the president, who is a military officer instead of a civilian judge, the composition of a Field Court is the same as that of a regular military court. As will be seen later, the procedure in a case going before a Field Court, particularly prior to trial, is considerably simplified and abbreviated. A sentence pronounced by a Field Court is final. No appeals are executed without the approval of the President of the Republic.

Handling of an offense by a military court usually goes through three stages:

- (1) Opening of the case by the filing of a complaint or accusation.

- (2) Preliminary investigation.

- (3) Trial and possibly a fourth stage, that of appeal. However, in those cases where a Field Court is utilized, stage two, the preliminary investigation, is considerably abbreviated and since there is no appeal, the fourth stage is eliminated.

When, through various public officials, witnesses, victims, or others, it is learned that an alleged offense has been committed, the nearest Criminal Investigation Service office or judicial police official is notified and an investigation begins immediately. If the investigation produces evidence leading to the conclusion that a particular individual has committed the offense, a report is made to the nearest military justice officer who may be located at Saigon, Nha Trang, Can Tho or Hue, as the case may be. There the report is examined to determine if there is proper legal basis for a trial, and if so, whether the accused should be confined or released to an administration company pending trial. Both are important decisions because in some cases a very lengthy period may elapse prior to trial. In any event, an offender destined for trial usually is transferred from his unit and will await trial either in prison or in an administration company located near the military court which will eventually hear his case.

When the appropriate military justice personnel have examined the file and determined that the evidence contained therein is sufficient to warrant trial, the case is forwarded to the Minister of Defense, if the accused is an officer. If an enlisted man or a civilian is involved, the case goes to the commander of the Corps Tactical Zone where the accused is located. Depending upon the particular circumstances, the Minister or the corps commander will either order the case placed on the docket for direct trial or sign an "Order for Investigation" granting the accused a hearing before an examining magistrate. In time of war, provided an investigation has been made by an official having judicial police powers, any offender can be ordered directly before a court,

without a preliminary investigation by an examining magistrate. In time of peace, this abbreviated procedure is permissible only in those cases involving offenses in which the maximum punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding five years. The case is sent first to the prosecutor who is a Military Justice Corps officer, usually holding the grade of major. If an "Order for Direct Trial" is involved, he arranges for the case to be placed on the docket for trial. When he receives an "Order for Investigation" he forwards the case directly to the examining magistrate. As a matter of practice, however, even in time of war, most cases involving serious offenses, other than those classified as en flagrant delit are referred to an examining magistrate for a preliminary hearing.

The Examining Magistrate. One of the characteristic features of SVN criminal procedure, civilian as well as military, is the investigation by an examining magistrate. In marked contrast to Anglo-American practice, the SVN system of proof in criminal affairs allows the parties little or no control over the presentation of evidence. Thus, in SVN, the evidence is led not by advocates representing the prosecution and defense, but by the president of the court, in the interest of abstract justice alone. This makes it essential that the president be well informed, not only of the charges against the accused, but also of the evidence which points to his culpability. If the president's interrogation of witnesses is to be at all fruitful, he must be thoroughly familiar with every aspect of the case. It is virtually indispensable, therefore, that the facts be fully investigated before the trial and the results of the investigation presented to the president in a manner which, as far as possible, ensures their accuracy. This is the job of the examining magistrate. It is up to him to conduct a very patient preliminary examination of all the evidence, sifting and studying, hearing and rehearing it, until as many as possible of the inconsistencies have been eliminated and those remaining, thrown into sharp relief. He has wide powers to call as a witness any person whose testimony might throw light on the case. If portions of the testimony should prove to be contradictory, the witnesses are reheard and asked to explain the contradictions. All of this time they are under oath; but, if inconsistencies still remain, the examining magistrate is likely to resort to a "confrontation." In other words, he arranges for persons giving contradictory testimony to confront each other as he questions them in the hope that one or the other will give way. He may also proceed to a "reconstitution of the crime." This often demonstrates to the accused or a witness the futility of maintaining a false version of the facts and leads to admissions of the truth. Each bit of testimony heard is reduced to writing and placed in a file where all papers relating to the case are assembled. By the time the examining magistrate has completed his investigation, the file will contain a complete record of the events leading up to and constituting the crime, as well as all subsequent steps taken by the authorities in bringing the offender to justice. Thus, by studying the file prior to trial, the president is in a position to question the witnesses effectively and, when they depart

from their previous testimony, to challenge any apparent contradictions.

Rights of the Accused. The examining magistrate, at the initial hearing, informs the accused of the charges against him, of his right to remain silent and that he may, at his own expense, retain counsel of his own choosing. If the accused is unable to afford counsel, the examining magistrate will ask the head of the civilian bar association to designate a lawyer to defend the case. Unfortunately, in actual practice, these lawyers, who are not paid for their service, often fail to appear at the hearing. While these absences are tolerated at the proceeding before the examining magistrate, the appointed counsel is required to appear and represent his client at the actual trial.

An accused in custody may request a provisional release. It is then up to the examining magistrate, after consulting with the prosecutor, to approve or disapprove this request. Even though the accused makes no such request, the examining magistrate may, early in the proceedings, decide whether the accused is to be kept in confinement or released pending completion of the investigation and trial. The Vietnamese Code of Military Justice also permits the examining magistrate to require bail. However, inasmuch as bail is not commonly used, provisional liberty is generally based on the mere word of the accused that he will subsequently appear. In any event, an appeal from the examining magistrate's decision may be made by either the accused or the prosecutor to the indictment chamber of the local civilian Court of Appeals.

The accused generally is not entitled to be present during the interrogation of witnesses by the examining magistrate. However, the latter must make available to the accused for his information, all evidence which might serve to convict him. In fact, Article 45 of the code requires that upon completion of an investigation during which an accused was not represented by counsel, the examining magistrate read to the accused the entire report of investigation. The accused is permitted, at all times, to communicate freely with his counsel and may not be interrogated or confronted with witnesses against him, except in the presence of his counsel, unless he expressly renounces this right. The day prior to the interrogation of the accused, his counsel is given access to the dossier and is brought up to date by the clerk on all orders or instructions issued thus far by the examining magistrate. When an interrogation is ended, the accused is entitled to review any statement made by him to ensure its accuracy and truth. The transcripts of such statements must be signed by the accused, the examining magistrate and his clerk. If the accused refuses, or is unable, to sign, this fact must be reflected in the record. The code also provides that an accused may, during the investigation, produce all evidence which he believes material to his defense.

(Again, proposed Decree Law 11086 QD-HC-1-2, if put into effect, would enlarge the rights of the accused by granting him military defense counsel before the corps tribunal and also on appeal.)

The Examining Magistrate's Decision. When his investigation is completed, the examining magistrate transmits the dossier to the prosecutor, who has three days to return his recommendations in the matter to the examining magistrate. The latter, who is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendations, has several possible sources of action open to him. If he determines that the offender is not subject to military jurisdiction, he will return the dossier to the authority who issued the "Order of Investigation" for transfer of the case to a civilian court competent to hear it. The examining magistrate may, in another instance, find that the facts do not constitute a punishable offense or that the evidence is insufficient to justify prosecution of the alleged offender; whereupon he will order the case dismissed. On the other hand, if he concludes that an offense subject to military jurisdiction has been committed and that there is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution, he refers the case to a military court for trial.

Either the accused or the prosecutor may appeal from a decision of the examining magistrate to the indictment chamber of the local civilian Court of Appeals. Such appeals are quite common, particularly in cases involving suspected VC and other persons accused of offenses against the security of the state.

Once a case finally has been referred to a military court for trial, it is up to the government prosecutor to take all the administrative steps necessary to get the proceedings under way. He prepares the charges, arranges for the time and place of trial, summons the witnesses and notifies the members of the court. At least three days before the trial, he must furnish the accused a copy of the charges against him, the text of the applicable law and a list of prosecution witnesses. He also must inform the accused that if he does not select his own counsel, the president of the court will designate one for him. The counsel may read the entire dossier in the clerk's office or, if he so desires, make copies of it at his own expense. The accused may have any witnesses he chooses called simply by giving their names to the clerk of court. All sessions of military courts ordinarily are open to the public. However, if an open session might endanger public order or morality, the court may sit in closed session. In any event, the verdict of the court must be publicly announced.

From the beginning to end, the president is in complete charge of the proceedings. An invaluable aid to him in this task is the dossier prepared by the examining magistrate, which he has given careful previous study. His first official act after opening the court is to swear in those members who have not already been sworn. He then calls the accused before the bar and asks his name, age, profession, residence and place of birth. Standing beside the accused is his defense counsel, wearing a long black robe with a white ermine tassel hanging over one shoulder. Not infrequently, rather attractive women lawyers appear before military courts as defense counsel.

Next, the president directs the clerk to read the orders convening the court and referring the case for trial, the charges drawn by the prosecutor and such other information in the case that he thinks necessary to be brought to the attention of the court. When the clerk has finished reading, the president reminds the accused of the offense for which he is being tried, pointing out that the law gives him the right to say everything that is useful in his defense. The president also advises the defense counsel that he cannot say anything contrary "to his conscience or against a due respect for laws and that he must express himself with decency and moderation."

At this time, the accused is afforded an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf, after which the president questions him. If the other members of the court or the defense counsel have any questions, they cannot ask them directly but must have them relayed through the president. This is true in the case of other witnesses as well as the accused.

When the accused leaves the stand, the clerk shouts out the names of all the witnesses, prosecution and defense alike, who then come to the front of the courtroom and await further instructions. When the roll call of witnesses has been completed, the president directs them to go to the witness room and remain there until they are called upon to testify. Each witness, before testifying, is sworn by the president to "speak without hatred and, to tell the truth and nothing but the truth." One after another, the president questions the prosecution witnesses -- a white-uniformed policeman, a company commander, a barefoot peasant in his black pajama-like costume -- until all such witnesses have been called. In formulating his questions, the president relies heavily on the dossier prepared by the examining magistrate, going through a similar process of sifting and winnowing to arrive at the facts of the case. On occasion, a witness may deviate from the testimony he gave before the examining magistrate. Whenever this happens, the president is quick to point out the discrepancy and demand an explanation. In the event of conflicting testimony by several witnesses on a particular point, the president may order a "confrontation," which can be a very effective means in arriving at the truth.

In the statement he makes at the conclusion of the government's case, the prosecutor does not take the aggressive, adversary approach familiarly associated with US criminal proceedings. He simply summarizes the facts and the law on which the prosecution is based and, more often than not, asks for a fair and equitable sentence giving the accused the benefit of any mitigating circumstances which are present in his case.

Now reached is the stage of the trial where the defense presents its side of the story. The accused may call such witnesses or present such evidence as he deems useful in his defense. This includes matters

in mitigation or extenuation of the offense as well as evidence on the merits. At the conclusion of the defense's case, the prosecutor may make a reply, but in the event he does so, the accused and his counsel are always given an opportunity to have the last word.

The honor guard then presents arms and everyone stands as the court leaves the room to go into closed session to deliberate on the findings and sentence. Voting is by secret written ballot and a majority vote is required for a conviction as well as in arriving at a particular sentence. If convicted, the accused is ordered by the court to pay the costs of the trial. The court also, in certain cases provided for by law, orders the confiscation or return to the government or other owner, of all items seized or produced as evidence in the case. The judgment, which is quite lengthy compared to the findings and sentence of a US court-martial, is prepared by the court clerk and signed by him as well as the president and the other court members.

An indication that the court has arrived at its findings comes when the honor guard again snaps to "present arms," shortly after which the court re-enters the courtroom. If the accused has been found not guilty, the court will announce his acquittal and the president will order his release, if he is not detained for some other cause. When the accused has been found guilty, his sentence is announced by the court clerk and the prosecutor advises him that he has three days in which to appeal to the Cour de Cassation, the highest civilian court of appeals in SVN. The prosecutor may also submit an appeal within the same three-day period. As has been previously pointed out, there is no appeal from a decision of a Military Field Court. However, in a case involving a death sentence, the accused always has a right to petition for amnesty, even when he has no right of appeal or even after his appeal has been rejected. (Proposed Decree Law 11086-QD-HC-1-2 would merge the field courts and military courts in the Corps Tribunal and establish a military appellate body to perform the function now assigned to the civilian Court of Appeals.)

The record of trial, being a summarized rather than verbatim record of the proceedings, is quickly and easily prepared. When the time limit for an appeal has passed or appellate procedures have been completed, the record is transmitted to the Director of Military Justice. Provision in appropriate cases is also made for suspension of a sentence or remission of the unexecuted portion.

Nonjudicial Punishment. The SVN Code of Military Justice makes no mention of nonjudicial punishment. Nevertheless, this form of disciplinary action has long been authorized by various directives and orders of the Ministry of Defense. Provision is made for a variety of punishments, the permissible type and amount depending generally upon the grade of the offender and the grade of the person imposing the punishment. Types of

punishment which may be imposed, include admonition, reprimand, restriction to certain specified limits and confinement. The place of confinement is specified, i.e., the unit guardhouse, post stockade or, in the most severe cases, solitary confinement in a detention cell in a disciplinary barracks.

In contrast to the provisions of Article 15 of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, the GVN regulations do not provide for a forfeiture of pay. A further difference in the two systems lies in who may impose nonjudicial punishment. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, only a "commanding officer" has this authority. This term includes a warrant officer but not a noncommissioned officer or civilian. On the other hand, the lowest grade SVN punishing authority is a corporal who may impose a maximum of two days restriction on enlisted men under his command. The amount and variety of punishment which may be awarded a member of the RVNAF increases with the grade of the punishing authority, finally reaching a peak with the Minister of Defense who may impose penalties ranging from an admonition to 60 days solitary confinement. The SVN accused has no right to elect trial by court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment but is permitted to represent to the punishing authority matters in mitigation, extenuation or defense.

Conclusion. SVN jurists have adopted the French concept that the essential purpose of criminal justice is to arrive at the truth. Great stress is placed on the pretrial phase of the procedure. There is also a tendency to place greater faith in the integrity of the men who administer the procedure than in the procedure itself. And these men are sometimes inclined to feel that justice is served when the truth is uncovered no matter what means are used to uncover it. Protection of society is the paramount concern. In contrast, US criminal justice, military as well as civilian, is designed to protect the accused at every state of the proceedings against the enormous police power of the state. This design injects into the proceedings an element of fairness which is deemed indispensable. It is said to matter little that this will occasionally permit a criminal to escape the law, for the system is itself more precious than the result in a particular case. However, there is little or no dispute as to what the machinery of justice in both systems is trying to accomplish. US and SVN alike believe that criminals should be punished and that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused is on the state. It is only in the manner of going about this proof that the two systems differ.

Prompt steps to place proposed Decree Law 11086 QD-HC-1-2 into effective operation and further legislation ensuring appeal from all military convictions would go far to help the SVN military justice system achieve this end and would enable observers to reach a far more confident conclusion about the evenness of the delicate balance required between wartime military discipline and military justice.

These crucial needs could also be furthered by certain steps which would enable the Military Justice Corps to be a more effective and influential voice within the RVNAF. First, the rank of the corps director should be raised from that of colonel to the general officer level, as is already authorized but not implemented, and second, the proportionate number of field grade officers within the corps should be increased. During the past year and one-half there has been a noticeable and commendable increase in the field grade ranks and this has already reflected favorably in the operation of the corps.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D

VIETNAMESE LEGAL HISTORY

Introduction. It is always easier, and usually less risky, to retrace steps than to move ahead. However, in order intelligently to predict what the future may bring in the legal field in SVN, we have to do both. For, only by reviewing what has taken place can we determine the direction in which we are moving and where the greatest opportunities for improvement of the Vietnamese legal system lie.

The problem of establishing conditions of law, order and security is not new. Vietnamese revolutionary tradition predates the time of Christ. Vietnamese have fought Chinese, Mongols, Khmers, Chams, Japanese, French, Americans, and, most of all, other Vietnamese. Violence has been a way of life in Vietnam. The peasantry in the countryside has rarely enjoyed peace and security, nor the benefit of modern law. The history of the Indochina peninsula makes even the Balkans looked peaceful by comparison.

Confucianism. Probably the most important cultural aspects extracted by the Vietnamese from the one thousand years of Chinese domination were Confucianism and the Mandarinate. Confucianism became, as in China, the official state ethical code and the dominant intellectual tradition of the Vietnamese mandarins who administered the country when it emerged from direct Chinese control. Throughout much of Vietnamese history the principles of Confucianism were synonymous with "law." Later, they furnished the framework for the development of a more comprehensive system of written law. Even today, it is within the context of these principles that current GVN law is interpreted and enforced.

The Confucian ethical code defines the perfect society and the principles of personal conduct supporting it. Holding up the patriarchal family as the ideal human institution, the Confucianists, by a series of rigid rules, framed their morality in terms of the duties and obligations of child to parent, wife to husband, younger brother to elder brother and of all to the father as the senior representative of the family group, the welfare and continuity of which was held to be more important than the interest of any individual member. The veneration of ancestors symbolized in the rites before the family ancestral altar affirmed the conception of the family as a supremely valued continuum of all its members -- deceased, living and yet to be born. Confucian scholars extended the familial model to comprehend the nation as a whole, with the Emperor as father and the mandarins and the people as senior and junior members. The virtues which were

held to be necessary for the harmonious functioning of this hierarchy were filial devotion, loyalty, benevolence, justice, propriety and respect for learning.4:97,98,130/

According to Confucian doctrine, disorders arising in a social group spring from improper conduct on the part of its individual members. Achievement of harmony through adaptation therefore is the first duty of every Confucianist, the dominant theme of society and the key to the Vietnamese outlook on life.5/ To ensure the required harmony in society, the Confucianist is enjoined to conform to a body of high moral relationships, phan, and to observe certain principles of etiquette and ritual, li. Adjustment of principles to a given situation, rather than firm adherence to immutable principle, is admired. In politics, as in other aspects of Vietnamese life, the ideal solution to conflicts is settlement by negotiation and adjustment. It does not take long, even for an outsider, to realize that after centuries of negotiating from positions of weakness, the Vietnamese have become adroit bargainers, expert in obtaining through compromise and patience the best terms at the lowest price.

In Vietnam no position taken is irretrievable; no commitment is final. Because Vietnamese value adaptability so highly, leaders are expected to adjust to changing circumstances. In less than two years, Emperor Bao Dai supported first the French, then the Japanese, then the Viet Minh, then the Americans, then switched back to the French. Not even communist propaganda made much of these changes. They made sense to the Vietnamese people, because at that time circumstances were changing quickly, and in their eyes a prudent man would change his loyalties quickly also. Bao Dai's former viceroy in Tonkin is now a minister in the Ho Chi Minh government of NVN, while several men who were once communist officials held key positions in the South under President Diem.4:130-131/

Early Confucian scholars in China, taking for granted the Chinese family system, concluded that the awe and respect felt for the father was the natural force upon which all society was built and that all society could be brought into proper order on the basis of filial piety, or hieu. Another cardinal Confucian virtue was loyalty, or trung, meaning conscientiousness toward others. By tradition, loyalty was associated with both sovereign and family. In fact, the most important force for harmony in traditional Vietnamese society -- and one which is still strong today -- is family loyalty.6/

The Vietnamese Emperor was not only the supreme religious authority, but the chief executive, the highest judge and the only lawmaker of Vietnam, as well. This all-powerful role did not result from an original totalitarian disposition that was never rectified in later times, but was rather an indispensable attribute of a political order based

on Confucianist views. Just as a Vietnamese family fell apart if the father's orders were disobeyed, opposition to the Emperor was bound to bring chaos and ruin to the state. Better to have a dynasty that was no longer able to command obedience replaced by force than to question its authority or to apportion its supreme power among several different hands. As Confucianist philosophers of state, the Emperors would have regarded the so-called division of powers as an absurdity--like a family run on a parliamentary basis, or an Almighty God with no right to dispense justice.^{7:285-6/} That this attitude has not completely disappeared was reflected in former President Diem's statement that "a sacred respect is due the person of the sovereign. ... He is the mediator between the people and Heaven." Thus, government in Vietnam traditionally has been authoritarian and highly centralized.

The Mandarins. Imperial authority, no matter how absolute it became, differed from parental authority in one important aspect. It could not be wielded over the Emperor's subjects in the direct and personal manner in which parental authority was exercised over the members of a Vietnamese family. The Emperor's subjects were too many and the territories over which they were spread too vast. To discharge his various duties on all levels of government, the Emperor had to delegate his powers to a group of officials called mandarins. Thus, in practice, it was this hierarchical bureaucracy which ruled Vietnam.

The Mandarinate became a national institution in Vietnam during the reign of Emperor Ly Than Ton who ruled during the 11th century. It had two branches, civil and military, both divided into nine degrees with each degree subdivided into two classes.^{8/} In accordance with Confucian tradition, civil mandarins enjoyed greater prestige than those of the military branch. Mandarins were recruited by a complicated system of competitive examinations based upon Confucian scholarship. The textbooks used were the four classical books, Tu Thu, composed by the master's disciples, and the five canonical books, Ngũ Kinh, written by Confucius himself. These books define the attitude man must have toward his superiors and inferiors.

To become a mandarin, the candidate spent many years in preparation for the examinations which would determine his degree of knowledge and resultant official rank. Study centered on rhetoric, ancient Vietnamese and Chinese history, poetry and ethics, and the ability to write poetry and draft government regulations. Candidates worked themselves up through a series of examinations beginning at provincial and regional levels, success in which procured entry into the teaching field and the lower levels of rural administration. Those who succeeded at the national or the court examinations normally entered directly into the corps of mandarins.

In principle, positions in the Mandarinate were accessible to people in all walks of life in all classes of society. The ideal of advancement

according to ability was not always realized, however. Although in theory even the poorest peasant competed equally with the highest noble, in practice only the sons of great and wealthy families could devote their time exclusively to study in order to attain the necessary scholarly background.

The ideal mandarin was a righteous man who lived a frugal life and who served as an example to the populace. His salary provided for only a modest existence. He was paid both in cash and in goods; he received rice, housing, servants and certain products from the imperial monopolies such as cinnamon, precious wood and ivory. There were no doubt many gallant and honest souls who led frugal lives in spite of their high positions. But social pressures made it difficult for the mandarins to live by the moral code depicted in Confucian philosophy.

And many of them depended upon other sources of income. As a matter of fact, there were special royal grants to mandarins, called Tien Duong Lien, or literally, money for the purpose of nurturing honesty. Thus the corrupted mandarin was not satisfied with token gifts but demanded large sums as the price for administrative and political favor.

Early Vietnamese Codes. The Chinese were finally evicted from Vietnam in 1428 when the great warrior Le Loi recaptured Hanoi from the Chinese forces, proclaimed himself Emperor Le Thai To and established the Le Dynasty. This was the start of that period, from 1428 to 1865, during which Vietnamese cultural life underwent its most brilliant development. After having ascended the throne, Le Thai To initiated a series of far-reaching reforms, mainly directed toward improving the lot of the peasantry. Despite the fact that he was a rich, aristocratic landowner himself, he ordered a general repartition of land among the whole population. In keeping with the spirit of national renovation generated during the war with the Chinese, Le imposed a strict and puritanical regime on his country in order to speed up the process of reconstruction. During the war, robber bands had established themselves throughout the country. Le exterminated them and introduced a new penal code to fight crime more effectively. Under this code, even laziness became a major crime. Gambling, that omnipresent vice in Indochina, was punished by cutting off one hand. Buddhist monks and Taoist priests were required to take examinations designed to demonstrate their ability to practice their profession. Those who failed were forced to give up their sheltered monastic existence and begin a wearisome life of work and personal responsibility. 7:158-161,182/

Another great ruler of the Le Dynasty, Le Thanh Tong (1459-1497), created an administration of a character very advanced for the 15th century, including a cabinet with a prime minister and ministers of rites, interior, finance, army, justice and public works. A board of censors kept watch over the administrative officials and advised the Emperor of any infractions. Beneath the central bureaucracy the Vietnamese villager

enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Mandarin authority extended to the village level, but it was impossible for this authority to be exercised directly in the thousands of villages scattered throughout the countryside. Poor communications, difficulty of travel and the number of villages made it necessary for the mandarins to administer the villages indirectly through councils of notables. The Village Council was responsible for public order, administration of justice, implementation of official decrees, collection of taxes and recruitment of conscripts for the army. Le Thanh Tong exerted considerable effort to imbue his subjects with the moral ideals of Confucianism, forbade the building of more Buddhist temples, which he considered to be places of superstition, and published a moral code of 24 articles regulating the duties and privileges of state and family. 7:184-185/

Hong Duc Code. Le Thanh Tong is also credited with the promulgation of the Hong Duc Code, 9/ one of the most advanced legal codes of older times -- an almost complete codification of the civil law. It also contained criminal provisions.

The authors of the Hong Duc Code are said to have derived their inspiration from the Code of the T'ang (618-907 A.D.), the earliest Chinese code presently surviving intact. The T'ang Code was considered by Escarra in his Le Droit Chinois 10/ as incorporating all the "Chinese legislative experience from the very beginning to the modern codification era." While the Hong Duc Code took into consideration the lessons learned by the Chinese, it was in fact a codification of Vietnamese habits and customs relating to the family and marriage. The success of the Hong Duc Code can be attributed to the fact that it properly reflected the peculiar character of Vietnamese thoughts and actions.

A remarkable feature of this code was that it decreed women's equality with men in almost every respect. Marriage became valid even without parental permission. Daughters were granted equal rights with sons to the parental inheritance. In a most original measure, it fixed a maximum time limit for the period between engagement and marriage. The achievements of Le Thanh Tong were upheld and even enlarged under his son, Hien Tong (1497-1504), who improved the administration of justice by introducing a direct appeal to himself against a judge's sentence. 7:185/

One of the earliest accounts (1685), in English, of Vietnamese justice is by Samuel Baron, who in his book, A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen by S. Baron, A Native Thereof, observes that:

"The China laws are in use amongst them, which indeed may be considered as their civil and written law; but the temporal edicts, statutes, and constitutions of their princes and chiefest doctors, intermixed with their old customs, are of greatest force,

and in a manner the whole directory of the government, and the rule of the people's obedience; all which are committed to writing, and digested into several books that make at present their body of law."11:143/

Speaking more specifically, he points out that:

"Polygamy is here tolerated; however, that woman whose parents are of the greatest quality, is chief amongst them, and has the title of wife.

"Rapes, and the like, are not known, much less practiced in this country. The law of the land permits a man to divorce his wife, but the woman has not the same privilege, and can hardly obtain a separation, against the good-liking of the husband, unless she be of a family that is able to compel him to it, by mere authority. When the husband designs to repudiate his wife, he gives her a note, declaring under his hand and seal, that he has no more pretensions to her person, and that she is free to dispose of herself, as she finds occasion, which liberty capacitates her to marry another; neither would any person dare to pretend to her, without being certain of the said note, for fear of her former husband, who in that case can claim her again, and thereby embroil such a one in the labyrinths of the law, and recover a good sum of money from him.

"As for adultery, if a man of quality surprises his wife in the fact, he may freely, if he pleases, kill her and her paramour, with his own hands; otherwise the woman is sent to be trampled to death by an elephant; the adulterer is delivered to the justice, who proceeds with him to execution without any further delay."11:131/

After examining the procedure followed by the various courts in operation at that time, Baron rather pessimistically concludes:

"Questionless their primitive legislators were wise and good-intentioned politicians; but how commendable soever those institutions were, yet the misery of human imperfections, degeneracy by length of time, multiplicity of lawyers, together with the daily increase of other petty officers, has brought justice now to that corruption, that for money most

crimes will be absolved, since there are few of their judges but what are subject to bribes."11:143/

Gia Long Code. Emperor Gia Long, who ruled Vietnam from 1802 to 1820, issued a legal code 12/ which took the place of the ancient Le Code. Gia Long and his legal advisors, believing in the Confucius maxim that man was basically good, thought that a clear distinction between moral and immoral behavior would finally abolish crime. Somewhat naively the preamble says:

"We gave orders to highmandarins to examine all existing codes with scrupulous attention . . . and to create a law that We Ourselves have examined and are promulgating now so that everybody may know what is allowed and what is forbidden, that our laws and regulations may be clear like the light of the sun or the moon. . . . Every mandarin will have to know the laws included in this code; the ignorant people will know them too, and will change their behavior and will become good, so that education will take the place of punishment."

In spite of the assertion of the preamble that the Emperor ordered a scrupulous study of all existing laws before the codification, Gia Long's code has been criticized for having been compiled with undue haste. It had many shortcomings primarily because the legislative committee copied too many provisions from the Chinese Dai Thanh Code which were incompatible with Vietnamese customs. Furthermore, it lacked clarity in that confusion existed between the civil and criminal articles. At best it was only an attempted modernization of the old Le Code without any far-reaching changes. The Gia Long Code was promulgated in 1812 and consisted of 398 articles arranged in 22 books.

Administration of Justice Under the Nguyen Dynasty. Lieutenant John White, United States Navy, who visited Saigon in 1819-20, during the latter part of the reign of Gia Long, gives a vivid description of "justice in action" at that time:

"In the administration of justice, the utmost venality prevails, the case generally turning in favour of the party bribing highest. Murder, which according to the earlier travellers, was formerly very uncommon in Onam, is now by no means unfrequent. Theft is universal, although capitally punished upon detection. All capital crimes, excepting adultery, are punished by decollation. The culprits are brought into the great bazars, among which (in cases where there are many to suffer,

and this is not unfrequent) they are distributed. Officers on horseback, and foot soldiers, are arranged as guards round the bazars; the criminals, are placed upon their knees in a row, distant from each other a few paces, and before each, attached to a stake, planted in the earth is a placard, stating the crimes for which they are respectively to suffer. The executioner prepares with his keen two handed sword to inflict the coup de grace, while his attendant stands before the first malefactor, gathers his long hair in his hands, pulling it with some violence, by which means the neck is distended; the word is given by the chief mandarin; one blow severs the head from the trunk. The executioner immediately proceeds to the next, who is instantly despatched with the same barbarous dexterity, and in this manner they proceed through the whole line. The heads are erected on poles, and they are exposed for a few days, till by permission, they are taken down by their respective friends.

"In cases of adultery, the parties are bound together back to back, and thrown off a bridge into the river. Minor crimes are punished by imprisonment, flagellation, and the carvingue. Polygamy and concubinage are universal in Cochinchina. Marriage is a verbal contract, made in presence of the respective parents and friends of the parties, and ratified by the exchange of presents; they seldom take more than three wives, one of which is always paramount; the children of all are, however, equally legitimate. There is no limitation to the number of their concubines, that depending on caprice, and the ability to maintain them. Notwithstanding the severe punishments inflicted on those females who are guilty of a breach of matrimonial fidelity, no opportunities are neglected to evade the laws enacted for its prevention, where there is any reasonable chance of escaping undetected; and among unmarried females, chastity is scarcely considered a virtue.

"The police of the city is conducted on an excellent plan; in each street, one of the most respectable inhabitants is appointed to superintend the judicial affairs of the street, for the good

order and management of which, he is accountable, to the chief civil magistrate, and this mode, by which the interest of the 'Head of the street,' as they are designated by the natives, is so intimately blended with those of the government, is productive of the most beneficial effects; riots and disturbances, being very rare. However, notwithstanding the vigilance of the police, the natives find means to evade many of the laws; for instance, there are certain days on which the people are prohibited from killing pigs, by an edict founded on some superstitious notion of the priests; to prevent detection in the violation of this law, they plunge the animal under water, and despatch him there. If inquiry or examination takes place, it is easy to prove that the pig was drowned accidentally, and afterwards bled;"13:280-282/

Chaigneau 14/, who probably gained a greater knowledge of Indochinese civilization than any other Occidental prior to the 20th century, describes the system of jurisprudence in force during the reign of Emperor Gia Long as follows:

"The police is exercised by the chiefs of the village. They can also impose a slight fine, inflict a few strokes of the ratan, and even in certain cases condemn to the cangue, or wooden collar. Severity is inevitable in the midst of so numerous a population. Should the person convicted consider himself unjustly condemned, he can appeal from the jurisdiction of the village chief to that of the chief of the Huyen, and from this again to the governor of the province. When the penalty is small, the judgment of the governor is final; but in all affairs of consequence, whether civil or criminal, an ultimate appeal is open to the royal council. It can scarcely fail, but that an affair is brought before this last tribunal, especially if the accusation be of a capital nature, should be judged with the utmost impartiality. The eyes of the master are too near at hand. Besides, the most scrupulous precautions are taken, in order that the life of the accused may not be exposed to danger through the ignorance or prejudices of his judges. The documentary evidence is reviewed with the most strict attention; the witnesses are heard anew; all is weighed and discussed gravely and deliberately. In fine, at the moment of pro-

nouncing judgment, the judges are forbid to communicate; each considers the case by himself, and signs and seals his vote. These votes, placed on the Council Board, without being opened, are jointly put under the seal of the Council, and carried into the interior of the palace, where the King takes cognisance of the affair. Should the votes be equal, the process is commenced anew. If the party accused is found to be innocent, the Emperor directs the accuser, or first judges, to be punished, according to circumstances. In the event of all members of the council voting for a capital punishment, the King either orders execution, or occasionally directs a new trial. It is a maxim of the reigning prince (Gia Long), that no precautions are too great when life is concerned. The chiefs of the villages of Toas and Huyens receive the requests and petitions of the persons under their authority, and the governors of provinces give an audience each day, but without presents you can obtain no answer; so that the governors make rapid fortunes. In Cochinchina, the laws make no distinction between native and stranger; and the latter can travel, buy, sell, in the interior, provided he be furnished with a passport from the Minister of Strangers; for which he pays nothing, although it be customary to offer this chief a trifling present."15:297/

At this time, the bodies within the government's central administrative structure which assisted the Emperor in the administration of justice were the Censorate, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Penalties.16:28-29/ The Censorate was charged with inspecting or criticizing the work of the mandarins and giving them counsel. It included several general inspectors of second grade mandarin rank who were supposed to travel around the country for this purpose. In Vietnam, as in China, the Censorate was a key instrument for control of the bureaucracy. The Court of Appeals was concerned primarily with important criminal matters, but it also received petitions from persons claiming abuse at the hands of the mandarins. The members of this court, together with the officials of the Censorate, sat in the Ministry of Penalties to form a Supreme Court which reviewed death sentences and other judicial matters referred to the Emperor. The Ministry of Penalties was simply a ministry of justice under another name which was indicative of its primary job at that time.

Spare the Rod, Spoil the Confucianist. As has been previously pointed out, Confucian doctrine extended the familial model to comprehend

the nation as whole. This resulted in all individuals and institutions of the country being permeated with a parental character which vested in every superior a judicial authority to correct his inferior by corporal punishment. Fathers and mothers punished their children, of all ages, with the bamboo; husbands punished their wives;^{17/} petty officers punished soldiers for the most trifling offenses, and were punished in their turn by superior officers.^{15:297/} Even mandarins who usually meted out punishment to the populace were not exempt from the bamboo cane and other punishment.^{18/} In the words of George Finlayson, a British diplomat who visited Hue in 1821-22, "The bamboo is perpetually at work, and every petty, paltry officer, every wretch who can claim precedence over another, is at liberty to inflict lashes on those under him."^{19:382/} "The omission of accustomed forms or ceremonies, the commission of the slightest fault, imaginary or real, is followed by immediate punishment. The bamboo is the universal antidote against all their failings."^{19:384/}

The great extremes to which this authority was carried out are geographically, if not humorously illustrated in the following account by John Crawford, another British diplomat, of a personal experience in Hue on 16 October 1822:

"Another incident, of which we were eye-witnesses, deserves to be mentioned, as highly illustrative of Cochin Chinese manners and Cochin Chinese government. While we were entering the court-yard of the Minister's house, we saw a company of comedians, who had been exhibiting, as upon the first occasion. It seems that they were not perfect in their parts, or at least that their performance did not satisfy the taste of the great man. They were accordingly undergoing, the universal panacea for all breaches of moral, social, and political obligation, -- for all errors of omission or commission; that is to say -- the bamboo. The first object that caught our attention was the hero of the piece lying prone on the ground, and receiving punishment in his full dramatic costume. The inferior characters, in due course, received their share also, as we afterwards ascertained from hearing their cries, while we sat with the Minister."^{15:425-426/}

As we have learned from Samuel Baron and Lieutenant White, polygamy was permitted to any extent; for, in Cochinchina, marriage was a state of mere convenience to the men, and the wife or wives were little better than the chattels of the husband. The first espoused, being usually a person of equal or superior rank, was looked upon as the real wife; and the succeeding ones, persons of inferior condition, little better than her handmaids. Before marriage, the young

Cochinchinese women were allowed the most perfect liberty, or rather license. A breach of the laws of chastity, on their part was considered no offence, nor even an obstacle to marriage. However, once the matrimonial knot was tied, the female's liberty came to an abrupt end. The punishment in Cochinchina for adultery was death to both parties involved; often, however, commuted to severe corporal punishment. Under this law it was not the moral offense, but the invasion of property which was the object of the punishment.15:332/

Edicts Against Christianity. It was a French missionary, Pigneau de Behaine, Bishop of Adran, who was primarily responsible for the Western advice and military assistance that enabled Emperor Gia Long to defeat the Tay Son and ascend the throne in 1802.7:267/ Gia Long's successors, however, were far less sympathetic to the introduction of Western influences in the form of technical ideas, administrative services and particularly Western political and religious ideologies. Minh Mang, Thieu Tri and Tu Duc, Gia Long's immediate successors, were unfriendly to Europeans and suspicious of the motives of both the traders and the missionaries. This led to cruel and indiscriminate persecutions being launched against both the missionaries and the sizable convert communities,4:16/ which by 1820 totaled a half-million Christian converts under the shepherdship of three bishops and some 15 European and 50 Vietnamese priests.16:11/ As far back as 1596 there had been periods of religious persecution,7:213/ interrupted by spells of tolerance. Emperor Minh Mang was an intellectual, particularly devoted to Confucian ethics which spurred him to oppose the spread of Christianity, a religion which preached against the Confucian concept of an absolute and a line monarchy. The standard accusation against missionaries, in fact, was that the existing social order was being corrupted by their work.20/ An imperial edict issued in 1833 declared the profession of Christianity a crime punishable by death, and in the following years French missionaries were hounded out of the country, imprisoned or executed.21:28-30/ This active antagonism, plus French colonial aspirations, resulted in French military intervention and eventual conquest of Vietnam. Between 1858 and 1867, through military action touched off by more savage attacks on French missionaries, the French annexed Cochinchina (southern Vietnam). In 1883 a French expeditionary force took Hanoi. By the terms of the treaty signed on 25 August 1883, French protectorates were established over Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and Annam (central Vietnam). And thus, nine hundred years of Vietnamese independence came to an end.

The French Colonial Period. French colonial domination brought new Western dimensions to the culture of Vietnam, causing economic, political and social developments of major impact. Traditional Vietnamese institutions, such as the monarchy and the Mandarinate, were relegated to secondary status, to be replaced by French institutions and officials which were superimposed and maintained largely through

power rather than popular support. Much of Vietnam bent to the French rule, but the seeds of national liberation were never completely eliminated and from time to time the French resorted to force in putting down rebellions staged by the more vigorous of the population.

The French protectorate over Tonkin and Annam was formally recognized by a treaty, signed 25 August 1883, between the court of Hue and France. In Tonkin French residents were to rule indirectly through the existing Vietnamese mandarins. Annam was administered in a similar manner, but the Emperor and his court were retained. Cochinchina was technically subject to more direct French control and was classed as a colony. But whatever the difference between these forms of rule they appear insignificant since the remaining elements of Vietnamese authority were completely subordinate to the absolute French authority.

"The distinction between direct and indirect rule, however, constitutes one of the great myths of colonial administration; its effect was legal rather than practical, since in fact French authority throughout Indochina was absolute."21:20/

Even this "legal" effect was fairly insignificant, since it involved only the technical aspects of rule and did not touch upon the substance or content of the legal system and laws.

The Monarchy and Mandarinate Under the French. With the advent of their rule the French dominated the Emperors, selecting and discarding them according to colonial needs. The Emperors continued to exist, along with their ceremonial courts and cabinet ministers, but all of their acts, except on some minor matters of religion, required the approval of the French resident. Until 1949, when certain limited powers were restored to Bao Dai in an unsuccessful attempt to satisfy growing nationalistic demands,7:459-460/ the Emperors remained a tool of the French regime designed to aid stability and legitimacy. It is actually quite remarkable that the monarchy survived at all through this period of debasement and perhaps this tenacity helps to demonstrate the Vietnamese' ability to cling to the fundamentals of their tradition and society while assimilating selected aspects of Western culture.

The mandarins lost much of their political and administrative power under the French. Some mandarins resisted the power of the French and attempted unsuccessful rebellions.16:112/ Others, overcome by the uselessness of resistance, chose suicide. Many simply withdrew from public life or served the French in form. Some who maintained their positions did so only long enough to ensure their economic

security and then resigned. A certain number gave themselves over more completely to the French, some out of neutrality and others out of opportunistic attempts to make the best of a bad situation.

In Annam and Tonkin the French attempted to work through the Mandarinate and to preserve the institution, however, on terms more consistent with French needs. The resulting new breed of mandarins lacked the experience, dignity, background and education that had characterized their more lofty predecessors. But then, lower standards were inevitable since the mandarins were no longer national leaders but were instead subordinate administrators.

Shortly after 1900 in Annam the French sought to end the traditional emphasis placed on mandarin ritual. This and some other "reforms," such as eliminating the need for prostration by mandarins in the presence of French officials, indicated a twofold aim to suppress the traditional administration. Each year a number of mandarins were sent to France to give them a greater knowledge of Western customs and ideas. In 1908 the resident superieur urged the mandarins to use more initiative rather than limiting themselves to following specific orders. The mandarin examinations ceased to be held after 1918, and advanced Confucian studies thereafter were left to the interest of a dwindling number of individual scholars. In 1919 a new standard of ethics for mandarins was directed by imperial decree. 16:97/

Also in the early stages of the French domination specialized Mandarinates were established to work in the education and military fields. This was a significant departure from the mandarins' tradition of devotion to all aspects of administration and education. A further mark of a new order was bestowed upon the mandarins in 1900 with the introduction of a retirement and pension system giving pensions to all mandarins 55 years of age who had 30 years of service and proportional pensions for mandarins of 25 years' service.

The final significant changes in the Mandarinate were made in the decree of 4 July 1933, as amended by the decree of 16 March 1935, called the Bao Dai reforms. This was an attempt to prevent the mandarin system from becoming too French. The reform "sought through future appointments to gradually renew and alter the nature of Mandarinate membership to make much of it an intellectual, enlightened bourgeoisie worthy of its leadership role." 16:99/

Despite the decline in its significance as a formal intellectual tradition, Confucianism in the mid-20th century retains its importance as a traditional source of attitudes and values, at least among

the peasantry. The Vietnamese villager still tends to feel that the family is more important than the individual, to venerate learning and to believe that man should live in harmony with his surroundings. The new, Western-trained official frequently lacks the moral authority of the Confucian mandarin among the people, for there is little correspondence between his values and those of the great majority of the peasantry, which is only beginning to be exposed to the intellectual influences of the modern world.

Legal Systems Under the French. One of the most significant French influences fell upon Vietnamese jurisprudence. An independent court structure was established for the use of French and other nonindigenous persons. These courts eventually became the official system and the traditional or customary courts continued to exist, as they do today, only in the rural areas where the formal courts failed to reach.

Not only did the French restructure the courts along their own lines, but eventually many of the codes of France essentially became the substantive law of Vietnam. The civil codes enacted during the colonial period were largely of French inspiration and were quite similar to the French codes. Prior to this time, Vietnamese written law rested on two judicial documents which were both civil and criminal in nature, the code of the Le Dynasty, the Hong Duc Code promulgated in the 15th century and the Gia Long Code promulgated in the 19th century. The French legal influence was most quickly felt in Cochinchina where the Precis of 1883, the work of Lasserre, a magistrate, was the first substantial adoption of the French civil code. As a colony, Cochinchina became almost totally subject to French law. The process of assimilation continued and the 1931 Civil Code adopted in Tonkin was totally of French inspiration. This code directly inspired the Civil Code of 1936 promulgated in Annam which was likewise almost totally copied from French legislation.

The French also introduced the concept of separate written laws dealing with criminal matters. In Cochinchina the French Code Penal Modifie of 1912 became completely applicable. In the protectorates the process was less abrupt and less complete, but by 1933 the Code Penal du Centre Viet-Nam, largely a French product, was placed in force.

It was not unnatural in light of this growth of French-inspired law that many judicial functions were taken over by French officials. Unfortunately, French judges were usually unable to speak Vietnamese and were dependent upon local interpreters who were not always as reliable as might have been hoped.^{16:121,127/} The remaining judges were naturalized French from other French possessions. All of these judges fell prey to the criticism that they were either unfamiliar

with or critical of Vietnamese social customs and traditions.22/

It has become a part of the folklore of many newly emerging nations that the legal codes of the colonial period are sure to be incompatible with the new era. This notion has been all too often accepted unquestioningly with regard to Vietnam, which tends to obscure a more objective assessment of the French influence.23/

Actually, there are still areas of rural Vietnam where French law has yet to make any impact. Further, in those areas where the French system has developed, it has introduced distinct improvements, such as the abolition of excessive imprisonment and corporal punishment for minor offenses and mutilation as a punishment for certain crimes.

All developing societies are subject to numerous foreign influences, and, in fact, there would be no development without such stimulation. The important thing for a society is to learn and to achieve progress by selecting and assimilating these influences, just as the vastly different ethnic groups in the United States have adjusted to the Anglo-American system of law. While there are many inconsistencies between the system imposed by the French and the traditional Vietnamese approach, it must also be said that the French have erected a basic legal foundation upon which the Vietnamese can build answers to the drastic challenges of today. It is quite likely that the Vietnamese system of old, left to grow alone without foreign influence, would be far less adequate to meet today's rapidly growing needs and demands.

Actually, the real friction between the legal concepts of Vietnam and France are usually overlooked. The major difference lies in the attitude each country takes toward the tension between rights and duties, a problem of balance which all legal systems face. The French are primarily concerned with protecting the rights of the individual, while traditional Vietnam stressed the Confucian concept of duties that each person must fulfill. However, the existence of the French legal system in Vietnam has not completely overwhelmed the Confucian tradition and it appears that the legal structure does not necessarily dictate the point of view that must prevail. Certainly in the United States legal system each of these concepts has prevailed from time to time.

From Colonialism to Independence. World War II led to the undermining of French authority. Although the French retained administrative control until early 1945, they did so under Japanese occupation. In these late days of the war, the Japanese assumed a greater amount of authority and thus accelerated Vietnamese nationalism. The years

of turmoil that followed are well described elsewhere and need not be gone into here. It is sufficient to point out that, throughout this period, the legal system remained essentially as it was at the start of the war; except that, by 1955, with the departure of Emperor Bao Dai and the firm establishment of Ngo Dinh Diem as Chief of State the emperorship was completely dissolved.

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D

NOTES

1. Hickey, Gerald C. Village in Vietnam. New Haven, 1964.
2. Sabatier L. Recueil des Coutumes Rhades du Darlac. Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient. Collection de textes et documents sur Indochine. Vol IV. Hanoi, 1940.
3. Michigan State University. Preliminary Research Report on the High Plateau and Field Trip Report on the Katu. A Report Prepared by the Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, Saigon, 1957.
4. U.S. Army. Area Handbook for Vietnam. Washington, 1962.
5. The Vietnamese have a proverb which points out that the supple bending reed survives storms which break the strong but unyielding oak. The Republic has, in fact, replaced the dragon on the former coat of arms with a bundle of bamboo reeds which represents the endurance of the adaptable Vietnamese in the face of all vicissitudes.
6. The individual Vietnamese will compromise most other obligations in the interest of family ties and family unity. Though honesty, for instance, is an admired virtue, it would be considered foolish and wrong to sacrifice one's family interests for the sake of being fair to strangers.
7. Buttinger, Joseph. The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam. New York, 1958.
8. The military mandarins also had to pass an examination that was rather a physical than an intellectual test. They had to carry two balls of lead, each weighing sixty pounds, over a distance of sixty yards; they had to prove their ability with different weapons such as swords and halberds. Only after having passed these and similar physical tests were they subjected to an examination in military tactics, military history and the institutions and history of their country. The ninth and eighth degrees of the military Mandarinate could be awarded without an examination to soldiers who had excelled in bravery. For the seventh degree and all higher ranks examinations were prescribed. The seventh and sixth degrees were conferred on company commanders, the fifth and fourth degrees on colonels, the third and second on generals, the first degree on marshals and the admiral of the fleet. Only the commander in chief (called Marshal of the Center) was a military mandarin of the first class of the first degree. In the civil Mandarinate the first class of the first degree was only sel-

dom conferred. The cabinet ministers and governors of the large provinces were mandarins of the second class of the first degree; the governors of the small provinces were mandarins of the second class of the second degree. The mandarins were not only civil servants but priests of the official religion. The symbol of their office was a seal they always had to carry with them. The theft of a mandarin's seal was punished by decapitation. The same punishment was applied for the forgery of an official's seal. Pasquier, Pierre, L'Annam Autrefois, Paris, 1907. pp. 119-165.

9. A French translation of this code is found in Deloustal, Raymond, La Justice dans l'Ancien Annam. Hanoi, 1911.

10. Escarra, Jean. Le Droit Chinois. Peiping and Paris, 1936. English translation by Gertrude R. Browne, Harvard Law School, 1961.

11. Baron, Samuel. A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen. Vol. VI, of Collection of Voyages and Travels . . . 3rd. Edited by A. Churchill, London, 1746.

12. A French translation of the Gia Long Code was published by P. Philastre in two volumes, Paris, 1876.

13. White, John. A Voyage to the China Sea. Boston, 1823.

14. Jean-Baptiste Chaigneau came to Vietnam in 1794. In 1802 he married a Vietnamese girl and settled in the vicinity of Hue. He eventually became a Vietnamese mandarin, first class, and sat in the council of Emperor Gia Long. At the same time, he held the office of a consul of France.

15. Quoted in Crawford, John. Journal of an Embassy from the Governor General to the Courts of Siam and Cochinchina. Vol. II, London, 1830.

16. Jumper, Roy, and Hue, Nguyen Thi. Notes on the Political and Administrative History of Vietnam. Prepared by the Michigan State University Advisory Group, Saigon, 1962.

17. In this connection, Crawford states:

"A Cochinese husband may by law inflict upon his wife the severest corporal punishment, short of life, without being called to any account. We were ourselves witnesses to several specimens of this discipline. While our ship lay at the village of candyu, one of our gentlemen saw a very decided case of this nature, in the person of a young woman of twenty-four or twenty-five years of age. She

was thrown down upon her face in the usual manner, and a man and woman held her, while a brute of the male sex, believed to be her husband, inflicted at least fifty blows of a ratan. The punishment took place in the open street, and excited very little notice among the people." Crawford, Note 15 above 333-334.

18. Crawford's Journal entry from August 10, 1823 reads in part as follows:

"August 10. /1823/ * * * Nothing remarkable occurred. Three or four thieves are executed every week. His Excellency is rigorous in the execution of justice, and permits no one to escape. He says, that wretches of this description are of no manner of use to the public, but, on the contrary, a burden. The Mandarin who brought us up from Canju, has just been convicted of bribery and corruption: the Governor has confiscated his property, confined the persons of himself and his wife, and put the heavy Cangue, or wooden collar, about their necks. The Mandarin's crime was withholding regular payment from the labourers engaged on the canal of Athien, and extorting money from the peasantry of the neighboring villages. The amount taken did not exceed one thousand quans. In the evening, the Mission was invited to see the elephants exercise. In passing the market-place, we were told that three criminals had been executed there in the morning; their wooden collars were still lying on the ground."

19. Finlayson, George. Mission to Siam and Hue the Capital of CochinChina in the Years 1821-22. London, 1826.

20. An imperial edict by Minh Mang, issued in February 1825, forbade the entry of missionaries into Vietnam and officially accused the "perverse religion of the Europeans" of "corrupting the hearts of men." Buttinger, Note 3 above, p. 243.

21. This edict is reproduced in full in Vietnam, History Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis. Edited and Introduction by Marvin E. Gettleman. Greenwich, Conn., 1965.

22. "The French judges were the officials who needed to know the most about Vietnamese culture but actually were the least informed. According to James, most judges were naturalized French from other French

possessions who were especially critical of Vietnamese social customs. Such ignorance, coupled with a natural animosity, caused the judges to commit many errors in the execution of justice." Jumper and Hue, Note 16 above, p. 126-127.

23. "The most injurious social measure was the substitution of French for indigenous law. The Gia Long Code applied earlier was a rigid system of laws with specific punishment for every particular violation of the law. French law was completely out of harmony with traditional law and custom." Jumper and Hue, Note 17 above, p. 126.

ANNEX E

NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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ANNEX E

NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Introduction

The US has undertaken few, if any, tasks as difficult as helping the GVN to overcome the current insurgency and to build a viable nation state. Among the most difficult parts of this undertaking are the diagnosis of the precise nature of the challenge confronting the GVN and the prescription of internally consistent and mutually supporting remedies for the various problems therein. We have attempted in this study both to diagnose and to prescribe.¹ While recognizing the critical importance of devising specific programs -- and, even more, of implementing them effectively -- we have not attempted the detailed programming which we believe must be done in the field, keyed to particular circumstances and timing.

Our analytical task is too complex to assault by simply describing the detailed goals sought, defining the present situation and prescribing the best route from here to there. Given man's incomplete knowledge of social processes and his own individual perversity, it is impossible to "pictorialize" the exact kind of state which SVN must become in order to succeed. At the same time, however, it is essential that the Vietnamese and those who seek to help them have some clearly defined idea of the principal requirements for governmental stability and nation building in order to guide the myriad details of policy and program needed to achieve those goals.

Fortunately, social scientists -- and, particularly those engaged in the study of comparative politics -- have spent a great deal of time in the last decade analyzing the problems of governing and modernizing the new states. They have developed methodology and criteria for studying the modernization process which can be used to discern the main outlines of the nation building task confronting the GVN. As a first step in analysis, this fund of knowledge must be drawn on to establish a "model" of a stable, non-communist, non-Western state. This model is necessarily, and rightly, defined in only its broadest outlines, but it does serve to highlight the nature of the tasks confronting new states seeking stability as they build their nations into modern polities.

Having thus identified the kind of political environment and governmental structures and processes conducive to stability and modernization in general, the need exists to measure, in terms of these factors,

the current situation in Vietnam and the trends and forces operating therein. We recognize the danger inherent in trying to compare any particular society with a statistically derived ideal; we are equally conscious of serious gaps in our knowledge about the particular polity we are dealing with. Nevertheless, we believe that the comparison found is both sound and useful at the level of generalization with which we have dealt.

In the course of the comparison of the situation in Vietnam with the stability model, we have suggested general policy goals toward which SVN should be moving and current trends there which should be reinforced or altered, and some specific programs.

Finally, we have discussed the policies the US should pursue in assisting the GVN in its nation building efforts. Some of these positions may appear to belabor the obvious. But, what is obvious in theory is often violated in practice and bears emphasis.

An Empirical Model of a Stable Society

The model of a stable polity set forth in this section has been derived by analyzing the experience since 1945 of more than a hundred states. From this number, we have chosen 40 of the less modern or less developed states for detailed comparisons; 18 of them with governments which have been relatively stable and 22 of them with governments which have been unstable since World War II. By comparing the characteristics of these two groups of countries, we have identified elements of political environment and governmental system which are strongly correlated with stability. These elements, which taken together make up the "stability model," are described briefly in succeeding paragraphs. The appendices contain a fuller explanation of the model, its statistical base and the computer programing involved in its derivation.^{2/}

Integration. The prospects for governmental stability in a given society depend importantly on the degree to which the members of that society share a common background, outlook and values. This statement does not mean that all subcultures or groups must be broken up and the society thoroughly homogenized; for the data show that governmental stability is not, for instance, correlated with linguistic homogeneity or religious homogeneity. There is, however, a relation between racial homogeneity and stability, indicating that there are limits to which differentiation can go without endangering the integrity of governmental system. As another measure of the consequences of heterogeneity, strong sectionalism is linked with less stability. Similarly, but on a more general level, there is a clear link between governmental

stability and the degree of political enculturation or integration of the various elements in a society (i.e., lack of communalism, disenfranchisement and political nonassimilation).

Wide Participation. Other elements of the political environment within which a society works out its processes and forms of government have a key influence on the stability of those processes and forms. For example, it is important that political participation not be restricted to a narrow elite. If autonomous groups are tolerated and permitted to express views which do not necessarily coincide with those of the government, there tends to be a greater stability than if they are suppressed. The fact that widening the participation base and the interchange of views between people and government contributes to stability is also indicated by data on the social origins of the state's leaders; thus, if leadership elements are drawn from broad strata of the population and not merely from particular elite groups, governments tend to have greater stability. Further contributing to popular political consciousness and to the political dialogue which keeps a government in touch with its people is the activity of a free press. Contrary to opinion that a free press is a luxury naturally restricted to developed states, the data show that, even in those less developed states in our sample, the presence of a free press is correlated with greater governmental stability.

Political Parties. Turning to characteristics that are partly environmental and partly governmental, a highly differentiated party system apparently does not lead to stability, for one-party systems tend to be correlated with greater stability and multi-party systems with greater instability. Included in the one-party systems are "national fronts" and other fusionist groupings; analysis of data on system representativeness indicates that such a broad, fusionist type of party is more likely to yield stability than a narrower one. It is important, too -- whatever the number of parties -- that the party system itself be relatively stable, rather than made up of congeries of shifting factions such as seem to characterize many unstable states.

In stable polities, parties tend to be broad in their appeals, bringing together a multiplicity of interests rather than articulating the views of a single interest group. The precise type of parties' appeals and the nature of the groups to which they appeal apparently make little difference for stability; there are, for example, no significant correlations with either stability or instability in the case of a dozen qualitative descriptions of parties.

Constitutionalism. With regard to governmental structure and process itself, there is strong evidence that a constitutional system

(i.e., one that is "conducted with reference to recognized constitutional norms") tends to be more stable than authoritarian or totalitarian ones in which power is used arbitrarily. Following the same pattern, other measures show that stability is linked with politically neutral police and military forces. Stability also correlates with the extent to which a government is polyarchic (i.e., broadly representative of the interests of the governed).

Governmental Structures. Generally, the particular forms or structures of government are apparently not so important for stability as long as nongovernmental groups can function to articulate and aggregate popular interests and can have access to decision-making points in the governmental structure. It does not matter, for instance, whether a state's governmental powers are discharged through a federal or a unitary system, for there are no correlations between stability or instability and the kind or degree of vertical distribution of power. It does matter, however, whether government's powers are adequately distributed horizontally. Thus, there is greater stability if power is distributed among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, rather than monopolized by one branch.

The particular kind of legislative-executive structure a society adopts (e.g., presidential, parliamentary, monarchical, various hybrids) apparently has little impact on stability. It is important, however, whatever the form adopted, that both the executive and the legislature play effective roles. Fully effective legislatures are correlated with greater stability and so, too, are powerful executives. Whatever the executive structure, it is also important that it function so as to integrate a variety of interests.

On one structural point, namely, on the choice of bicameral or unicameral legislature, there is a linkage with stability; bicameral legislatures correlate with greater stability. It seems safe to speculate, however, that the question here may not really be one of form but one of degree of representativeness; for a bicameral legislature permits fuller representation of the varied interests in the society than does a unicameral one.

An additional characteristic of a stable polity, not covered in our survey, is that it has judicial and regulatory techniques based on a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law.

Other Modernization Factors. Available data give but scant guidance on the broad range of modernization needs beyond the general political, environmental and structural requirements already described. It is clear that effective government is required (i.e., government able to allocate resources authoritatively and to pursue programs

effectively). A further point stands out, namely, that economic growth is correlated with governmental stability. Although the data in the stable sample show, as one would expect, that a comparatively higher degree of development is correlated with greater stability, this linkage should not be interpreted to mean that a nation necessarily becomes more stable as it moves up the developmental path. There are also data to show that there is generally less stability in nations which have been in the modernization process for some time than in nations just beginning it. Apparently a state must build adaptability and flexibility into its political and social institutions in order to avoid disruptive political change as modernization proceeds.

Conclusion. The "model," stable polity defined in the foregoing list of characteristics is in tension between two opposing pulls -- one toward freer political patterns and broader popular representation and participation; the other toward centralized, strong governmental leadership. The dimensions of the challenge to the political leaders of the developing nations emerge clearly from this dichotomization. They must create an integrating political and economic environment in which citizens feel their interests are adequately represented and a political structure which in fact does provide such representation under constitutional safeguards; at the same time, they must build a political structure which limits disintegrative forces, gives the state broad powers to mobilize the nation's energies and resources and governs effectively -- at both the center and out in the villages. Neither pull can be given temporal priority; neither can be permitted to triumph over the other. The dynamic balance required will be difficult to achieve and even harder to maintain as modernization proceeds.

Measuring the Situation in Vietnam Against the Stability Model

Integration. Clearly, the GVN is an insufficiently integrated polity. Although, for the most part, its linguistic and religious differentiation is not so marked as to preclude increasing integration of the body politic, there are some "lumps" in its mixture of peoples and languages which will be difficult to assimilate in the short run. One of these is the Chinese minority, nearly one million, largely centered in the Saigon area. Two other principal groupings are in the Montagnards and the Khmers, each numbering perhaps half a million. Since these three groupings are comparatively small in comparison with the thirteen million ethnic Vietnamese and since the emotional and cultural brakes on their assimilation are so strong, it is probably not necessary or wise for the GVN to press their assimilation in the near future. In fact, with the Chinese and Khmers at least, a fairly

high degree of cultural autonomy and perhaps (though not necessarily) some special representation in the central government should provide sufficient integration of these groups, or at worst, their neutrality during the process of nation building. The Montagnards seem to require a more directly political approach involving a somewhat higher degree of local autonomy and central-level representation.

Other centripetal elements which can more readily be integrated into the country's political life can be described in terms of the following dichotomies: Buddhists versus Catholics, Tonkinese or Annamese versus Cochinchinese and students and other younger elements versus tradition-oriented forces. Each of these sources of divisiveness runs deep into the heart of political life, and the first two of them endanger the degree of enculturation which a stable polity needs. Other lesser foci of separateness are the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects.

The Buddhists represent one of the key political as well as religious and social elements in South Vietnam. For centuries, including the immediate post World War II era, the Buddhists were largely a passive factor in the country's political life. As the policies of the Diem government became more pro-Catholic, however, Buddhist sensitivity and cohesiveness began to emerge. As Diem closed off avenues of political participation by various repressive measures, the Buddhist movement also increasingly became a focal point for political dissent. Lacking alternative instruments with which to battle Diem, a wide variety of political opponents rallied behind the Buddhist banner.

The overthrow of Diem left the Buddhists comparatively well organized and conscious of their political strength. Although they have continued to play a political role since late 1963, it has largely been the negative one of seeing that the government in power does not favor Catholics or otherwise harm Buddhist interests. Some of the leadership elements, particularly younger ones, are pressing for an increased secular role by the bonzes and the Unified Buddhist Association, but the leadership as a whole is reluctant to act affirmatively or responsibly in the political realm.

The Buddhist leadership is factionalized to the extent that even the passive support it gives the various governments which it sees as non-threatening to Buddhist interests cannot be counted upon. There may be an element, for example, which feels that if the Chinese and American presence were removed from the area, the Buddhist movement would be able to manage the Vietnamese Communists and create a unified, non-communist Vietnam. The bulk of the Buddhist leadership, however, appears to have a fairly realistic appraisal of the strength of the North Vietnamese Communists and of the danger of communism to their faith.

By opening other avenues of political participation, the government can to some degree de-politicize the Buddhist movement. In addition, government efforts could be directed toward increasing the cultural and social role of the Buddhist movement, particularly the latter, at the expense of its political role. Even so, for the foreseeable future, the Buddhists will represent one of the prime political forces in the country, one which must be adequately represented in both the executive and the legislature. Over the long run, national integration requires that the Buddhist religious leadership recognize that the state is protecting Buddhist interests and that, accordingly, they can increasingly turn their efforts from politics to cultural and social affairs. For the short run at least, Buddhist political energies should be channeled away from the religious hierarchy and into the hands of lay leadership as much as possible.

Catholicism has been a factor in Vietnamese political life for more than a century, but the fact that President Diem was an ardent Catholic whose principal support in the countryside resided in the roughly one and one-half million of his co-religionists has given it a position of particular importance in GVN. Although much of the so-called discrimination of the Diem regime in favor of Catholics was more apparent than real, there was enough truth associated with the charge to make this point a running sore. The difficulty of drawing the heat out of the issue has been intensified by the fact that it is partially intertwined with another major divisive issue, namely, North-South sectionalism. The vast bulk of the 900,000 refugees who streamed southward from Central and Northern Vietnam following the Geneva Settlement of 1954 were Catholics. The resettlement of these refugees in concentrated areas perpetuated their separateness and easy identification as both Northerners and Catholics. Since both the Northern refugees and the long-term Catholic residents of the South have tended to be better educated than other population groups, they have had a natural advantage in the competition for status and power, in addition to whatever favored position they were given by the Diem government.

Again, with the Catholics as with the Buddhists, the Government of Vietnam cannot now ignore such a key force in politics. Over the long run, it should attempt to de-politicize the Church and channel it into social and cultural affairs as much as possible. The privileged position of the Catholics under the old regime has already eroded; what is needed now is assurance to them that they will not be disadvantaged in the face of other religious elements. Realistically, however, the Catholics must be brought to face the painful and inevitable readjustment to minority status in a non-Catholic country.

Of the two minor religious sects, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, the former is far more politically significant. It is more numerous,

more militant, and more strategically placed. Although the concentration of the Hoa Hao in a few provinces means that its significance is largely a local one, it is not one to be ignored, nor is it necessarily a wasting one (as is the Cao Dai). The strong ideological bond among the Hoa Hao and its staunch anti-communism make its territory a secure base for any government which respects its interests and gives its leaders a role in administering the areas where it is centered. The Hoa Hao can be increasingly integrated into the national unit if the GVN meets its legitimate demands for locally administered programs and representation in the central government proportionate to its strength in the countryside. This process cannot go so far as to encourage "warlordism" however a malady to which the Hoa Hao are traditionally prone and which could deeply alienate the non-Hoa Hao population in these areas.

The Cao Dai are even more easily assimilable, for they are both weaker and more factionalized than the Hoa Hao. Time, reason and religious toleration should "solve" the problem of integrating the Cao Dai.

The Montagnards deserve special mention. Assimilating them into the dominant lowland culture may be a desirable long-range policy, but it is clearly not now a viable alternative. The GVN does not have the strength both to fight the communist insurgency and to force assimilation of the Montagnards, particularly when the North Vietnamese are ostensibly pursuing a self-rule policy toward their own Montagnards. On the other hand, the southern Montagnards -- divided as they are among themselves -- are in no danger of setting up a separate state. Their more modest aims of cultural preservation and some degree of local autonomy could be accommodated within the framework of a pluralistic, though integrated, southern polity. Assimilation will have to wait. Though the mutual animosity between highlander and lowlander and the cultural gap separating them are too wide to be bridged in the foreseeable future, the GVN can begin the task of bringing the Montagnards into the nation building process by giving them more considerate and equitable treatment and a fair share of developmental resources.

Sectional feelings between the Annamese, Tonkinese and Cochinchinese (or central, northern and southern Vietnamese) are compounded by religious antipathies as noted. While there is a traditional Northern or Central versus Southern split, the problem has been greatly compounded recently by the fact that Buddhist strength is concentrated in Central Vietnam while the Catholics are primarily Northerners, as mentioned previously. In fact, last Spring the Catholic Tonkinese and non-Catholic Cochinchinese actually allied themselves against the Central and Northern Buddhists to bring down the Quat government. Great adroitness in balancing sectional demands and time for healing are required. To some degree, the depoliticizing of religion -- discussed in preceding

paragraphs -- will also help alleviate sectional tensions. The rise of a new "nation-minded," rather than parochial, generation will ameliorate the strain on the part of Northerners and Southerners. The Central Vietnamese are likely to remain considerably independent of either Northerners or Southerners, at least until a developing national economy makes it possible for the South's relatively abundant resources to be brought to bear on Annam's pressing economic and material problems.

The rift between generations is a problem which Vietnam shares with most less developed countries (and some developed ones as well). The older generation of Vietnamese patriots who led the fight against French colonialism and who, within the SVN elite, at least, tended to be more traditional and conservative minded, will inevitably be replaced over the next few years by younger, more modern-minded elements. The older nationalists were and are deeply divided in personal, sectional and ideological rivalries, perhaps because they were in large measure politically sterilized by the years of French rule and the narrow participation permitted them under the Diem regime. Although this older group contains considerable talent and experience, both of which are in scarce supply in the GVN, it is perhaps as well that it is being jostled off stage by younger elements in the urban areas.

On the other hand, it should be recognized, particularly in the rural areas, that the older generation is a source of stability. Increasing the rate of modernization by encouraging the displacement of the traditional elite incurs the possible cost of decreased stability. In the rural areas, it is questionable whether, at least in the short run, the potential gain of modernization is worth the cost in stability. The "Revolution of Rising Expectations" is largely an urban phenomenon which, in the short run, does not present a problem of "rising frustration" in the rural areas. In rural areas, the problem should be viewed as one requiring moderate social reform, such as effective use of the existing village councils or credit reform, rather than radical change in the social structure, (e.g., installing new leadership in the villages or drastic land reforms which overload the bureaucracy).

Since the future belongs to the younger elements, they should increasingly be given a share in governing the nation, thereby sobering them as they deal with real problems on a responsible basis. As the youngest politically articulate element, the university and secondary school students should in particular have their energies harnessed to the cause of nation building. The Republican Youth movement, which Ngo Dinh Nhu created as a political base for Diem's regime and which disintegrated with his government's overthrow, was too authoritarian an institution to mobilize the energies of the young people, at least in the politically crucial urban areas. Some other more liberal and responsible youth movement should replace it. By the nature of the

situation, a developing nation's youth is inevitably politicized; the immediate task in SVN is to see that the politicizing is non-communist in nature.

Wider Participation. In the last 20 years, the politically conscious Vietnamese have been offered a narrow and unsatisfactory range of options. They have had to choose successively between French colonialism and the Viet Minh and between Diem's authoritarianism and the VC or National Liberation Front (NLF). The common reaction to these choices has been attentisme, or wait-and-see, on the part of the intellectuals and middle classes and apathy on the part of the peasants. There must be viable options and ways for political participation open to the bulk of the people who have been unwilling to submit to the rule of either extreme. Subject to the "law of the gun" for more than 20 years, it is not surprising that the vast majority of Vietnamese have not crystallized their views into political movements or groupings.

The toleration now shown toward autonomous groups in SVN should be further encouraged. This opening should be institutionalized by workable constitutional guarantees and by affording such groups protection against bureaucratic or police intervention. Participation and representation, which the stability model shows are essential, should not be confused with Western-style democratic practices which are not now, and may never be, appropriate to the Vietnamese case.

The creation of a free and responsible South Vietnamese press will help to revitalize popular participation in political life. The comparatively free press of the earlier Diem years was not as responsible as it should have been, but its shortcomings were probably not as damaging as the stifling of all freedom which followed later. A new balance must be sought. At the same time that the government moves to limit press censorship, intimidation of editors and political control over the availability of newsprint, it should tighten libel laws and press other measures designed to ensure that a sense of responsibility goes with the increased freedom.

Political Parties. SVN has no broad, aggregating political party of the type indicated by the stability model. The several dozen "parties" in Saigon follow the traditional pattern of cliques centered around individuals and based on personal ties. With no prospect of facing an election and no chance of assuming power, these have invariably become futile factions. Yet there appears to be no adequate substitute for political parties as a means of coalescing various viewpoints into viable alternatives for public decision. Thus, unpromising as Vietnam's experience with political parties is, it appears that if its government

is to be genuinely representative, a viable party system should be developed.

To a considerable extent, the electoral process itself can press some of the cliques in the direction of becoming viable parties. But, given the diversity of interests in SVN and the magnitude of the issues confronted, there is a danger, at least for some time, that there will be too many parties, too narrowly based. Recognizing that a multi-party system is generally associated with instability in modernizing countries, whereas a one-party system (or a one-and-a-half or two-party variant between the one-party and multiparty system) is correlated with stability, it is clear that SVN cannot afford a multi-party system. Equally clear, given the schisms among important interests, a narrow one-party system would lead to instability because of the lack of representativeness of these interests. An appropriate compromise at this stage of Vietnam's development would seem to be a national front or alliance among a few particularistic parties. Such a party system would also satisfy the requirement of the stability model that political parties should represent aggregations or collections of various interests and not be confined to representing a single interest group.

The basic law establishing the electoral system should be devised in such a way that a "one-party dominant," or at most two-party, system is encouraged and, importantly, stabilized. Stipulations on the means for a candidate to have his name appear on the ballot, the percentage of votes which he must receive to avoid forfeiting his deposit, the provision of single-member constituencies and other devices well-known to political scientists are available to pursue this objective.

Constitutionalism. When the constitution of October 1956 was suspended in 1963, the GVN was left without any basis in fundamental law. Long before the suspension, however, the arbitrary and authoritarian manner in which the government was conducted had reduced the constitutional system to a mere facade. This debasement was not simply a consequence of President Diem's mandarin style of governing but, more fundamentally, of his oft-expressed conviction (shared by many Americans) that developing countries need authoritarian rule. Perhaps more than any other single factor, this misconception of the basic requirement for nation building led to the downfall of the Diem regime and contributed to the grave handicaps the GVN has encountered in enlisting public support to meet the insurgency threat. The arbitrary exercise of power, frequent recourse to extra-constitutional methods and circumvention of constitutional limitations lead not to strong government but, ultimately, to weak government, for the authoritarian or totalitarian government not only cuts itself off from

constructive criticism and two-way communication with its people, but also fails to mobilize the energies of the nation.

In SVN, not only has the government traditionally not represented the people but its administration of programs has also suffered from the arbitrary and overbearing style of executive and bureaucratic behavior resulting from nonconstitutional norms. Diem's overthrow has added further instability and insecurity to the problem. Return to constitutionalism appears essential, if only to that of the October 1956 situation; for the government established by that constitution was reasonably well structured to meet the needs of today. What it lacked was accomplishment in spirit as well as form.

The direct exercise of political power by the military or police is not compatible with long-range stability. In some Latin American countries, perhaps elsewhere, with long traditions of rule by the armed forces, military intervention in politics may be the "least worst" form of authoritarianism. In SVN, this is not likely to be the long-run case. In the foreseeable future, however, the military must play an important role. They are one of the few groups with a genuinely national outlook and are modern-minded for the most part. Moreover, with the weak threads of legitimacy of civil government broken by Diem's overthrow, they are a political force in their own right. Until political life slowly revives as autonomous groups grow in strength and coalesce into interest groups and parties, until the older generation's factionalism is replaced by the younger element's focusing on the nation's modernization, the military will have to play a prominent role -- either as the wielder of executive power directly, or as supporters of civilian leaders who are only partially independent. The long-run prospects for stability will be advanced as the military men fade into a background and supportive role, gradually extricating themselves from the political (though not necessarily from the administrative) process. Perhaps the way in which President Ayub withdrew the Pakistani armed forces from politics after the 1958 coup affords a precedent to the GVN military leaders.

Whatever the constitutional forms, it is important that there be broad representation of the varied interests in the country, and that government not only be for the people, but also of and by the people. Representatives can in part be assured by bringing various interests into an appointive house in the legislature or into positions of executive and bureaucratic responsibility. But it can best be assured by elections which, provided they are reasonably free, are the proven form of on-the-job training in responsible government. If a government is forced to seek popular approval by articulating and defending its program, and opposition elements are forced to devise sensible alternatives and to critique the government's performance in

a constructive manner during an election campaign, the prospects for stability are strengthened -- even if the elections are only local or provincial.

There have been no genuinely free, nation-wide elections in SVN to date, and it is unreasonable to expect them in the near future. It is not unreasonable, however, to expect local, municipal and provincial elections periodically in areas where the VC are incapable of seriously disrupting the electoral process. One recent bit of evidence of popular demand for elections was the request by representatives of 37 provincial and municipal councils (when they met in Saigon last October) that the government "prepare for the election of a National Assembly."

The need expressed here and in preceding paragraphs is not for liberal democracy, however desirable that goal in American terms, but for representative, constitutional government.

Governmental Structure. The present rickety structure in SVN must be replaced by something more durable. Western-style parliamentary forms are not the answer, for they are not suited to the present situation, nor even to the situation which is likely to emerge when major hostilities are terminated. As Solon observed, "No more good must be attempted than the nation can bear."

The architects of the new constitutional order in SVN need to be both imaginative and practical. The system they devise should provide a voice for all the main political factions but should not make strong government impossible thereby. Until the maturation of political life discussed earlier occurs, the system should create a structure within which the military can legitimately exercise authority or leadership. A number of constitutional precedents are available: the Pakistani system of a strong executive and three-tiered legislative representation with direct election only at the lowest tier; the dyarchical system of the 1919 Government of India Act which provided for election of part of the legislature and appointment of another part and which reserved some key areas of governmental responsibility for the executive's prerogative rather than legislative action; and, the dominant presidency system of the French Fifth Republic. Political inventiveness will not result in a trouble-free mechanism. The violence of the recent Philippine elections is one indicator of the turbulence ahead for the GVN, which is neither so well situated currently nor so soundly based historically as the Republic of the Philippines.

While it is important that the constitutional order give the executive a powerful position, safeguards must also be built into the system to avoid the executive's usurping the legislature's functions.

Vietnam's recent history further indicates the importance of also safeguarding judicial independence. Although the constitutional distribution of governmental powers among those three branches will be modified in practice, brakes should be built into the system to limit overly rapid or drastic modifications. Thus, the executive's right to appeal directly to the people in plebiscites should be carefully circumscribed, the executive could be given qualified veto power, full publicity should be given to legislative deliberations, provision for impeachment of officials should be made.

Although the stability model provides no guidance on appropriate vertical power distribution (whether federal or unitary states tend to be more stable), the unique situation in SVN requires the constitutional architects to face up to the question of decentralization. With some provinces comparatively peaceful, others confronting serious insurgency and some the scene of major conventional warfare, it is clear that not all parts of the country can or should be governed alike. The bureaucratic decentralization which, as a minimum, this situation calls for, has the further merits that it brings a larger number of officials into responsible positions and that it will permit government in the provinces to go forward even if there is continued turbulence at the central government level. Apart from the question of decentralization to the province level, there should be an intermediate level of administration between Saigon and the provinces, as American advisors have repeatedly pointed out (and as the situation itself has apparently necessitated with the Army corps increasingly being used to coordinate rural development efforts in the various division sectors and provinces).

Other Modernization Needs. Developing the appropriate political environment in the capital and other urban areas and recasting the machinery at the higher levels of government are vital but do not exhaust the dimensions of the modernization process. A necessary condition for the requirement of effective government is a professionalized civil service and military officer corps. An essential characteristic of every profession is a sense of social responsibility to its society which furnishes the motive to perform the functions required by society. At present, neither the civil service nor the officer corps in SVN are professionalized in this sense. The professionalization of the civil service will serve to reduce the corruption and graft which pervades the structure of government. This results not only in misallocation of resources but, perhaps more importantly, makes it more difficult to obtain the commitment of the people to the GVN. The professionalization of the army is necessary if, in the short run, divisive struggles for political power are to be reduced. In the long run, the military must become professionalized if they are to withdraw from politics and become politically inactive.

Economic development and political modernization at lower levels are also necessary ingredients of the nation building task. If efforts to develop the economy of SVN were earlier cast into too long-range terms for a nation combating a serious insurgency, they are now in danger of being defined too narrowly. Although, under current circumstances, in some areas there is no alternative to short-range and locally oriented programs, attention should continue to be given to comprehensive, long-range development. Military imperatives should not override economic ones without an exploration of alternative military methods in light of their economic consequences. The nature and speed of the logistical build-up for American forces, for example, might be handled differently -- and the competition for resources with the Vietnamese economy influenced accordingly -- if the developmental impact of inflation were weighed under various types of military action.

Economic gains in the first half-dozen years of Diem's rule represented a rate of economic development which would probably be satisfactory if it could be resumed. But, assuming some growth in output, the rate of development may not be as important as the distribution of its benefits. In light of doubts about the adequacy of land reform (on which we admit some confusion) and of the unreliability of detailed economic statistics, it is not clear whether distribution of the fruits of development was adequate in earlier periods or not. It is clear, however, that care must be taken on this point in the future; for, whatever distortions were in the system earlier have probably been increased by the economic turmoil inevitably growing out of current large-scale hostilities.

While the GVN must keep its overall economic development goals before it and choose, whenever possible, military courses which do not jeopardize those goals unnecessarily, it has the more immediate task of ensuring all its people the essentials of life during the current struggle. Toward that end, and toward the developmental end too, efforts should concentrate on maximizing food production in the countryside. Production (and movement of the produce to market) in turn depends on security, bringing us full cycle to the insecurity in the countryside which has produced the current economic crisis.

The most promising way of breaking out of this vicious circle is through a localized strategic hamlet-like approach. The hamlet program was and is essentially sound in concept, though it was overextended and oversold in earlier practice. Its implementation was pushed too hurriedly and was especially inept in the political, economic and social spheres. Furthermore, its progress was not adequately correlated with the military effort, with the result that the fundamental promise of security to the peasants was not fulfilled. The military effort for a new program must, however, avoid the development of a watchtower

complex. Strategic hamlets or their equivalent in a new program could be liabilities rather than assets if they result in the commitment of large forces for static defensive use. But the basic approach is a sound one, for it not only contributes to development and security but it also politicizes the countryside and mobilizes it for the nation building task. Youth, women's groups, veterans and other local elements can be made participants in the modernization process through a carefully designed, hamlet-oriented, community development program. This kind of program will take years to come to full fruition, not only because implementation cannot really begin in areas of heavy fighting but also because the nation building process is not architectural but biological in nature. The organic quality of modernization precludes its being telescoped into arbitrarily defined brief periods.

In areas of comparative quiet, the hamlet approach should be pursued vigorously but patiently. The GVN cannot wait upon nationwide peace to start again on a program, which like the war itself is localized or regional in nature. Thus, in the Mekong Delta, the Vietnamese now seem able to handle the military situation by themselves (i.e., without US troops). They face largely local VC whose distance from the Ho Chi Minh trail makes difficult large-scale resupply and reinforcements. The terrain is generally less favorable to movement of large guerrilla units. The nature of both the economy and the population offers somewhat more fertile ground for encouragement of VC defection, certainly more than among the hard-core VC (Northerners and re-infiltrated Southerners) fighting north of Saigon. Consequently, the Delta seems to offer the best current prospect of seizing the psychological and political, as well as the military, initiative by demonstrating that the Vietnamese themselves can handle local communist insurgency without US troops, and by restoring to GVN control the most economically productive part of the country.

Any significant successes in the Delta -- either military or political -- should be consolidated thoroughly and then propagandized heavily. This would encourage the GVN's "nationalist" image and highlight the great difference between the Delta and those areas where massive outside intervention is required (e.g., the Central Highlands) solely because of escalated aggression from the North.

An additional opportunity for the GVN to seize the initiative and commence a program of "political enculturation" and integration is posed by the large and constantly increasing number of refugees. As a large number of these refugees appear to be fleeing from VC-controlled areas, unaffected previously by the government's influence, this situation could reap considerable dividends. Conversely, the situation presents the possibility of another great failure if the government is unable to mobilize itself sufficiently to deal with the problem.

Recommended American Policies

Integration. American policy should proceed from an understanding that there are three main forces operating in Vietnam, forces which are generally present in the less developed areas in varying degrees of strength and intensity. These are nationalism, social revolution and communism. By the time the US arrived on the scene in a major way in 1954, the French had to a considerable degree delivered the nationalist and social revolution causes into the hands of the Communists. It has been a massive, uphill struggle ever since, and will continue to be for many years, to reverse this terrible blunder. If this is to be accomplished, the Southern government must show that it is at least as nationalist as the Northern government and that it is independent of the Americans. It should also trumpet the essential dependence of the North Vietnamese on Red China.

The question of whether the US should favor a unified Vietnam is importantly connected with the question of the GVN's nationalist image. A unified Vietnam should theoretically pose a stronger barrier to Chinese expansionism to the South than a bifurcated Vietnam. But, in view of the fact that for the foreseeable future there will be a centralized communist government in the North, it is clear that a unified Vietnam in the near or middle-run future would be communist-dominated. Although a unified communist Vietnam would undoubtedly continue to be anti-Chinese to some degree (perhaps the analogy of Titoism is relevant), it is questionable whether such a government could resist Chinese domination over the long run. Moreover, because of the expansionist nature of communist regimes per se and because of the centuries-old colonialist drive of the Vietnamese people themselves, such a unified strengthened Vietnam would be a major threat to its lesser neighbors. Only the arrival of European colonialists in the 19th century prevented the Vietnamese from taking over Cambodia and much of Laos long ago. Sihanouk's behavior in recent years is largely traceable to continuing Cambodian concern. He has told visitors that Cambodia does not fear the Chinese dragon, but the Vietnamese lizard. "We are only insects," said Sihanouk, "and dragons don't eat insects while lizards do."

If there were strong popular demands for unification among Southerners, perhaps the US would have to adjust accordingly; but the tension between Northerners and Southerners (and of each with the central Vietnamese or Annamese) is of sufficient intensity that few Southerners now give more than lip service to the ideal of unification. Even the million-plus refugees from the North do not press for unification with their homeland, for they are aware of the dangers of communist domination of a unified country. As far as possible, the US should not commit

itself on the unification problem, addressing itself instead to encouraging cohesion and a growing sense of nationhood among the people of SVN. The US approach on North-South unification should be one of political cooperation, extending perhaps to confederation, but not to political integration. Another approach might be a SEA or Mekong States "customs union and area of political cooperation." Both of these general approaches offer NVN an alternative to Red China's arms. Coexistence of South and North is inevitable in some form; but, coalition between the halves is a no more acceptable outcome than is coalition between non-Communists and the NLF within a Southern government.

There is little the US can do beyond encouragement and warning to help the South Vietnamese proceed with the task of national integration. Among the pitfalls we should avoid is the temptation to favor, or even the appearance of favoring, any particular group (e.g., the Montagnards) with whom we have developed special relationships. Another prime pitfall on the integration path is the problem of re-integrating elements of the NLF and VC into national life. If the GVN is to have a reasonable chance of evolving satisfactorily once the conventional warfare phase of the current struggle ends, it is important that whatever negotiations or understandings take place in terminating the hostilities do not provide the NLF or VC an institutional, or territorial, base within SVN. Individual VC or NLF members, even leaders, can be restored to full civil rights and participate in the political process accordingly, but the demand for a role in the government or other special place for the NLF as an institution should be resisted by the US as well as the GVN.

A key element in both pacification and nation building programs is the need to devise measures which will separate the peripheral, nationalist-oriented people from the hard core communist and North Vietnamese elements within the NLF and VC. In addition to stressing its own nationalist appeal, the GVN must provide an attractive option to defectors and ralliers to include a full pardon, restoration of civil rights, funds to resettle and restart life in the South and perhaps employment or land holding rights. The US can play a major role in helping the GVN with this aspect of its problem. We have the psychological warfare capacity, the resources to underwrite the program of resettlement and the military advisors with the ARVN units to help sell and execute the program in the field.

Wide Participation. Again, the US can play but a relatively small direct role in helping the GVN to generate an environment of political participation and implementing party and governmental structures. We can give technical assistance in the form of advisors to the drafters of the constitution and we can provide counterpart help from non-partisan political organizations in the US such as the League of Women Voters.

Although the US Government is probably not the proper channel, we can also help with the creation of a free, responsible press. Perhaps the American communications media should assist with this project; or, alternatively, US private foundations might undertake a program of technical and financial support of selected portions of the Vietnamese press.

Constitutionalism. Our role could be crucial with respect to the type of government which emerges in SVN if we ignore the imperatives of representative, constitutional government and favor authoritarian arrangements "while the emergency lasts." The emergency will last not only until Hanoi ceases its aggression but also as long as the GVN offers its own people repression instead of representation. In this connection, the US must avoid measuring the people, parties or governments in South Vietnam in terms of the degree of anti-communist fervor or anti-North Vietnamese attitude which they display. In particular, we should not view any opposition to the GVN as necessarily pro-communist. If the GVN further polarizes the country into anti-Communists and Communists (which was to a considerable extent what Diem was embarked upon), it may lose a considerable part of the excluded middle, namely, the large part of the population which is passively non-communist. This "middle," which may make up as much as 70-80 percent of the people, must be brought into the political dialogue and the nation building task. Despite the fact that direction, supply and key cadre for the insurgency are provided to the VC by Hanoi, we should keep it clear in our own programs that a substantial proportion of the VC are in fact South Vietnamese.

The extent of the involvement of the indigenous population in the insurgency has been underestimated by the US Government in the past, and we should face up to the implications. The GVN is now not simply faced with the task of defending the status quo, but to a marked degree is in the position of an insurgent force attempting to upset the status quo in those areas where the VC have control, in effect, as the incumbent government. It is one thing to make a statement for public consumption to the effect that "above all, war in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government,"^{3:1/} and another to act on the basis that it is not at all an indigenous rebellion. There is a particular danger that the use of military force to achieve short-run gains may make a long-term solution impossible if the uncommitted middle of the population is alienated from the government in the process. Lip service to the principle of the use of military means proportionate to the ends is easy. In practice, however, military force tends to develop its own momentum with the danger of the means dominating the ends. This danger is increased if the war is seen to be simply one where the "aggression is as real as that of an invading army,"^{3:1/} for in this event the people would be expected to rally around the government regardless of the nature and impact of military operations.

Modernization Needs. Helping the GVN progress in the developmental and modernization effort is also to be approached with caution. Nationalism and the necessity to strengthen the GVN's nationalist appeal are heavily involved. The GVN must show that it is as devoted to political and economic modernization and the consequent improvement of the citizens' lot, as is the North, and that Vietnamese, not Americans, are in charge of the program. In the context of the current insurgency, the competition in SVN with regard to social revolution is more between the GVN and the NLF-VC than between the GVN and DRV.

The US must be prepared to work patiently, and imaginatively, with the GVN to encourage and prod it to advance the economic and social revolution and to thereby dim the VC appeal. The US must, however, avoid too frequent or public confrontations with its ally which would dim its independent, nationalist image. Our leverage is limited, despite our enormous commitment, for we can generally ill afford to force issues or secure fulcrums which will permit us to gain an advantage through pushing the other side. "Leverage" in this sense can occasionally be brought to bear on a critical issue, but it is not an appropriate basis for day-to-day relationships across the spectrum of problems we are working upon together. We can best get the South Vietnamese to work with us by persuasion based on confidence in us as individual advisors, in the wisdom of our national policy and in our trustworthiness in following through on our undertakings. We have to depend on a stock of good will accrued through working together toward common objectives when we ask the Vietnamese to do something that they do not see as necessary. When pressure is applied to the other government it should be as low key as possible.

The US must also realize that it too has occasionally made mistakes, given bad advice and made unrealistic promises in Vietnam. Americans -- both military and civilian -- must avoid pressing limited Vietnamese managerial and technical resources beyond their capabilities and into programs which the Vietnamese themselves may well consider marginal to the war effort. American bureaucratic requirements should not be allowed to overburden the Vietnamese but should be fitted to Vietnamese capabilities rather than vice versa. Additionally, US personnel must be careful not to raise Vietnamese hopes by promises they cannot fulfill; this is particularly true in the technical field, where the American record is a justifiably proud, but not an entirely perfect, one. Influence must be sought, and pressed hard when necessary; but we must also remember that bad advice is like bad money -- it cheapens and drives out the good -- or, alternatively, that advice is like electric power -- too much will burn out the circuits.4/

In addition to the generalized contributions described in preceding paragraphs, the US can provide essential assistance to the

strategic hamlet or, otherwise named, pacification program on whose success the fate of SVN ultimately rests. Our participation in this process should rest on a clear understanding of its interdisciplinary nature; projects must be designed and phased in light of the necessity to carry forward in a number of areas simultaneously rather than serially. In this connection, it is particularly important not to assign a priority to one part of the task such as creating conditions of local security to the even temporary neglect of concomitant tasks. Counterinsurgency war is total war in societal terms. The program applications of these generalizations are manifold: political, economic and social programs must be kept in mesh with military programs and the whole carefully consolidated in one area before moving on to other areas; in general, no effort should be made to pacify an area with military forces unless the area can be developed politically and economically by simultaneously executed programs; conversely, money should generally not be invested in political, economic and other nation building activities in an area unless the physical security of the area can simultaneously be achieved.

It may be useful to think of the appropriate American role in the nation building phase of the struggle in SVN in terms of medical analogies. This kind of reasoning is applicable because a society is an organism with its own unique drives, needs, interaction of constituent elements and balancing, regulatory, and protective mechanisms. Insurgency is an infection which, once it has proceeded to any substantial degree, must be dealt with by antibodies and not amputation. The people of SVN must themselves provide the antibodies to cure the infection. The US can help with local surgery or intravenous feeding; it can perhaps be introduced in crisis situations as a sort of antibiotic, but the side effects on the organism as a whole of such intervention are likely to be deleterious unless the infection has been diagnosed accurately and the appropriate kind and amount of dosage calculated very carefully.

In view of the organic nature of the nation building process and the necessity for simultaneous programs, priority should be given to converting "gray" areas into "white" areas rather than "black" to "gray" areas. Because of the demonstration effect, particularly in areas such as the Delta where the GVN versus VC scales may frequently be delicately balanced, such a concentration policy may also pay dividends through black areas turning gray even without counterinsurgency actions in those areas.

In organizing the American contributions to these programs, prime attention should be paid to flexibility and adaptability to meet local situations. We should decentralize our operations. Since counterinsurgency programs are not hardware-oriented but people-oriented, it is not critical that they be tied closely to budgetary and programing controls; rather, they should focus on getting the man on the spot the means to

meet rapidly changing situations. Procedures have to be carefully refined in the area where the counterinsurgency responsibilities of differing American agencies are involved, for example, the Public Safety Program of AID and the military programs of DOD. Each of these agencies must give its field people a maximum degree of flexibility within mutually agreed guidelines and then encourage the utmost cooperation in the field.

The very scale of US current and projected involvement in SVN raises a threat to a viable Vietnamese-generated political order. Once the large conventional battle phase of the fighting is behind us, or even before, there is danger that we will overapply our massive resources. If the US were to keep, for example, 200,000 or even less troops in the countryside for a protracted period to help the South Vietnamese deal with insurgents and renewed PAVN attacks, the temptation for it to intervene in various ways and to substitute its judgments and actions for those of the Vietnamese would be very great. The US should carefully limit its forces and missions to fighting and dispersing communist forces and resist all temptations to enter into the military government business. It should not only avoid taking over the war in its current conventional fighting phase, but should also be careful not to dominate or monopolize the civic action field. This should not preclude our using our massive resources to rebuild war-shattered areas. But, as we go beyond the task of fighting conventional forces or guerrillas, we risk discouraging local initiative, subverting the GVN's nationalist image and leading both ourselves and ARVN into mishandling what will become an increasingly difficult internal political problem of nation building.

In furtherance of this general idea of limiting and tailoring our effort, it is also essential to fight the pacification battle, both conventionally and unconventionally, in such a way as to minimize the chances of driving further South Vietnamese into the VC ranks and in a manner calculated to maximize the prospect of dividing the VC and NLF among themselves. This consideration, which is one aspect of the general principle that the method of fighting in the current phase should not foreclose desirable options in the next phase of the struggle, further emphasizes the importance of "staying" in and consolidating cleared areas. It also calls for minimizing air and artillery operations which are not in immediate support of an actual tactical operation.

Conclusion

This paper has summarized one method of identifying -- and has identified -- the political environment and governmental processes and

structures already shown to be conducive, in a number of societies, to the development of a stable and modern society. It has compared the GVN with a "model" resulting from interdisciplinary study of a wide variety of characteristics common, in varying degrees, to such a stable, modernizing society. Application of the generalized concepts developed in this paper to the particular situation at some particular future time in SVN lies beyond the assumed purview of its authors. Indeed, we believe that further detailed analyses are needed in a number of problem areas before realistic specific programs can be drawn up.

Although the model has pointed up several general policy directions in which the Vietnamese should be moving (and the US should be urging them to move), we have not prescribed the precise timing and route of movement all the way to the goal.^{5/} This is partly because we do not pretend to be "social engineers" and partly because the model we have used is a generalized one which takes no account of the fact that SVN is confronting a major insurgency, aided and abetted by outsiders, as well as facing the normal problems of a developing nation. Short-term security and long-term stability considerations are intertwined and sometimes conflicting. It is important to realize, therefore, that the Vietnamese and ourselves face a task of unprecedented complexity and difficulty -- a task that will last years, or perhaps decades.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E

CROSS-POLITY SURVEY

The purpose of this paper is to explain a method of analyzing certain "objective" data regarding the problem of nation building. The data are derived from Banks and Textor's Cross-Polity Survey which is essentially a computer printout of geographic, economic, social and political data on 115 countries. The "raw characteristics" which are coded for each country range from land area, population, literacy rate and similar information to the political role of the police and other "facts" requiring judgments. These judgments rely heavily, both in terminology and concept, on the works of such political scientists as Almond, Coleman, Binder, Lerner and Easton. Appendix 2 contains a brief tabulation of the various characteristics and attributes which are considered in this paper. For a full understanding of the data the Cross-Polity Survey should be consulted. Appendix 3 explains the statistical methods behind the analysis.

The Cross-Polity Survey does not try to prove or disprove any theories. Rather, it presents a mass of data for the reader's further analysis. The authors determined 57 "raw characteristics" of a state and for each characteristic they established certain attributes to further define or quantify it. For example, raw characteristic 10, population growth rate,^{6/} contains three attributes: (1) high (2 percent or above); (2) low (less than 2 percent); and, (3) unascertained. In a similar manner, each of the 57 characteristics is coded with a variety of attributes for each of the 115 countries. The authors then compare characteristics and attributes in a variety of ways.

Our study is designed to examine certain characteristics and attributes which may be related to the problem of governmental stability. We decided to analyze those less developed countries which were clearly either stable or unstable. We also attached the proviso that these countries be non-communist. Upon examination, we found that there were 18 less developed countries in the world which can be called "stable" using the minimum criterion of "government generally stable since World War II."

We then found 22 less developed countries which were definitely unstable. The countries in these two categories are listed below.^{7/} None of the newer countries, particularly those in Africa, are included among the 40 countries in our analysis.

Although the data appear formidable, the scheme of analysis is quite simple. The essential feature is an analysis of the percentage

of countries which share a particular attribute. (We have included in our study only those characteristics and attributes which we deemed likely to be important for modernization and stability.) We first compute this percentage for all 40 countries combined. We then compute a separate percentage of the 18 countries in the stable sample which share the particular attribute and percentage of the 22 countries in the unstable sample which share the particular attribute. Next we compare these percentages of 18 and 22 with the percentage of the total sample to determine if there are statistically significant differences. For an example, turn to Appendix 2 and characteristic 54, "Political Participation by the Military." In the case of the first attribute, "interventive," the percentage of 18 stable countries which showed this type of military behavior was significantly less than the percentage of all 40 countries which showed this type of military behavior. Conversely, in the case of the third attribute, "neutral" (i.e., apolitical), the percentage of 18 stable countries showing this military behavior pattern was significantly greater than the percentage of all 40 countries showing it. Thus, political intervention by the military correlates significantly with political instability; politically neutral behavior by the military correlates significantly with stability. Appendix 2, which is a distillation of the computer printout, indicates the statistical significance or insignificance of all the relevant characteristics and attributes with regard to stability or instability.

The following countries are included in the study:

Countries Which are Stable:

Afghanistan	Malaya
Ghana	Mexico
Guinea	Morocco
India	Philippines
Ireland	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Tunisia
Japan	UAR
Liberia	Uruguay
Libya	Yugoslavia

Countries Which are Unstable:

Argentina	Jordan
Brazil	Korea Rep
Burma	Laos
Ceylon	Lebanon
Congo (Leo)	Nepal
Ecuador	Pakistan
El Salvador	Panama
Guatemala	Peru
Honduras	Sudan
Iran	Syria
Iraq	Venezuela

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B

CROSS-POLITY ANALYSIS

CHARACTERISTICS	STABLE	UNSTABLE	VIETNAM (Banks-Textor)	SVN (USMA)
5.(d) POPULATION GROWTH RATE - I 10(e)				
1. HIGH (2 PERCENT OR ABOVE)	X(b) 11(c)	X 18	1	2(f)
2. LOW (LESS THAN 2 PERCENT)	X 6	X 4		
11. STATUS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - I 16				
1. DEVELOPED (SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH; GNP PER CAPITA OVER \$600)	X 0	X 0		
2. INTERMEDIATE (SUSTAINED AND NEAR SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH)	GR(a) 5	X 2		
<p>NOTES: (a) GREATER THAN (GR) or LESS THAN (LE) refers to fact that, in sample of stable or unstable countries, the percentage of countries sharing the attribute is significantly (greater than) less than the percentage of all stable and unstable countries combined which share the particular attribute.</p> <p>(b) X's indicate either that there is no statistically significant relationship or that sample was too small to establish significance.</p> <p>(c) Figures in columns indicate number of countries which share the characteristic.</p> <p>(d) Numbers refer to Banks-Textor classification of raw characteristics.</p> <p>(e) Numbers refer to revised numbering of raw characteristics which is compatible with numbering in Appendix 3.</p> <p>(f) 2's indicate characteristics and attributes of SVN based upon analysis of three USMA specialists on the area.</p>				
3. UNDERDEVELOPED (REASONABLE PROSPECT OF ATTAINING SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH BY MID-70s)	X 4	X 5		2
4. VERY UNDERDEVELOPED (LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT OF ATTAINING SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH WITHIN FORESEEABLE FUTURE)	X 7	X 13	1	
13. DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - I 18				
1. COMPLETE (NO CENSORSHIP OR GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF EITHER DOMESTIC PRESS OR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS)	GR 7	X 2		
2. INTERMITTENT (OCCASIONAL OR SELECTIVE CENSORSHIP OF EITHER DOMESTIC PRESS OR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS)	X 4	X 8		
3. INTERNALLY ABSENT (STRICT DOMESTIC CENSORSHIP, NO RESTRAINT ON FOREIGN NEWSGATHERING, OR SELECTIVE CABLEHEAD CENSORSHIP)	X 4	X 6	1	2
4. INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY ABSENT (STRICT DIRECT OR INDIRECT CENSORSHIP OR CONTROL, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN)	X 3	X 1		
17. RACIAL HOMOGENEITY - I 22				
1. HOMOGENEOUS (90 PERCENT OR MORE OF ONE RACE)	GR 14	X 12		
2. HETEROGENEOUS (LESS THAN 90 PERCENT OF ONE RACE)	LE 3	X 9	1	2

<u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Tensor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
18. LINGUISTIC HOMOGENEITY - I 23				
1. HOMOGENEOUS (MAJORITY OF 85 PERCENT OR MORE. NO SIGNIFICANT SINGLE MINORITY).	X 8	X 8		
2. WEAKLY HETEROGENEOUS (MAJORITY OF 85 PERCENT OR MORE. SIGNIFICANT MINORITY OF 15 PERCENT OR LESS)	X 0	X 2	1	2
3. STRONGLY HETEROGENEOUS (NO SINGLE GROUP OF 85 PERCENT OR MORE)	X 10	X 12		
8. AMBIGUOUS				
23. POLITICAL MODERNIZATION PERIODIZATION - I 28				
1. ADVANCED (TRANSITIONAL PHASE COMPLETED)	X 11	X 11		
2. MID-TRANSITIONAL (ENTERED TRANSITIONAL PHASE PRIOR TO 1945)	LE 1	X 6		
3. EARLY TRANSITIONAL (ENTERED TRANSITIONAL PHASE 1945 OR LATER)	X 3	X 5	1	2
4. PRE-TRANSITIONAL (NOT YET IN TRANSITIONAL PHASE)	X 1	X 0		
24. IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION - I 29				
1. DOCTRINAL	X 1	X 0		
2. DEVELOPMENTAL	GR 6	X 3		
3. SITUATIONAL	LE 0	X 4		
4. CONVENTIONAL	X 5	X 3		
5. TRADITIONAL	X 2	X 1		
8. AMBIGUOUS		9	1	2
26. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CURRENT REGIME - I 31				
1. CONSTITUTIONAL (GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED WITH REFERENCE TO RECOGNIZED CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS)	GR 11	X 7		
2. AUTHORITARIAN (NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION, OR FAIRLY REGULAR RECOURSE TO EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS. ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF POWER CONFINED LARGELY TO THE POLITICAL SECTOR)	X 6	X 9		2
3. TOTALITARIAN (NO EFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION. BROAD EXERCISE OF POWER BY THE REGIME IN BOTH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SPHERES)	X 1	X 0		
7. UNASCERTAINABLE			1	

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Textor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
27. GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY - I 32				
1. GOVERNMENT GENERALLY STABLE SINCE WORLD WAR I OR MAJOR INTER-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE	4*	0*		
2. GOVERNMENT GENERALLY STABLE SINCE WORLD WAR II OR POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE	14*	0*		
3. GOVERNMENT MODERATELY STABLE SINCE WORLD WAR II OR MAJOR POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE	**	**	1	
4. GOVERNMENT UNSTABLE SINCE WORLD WAR II OR MAJOR POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE.	0	22*		2
28. REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF CURRENT REGIME - I 33				
1. POLYARCHIC (BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM)	GR 10	LE 3		
2. LIMITED POLYARCHIC (MASS-SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE OR BROADLY OLIGARCHIC SYSTEM)	X 1	X 3		
3. PSEUDO-POLYARCHIC (INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE, OR DISGUISED OLIGARCHIC OR AUTOCRATIC SYSTEM)	X 5	X 4	1	
NOTES: * DENOTES "COUNTRIES" ** DENOTES "EXCLUDED"				
4. NON-POLYARCHIC (NON-REPRESENTATIVE IN FORM AS WELL AS CONTENT)	X 1	X 4		2
7. UNASCERTAINABLE		6		
8. AMBIGUOUS		2		
29. CURRENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM - I 34				
1. COMPETITIVE (NO PARTY BAN, OR BAN ON EXTREMIST OR EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES ONLY)	X 7	X 7		
2. PARTIALLY COMPETITIVE (ONE PARTY WITH 85 PERCENT OR MORE OF LEGISLATIVE SEATS)	X 0	X 0		
3. NON-COMPETITIVE (SINGLE-LIST VOTING OR NO ELECTED OPPOSITION)	GR 5	X 1	1	
7. UNASCERTAINABLE	2	10		2
8. AMBIGUOUS	1			
30. DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF GROUP OPPOSITION - I 35				
1. AUTONOMOUS GROUPS FREE TO ENTER POLITICS AND ABLE TO OPPOSE GOVERNMENT (SAVE FOR EXTREMIST GROUPS, WHERE BANNED)	X 7	X 8		
2. AUTONOMOUS GROUPS FREE TO ORGANIZE IN POLITICS, BUT LIMITED IN CAPACITY TO OPPOSE GOVERNMENT (INCLUDES ABSORPTION OF POTENTIAL OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP INTO GOVERNMENT)	X 4	X 2		

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Tantor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
3. AUTONOMOUS GROUPS TOLERATED INFORMALLY AND OUTSIDE POLITICS	GR 7	X 2	1	2
4. NO GENUINELY AUTONOMOUS GROUPS TOLERATED				
31. POLITICAL ENCULTURATION - I 36				
1. HIGH (INTEGRATED AND HOMOGENEOUS POLITY WITH LITTLE OR NO EXTREME OPPOSITION, COMMUNALISM, FRAC- TIONALISM, DISENFRANCHISEMENT, OR POLITICAL NON-ASSIMILATION)	X 2	X 0		
2. MEDIUM (LESS FULLY INTEGRATED POLITY WITH SIGNIFICANT MINORITY IN EXTREME OPPOSITION, COMMUNA- LIZED, FRACTIONALIZED, DISENFRAN- CHISED, OR POLITICALLY NON- ASSIMILATED)	GR 10	X 5		
3. LOW (RELATIVELY NON-INTEGRATED OR RESTRICTIVE POLITY WITH MA- JORITY OR NEAR MAJORITY IN EX- TREME OPPOSITION, COMMUNALIZED, FRACTIONALIZED, DISENFRANCHISED, OR POLITICALLY NON-ASSIMILATED)	LE 4	GR 17	1	2
9. UNASCERTAINED	2			
34. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY INSTITUTIONAL GROUPS - I 39				
1. VERY SIGNIFICANT	X 6	X 12	1	2
2. SIGNIFICANT	X 9	X 10		
3. MODERATE	X 3	X 0		
4. LIMITED	X 0	X 0		
36. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY ANOMIC GROUPS - I 41				
1. FREQUENT	LE 0	GR 9	1	2
2. OCCASIONAL	X 10	X 11		
3. INFREQUENT	GR 7	LE 10		
4. VERY INFREQUENT	X 7	X 0		
7. UNASCERTAINABLE				
8. AMBIGUOUS				
37. INTEREST ARTICULATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES - I 42				
1. SIGNIFICANT	LE 1	X 7		
2. MODERATE	X 1	X 6		
3. LIMITED	X 0	X 0		
4. NEGLIGIBLE	GR 7	LE 0	1	2
7. UNASCERTAINABLE		8		

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Textor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
8. AMBIGUOUS				
0. IRRELEVANT				
38. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES - I 43				
1. SIGNIFICANT	GR 4	X 0		
2. MODERATE	GR 6	X 1		
3. LIMITED	LE 0	X 4		
4. NEGLIGIBLE	LE 1	X 5	1	2
39. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY EXECUTIVE - I 44				
1. SIGNIFICANT	GR 9	LE 1		
2. MODERATE	X 3	X 0		
3. LIMITED	X 3	X 8		
4. NEGLIGIBLE	X 2	X 3	1	2
7. UNASCERTAINABLE		8		
40. INTEREST AGGREGATION BY LEGISLATURE - I 45				
1. SIGNIFICANT	X 3	X 0		
2. MODERATE	X 3	X 1		
3. LIMITED	LE 1	X 7		
4. NEGLIGIBLE	X 8	X 6	1	
7. UNASCERTAINABLE				
8. UNASCERTAINED				
0. IRRELEVANT				2
41. PARTY SYSTEM. QUANTITATIVE - I 46				
1. ONE-PARTY (ALL OTHERS NON-EX- ISTENT, BANNED, NON-PARTICIPANT, OR ADJUNCTS OF DOMINANT PARTY IN ELECTORAL ACTIVITY: INCLUDES 'NATIONAL FRONTS' AND ONE-PARTY FUSIONAL SYSTEMS)	GR 6	LE 0		
2. ONE-PARTY DOMINANT (OPPOSITION, BUT NUMERICALLY INEFFECTIVE AT NATIONAL LEVEL. INCLUDES MIN- ORITY PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT WHILE RETAINING PARTY IDENTITY FOR ELECTORAL PURPOSES)	X 2	X 0	1	
3. ONE-AND-A-HALF PARTY (OPPOSITION SIGNIFICANT, BUT UNABLE TO WIN MAJORITY)	X 1	X 0		
4. TWO-PARTY OR EFFECTIVELY TWO- PARTY (REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PARTY ROTATION)	X 1	X 1		

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Textor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
5. MULTI-PARTY (COALITION OR MINORITY PARTY GOVERNMENT NORMALLY MANDATORY IF PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM)	LE 2	GR 12		
6. NO PARTIES, OR ALL PARTIES ILLEGAL OR INEFFECTIVE	X 3	X 0		2
43. STABILITY OF PARTY SYSTEM - I 48				
1. STABLE (ALL SIGNIFICANT PARTIES STABLE AND ORGANIZATIONALLY NON-SITUATIONAL)	GR 10	LE 0		
2. MODERATELY STABLE (RELATIVELY INFREQUENT OR NON-ABRUPT SYSTEM CHANGES, OR MIXED SITUATIONAL-PERMANENT PARTY COMPLEX)	X 2	X 0	1	
3. UNSTABLE (ALL PARTIES UNSTABLE, SITUATIONAL, PERSONALISTIC, OR 'AD HOC')	LE 0	GR 18		2
44. 'PERSONALISMO' - I 49				
1. PRONOUNCED (ALL PARTIES HIGHLY PERSONALISTIC OR FRACTIONALIZED ALONG PERSONALISTIC LINES)	LE 2	X 7		
2. MODERATE (SOME TENDENCY TOWARD PERSONALISM BY ALL PARTIES, OR MIXED PERSONALISTIC, NON-PERSONALISTIC PARTY COMPLEX)	X 3	X 5	1	2
3. NEGLIGIBLE (NO PARTIES WITH SIGNIFICANT PERSONALISTIC TENDENCIES)	GR 10	LE 1		
45. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP - I 50				
1. ELITIST (RECRUITMENT CONFINED TO A PARTICULAR RACIAL, SOCIAL, OR IDEOLOGICAL STRATUM)	X 4	X 6		
2. MODERATE ELITIST (RECRUITMENT LARGELY, BUT NOT WHOLLY, CONFINED TO A PARTICULAR RACIAL, SOCIAL, OR IDEOLOGICAL STRATUM)	X 5	X 4	1	2
3. NON-ELITIST (RECRUITMENT LARGELY ON THE BASIS OF ACHIEVEMENT CRITERIA ONLY)	GR 8	X 3		
7. UNASCERTAINED				
47. VERTICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION - I 52				
1. EFFECTIVE FEDERALISM	X 0	X 1		
2. LIMITED FEDERALISM (FEDERAL STRUCTURE WITH LIMITED SEPARATION OR PRONOUNCED CENTRALIST TENDENCIES)	X 2	X 3		
3. FORMAL FEDERALISM (FORMAL OR LIMITED FORMAL FEDERAL STRUCTURE ONLY)	X 3	X 1		
4. FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE UNITARISM	X 13	X 15	1	
7. UNASCERTAINABLE				2

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Textor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
48. HORIZONTAL POWER DISTRIBUTION - I 53				
1. SIGNIFICANT (EFFECTIVE ALLOCATION OF POWER TO FUNCTIONALLY AUTONOMOUS LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL ORGANS)	GR 7	LE 1		
2. LIMITED (ONE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT GENUINE FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY, OR TWO BRANCHES WITH LIMITED FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY)	X 3	X 7		
3. NEGLIGIBLE (COMPLETE DOMINANCE OF GOVERNMENT BY ONE BRANCH OR BY EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY)	X 8	X 6	1	2
50. CURRENT STATUS OF LEGISLATURE - I 55				
1. FULLY EFFECTIVE (PERFORMS NORMAL LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION AS REASONABLY 'CO-EQUAL' BRANCH OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT)	GR 7	LE 0		
2. PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE (TENDENCY TOWARD DOMINATION BY EXECUTIVE OR OTHERWISE PARTIALLY LIMITED IN EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION)	X 3	X 7		
3. LARGELY INEFFECTIVE (VIRTUALLY COMPLETE DOMINATION BY EXECUTIVE OR BY ONE PARTY OR DOMINANT PARTY ORGANIZATION)	X 2	X		
4. WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE (RESTRICTED TO CONSULTATIVE OR 'RUBBER STAMP' LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION)	X 5	X	1	2
7. UNASCERTAINABLE				
0. IRRELEVANT				
51. CHARACTER OF LEGISLATURE - I 56				
1. UNICAMERAL	X 4	X 7	1	
2. BICAMERAL	GR 12	X 9		
7. UNASCERTAINABLE	X 1	X		2
52. CURRENT STATUS OF EXECUTIVE - I 57				
1. DOMINANT	GR 11	LE 5	1	
2. STRONG	X 6	X 5		2
3. WEAK	X 1	X 0		
54. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION BY THE MILITARY - I 59				
1. INTERVENTIVE (PRESENTLY EXERCISES OR HAS RECENTLY EXERCISED DIRECT POWER)	LE 1	CR 12		2
2. SUPPORTIVE (PERFORMS PARA-POLITICAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF TRADITIONALIST, AUTHORITARIAN, TOTALITARIAN, OR MODERNIZING REGIME)	X 6	X 4	1	

<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>STABLE</u>	<u>UNSTABLE</u>	<u>VIETNAM</u> <u>(Banks-Tensor)</u>	<u>SVN</u> <u>(USMA)</u>
3. NEUTRAL (A-POLITICAL OR OF MINOR POLITICAL IMPORTANCE)	GR 11	LE 1		
55. ROLE OF POLICE - I 60				
1. POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (IM- PORTANT CONTINUING OR INTERMITTENT POLITICAL FUNCTION IN ADDITION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT)	LE 9	X 17	1	2
2. NOT POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT (ROLE CONFINED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLY)	GR 8	LE 1		

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX E

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

1. The statistical analysis of the Banks and Textor Cross-Polity Survey presents serious conceptual problems. Ideally we would like to formulate hypotheses about characteristics and attributes which are determinants of stability. However, we must settle for less. Initially we attempted to use multiple regression analysis in the hope of building a model for stability. However, the fact that much of the data is in the form of discrete integers precluded obtaining meaningful results. Therefore we decided to use an analysis of proportions.

2. We first selected 18 non-Western countries which are stable as defined by characteristic 32, attributes 1 and 2, and 22 countries which are defined as unstable by characteristic 32, attribute 4. We then assumed that the combined stable and unstable samples constituted a population of 40 countries. With this assumption we were able to compute a population proportion, and a sample proportion for the stable and the unstable sample. We then compared the sample proportions with the population proportion to determine if there was a significant difference.

3. We assume that the two samples are two of the many samples which could be taken from the population. If these samples were random we would expect the sample proportions to be within a certain range of the population proportion. If the sample proportion does not fall within the appropriate range we conclude that the sample is not a random one and the particular attribute is significantly related to the manner in which we took the sample, i.e., stability or instability.

4. The calculations for significance follow:

$$\text{Theta}_p = \frac{\sqrt{1-f_s}}{s} \quad \frac{\sqrt{P_i(1-P_i)}}{n} \quad \text{where } P_i = \text{population percentage.}$$

n=number in sample.
1-f_s=approximate finite
population correction
factor.

$$Z = \frac{p - P_i}{\text{Theta}_p} \quad \text{where } p = \text{sample percentage.}$$

Z is tested using the one tailed normal distribution at the 97.5 percent level. It should be noted that the finite population correction factor was used in the calculation of Theta since both samples constitute a large proportion of the population which is itself finite.

5. The computer printout is a complete listing of all characteristics and attributes showing the number of countries with a particular attribute for both samples and the total, the proportion for the samples and the population, the difference between the sample proportions and the population proportion, Theta and Z.

6. The above method of calculation may be questioned on the grounds that for all values of n the normal distribution does not give a sufficiently close approximation and the expansion of the binomial should be used. Since the population proportion is known the probability distribution of all possible sample distributions is given by the binomial distribution and a more satisfactory test would be the use of the binomial. However, the smallest value of n is 22 and for values of p greater than .2 the normal distribution may be safely used. For smaller values of p in the unstable sample the binomial should be used.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E

NOTES

1. This study is the product of an ad-hoc committee of officers at the United States Military Academy. Its principal author is Colonel A. A. Jordan, Professor of Social Sciences, who is responsible for the final form and language in which it is cast. Other committee members were: Lt Col J. Buck, Mr. J. Rosenthal (FSO), Majors S. Sarkesian, M. Wier, O. Combs, R. Hobbs, A. Raymond and Captain J. Sewall of the Department of Social Sciences; Lt Col C. K. Nulsen, Jr., Department of Tactics; Lt Col P. F. Braim, Department of Military Art and Engineering.

2. The data for the model have been drawn from a massive "Cross-Polity Survey" which describes 115 states in terms of 57 "raw characteristics," which are, in turn, further broken down into 253 more refined characteristics. We have chosen as one sample 18 representative, non-Western, non-communist states which have been generally stable since World War II. For the other sample, we have selected 22 states which have had unstable governments since World War II or which have undergone major postwar constitutional changes. The newer African states have not been included in either sample on the ground that there is not yet sufficient information to classify them. See: Banks, Arthur S. and Textor, Robert B., A Cross-Polity Survey, Cambridge, 1963.

3. U. S. Department of State, Agression From the North, Publication 7839.

4. Care should be taken that current, reasonably effective programs are not untracked simply because they do not match with new programs. Where possible, existing programs should be modified or added to rather than new ones initiated, to avoid acting at cross purposes. In this regard, one useful approach might be to make the assumption that there are no new programs or ideas for Vietnam, only variations on old programs or already suggested ideas. Any new program should be researched thoroughly prior to implementation in order to learn what, if anything, is similar to that which has gone before and to profit as much as possible from the experience and information available from the past.

5. The fruitful execution of any set of policies and programs to achieve ends such as those suggested in this paper must be accompanied by a set of criteria forming the basis for judgment of the effectiveness of these policies and programs. Care must be taken in selecting

yardsticks to measure the progress of the military conflict and the nation building effort. It is indeed likely that specific programs may simultaneously promote the success of the military conflict and be deleterious to efforts directed toward nation building. In fact a major problem necessarily left unresolved in this study is that of relating operations concerned with the short-run insurgency problems to programs aimed at long-term development and stability. Measurements are needed for the trade-off between the two, but criteria in the past have been misleading. Even objective yardsticks, such as the number of people going to the polls, the number of acres of rice under production, numbers of KIA and captured weapons, must be approached with great caution. Such objective statistics may measure the wrong things -- or measure the right things wrongly. Subjective yardsticks, which are probably the only valid ones in the vital areas of psychological and political achievement, are even more susceptible to faulty interpretation and to abuse in their application. Most importantly, yardsticks must be interdisciplinary for counterinsurgency is an interdisciplinary matter. Success in one part, if out of phase with performance in other parts, may be useless or even harmful. We believe that the only successful yardstick of this nature is the analytical capability of an intelligent mind which understands the nature of revolutionary war and insurgency and which is trained in the range of means to defeat it.

6. For data processing convenience, the authors' original numbering of characteristics has been modified. For each characteristic listed in our paper, it is necessary to subtract 5 in order to be compatible with the original survey. Thus, our characteristic 10 is numbered characteristic 5 in the original survey.

7. The data shown in Appendix 2 give figures which often total less than the 18 and 22 figures due to the fact that for certain characteristics some countries are ambiguous or unascertainable.

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ANNEX F

TRACE OF US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES IN TIME

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ANNEX F

TRACE OF US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES IN TIME

The Issue of US Policy

"Our policy in Vietnam is the same as it was one year ago and, to those of you who have inquiries on the subject, it is the same as it was ten years ago. I have publicly stated it, I have reviewed it to the Congress in joint sessions, I have reviewed it in various messages to the Congress and I have talked individually with more than 500 of them stating the policy . . . and answering questions on that subject in the last 60 days. In addition, I have stated this policy to the press and to the public in almost every state in the Union. Specifically, last night I read where I made the policy statement 47 times."

The foregoing is integral to a major foreign policy statement of the President of the United States.^{1/} Critics of our posture or strategy in SVN claim that the US has no policy toward SVN; only a "sad melange of improvisations and stop-gap measures, frequently working at cross purposes and achieving no clearly defined objectives."^{2:249/} While the President maintains that our policy has been the same "for 10 years, under three presidents," others insist that "policy has been altered abruptly -- conflicting statements have been issued -- deeds have not matched words."^{3:4/} To arrive at the facts of this issue, one must understand the logic, the semantics and the political motivation of both sides.

Support for US Policy. Spokesmen who sustain the consistency of US policy visualize "policy" as a conceptual framework for guiding concrete actions toward accomplishing comprehensible goals. They maintain that US policy toward SVN -- as stated by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson -- has always centered on safeguarding the independence of South Vietnam from communist aggression and subversion. Various political and diplomatic techniques or tactics may be brought into play, depending on the circumstances, but these are only variations in method designed to more effectively pursue the central policy. Secretary of State Rusk summarized this position by stating:

"Look at all of it -- look at all of it taken together. That is the policy . . . How you feel you must act at a particular time and under particular circumstances under this policy and within that policy -- for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress -- depends

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upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to act to support the independence and safety of these countries of Southeast Asia. That is the policy."
4:155/

Criticism of US Policy. Critics who assert that US policy with respect to SVN has been inconsistent interpret "policy" more in terms of actions or tactics rather than as a broad conceptual framework of operations. According to this viewpoint, policy changed when: (1) the US altered its position regarding Diem; (2) US advisors became combatants; (3) the role of US aircraft changed from transportation and logistical support to combat support of GVN and US troops; (4) US troop units were committed to defend US installations, later to expand enclaves, then to provide a mobile reserve for ARVN and, finally, to find and destroy Viet Cong units; and, (5) US aircraft attacked NVN.

While many critics cite these as policy changes, Administration spokesmen deem them variations in the tactics of providing support for the same policy -- to provide such assistance as may be necessary to preserve the independence of South Vietnam.

The Issue of US Objectives

Perhaps the most confusing single aspect of our foreign policy centers on statements of objectives. Analysis of the statements of national objectives regarding South Vietnam -- as contained in documents of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the US Information Agency -- reveals both differing statements and interpretations. Some objectives are not only viewed differently but are conflicting (e.g., The Military Assistance Plan for 1966 indicates reunification of North and South Vietnam, by military force, as an objective) 5:A-1/

Late in January of 1966, members of the Congress expressed discomfiture with respect to official policy and objectives statements. This surfaced during the course of polling 35 Senators and 237 Representatives as to "The Way Congress Sizes Up The War" -- excerpts follow. 6:30/

-- "In general, it is my feeling that the Administration has failed adequately and clearly to communicate our nation's policy -- not only to other governments but also to our own citizens at home."

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-- "Certainly before we escalate the present conflict in Southeast Asia, we must redefine our national goals and responsibilities. The American people are confused on our progress in Vietnam. As Ambassador Goldberg confessed only the other day, there has developed a crisis of credibility. People do not know what to believe about what they hear from the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and from the multitude of public-relations and liaison assistants jumping back and forth between Saigon and Washington."

-- "We must define specifically our objectives in Vietnam and not talk in the glittering generality of 'negotiation' or 'win the war.'"

It appears virtually impossible to develop a listing of US objectives with respect to Vietnam that would be acceptable to all US departments and agencies. For example, the military establishment draws heavily from National Security Action Memorandum 288 for policy guidance. It carries Presidential approval and sets forth an "independent, non-communist South Vietnam" as an ultimate goal. Moreover, SVN "must be free ... to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security." Some members of the Vietnam Working Group at Department of State, during the research phase of PROVN (21 September 1965), had never heard of NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964. When made aware of its content, one group member explained that the "independent, non-communist South Vietnam" objective statement had long been superseded; it was no longer basic that SVN remain non-communist. The lack of an agreed, unequivocal statement of our fundamental objective with regard to SVN can but hamstring effective coordination and application of the US support effort.

Evaluation

The question of whether or not US policy toward Vietnam has been consistent is, in a large sense, academic. The argument can be sustained on either side simply by defining the word "policy." This controversy will continue, but it is not important. What is important is where it, regardless of definition, has led us; and, of even greater importance, where it is likely to lead us in the future.

The constraints of public opinion and the realities of American and international politics justify a degree of ambiguity and equivocation on the part of foreign policy spokesmen. However, unsubstantiated and short-haul optimism cannot successfully dominate or compete with realism and supportable facts forever.

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Many potential supporters of US policy, domestic and foreign, withhold commitment under such forms of obfuscation. Enthusiastic public support stems from a policy framework that is understandable and squares with the known facts of a given situation. Even seasoned political analysts manifest serious difficulty in understanding how the policy-objectives-situational matrix is formed with respect to SVN.

The situation in SVN is serious. US national interests are at stake. Nevertheless, as our troop commitments escalate, our enunciated objectives appear to de-escalate. With a 16,000-man advisory and support effort committed to SVN in 1963, our objective was "achieving victory," with nearly 200,000 US troops committed to the area in division and brigade configuration during 1965, our objective under increasing domestic and world pressures for peace appears to be eroding to something less than achieving the enunciated 1963 "victory."

Conclusions

The US must determine and label who its real enemy is. The Vice-Premier and Minister of Defense for Communist China has announced Peking's strategic design for world audition. Founded on the belief that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Red Chinese strategy hinges on winning the "rural areas of the world" -- Asia, Africa and Latin America. After such areas are conquered through "wars of national liberation," the cities of the world (the United States and its Western allies) will be encircled and will be finally and decisively defeated. While this announcement of intent has its doctrinaire trappings, the meaning is unambiguous and unequivocal. The muscle to execute this plan commits nearly 700 million "collectivized" Chinese, an active duty military force of approximately 4 million men and an embryonic nuclear capability. Clearly, Communist China poses a threat to US national interests of far greater consequence than do the Viet Cong and PAVN forces operating in SVN today. Consequently, US strategic attention with respect to Asia should rivet on Red China; Vietnam requires massive tactical attention.

US objective statements should exclude any reference to negotiations as a meaningful goal for achievement in any crisis situation; above all, the Geneva Accords should not be cited as a basis for peace or stability in Southeast Asia. There is nothing to negotiate except, perhaps, termination of US bombing inside NVN. The Geneva Accords are unrealistic.

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After a detailed analysis of Geneva, one authoritative Southeast Asian analyst summarized his findings as follows:

"The Geneva Agreements were thus inept, hopelessly ensnared in a mess of irresolution, ill-defined, with no policeman capable of handling any but the most unimportant complaints and minor violations. To go back to their essentials or their specifications is to go back to a political scene helpful only in advancing the Communist cause of warfare at the lower end of the spectrum: infiltration, subversion, guerrilla activity -- the so-called 'wars of national liberation'."9:7/

Each of our past four Administrations has broadened and deepened American involvement in SEA. All have contributed constructively and creatively to the formulation of policy toward Vietnam. Nevertheless, and on balance, their actions have appeared reticent and restrained. An unwillingness to go the whole way, to make the decisive commitment and to carry the public with them characterizes the trace of policy and action in time. Consequently, US policy with respect to this region has lacked the dynamism, coupled with a sense of urgency and crisis, commensurate with the seriousness of the Communist challenge.

Upon completion of its analysis, PROVN contends that reticence and uncertainty should be replaced by dedication to purpose, total commitment and conviction. The task ahead in SEA must be viewed in its long-term context, and soon, at highest national levels. The statement of US national objectives in terms essentially defensive or negative will not suffice. The need is for more than something to fight against. "Defeat of the Viet Cong" should be established clearly within an intermediate military objective context. President Johnson has emphasized this concept:

"It is not enough to just fight against something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict, there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so, can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can long run stability and peace come to their land."4:223/

The US should define its fundamental objective in SVN in clear, precise terms. Once defined, this objective should be stated in a consistent manner by all official spokesmen. It bears repetition without semantic or literary twists. It is the opinion of PROVN

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that neither our fundamental objective, nor our basic policy, statements toward SVN are understood. Neither the GVN nor the Vietnamese people, much less our avowed enemies, understand them. The need exists, now and as a matter of prime urgency, to terminate this confusion and specify America's intent world-wide. The fundamental NSAM 288 statement should be sustained. To this end, PROVN submits the following:

The basic US national objective is A FREE, INDEPENDENT, NON-COMMUNIST SOUTH VIETNAM.

The basic US national policy is TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO PRESERVE AND FURTHER THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL FREEDOM; TO INSURE AND ADVANCE THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH; AND, TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN A VIABLE AND JUST GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE TO ITS CITIZENRY.

As a means of providing definitive guidance to assist US governmental organizations in the development of support programs for SVN, subobjective statements as follow are proposed:

NATIONAL SECURITY

Short Range: The defeat of PAVN-Main Force VC and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure among the population.

Mid Range: An established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability.

Long Range: A secure nation.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH

Short Range: A war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial foundation for economic growth.

Mid Range: A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion.

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Long Range: A diversified, maturing economy based on integrated local resources and international trade.

VIABLE GOVERNMENT

Short Range: Leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.

Mid Range: Government representative of, and responsive to, its people.

Long Range: A viable government.

The above objectives correlate closely with the frequently repeated objectives of GVN. Major policy statements by senior GVN officials emphasize nation building objectives in five major areas:

- (1) Internal defense and security.
- (2) Economic progress to better the standard of living.
- (3) The improvement of social services.
- (4) The establishment of political institutions and a positive ideology.
- (5) Amelioration of the administrative system.

Addendum: Policy Trace Since 1950

Preface. Although not codified in any fundamental and obligatory reference for official planning and programing, substantive and government-wide accord below Cabinet-level was achieved early in December of 1962 as to "The National Security Objective" and "The Long Term Goal" of the United States. 10: underline added/

(1) US National Security Policy should aim at promoting and maintaining a world environment in which the abiding American purposes, as set forth in the Preamble to our Constitution, can be best attained.

(2) To this end, the operative constructive goal of US policy is to foster and develop an evolving international community, the members

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of which: (a) effectively cooperate in their areas of interdependence; (b) move forward in their own ways toward political systems based increasingly on consent and individual freedom; (c) yield for their peoples regular progress in economic welfare and social justice; (d) settle their differences by political means or legal processes rather than by armed conflict; (e) increasingly participate in institutions and organizations which transcend the independent powers of the nation-state; and, (f) move progressively towards a legal order which lays down and enforces essential rules of conduct in interstate relations and provides sure and equitable means for the settlement of international disputes.

For all practical purposes, this significant Department of State initiative was destroyed within 45 days of lower-level Executive Branch agreement on the substance contained in a guidance compendium to be titled "Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)." A decision had been reached, as follows, to obviate any possibility that US policy might be "fixed in concrete."

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 5906/1

SUBJECT: Rescission of NSC 5906/1,
"Basic National Security Policy"

The President has authorized the rescission of NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy", to be effective immediately. For the present, current policy guidance is to be found in existing major policy statements of the President and Cabinet Officers, both classified and unclassified.

Copies of this document now in the custody of the member agencies may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the regulation of the member agency relating to the custody and destruction of classified materials, and with Executive Order 10501, as amended by Executive Order 10964.

NSC Control No. 103

s/Bromley Smith
t/Bromley Smith
Executive Secretary

The Trace. The Government of the United States accorded diplomatic recognition to the Government of the State of Vietnam on 7 February 1950. This recognition was described by the Department of State as "consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence."4:21/ The US Government's gratification, at the 8 March 1949 signing of the French-Vietnamese agreements, was expressed; they were termed "the basis for the evolution of Vietnamese independence within the French Union," and there was an expression of confidence that they would "promote political stability and the growth of effective democratic institutions."4:21/ The US began considering what steps it could take "to further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by internal dissension fostered from abroad."4:21/

Three months later, on 8 May 1950, Secretary of State Acheson acknowledged the urgency of the situation in SEA; that there was need for remedial action; and, that solution of the SEA problem depended upon "the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism."4:22/ He further explained that the US could "and should contribute to these major objectives." This statement marked the beginning of US military and economic assistance to the Associated States (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), as well as to France for restoration of area stability. Specifically, Secretary Acheson stated:

"The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."4:22/

On 24 May 1950, the US simultaneously delivered statements to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and France formally initiating a program of economic aid "to restore stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development."4:22/ A military aid program began soon thereafter.

A decision was reached on 23 September 1951 to increase US military aid. A second increase was agreed upon by representatives of the US, France, Vietnam and Cambodia on 18 June 1952; there was further agreement that this increased assistance over and above what was being provided for Indochina (which approximated one-third of the total cost of Indochina operations) would be especially devoted to

assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.4:24/ These conversations reaffirmed the common determination of participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

In a speech on 11 June 1954, Secretary of State Dulles addressed the question of direct US intervention in the war in Indochina. The conditions under which the US agreed to intervene were: (1) an invitation from the existing lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and, (5) assurance that France would not withdraw from the battle until it was won.4:26/ He reiterated that "only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help restore peace in the area."

Secretary Dulles cautioned, however, that these conditions would not apply in the event of overt Chinese Communist military intervention. While explaining that the American people wanted peace, he warned: "should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we -- regardless of any other country -- meet the issue squarely."4:28/

On 30 September 1953, the United States added an additional \$385 million to funds already earmarked for the Indochina war. These were to be made available to the French Government prior to 31 December 1954.4:26/ Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh forces on 7 May 1954, and France submitted armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference which had convened the previous month to discuss both Korea and peace in Indochina. Separate agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were reached by 20 July 1954. A final declaration at Geneva endorsed the armistice agreements on 21 July 1954, and, on the same day, President Eisenhower stated that:

"The United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice."4:60/

On 21 July 1954, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith delivered the formal declaration explaining our position regarding Geneva; in taking "note of the agreements" the US:

"(1) ... will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them ... and (2) it would view any aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."4:61/

He indicated that, in the case of nations divided against their will, the US would "continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly." Under Secretary added that "the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this."

On 21 July 1954, President Eisenhower stated that the US was actively pursuing discussions with other free nations in an effort to organize a collective defense system in Southeast Asia to prevent further Communist aggression. 4:60/ This concept had been envisaged by the United States for several years. After Dien Bien Phu and Geneva, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles made the need to establish defense treaty arrangements for SEA a point of special emphasis. On 8 September 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was formed; it entered into force on 19 February 1955.

Under Geneva Accord provisions, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam became fully independent states. In recognition of this fact, a Franco-American communique was issued on 29 September 1954, to reaffirm the support of both governments for "the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty ..."4:66/ Both pledged to support the "complete independence" of the new states and to assist their efforts "to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their people."

President Eisenhower sent a message to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam on 23 October 1954 explaining the purposes and conditions of US aid. He explained that the US wanted to find ways and means whereby its aid could "make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam."4:67/ American aid would continue provided that the GVN was prepared "to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied." The purpose of this offer was to assist the GVN "in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

President Eisenhower explained that the US Government:

"...expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people."4:67/

On 23 October 1955, a national referendum deposed Bao Dai, the former Emperor, and (since 7 March 1949) head of State of Vietnam. On 26 October 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem became the first President of South Vietnam and proclaimed a Republic. The US recognized him on 26 October 1955, proclaiming its intention of "maintaining ... the same cordial and friendly relations which have in the past so happily existed between the two governments."4:69/

The Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs (Walter S. Robertson) delivered a detailed statement of US policy toward SVN on 1 June 1956. He explained our position toward President Diem, listed US objectives and commented on means to achieve objectives. President Diem was described as a leader of

"... dedication, courage and resourcefulness ... a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us ... President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example ... The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at this fateful hour."4:70/

Mr. Robertson declared that the United States was proud "to be on the side of the ... Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the good life." Four US policies were listed:

"To support a friendly non-Communist government in Vietnam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

"To help the Government of Vietnam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

"To encourage support for Free Vietnam by the non-Communist world.

"To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war."

The Assistant Secretary cited military assistance as first priority. The US was "helping to sustain the internal security forces ... by providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces." Other US aid would be extended "to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people ..." He very carefully stipulated that economic aid and counsel would be given "only as freely invited."

Addressing the issue of free election, Assistant Secretary Robertson stated the US position as one of hoping and praying that the partition of Vietnam would "speedily come to an end." He elaborated on this key point by pointing out that the US believed in free election but would support President Diem fully in his position that:

" ... if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist, there can be no free choice."

Viet Cong insurgent activity had surfaced and began to increase by late 1957; it reached serious proportions by 1959. President Eisenhower, in defining the seriousness of the communist threat and the importance to the US of the security and progress of Vietnam, described the Viet Cong as "a great flanking movement: which would deny freedom to 12 million people immediately and seriously endanger the freedom of 150 million others. Because of this fact, "military as well as economic help" was needed for Vietnam. The President concluded his address with the statement that the US had reached:

" ... the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Vietnam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom."4:74/

At its Third Congress on 10 September 1960, the Communist Party of

NVN (Lao Dong) adopted a resolution declaring that the Vietnamese revolution had as its strongest major task the liberation of the South from the "rule of US imperialists and their henchmen." This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the government of SVN.4:76/

Making reference to this resolution, Secretary of State Rusk declared, on 4 May 1961, that the President had "authorized an increase in the amount of military assistance, and a number of other measures ..."4:76/ The US was to undertake training and advisory measures designed to strengthen both materially and militarily the ability of the Vietnamese armed force to overcome the communist threat. The increased aid was to include "a vigorous civil program" in the economic and social field.

In view of the worsening situation in SVN as of 5 May 1961, President Kennedy announced that Vice-President Johnson would discuss with President Ngo Dinh Diem measures to help the country resist Communist pressures. A joint communique was issued in Saigon (13 May 1961) highlighting the results of this conference; eight areas of agreement were cited:

-- "Existing military and economic aid programs would be extended, and both governments would infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

-- "The regular armed forces of SVN would be increased.

-- "The US would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force.

-- "Both governments would collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist the Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages.

-- "The assistance of other free governments to GVN would be welcomed.

-- "A group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Vietnam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

-- "New economic and social measures would be undertaken in rural areas to insure that villagers benefited promptly from the restoration of law and order.

-- "The two governments would work together a longer range economic development program, including ... the fields of agriculture, health, education, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development."4:77/

Seven months later, President Kennedy announced another increase in US military assistance to help the Vietnamese people "maintain their independence."4:84/

On 4 January 1962, a joint communique was issued which focused on new joint efforts to accelerate and broaden assistance to the countryside and to support a comprehensive and coordinated counterinsurgency program. This was an 11-point economic program which would provide a major increase in efforts "to bring increasing prosperity to the people."4:86/

On 1 March 1962, Secretary of State Rusk referred to Communist demands that the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference and other countries concerned consult regarding Vietnam; he stated that "the United States is always prepared to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble."4:88/ He added "there could be peace overnight in Vietnam if those responsible for the aggression wish peace. The situation is just as simple as that."

In May of 1963, police handling of riots in Hue set off disputes between the Buddhists and the Vietnamese Government. Martial law was proclaimed in August after increasing demonstrations -- including immolations. The US Government felt increasing concern about GVN conduct. This feeling of disenchantment was expressed publicly by President Kennedy during the first two weeks in September of 1963. In a TV interview on 2 September, he asserted:

"I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. ... We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people."4:997

The President went on to explain that the situation was not hopeless; he believed that "with changes in policy and perhaps with personnel" the government could regain popular support.

On 9 September 1963, President Kennedy indicated his opposition to reducing aid for the GVN. "I don't think ... that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there.... You might have a situation that would bring about a collapse."4:99/ He strongly denounced any thought of US withdrawal from SVN and expressed his belief in the "domino theory."

"I believe it ... China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of their future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists."

As dissension between the Buddhists and the GVN increased, the US re-examined its policy. On 12 September 1963, President Kennedy stated, "What helps to win the war we support -- what interferes with the war effort we oppose."4:104/ McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, added (30 September 1963): "The object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subversion -- military, paramilitary, and political. ... It is the policy of the United States to sustain that effort."4:103/

A key policy statement was issued from the White House on 2 October 1963 immediately after the return of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor from Vietnam. It identified the security of South Vietnam as "a major interest of the United States." The US was to adhere to its policy of "working with the people and government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Vietnam."4:102/ The military program in SVN was described as sound in principle but needing improvement. Major US military assistance was to terminate as soon as the insurgency was suppressed or when the national security forces of SVN were capable of suppressing it.

The political situation in SVN was termed "deeply serious." The US made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions by

GVN. Such actions were cited as threatening to influence significantly the military operations. Although the US objected strongly to the repressive actions of GVN, the US would continue "to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society." Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported that, in their judgment, the major part of the US military task could be completed by the end of 1965, although a continuing requirement for a limited number of US training personnel might exist. They reported that, by the end of 1963, the US program of training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 US military personnel could be withdrawn.

A military coup by virtually the entire Vietnamese leadership against the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem occurred on 1 November 1963. President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated. A provisional government was set up which was recognized by the United States on 7 November 1963. The following day, Secretary of State Rusk held a press conference and appraised the new situation by explaining:

"The great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Vietnam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside."4:104/

The Secretary indicated his encouragement as to the possibilities of the new regime but emphasized that there "was a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead." He believed that the effort to eradicate the Viet Cong aggression would "get an impetus from recent events" and that the GVN could "go ahead now with more confidence." He then summarized his views and restated US policy:

"As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special United States interest in terms of military bases or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Vietnam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that the central problem there will be dealt with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side."

On 22 November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated. In December, President Johnson sent Defense Secretary McNamara and CIA

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Director John McCone to Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war effort. On 31 December 1963, President Johnson sent a New Year's greeting to General Duong Van Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council, which wished the new Revolutionary Government success in prosecuting the war and explained that US aims were identical with those of GVN. These objectives were:

"...to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north ...

"The United States Government shares the view of your government that 'neutralization' of South Vietnam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Vietnam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Vietnam would only be another name for a Communist takeover."4:106/

Secretary of State Rusk restated our position with respect to neutralization on 7 February 1964. He described neutralization as "simply a device for the communization of all of Southeast Asia, and that we cannot accept." He insisted that "the basic point" was "that existing agreements ought to be observed, and if they would be observed, then the way is open for peace in Southeast Asia."4:107/

On 17 March 1964, National Security Action Memorandum 288 was issued. The US objective statement, approved by the President, established "an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam" as our goal. NSAM 288 reiterated that the US did not require SVN to serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. It specified that SVN must be free "to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security." This aid was to include not only economic and social assistance but also "police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements." Additional guidance underscored the facts that the US:

- (1) Was "prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control."
- (2) Would "fully support the Khanh Government and are totally opposed to any further coups."
- (3) Would "support fully the pacification plan now announced by Khanh, and particularly the basic theory ... of concentration on the more secure

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areas and working out ... followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of government felt and to provide economic improvements."

No major equipment replacement, or US troop additions, were considered likely within the framework of this promulgated policy.

On 24 July 1964, President Johnson expressed the fundamental US position toward a summit conference on the Vietnamese conflict: "We do not believe in a conference to ratify terror."11/

Early on 2 August 1964, the US Destroyer Maddox was attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes; all three directed machine gun fire at the Maddox; the Maddox engaged in local defensive fire. On the following day, the US conveyed a note to the Hanoi Regime calling attention to this aggression and warning of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against US forces."4:124/

During the early afternoon of 4 August 1964, the destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy were subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of torpedo boats of the NVN Navy while on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. These vessels were 65 miles from shore, and the attack lasted for over two hours. In an address on the evening of 4 August 1964, President Johnson informed the nation of this second attack and stated:

"Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the US must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations."4:121/

He emphasized that the US response to such provocations was "limited and fitting," and that the US was not seeking to spread the conflict. The address was concluded with the notification that he would immediately seek a Congressional resolution making it clear that the US Government was united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.

On the following morning (5 August 1964), President Johnson delivered a major address explaining the new US tactical decision:

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"...The attacks have been answered. Throughout last night and in the last 12 hours, air units of the United States Seventh Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of their supporting facilities. Appropriate armed action has been taken against them. The United States is now asking that this be brought immediately, and urgently, before the Security Council of the United Nations."8/

He added that three American presidents and the American people had been concerned for ten years with the peace and security of Southeast Asia:

"President Eisenhower sought and President Kennedy sought the same objectives I still seek:

"That those governments leave each other alone.

"That they resolve their differences peacefully.

"That they devote their talents to bettering the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance."

The President insisted that there must be no doubt about US policy or purpose. Peace required that existing agreements in the area be honored, and that the US and its allies stand firm against Communist aggression. He reaffirmed the US position on privileged sanctuaries by stating:

"...To any who may be tempted to support, or to widen the present aggression I say this. There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America. But there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the actions that we took yesterday."

Also on 5 August 1964, the Congress received the President's request for a resolution confirming support for US actions in Vietnam. This request reiterated the four propositions that the President had listed as US policy objectives previously and, in addition, explained that the US sought "the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed by Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos."4:122/

On 10 August 1964, Congress passed Public Law 88-408 (i.e., the Southeast Asia Resolution). This Resolution declared that Congress approved and supported the determination of the President to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the US and to prevent further aggression. It added that "the US regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of national peace and security in Southeast Asia" -- and that the US was prepared "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."4:128/ Congress specified that its resolution was to remain in effect until peace and security in the area was reasonably assured or until terminated earlier by concurrent resolutions of the Congress. The resolution passed by a margin of 502 votes to 2 votes.

In the closing months of 1964, President Johnson expressed his reaction to speculation regarding more direct US involvement in SVN. In September, he stated, "We don't want our American boys to be doing fighting for Asian boys."12/ On 28 November 1964, he chastised news reporters for their predictions of increased US commitments and indicated that, for the past few days, he had been:

"...reading about the wars that you have involved us in and the additional undertakings that I have made decisions on ... I would say, generally speaking, that some people are speculating and taking positions that I would think are somewhat premature."13/

Commencing at 1300 hours, 6 February 1965 (Washington time), two SVN airfields, two US barracks areas and several villages were subjected to a Viet Cong surprise attack. Substantial casualties resulted. On the evening of 6 February, the National Security Council recommended and the President approved a decision to meet these attacks by appropriate reprisal action against targets in NVN. The GVN concurred. On 7 February 1965, US and GVN air elements were directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barrack and staging areas in the southern portion of NVN. A White House statement, issued to explain this action, pointed out that the response was carefully limited to military areas which were supplying men and arms for attacks on SVN. The statement reaffirmed that the US sought no wider war but explained that the future course of action would depend on the actions of NVN aggressors.

These retaliatory actions had been preceded by a decision of the President on 1 February 1965 to "clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence."4:147/ Clearing the decks referred to

his decision to withdraw American dependents from SVN and to deploy a Hawk air defense battalion. He indicated that other reinforcements, in units and individuals, would follow.

On 24 February 1965, a US Embassy statement in Saigon declared that USAF aircraft were being used in combined air strikes within SVN. The statement acknowledged that US jet aircraft had participated in a number of combined operations within SVN during the week preceding this announcement. Use of US aircraft on combat operations within SVN was interpreted as being "in keeping with the announced US policy of providing maximum assistance to the Government of South Vietnam in its effort to repel the Communist aggression directed and supported by the Hanoi regime."4:152/

On 25 February 1965, Secretary of State Rusk held a news conference in which he reviewed US policy and objectives in SVN. In particular, he cited the joint resolution of the Congress passed in August of 1964 and reiterated that:

"...it has been stated over and over again that the key to peace in Southeast Asia is a readiness of all those in that area to live in peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Now there is no mystery about that formulation; those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means. It has an obligation under the 1954 agreements, under the 1962 accords on Laos, and under general international law."4:155/

Responding to press queries on US policy, Secretary Rusk said that the US policy in Vietnam "is made clear repetitively with governments all over the world, time and time again." Referring to his opening comments, he again addressed the need to view US policy in total context:

"Look at all of it -- look at all of it taken together. That is the policy -- that is the policy. How you feel you must act at a particular time and under particular circumstances under that policy and within that policy -- for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress -- depends upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to act to support the independence and safety of those countries of Southeast Asia. That is the policy."

Another exchange, between questioner and Secretary, occurred as follows:

(Q) "Mr. Secretary, perhaps, sir, then you could clarify this point. There has been a noticeable, considerable difference of emphasis in the statements of the general objectives of United States policy in these terms. There have been times when the United States policy has been said to defend the freedom of the people of Vietnam. There have been other times when the policy of the United States has been said to be to resist the expansion of Chinese Communist aggression. Could you clarify that?"

(A) "I think those two mean exactly the same thing. The expansion of Communist aggression involves the attempt to take over South Vietnam. Our people are looking at the same coin from both its sides."

Asked if the US had made a policy change by allowing American combat flights in SVN, Mr. Rusk replied:

"Well, again, the policy remains the same. Look at the Congressional Resolution passed by a margin of 502 to 2. Now, the use of a particular weapon may change from time to time, or a type of aircraft, but the policy is the same. When the circumstances or changed circumstances require changed actions, those actions will be taken. But that does not mean an underlying change of policy."

On 27 February 1965, the Department of State issued a lengthy report entitled "Aggression from the North" which set forth the facts relating to support of the conflict in South Vietnam from external sources. On 8 March 1965, the Department of State issued a memorandum titled "The Legal Basis for United States Actions Against North Vietnam." On 25 March 1965, the President publicly reviewed US policy on SVN:

"The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination -- when they will need not military support and assistance against aggressions but only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace. Even now, in Vietnam and elsewhere, there are major programs of

development which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian Councils -- and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.

"...As I have said in every part of the union, I am ready to go over there any time and meet with anyone whenever there is a promise of progress toward honorable peace. We have said many times -- to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation -- that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954 -- or reliable arrangements to guarantee the independence and security of all in Southeast Asia.

"...It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Vietnam for as long as required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control. The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose -- at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries too."4:195/

On 17 April 1965, President Johnson delivered a major policy address (known as "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia") at Johns Hopkins University. Many nonmilitary, as well as military, national objectives in Southeast Asia were covered as follows:

"We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

"We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.

"And I intend to keep that promise.

"...We must stay in Southeast Asia -- as we did in Europe -- in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.'

"...Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves -- only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary."

President Johnson went on to state that, in recent months, the US had stepped up its air attacks in both North and South Vietnam. He explained that, rather than a change of purpose, this action constituted a change only in what that purpose required; he added that the purpose of increased air action was to slow down aggression and to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam.

"And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam -- and all who seek to share their conquest -- of a simple fact:

"We will not be defeated.

"We will not grow tired.

"We will not withdraw, either openly or under cloak of a meaningless agreement. We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and praiseworthy judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

"Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Vietnam -- securely guaranteed, and able to shape its own relationships to all others -- free from outside interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other country.

"There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agree-

ments or their strengthening with new ones.

"We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this promise for unconditional discussions.

"...We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Vietnam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

"But we will use it."

In his explanation of the nonmilitary considerations of Southeast Asia, the President pointed out that the people wanted food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country and an end to the bondage of material misery. All of these wants were far more readily achievable through peaceful association with other countries rather than the endless course of battle; the US would assist the people of SEA in achieving these human desires:

"Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict torn corner of the world.

"The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Vietnam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

"For our part, I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is under way. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

"The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

"The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

"I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

"So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former president of the World Bank."

The President concluded his address by depicting a future that could come to the people of SEA; their aspirations were within cooperative achievement provided the aggression from NVN into SVN was terminated.
4:197/

The US replied to a Seventeen-Nation Appeal with respect to Vietnam on 8 April 1965; this reply reaffirmed previously stated objectives:

"Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam -- security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others -- free from outside interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other country.

"...There may be many ways to this kind of peace; in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones. We have stated this position over and over again; to friend and foe

alike. And we remain ready -- with this purpose --
for unconditional discussions."4:203/

On 27 April 1965, President Johnson reviewed the situation in Vietnam and cited constant acts of terror by the VC as murdering and crippling soldiers, civilians, men and women alike. In an effort to contain the war, the US had taken no action against the source of this brutality -- North Vietnam. When US destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, we had replied with only a single raid -- matching the punishment with the deed. For six months, thereafter, the US had taken no action against NVN; while the US had warned of danger and hoped for caution, the Communists had replied with attack and explosions and indiscriminate murder:

"It soon became clear that our restraint was viewed as weakness. Our desire to limit conflict was viewed as a prelude to surrender. We could no longer stand by while attacks mounted, and while the bases of the attackers were immune from reply.

"And so we began to strike back.

"But we have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.

"I say again that I will talk to any government, anywhere, and without any conditions; if any doubt our sincerity, let them test it."4:218/

The President declared that the US would follow the same course of "firmness with moderation, readiness for peace with refusal to retreat" and insisted that "the clearest lesson of our time" was that retreat did nothing but encourage and spur those who sought to conquer free nations within their reach. He described US policy as nothing new; that it was:

"...the same battle which we have fought for a generation. Wherever we have stood firm, aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.

"This was true under President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. And it will be true in Southeast Asia."

On 4 May 1965, President Johnson delivered a message to Congress requesting additional appropriations to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam. He asked for \$700 million, all of which was to be spent in the current fiscal year; he added that he could not guarantee that this would be the last request: "If our need expands, I will turn again to the Congress for we will do whatever must be done to ensure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and nation." He explained US rationale as follows: "South Vietnam has been attacked by North Vietnam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help because our commitments, our principles, and our national interest demand it."

President Johnson explained why the security of SVN should be the responsibility of the US: "The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding Communism." He guaranteed that the US would not withdraw or be defeated; the stakes were too high, the commitment too deep and the lessons of history too plain. He admitted deep regret as to the necessity of bombing NVN:

"But we began those bombings only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder ... and time and time again, men, women, and children -- American and Vietnamese -- were bombed in their villages and homes while we could not reply.

"...Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed, while the aggressor sits smiling and secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he has violated a thousand times."4:219/

On 13 May 1965, President Johnson elaborated his concept of economic aid for South Vietnam:

"It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long, brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict, there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so, can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can long run stability and peace come to their land."4:224/

He went on to explain his feeling that the war in Vietnam was being fought by too few Americans. He speculated on the advantages of enlisting the efforts of more citizens.

"For most Americans this is an easy war. Men fight and men suffer and men die, as they always do in war. But the lives of most of us, at least those of us in this room and those listening to me this morning, are untroubled. Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the nation flourishes . . .

"What a difference it would make if we could only call upon a small fraction of our resources -- business and unions, agricultural groups and builders -- if we could call them to the task of peaceful progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an irresistible blow for freedom there and for freedom throughout the world.

"I therefore hope that every person within the sound of my voice in this country this morning will look for ways -- and those citizens of other nations who believe in humanity as we do, I hope that they will find ways to help progress in South Vietnam."

On 1 June 1965, President Johnson sent a message to Congress regarding the SEA aid program; the US should "start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire Southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people." He hoped that this would be an international venture; the US contribution, amounting to \$89 million, was to be used: 4:228/

- (1) To accelerate development of the Mekong River Basin.
- (2) To support electrification near three provincial towns in South Vietnam.
- (3) To provide improved medical and surgical services, especially in the more remote areas of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
- (4) To train people for the construction of roads, dams and other small scale village projects in Thailand and Laos.
- (5) To finance imports of iron and steel, cement, chemicals and pesticides, drugs, trucks and other essential goods necessary for a growing civilian economy.

(6) To supplement the present program of agricultural development and support additional government services in the other three countries.

On 1 June 1965, Vice-President Humphrey stated that the US policy toward Vietnam was founded on three principles. "These principles -- honoring our military commitment, a continuing willingness to seek a political solution and a massive economic development program -- remain the bases of our policy."14/

At a news conference on 2 June 1965, President Johnson again emphasized the nonmilitary aspects of assistance to SVN; the following day, Secretary of State Rusk underscored the President's position:

"Military action is not a final solution in this area; it is only a partial means to a much larger goal. Freedom and progress will be possible in Vietnam only as the people are assured that history is on their side--that it will give them a chance to make a living in peace, to educate their children, to escape the ravages of disease, and, above all, to be free of the oppressors who for so long have fed on their labors.

"Our effort on behalf of the people of Southeast Asia should unite, not divide, the people of that region. Our policy is not to spread conflict but to heal conflict."15/

Returning from SVN in July of 1965, Secretary McNamara reported to the President on the growing seriousness of the situation. On 28 July, President Johnson addressed the nation and redefined US objectives in SVN:

"We insist and we will always insist that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it."17:4/

A new goal was introduced in this major policy address: "We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power."

In his State of the Union Message delivered on 12 January 1966, President Johnson explained the US position regarding SVN as follows:

"We have also made it clear -- from Hanoi to New York -- there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any Conference table, discuss any proposals -- four points or 14 or 40 -- and consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force; and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future ...

"...Let me be absolutely clear: The days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle."16:6/

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ANNEX G

VIETNAM SERVICE : QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS

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VIETNAM SERVICE: QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS

Introduction

The primary aim of this Annex has been to analyze and summarize the responses of approximately 330 US Army officers to a questionnaire regarding their service in SVN. Many of them had been advisors to the Vietnamese armed forces, although approximately 150 acted as sector and subsector advisors. In the view of PROVN, it is at this level that dialectics pale in significance, that specific problems have to be addressed and that the most fundamental actions must be designed to alleviate these real problems if "the object that lies beyond the war" is to be achieved in SVN.

Although originally designed for application to a sample of all US agency representatives operative at province-level, agencies external to the DOD were not persuaded by PROVN that participation should take place within the time limitations imposed and outside of formal request channels.

Responses to the questionnaire have been divided, for analytical purposes, into nine subject categories: (1) Free Elections; (2) Peasant Political Preferences and Future Changes; (3) Peasant-GVN Rapport; (4) Military-Peasant Relationships; (5) Organizational Aspects of the Advisory Effort; (6) Military Tactics; (7) Advisor Execution; (8) Advisor Training; and, (9) Evaluation of Assignment. Both multiple choice and narrative responses, as requested in the PROVN questionnaire, are summarized hereinafter.

Under each subject, responses are analyzed in the aggregate and also according to time and area of service in SVN. Respondent service in SVN has been divided into four time periods, using the date of initial service as a reference: (1) time period 1, before June 1963; (2) time period 2, June 1963-March 1964; (3) time period 3, March 1964-January 1965; and, (4) time period 4, after January 1965 or advisors currently serving in SVN. The area breakdown conforms to current ARVN corps boundaries. In addition, responses from officers who served as sector and subsector advisors are analyzed separately, since their experience is considered particularly relevant to the pacification mission. The conclusions of this study are preliminary.

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Primary Findings

Free Elections. More than half of the peasants do not have sufficient interest to cast ballots in a free national election. This results from a lack of political knowledge and awareness. The communications between Saigon and the peasant have been inadequate to the point where the peasant's knowledge of candidates is limited to recognition of one name with little other information about him.

If a free national election were held, underhanded activities would influence the outcome. Depending upon the area of the country and the progress of pacification, the "foul play" would be appreciably more extensive than observed in US elections. Success of an election largely depends upon the enthusiasm and interest of the local officials.

The problem of increasing political awareness is essentially that of establishing contact between the peasant and the central government. In areas where the local administrative authorities fail to keep the population informed, the peasants in the villages and hamlets have no idea of what government is, what it does, how it operates or what it can do for them. The peasant's primary aim is survival: "If he is shown that the government can do him some good, he would be for it." Frequently indicated steps for increasing political awareness are: (1) providing security to the population and keeping routes of communication open; (2) developing understanding and interest in politics at the local level; (3) keeping the population informed through more extensive use of communications media; (4) informing the rural population of activities through radios (stations run by VIS in Saigon with receivers in hamlets), television (program preparation in Saigon with TV sets in villages and market places), movies (distribution to inform and entertain), leaflets (distribution of propaganda and government-military information) and newspapers (local as well as national); (5) providing peasants with the feeling that their interests are recognized by having GVN officials appear at the local level to discuss political problems; and, (6) giving the population a tangible example of the benefits of government by further extending the educational programs (including a program of political training for both adults as well as children), providing medical aid and supplies and offering economic assistance (food, clothing and shelter, providing indemnification for damaged property).

As part of any program to increase political awareness, successful past accomplishments should be publicized, and the current use of promises discouraged. The peasants have heard promises too often. If they receive something tangible from the GVN, then they can convince themselves that the government has their interests at heart.

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A free national election in SVN should not be considered for at least 2 to 5 years from now. A political environment does not exist that would support a free election, much less a free national government. It would take at least two years or longer, depending on how long it takes the GVN to win the peasant's support, before a free national election will be possible.

Peasant Political Preferences and Future Changes. Those respondents who considered that candidates antagonistic to US-GVN interests were likely to be elected in a free national election were more numerous than those who considered such a result unlikely; but, nearly one-third felt themselves unable to answer the question.

More than half of the sector-oriented respondents, on the other hand, felt that victory of candidates opposing the US-GVN was unlikely.

Communist political control in the rural areas is the primary factor behind possible election of candidates opposing the US-GVN; those respondents who consider victory for such political elements unlikely, base their conclusion primarily on friendly strength in urban areas.

In evaluating the extent of voluntary active support from the local population to the VC and GVN, the consensus is that (to a great extent) Vietnamese peasants attempt to remain neutral toward both sides. They will, however, generally support whichever side establishes control over the area. Political preferences for neutrality were expressed most strongly in the IV Corps area.

It is generally agreed that the extent of popular support varies considerably from area to area, with the greatest single determinant being the relative military strength of the GVN and VC in the area.

Attitudes of the Vietnamese people toward the US are quite favorable, although not uniformly so. The proportion of those citing favorable attitudes is strongest in the II Corps area and lowest from IV Corps. Favorable popular attitudes toward the US are strongly noted by the sector-oriented respondents.

Measures most often mentioned by respondents to cause the peasant to identify the GVN with the ongoing social revolution were security for the peasant, better education and the need for an effective non-corrupt government in SVN.

Measures to develop a popular political base in SVN include: more responsive political leadership, better education, security as a prerequisite for political action, propaganda and indoctrination programs,

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improved government and the availability of local elections. Sector-oriented advisors, in particular, advocate building the political base from the bottom up.

Measures to develop an economic base include new light industries, improvements in the agricultural sector, and improvement of lines of communication, transportation capabilities and facilities for marketing produce.

The primary suggestion to "foster a spirit of resistance to the VC" was complete protection of the population from VC retaliation.

Respondents, when asked for measures to achieve social cohesion in SVN, placed most emphasis on integration of the many ethnic and religious factions into the national society.

Peasant-GVN Rapport. GVN appears to have some interest in the peasant's problems and to provide limited assistance. The degree of assistance depends on the attitude of the particular province and district chiefs. The central government is more likely to give only "lip service" to the peasant's problems while the degree of help by the local government is sometimes limited by circumstances. The Montagnards receive very little help from the GVN.

Primary peasant grievances listed by the respondents are lack of security, taxes without fair share of government assistance, relocation and property damage without proper or timely indemnification, corruption and lack of interest of the central government and no promised land reform. Current advisors emphasize the grievances of inflation and weapons more frequently than the rest of the sample.

The five most frequently cited aspirations of the peasants are for improved medical aid facilities, improved schools, better transportation systems, their own land and better food and housing.

Channels of communication for peasant grievances exist but are inefficient. Ineffective administrative machinery and the lack of accessibility of the district chief impact against the efficiency of the communications. Segments of the population who live in insecure areas or belong to racial minority groups are not informed by the GVN. A serious limitation, also, is the lack of adequate communications media. GVN sometimes misinforms the people, especially at times of crisis or to "save face." The degree of misinformation is not unusual for a country at war. Troop information programs, development of able leadership, an equitable promotion system and improved discipline would make the RVNAF more responsive to the people.

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Civil administrators could be motivated to be responsive to the people by educating them on their responsibilities, removing the conditions that allow graft and corruption by instituting a system of rewards and penalties, decentralizing administrative responsibility and providing for improved US controls over the reconstruction program. Rural cadre would be more responsive to the people if they were chosen from the rural population, properly trained and accorded protection from the VC.

Military-Peasant Relationships. Vietnamese military forces, both ARVN and the paramilitary elements, appear to act quite abusively toward civilian personal and property rights.

ARVN units are considered more abusive than the paramilitary elements, which operate more often in their home areas. The most abusive units are the elite Airborne, Rangers and Special Forces.

The US military in Vietnam has generally acted in an exemplary fashion.

In the IV Corps area, respondents rate both ARVN and Vietnamese paramilitary forces as more abusive of civilian rights than indicated by the country-wide figures.

Sector and subsector advisors, in comparison to other respondents, rate the paramilitary forces as decidedly less abusive of civilian personal and property rights.

Organizational Aspects of the Advisory Effort. A plurality of respondents who served at sector level recommend formalizing the provincial committee with the sector advisor as the senior advisor to the province chief. There is general agreement on the need for USIS representation on the committee along with other pertinent organizations. As the military effort becomes less important, transfer of control to the USOM representative is recommended.

The control of resources to carry out pacification programs should be decentralized to the province level or below. US advisors should have, at the minimum, "sign off" authority over resources at the level of utilization. The difficulties presented by storage and transportation requirements are recognized as inhibiting the degree of decentralization.

S-GVN plans can be accomplished more effectively by integrating effort at the national level and using the control of resources by US advisors to insure proper execution. Currently, there are too many plans, programs and ministries for a single national effort; resources dwindle while more plans are made.

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The province chief is usually not reluctant to execute programs. Lack of knowledge of the available resources and a tendency toward greater interest in urban areas at province level limit the amount of aid reaching the peasants.

Military and civil organizations in SVN will be improved by greater continuity of plans, better training of civil administrators, improved incentives and working conditions, more definite lines of civil authority and responsibility, better US-GVN coordination of the military effort and by emphasizing quality rather than quantity in the advisor effort.

Control of aid in US channels until utilization, or alternately, more supervision and proper accounting of aid in Vietnamese channels, is recommended to insure that US aid is used to better the lot of the rural population.

Continued US presence, the current build-up of US troops and bombing of NVN have had the greatest positive impact on the people of SVN. Medical aid programs, however, appear to have had the greatest cost effectiveness.

Indiscriminate use of artillery and air bombardment within SVN have produced the greatest negative impact on the people. Current advisors also cite inflation and desecration of pagodas as producing a significant negative effect.

Military Tactics. Various operations have particular merit in achieving certain goals. The respondents indicated that a combination of "area saturation" and "eagle flights" proved to be the most successful military techniques overall to employ against the VC. "Stay behind operations" is a good technique to employ in order to insure that the VC will not return once US-GVN forces have withdrawn. Almost none of the respondents recommended the use of "large sweeps" against the VC.

Choices listed under "other" suggested that small units of platoon and company size are the most effective. "It is all but impossible to get ARVN to operate effectively with larger units."

VC propaganda is a much stronger alienating influence on the peasants' attitude toward ARVN than the actual friction between the peasants and ARVN during ARVN operations against the VC. Alienation of the peasant is less likely if the peasant is informed of the objectives of ARVN operations and shown the value of helping to eliminate the VC. "However, some alienation should always be expected when offensive action is undertaken."

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The most practical way of preventing peasant alienation is to inform the populace of the necessity of identifying the VC. If they refuse to cooperate, make sure that the peasants understand that repeated military operations, as a consequence, cannot be avoided.

Advisor Execution. A combination of advisory techniques is necessary to influence the counterpart properly. Advisory techniques must be adopted to harness the existing military structure, assure a friendly atmosphere for suggestions, transmit ideas clearly, coerce the counterpart to act (when necessary) and increase the opportunities for offering advice.

Advisors should become moderately involved in political matters, especially when military implications exist or when requested by the counterpart. Current information on the political situation must be made available to the advisor, however, as a prerequisite.

Friendly persuasion by the advisor -- founded on professional respect and followed by bringing pressure to bear through the next higher echelon when necessary -- is suggested to get plans executed.

The advisory effort in SVN can be improved by increasing advisor leverage through more US resource control, unifying the advisor chain of command, increasing coordination between all US agencies and accruing the benefits of advisor experience through longer tours and proper debriefing before release of the advisors from their assignments.

Numerous progress indications, as follow, were submitted in response to the question: "What yardsticks did you develop to measure progress in implementing military and nonmilitary programs:"

(1) Military:

- (a) Conventional Statistics on Military Operations: KIA, WIA, MIA, Weapon Loss Ratios, Attacks Repulsed, Daily Contact, Type of Incidents
- (b) Extent of Secure Areas
 - Increased rise in tax payments
 - Rounds fired on helicopters
- (c) Road Security, Freedom of Movement
- (d) Chieu Hoi Returnees
- (e) CVN AWOLs
- (f) Small Unit Effectiveness

(2) Reconstruction Program:

- (a) Statistics and Charts on Civic Action Projects, Rate of Building

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- (b) Number of Volunteers for Civic Action Projects, Number of Self-Help Projects
- (c) Hamlet Progress
- (d) HOPTAC Criteria
- (e) Success of Elections
- (f) Food Prices, "Piaster" Exchange Rate
- (g) Proper Use of Technical Personnel

(3) Advisor Success:

- (a) Response of Counterpart to Suggestions
- (b) Maintenance of Equipment
- (c) System of Goals and Actual Achievements
- (d) Efficiency, Time Lag in Initiating Projects After Approval
- (e) Response Time of ARVN During Operations
- (f) Joint Inspections
- (g) Volume of False Reports

(4) Population Attitude:

- (a) Flow of Timely Intelligence from People
- (b) Friendliness of People, Responsiveness to Advice
- (c) Conversation and Observation
- (d) Spirit of the Military, Willingness to Fight
- (e) Whether Children Gathered Around US Soldiers in Hamlets
- (f) Full Schools
- (g) Full Market Places
- (h) Effectiveness of Resources Control Programs
- (i) Migration to SVN Controlled Areas, Number of Refugees
- (j) Advisor Intuition, Tone of Feelings of People

Some respondents felt that it was not possible to talk about "yardsticks" in connection with Vietnam for the following reasons: (1) one can only have a "yardstick" if one knows the objective; (2) there must be something accomplished before it can be measured; (3) the situation is too fluid for "yardsticks;" (4) developing "yardsticks" is a symptom of the illness in the advisor effort; (5) more than one tour is required to see progress; and, (6) each program has a different "yardstick."

The group of respondents who had served in sector and subsector jobs emphasize the reconstruction program "yardstick" more than the overall sample summarized above. Voluntary participation and the number of requested self-help projects by the peasants are suggested as "yardsticks" of progress. The reaction of the peasants in the hamlet, the neighboring hamlet and the VC to a reconstruction project are also suggested more frequently by the sector-oriented respondents than the overall sample.

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Advisor Training.

(1) Language Training. The respondents' consensus is that Vietnamese language is extremely important to success as an advisor; many term it the single most important requisite. Approximately 80 percent of the sector and subsector advisors after January of 1965 feel that they should at least be able to catch the gist of conversation and speak a few words; this compares to 90 percent of the sector and subsector advisors serving prior to January of 1965. Those advocating near or complete fluency have decreased to 63 percent from 76 percent. The subsector advisors after January of 1965 hold language proficiency to be more important than sector advisors (70 percent as compared to 45 percent), although some sector advisors strongly plug for language proficiency. The three major purposes for which proficiency is considered essential are to: (a) increase effectiveness of the advisor-counterpart relationship; (b) increase their understanding of the local situation; and, (c) gain prestige in the eyes of the Vietnamese.

(2) Military Training. Almost one-third of the sector and subsector advisors serving now in SVN cite a need for additional preparation for the military aspects of their assignment. This is almost a 50 percent decrease from the need indicated by those who served at this advisory level before January of 1965. The sole consensus among those now serving (as to additional preparation desired) is in the field of language training; of the sector advisors selecting the "yes" response, 80 percent wanted language training as compared to 38 percent of the subsector advisors. Other training desired by the subsector advisors includes: (a) background on US programs and funds (and how to get them); (b) information on the customs and traditions of Vietnam; (c) VC tactics; (d) lessons learned by previous advisors; (e) in-country instruction; (f) medical training; and, (g) jungle warfare and psyops schools. Some 17 percent of the subsector advisors complain of not receiving any training (or only "partial" training) prior to approval in SVN. Sector and subsector advisors serving prior to January of 1965 added GVN military organization and friendly intelligence capabilities as elements of desired additional military training.

(3) Nonmilitary Training. After January of 1965, 58 percent of the sector and subsector respondents feel the need for more training on the nonmilitary aspects of their job; this compares to 73 percent of those serving prior to this time period group. Current sector advisors are divided evenly on their desire for more training; almost three-fifths of the subsector advisors express the need for additional preparation.

Sector advisors want instruction as follows: (a) the missions, functions, programs (including funds and where to get them) of USOM, CAS and DEPSTATE as well as the relationship of such agencies to the

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US military effort; (b) information on the structure and function of the GVN from province through ministerial level; and, (c) a better understanding of the Rural Construction Program (plans and up-to-date information). A fourth grouping of sector advisor added training desires (not equal in importance to the other three) centers on a limited language course and in-country refresher courses.

The subsector advisors desire the following types of preparation -- in addition to that cited by sector advisors under (a) and (b) above -- prior to assignment: (a) additional language training; (b) more instruction pointing toward their specific assignment; and, (c) more training of a technical nature (construction, agriculture) and social nature (local customs, tradition, administration). A portion of these subsector advisors also want to take advantage of existing USOM and MATA courses of instruction.

In the sample of all respondents serving in SVN prior to January of 1965, just under half (49 percent) expressed the need for more training on nonmilitary aspects. Saigon area respondents expressed, to a significantly lower extent, the need for much such training; whereas, over half of the IV Corps respondents stated the need for more.

(4) Methods to Increase Advisory Effectiveness-- Training Aspects. The three most frequently mentioned methods to increase advisory effectiveness are careful selection of personnel; careful assignment to the specific advisory position open; and, training the advisor (not only to fit the specific open position but in language and area studies as well). Of the advisors mentioning training, 43 percent mentioned language training specifically.

Evaluation of Assignment

The initial PROVN questionnaire surfaced a requirement to investigate more thoroughly key aspects of US Army advisory assignments in SVN.

(1) Two issues of PROVN address -- tour extension and tour evaluation -- required refinement during this study to achieve a more precise appraisal of advisor views. This was accomplished by directing more refined questions on each subject to advisors serving in SVN since January of 1965. The results then were merged with those of advisors (who had addressed the initial questionnaire) having served in SVN prior to January of 1965. These integrated appraisals follow:

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Tour Extension

QUESTION 1 (Advisors prior to January of 1965): "Would you return for a second tour to Vietnam as an advisor?"

- "(a) If serving in the same job.
"(b) If serving in the same area of Vietnam.
"(c) If serving for the same counterpart.
"(d) With your family nearby.
"(e) If given all resources and told to remain until the job is completed.
"(f) Did you attempt to extend your tour while in Vietnam?"

DATA (percentage of "yes" responses only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample	67	79	71	68	83	8
Time Period 3	57	69	66	66	80	7
Time Period 2	80	74	69	72	81	6
Capital Military District	55	67	55	55	78	15
I Corps	89	93	73	69	77	11
II Corps	74	82	83	77	84	7
III Corps	63	85	69	70	83	6
IV Corps	75	95	70	78	100	10
Sector and Subsector Advisors	85	84	79	78	86	8

QUESTION 2 (Advisors after January of 1965): Assume that a DA general officer has offered you an opportunity to volunteer for an extension of your advisory assignment in Vietnam. He assures you that: (1) your response can be made wholly without prejudice to your career; and, (2) that you can select from terms he offers under which you would volunteer. For each of the following possible terms of service, indicate your choice:

CIRCLE ONE

- Yes No (a) I would accept only if permitted 30 days home leave (with per diem pay) after completing each nine months in Vietnam.
- Yes No (b) I would accept only if permitted to return to the same assignment.
- Yes No (c) My total tour (not counting leave) in Vietnam should be limited to (12) (18) (24) (30) (36) months. (CIRCLE ONE)

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Yes No (d) I would accept only if assured that I would have full command of the total US program in my area of responsibility and adequate resources to do the job as I saw it.

Yes No (e) I would accept only if I were assured a different assignment. (SPECIFY IN REMARKS)

Yes No (f) I would accept only if my family could be moved to a secure US base area in the Far East, and I could see them regularly. (INDICATE HOW OFTEN)

Yes No (g) I would accept only if serving with the same counterpart.

DATA (percentages only):

	(a)		(b)		(c)		(d)		(e)		(f)		(g)	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Total Sample	33	67	25	75	67	33	46	54	17	83	50	50	13	87
Sector Advisors	43	57	31	69	68	32	36	64	19	81	48	52	15	85
Subsector Advisors	27	73	22	78	67	33	51	49	16	84	51	49	13	87

INTEGRATED FINDINGS: Six of the seven terms offered as conditions for extending the present assignment (or for a second assignment in Vietnam) are rejected by 50 percent or more of all respondents serving after January of 1965. The length of tour most acceptable (to two-thirds of all respondents) is between 18 and 24 months. Half of the respondents desire the longer tour only if their family is nearby and they can see them regularly. The leave desired to see the families is between one to two weeks and should occur every one to three months if the desires of the majority of the respondents are satisfied. A third condition, that of acceptance only if assured full command and resources to do the job as they see it -- is the choice of 46 percent of all advisors. There is some evidence that the question remains not understood properly. There are essentially no differences between the sector advisors and the subsector advisors as to their selection of conditions for staying in Vietnam.

Tour Evaluation

QUESTION 1 (Advisors prior to January of 1965): "How do you evaluate your military experience in Vietnam?"

- "(a) Extraneous to my career pattern.
- "(b) About equal to a National Guard or ROTC assignment.
- "(c) An average worthwhile tour.

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"(d) Extremely rewarding and prepared me for what I consider to be the future Army role in counterinsurgency."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>
Total Sample	2	1	19	78
Time Period 3	3	1	20	76
Time Period 2	0	0	23	77
Time Period 1	1	1	16	81
Capital Military District	4	2	30	65
I Corps	0	0	14	86
II Corps	0	4	11	86
III Corps	0	0	20	80
IV Corps	4	0	4	91
Sector and Subsector Advisors	6	0	6	88

QUESTION 2 (Advisors after January of 1965): "How would you evaluate your advisory assignment as a contribution to your professional military development? (Check the response which is closest to your viewpoint, and explain your choice below)."

"(a) I think that advisory duty has little to do with this military profession, and I consider my advisory experiences an interruption in my professional development.

"(b) I have observed much going on in-country that will serve me well as professional background, but I do not consider my assigned duties as useful professionally.

"(c) My duty here is no more, nor less important professionally than most other assignments I might have received; as a soldier, I serve as I am directed.

"(d) I regard my assignment as a fairly useful contribution to my professional development, although I think it is significantly less valuable than the experience my contemporaries are receiving in different assignments. (SPECIFY BELOW)

"(e) What we advisors are doing here will be one of the principal tasks of the US Armed Forces for the foreseeable future. I think my present assignment is very valuable experience which significantly increases my value to the US as a professional officer."

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DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample	1	3	3	7	86
Sector Advisors	0	3	3	10	83
Subsector Advisors	2	3	3	5	87

INTEGRATED FINDINGS: All respondents in the group serving in SVN as advisors since January of 1965, except one (from IV Corps), consider themselves professional military officers. In addition, over 85 percent of them consider their present assignments as a very valuable experience which significantly increases their value to the US as a professional military officer and believe that their present assignment will be similar to one of the principle tasks of the US Armed Forces in the future. There are essentially no differences between the sector and subsector advisors currently serving in SVN.

Two new questions were devised by PROVN to probe deeper into the issue of advisor qualifications and to challenge the assertion that the US Army is making a serious mistake by assigning young, inexperienced officers to advisory duty in SVN. Both of these particularized questions were addressed solely by advisors serving in SVN since January of 1965.

Advisor Qualifications

QUESTION: A recent DA study estimated that success in an advisory position probably equates to 25 percent military competence (knowledge of tactics, weapons, equipment) -- plus 25 percent ingenuity and initiative -- plus 50 percent knowledge of the situation, terrain and people. "How would you write such an equation? Success as an advisor equals:"

- "(a) Military knowledge (%).
- "(b) Ingenuity, initiative, imagination (%).
- "(c) Local knowledge (%).
- "(d) Other factors (%)."

FINDINGS: The after January of 1965 advisor respondents rate the characteristics of ingenuity, initiative and imagination as those most influencing advisor success. These are followed closely by military knowledge and knowledge of the local situation, terrain and people. Various other characteristics for advisor success are also suggested and, although their overall rating value is poor, the individual characteristics are important enough to be mentioned. Some of the desired characteristics are maturity, rank, common sense, truthfulness, ability to influence the counterpart, language proficiency, patience, knowledge of budgets and funds for civic action programs and an understanding of the province chief's

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position. These factors have been given individual rankings almost as high as the overall ranking for local knowledge. There are no significant differences between the responses of the sector advisors, the subsector advisors or the combined sample.

DATA (percentages only):

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Total Sector and Subsector Sample	22	38	36	5
Sector Advisors	22	39	37	2
Subsector Advisors	22	38	35	5

Prior Combat and Command Experience

QUESTION: Some veterans of Vietnam advisory assignments have asserted that the US Army made a serious mistake in assigning young inexperienced officers to such duty, on the grounds that they were called upon to advise highly experienced counterparts, and had little to offer; other veterans have asserted that US officers serving at battalion or lower levels can function well despite a lack of extensive combat or command experience. "Which of the following comes closest to your viewpoint?"

"(a) The US Army should send no officer to an advisory post who has not had command and combat experience comparable to his counterpart.

"(b) Previous command and combat experience is no handicap, but it should be no criterion for picking people for an advisory assignment in Vietnam, since this is a different sort of war than any we have ever fought.

"(c) I think that as a general rule, the US officers who perform best in Vietnam are those who arrive without well formed ideas about either command or combat; for this reason, I think young and relatively inexperienced US officers can do an excellent job.

"(d) I think that a broad educational background including management skills is a more critical requirement than previous command or combat experience for advisors serving at sector level."

FINDINGS: The consensus of the after January of 1965 respondents is that, although command and combat experience is no handicap abroad, educational background (including management skills) is a more critical requirement for advisors serving at the sector level.

Some comments by sector advisors: "Personally, I think that an officer who serves excellently on other assignments will serve excellently

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here" -- "The greatest single contribution of the US advisor, both young and more experienced, is a sense of urgency and purpose."

Some comments by subsector advisors: "Any officer who is willing to learn and is willing to try to understand his counterpart's problems can be effective" -- "Most important factor is to be highly selective . . . insure that the person is a mature individual" -- "I believe previous command is no prerequisite. However, I believe an officer with experience does make a better advisor." -- "Organizing and coordinating ability is an absolute necessity." -- "It has been my experience that the younger, less mature officer or NCO is much less effective than a more mature older person."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>
Total Sector and Subsector Sample	3	44	12	41
Sector Advisors	7	40	13	40
Subsector Advisors	2	46	11	41

Recommended Future Developments

Questionnaire results indicate the value of this technique for increasing our knowledge of the Vietnam situation. Expansion of this technique, to include the study of additional problem areas, appears useful. There is a continuing need to update the information that has been gathered. The situation is changing rapidly, and new responses from sector and subsector advisors (located in areas where US combat elements have been operating) are needed to provide the closest American viewpoint of the Vietnamese reaction to these operations. In addition, a capability to analyze the responses on a continuing basis is also required, perhaps including an automated system for rapid analysis of the multiple-choice statistics.

US civilian returnees from SVN represent another group whose responses to a similar questionnaire could provide invaluable information, particularly regarding the nonmilitary aspects of US-GVN programs. Responses from AID, USIA and CIA personnel with field experience would provide a valuable adjunct, or comparison, to responses from military advisors. The synthesis of responses from both military and nonmilitary agencies would probably offer new insights into the total pacification and development problem.

If administratively feasible, a questionnaire probing Vietnamese viewpoints on pacification and long-term development could be extremely

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useful. For example, responses from the present province and district chiefs in SVN to the same questions asked of their US advisors (in Vietnamese and rephrased slightly to make them politically palatable) would provide an excellent supplement to the US data. Some measures would, of course, have to be developed to ensure the anonymity of the Vietnamese respondents so as to obtain the most candid responses. Because of political sensitivities, PROVN could not pursue its basic plan to test the efficacy of Vietnamese response as suggested by Major General C. J. Timmes in his Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, subject: "Vietnamese Interview Program," dated 4 June 1965. The fact remains, however, that six of the 26 GVN senior officers in attendance at the USA Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) have served as province chiefs in SVN; their views, for example, could contribute significantly to the task on-going. "Not only do they have an appreciation for the Oriental flavor of this conflict, but many of them have been taking part in it over the past 15 years."

Finally, it is suggested that the questionnaire used in this study be reviewed. A few of the questions should be reworded to increase their clarity. Additional options are also necessary in the multiple choice responses to reduce the need for repetitive clarifying remarks.

The Sample Breakdown

Respondents were divided into categories based on their time and area of service in SVN as illustrated in Table G-1 below. Further, since all respondents in time period "four" were sector or subsector advisors, an additional breakdown of their backgrounds is submitted in Table G-2.

TABLE G-1: CORPS AND TIME PERIOD BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE

TIME PERIOD	INITIAL DATE IN-COUNTRY	CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT	I CORPS	II CORPS	III CORPS	IV CORPS
1	Prior to June 63	31	10	18	21	10
2	June 63-March 64	8	3	5	3	7
3	March 64-Jan 65	29	15	19	31	21
4	Jan 65 - present	0	16	6	27	47

TOTAL: 327

68

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TABLE G-2: CURRENT ADVISOR BACKGROUNDS

	TOTAL	SECTOR	SUBSECTOR
Respondents	96	28	68
RA Respondents	70	24	46
Source of RA Officers			
Commissions:			
(1) USMA	20	11	9
(2) ROTC	35	6	29
(3) DCS	9	6	3
(4) Direct	4	2	2
(5) NGUS	2	0	2
ORC, AUS or Unclassified Officers	26	4	22
Rank of RA Officers:			
(1) Lieutenant Colonel	13	13	0
(2) Major	34	11	23
(3) Captain	46	4	42
(4) 1st Lieutenant	3	0	3
Branch:			
(1) Artillery	40	9	31
(2) Infantry	27	14	13
(3) Armor	20	5	15
(4) Others	9	0	9

Specific Replies to Specific Questions

QUESTION 1: "If a free national election were held, do you feel that over 50 percent of the peasants would have sufficient interest to cast ballots?"

- "(a) Yes.
- "(b) No.
- "(c) Unable to answer."

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DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	37	44	18
Time Period 3	38	49	13
Time Period 2	49	30	21
Time Period 1	33	44	24
Capital Military District	34	41	25
I Corps	32	61	7
II Corps	37	47	16
III Corps	43	42	15
IV Corps	40	40	21
Sector and Subsector Advisors	54	38	8
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	45	42	13
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	46	44	10

QUESTION 2: "To what extent do peasants (rural population presently have knowledge about leaders who might be candidates for national office?"

- "(a) Most might not recognize even one name on the ballot.
- "(b) Most might recognize only one name and would have vague information about this candidate.
- "(c) Most would have some information about more than one candidate.
- "(d) Most would be moderately knowledgeable about many of the candidates.
- "(e) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	23	31	15	2	29
Time Period 3	27	34	13	4	23
Time Period 2	21	18	24	0	38
Time Period 1	20	33	13	1	33
Capital Military District	24	22	7	1	46
I Corps	24	55	10	0	10
II Corps	41	24	17	0	19
III Corps	7	36	18	7	35
IV Corps	26	32	24	0	18
Sector and Subsector Advisors	22	48	22	4	6
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	35	29	19	0	16
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	19	42	19	2	19

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QUESTION 4: "If a national election were to be held at the present time, to what extent could underhanded influences be prevented so as to insure a fair election?"

"(a) Very little could be done to insure a fair election.

"(b) Somewhat effective safeguards could be introduced, but there still would be considerable foul play.

"(c) Moderately effective safeguards could be introduced, but there still would be appreciably more foul play than there is in a country such as the US.

"(d) Sufficient safeguards could feasibly be introduced as to insure a high degree of fairness.

"(e) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	28	36	13	6	18
Time Period 3	32	35	18	5	10
Time Period 2	24	39	15	3	18
Time Period 1	23	35	6	9	28
Capital Military District	29	25	15	4	28
I Corps	24	52	10	7	7
II Corps	22	34	12	10	22
III Corps	20	43	17	6	15
IV Corps	21	37	24	8	11
Sector and Subsector Advisors	20	42	28	10	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	29	10	29	29	20
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	8	38	25	11	17

QUESTION 6: "When is the earliest time that a free national election could be possible?"

"(a) Within the next 6 months.

"(b) 7 to 12 months from now.

"(c) 1 to 2 years from now.

"(d) More than 2 years but less than 5 years from now.

"(e) 5 or more years from now.

"(f) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	2	3	13	19	15
Time Period 3	3	4	20	21	10

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	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Time Period 2	3	6	3	22	44	44
Time Period 1	1	1	7	16	19	56
Capital Military District	0	2	6	27	16	49
I Corps	0	4	19	19	15	44
II Corps	2	2	14	14	8	57
III Corps	4	0	13	15	17	54
IV Corps	6	11	17	17	17	54
Sector and Subsector Advisors	2	8	16	24	8	42
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	3	3	23	23	20	27
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	2	9	15	16	13	46

QUESTION 3: "If a free national election were held at the present time, how likely is it that candidates antagonistic to US-GVN interests would be elected?"

- "(a) Very likely.
- "(b) Fairly likely.
- "(c) Quite possible, but unlikely.
- "(d) Very unlikely.
- "(e) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	11	26	17	14	31
Time Period 3	10	27	21	19	24
Time Period 2	15	22	19	11	33
Time Period 1	12	25	13	11	39
Capital Military District	6	25	16	9	43
I Corps	14	19	25	19	24
II Corps	18	21	18	15	27
III Corps	7	23	19	16	35
IV Corps	18	37	11	21	13
Sector and Subsector Advisors	6	20	14	40	18
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	10	17	40	13	20
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	8	17	29	19	27

QUESTION 10: "How much voluntary active support does the VC receive from the local population?"

- "(a) Local population is antagonistic to VC.
- "(b) Local population attempts to remain neutral, neither voluntarily offering assistance to nor hindering VC operations.

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"(c) Local population provides limited support to VC, and usually only under extreme circumstances.

"(d) Local population provides moderate support to VC.

"(e) Local population has a high degree of loyalty to VC and provides enthusiastic support.

"(f) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	5	37	11	18	4	26
Time Period 3	5	38	11	22	2	23
Time Period 2	8	42	11	11	8	21
Time Period 1	5	33	11	16	4	30
Capital Military District	4	22	12	16	5	40
I Corps	9	41	16	25	0	9
II Corps	2	41	15	12	5	24
III Corps	8	35	8	22	2	26
IV Corps	5	56	5	16	5	14
Sector and Subsector Advisors	13	42	20	20	3	3
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	15	47	15	18	0	6
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	23	31	26	8	2	10

QUESTION 11: "How much voluntary active support does the GVN receive from the local population?"

"(a) Local population is antagonistic to GVN.

"(b) Local population attempts to remain neutral, neither voluntarily offering assistance to nor hindering GVN operations.

"(c) Local population provides limited support to GVN, and usually only under extreme circumstances.

"(d) Local population provides moderate support to GVN.

"(e) Local population has a high degree of loyalty to GVN and provides enthusiastic support.

"(f) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	3	34	7	27	6	23
Time Period 3	3	36	7	32	4	18
Time Period 2	5	27	9	20	9	30
Time Period 1	2	34	7	24	6	27
Capital Military District	2	32	11	18	3	34
I Corps	3	34	3	41	3	14

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	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
II Corps	5	30	16	26	9	14
III Corps	2	34	2	36	8	19
IV Corps	4	44	4	29	7	11
Sector and Subsector Advisors	5	28	5	50	8	3
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	29	6	53	9	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	15	5	63	13	5

QUESTION 18: "What is the attitude of the people to the US government?"

"(a) Most people have strong favorable attitudes toward the US government and are pleased about US presence.

"(b) Most people have somewhat favorable attitudes toward the US government. They see the US as friendly and helpful for the most part, but they also have some reservations.

"(c) People are divided. Many have a favorable attitude toward the US government, but there are also many who have unfavorable attitudes.

"(d) Most people feel indifferently toward the US government, accepting American presence as a matter of course.

"(e) Most people have a somewhat unfavorable attitude toward the US government, and feel that the disadvantages of US presence outweigh the advantages.

"(f) Most people have a strong unfavorable attitude toward the US government and desire a quick and total withdrawal of US presence.

"(g) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>	<u>(g)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	16	40	24	14	2	0	3
Time Period 3	18	46	24	9	1	0	2
Time Period 2	30	30	18	15	0	0	6
Time Period 1	8	36	26	21	5	0	5
Capital Military District	13	38	19	18	4	0	7
I Corps	24	41	21	14	0	0	0
II Corps	17	49	27	2	5	0	0
III Corps	17	34	25	23	0	0	2
IV Corps	13	41	33	10	0	0	3
Sector and Subsector Advisors	21	54	17	4	2	0	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	25	47	16	9	0	0	0
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	33	46	15	5	0	0	0

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QUESTION 9: "When peasants have grievances with respect to GVN, what recourse is open to them?"

"(a) Established channels exist through which peasants are able to communicate easily and efficiently about their grievances to appropriate officials.

"(b) Established channels for communication exist, but they function inefficiently.

"(c) Established channels do not exist, but peasants are often able to make their grievances known to GVN.

"(d) Peasants are able to communicate to GVN about their grievances only by taking vigorous action.

"(e) Rarely, under any circumstances, do peasants succeed in communicating about their grievances to GVN.

"(f) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	7	43	3	7	12	28
Time Period 3	10	52	3	7	6	23
Time Period 2	3	36	3	6	19	33
Time Period 1	3	34	3	9	17	33
Capital Military District	0	21	4	6	17	52
I Corps	4	63	0	11	11	11
II Corps	7	49	5	12	7	20
III Corps	17	43	0	6	15	20
IV Corps	6	61	6	6	6	17
Sector and Subsector Advisors	14	70	2	6	4	4
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	9	67	12	6	3	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	29	52	3	0	5	11

QUESTION 20: "How effectively does GVN communicate its policies and intentions to the people? (Disregard the accuracy of the information communicated.)"

"(a) GVN makes almost no attempt to communicate with the people.

"(b) GVN occasionally communicates, or communication may be difficult to comprehend. Communications are delivered to only a small portion of the people.

"(c) GVN communicates moderately often, but there are major gaps. Communication may sometimes be difficult for the people to comprehend, or little attempt is made to reach certain segments of the population.

"(d) GVN communicates quite often, but on some important occasions there may be insufficient communication. Much of the communication is comprehensive and reaches a majority of the people.

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"(e) GVN informs the people, even those who are relatively inaccessible, about its policies. Communication is meaningful and easy to understand. Explanations are usually offered.

"(f) Have no ideas."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	1	20	47	10	0	21
Time Period 3	0	22	52	12	0	13
Time Period 2	3	16	53	9	0	19
Time Period 1	2	20	40	8	0	30
Capital Military District	2	20	45	3	0	31
I Corps	0	14	48	24	0	14
II Corps	0	29	45	5	0	21
III Corps	2	21	51	9	0	16
IV Corps	3	21	50	18	0	8
Sector and Subsector Advisors	0	18	59	19	2	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	13	58	16	6	6
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	21	55	21	0	3

QUESTION 21: "To the extent that GVN does communicate with the people, to what extent are these communications comprised of misinformation intended to deceive the people?"

"(a) Almost never.

"(b) Sometimes.

"(c) Usually.

"(d) Almost always.

"(e) Have no idea."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	16	20	7	1	57
Time Period 3	23	23	5	1	49
Time Period 2	9	15	12	0	64
Time Period 1	8	18	8	0	66
Capital Military District	7	19	7	1	64
I Corps	18	13	8	0	34
II Corps	14	24	5	0	57
III Corps	24	22	0	0	55
IV Corps	13	15	15	0	56
Sector and Subsector Advisors	37	20	2	0	41
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	20	30	3	0	47
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	27	14	0	0	59

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QUESTION 12: "To what extent does the Vietnamese military (ARVN) respect the personal rights of the civilian?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal rights, or personal rights are minimal. Citizens are frequently abused, coerced, or treated disrespectfully.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards personal rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal rights, and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	21	52	17	5	6
Time Period 3	20	51	18	7	5
Time Period 2	19	61	6	8	6
Time Period 1	24	48	20	1	7
Capital Military District	28	43	15	3	12
I Corps	4	50	21	18	7
II Corps	12	56	20	5	7
III Corps	25	56	16	2	0
IV Corps	27	54	16	3	0
Sector and Subsector Advisors	21	50	12	15	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	13	61	16	6	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	8	44	16	21	10

QUESTION 13: "To what extent does the paramilitary respect the personal rights of the civilian?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal rights, or personal rights are minimal. Citizens are frequently abused, coerced, or treated disrespectfully.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards personal rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal rights, and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

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DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	6	36	29	10	18
Time Period 3	6	35	33	11	15
Time Period 2	3	53	21	6	18
Time Period 1	7	31	29	11	23
Capital Military District	5	32	19	3	42
I Corps	11	14	54	11	11
II Corps	0	43	30	16	11
III Corps	7	35	33	15	11
IV Corps	9	54	23	9	6
Sector and Subsector Advisors	2	40	34	21	4
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	3	45	32	16	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	2	31	31	31	6

QUESTION 14: "To what extent does the US military respect the personal rights of the civilian?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal rights, or personal rights are minimal. Citizens are frequently abused, coerced, or treated disrespectfully.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards personal rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal rights, and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	1	6	11	64	18
Time Period 3	0	7	9	65	19
Time Period 2	0	6	14	69	11
Time Period 1	1	5	13	62	19
Capital Military District	1	10	19	45	21
I Corps	0	4	11	81	4
II Corps	0	5	21	60	14
III Corps	0	2	7	71	20
IV Corps	0	8	0	71	21
Sector and Subsector Advisors	0	0	6	80	14
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	0	0	91	9
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	2	5	73	20

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QUESTION 15: "To what extent does the Vietnamese military (ARVN) respect the property rights of the local population?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal property rights, or rights are minimal. Appropriation or abuse of property is common.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards property rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal property rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal property rights and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	21	44	18	5	12
Time Period 3	19	46	20	7	9
Time Period 2	26	54	9	3	9
Time Period 1	22	39	18	3	17
Capital Military District	19	39	19	1	22
I Corps	14	39	21	14	11
II Corps	17	48	23	2	12
III Corps	33	42	15	4	7
IV Corps	18	58	13	10	3
Sector and Subsector Advisors	23	54	8	13	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	24	52	17	3	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	12	32	17	27	12

QUESTION 16: "To what extent does the paramilitary respect the property rights of the local population?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal property rights, or rights are minimal. Appropriation or abuse of property is common.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards property rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal property rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal property rights and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

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DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	8	30	28	11	23
Time Period 3	7	31	34	12	17
Time Period 2	14	43	9	11	23
Time Period 1	6	24	29	10	32
Capital Military District	3	19	21	6	51
I Corps	7	33	33		15
II Corps	2	27	38	16	18
III Corps	11	33	29	16	11
IV Corps	17	47	22	6	8
Sector and Subsector Advisors	4	37	34	21	4
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	6	38	41	16	0
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	23	37	35	5

QUESTION 17: "To what extent does the US military respect the property rights of the local population?"

"(a) Military frequently disregards personal property rights or rights are minimal. Appropriation or abuse of property is common.

"(b) Military sometimes disregards property rights, but more often refrains from extensive infringements.

"(c) Except in cases of infrequent emergency, military usually respects personal property rights.

"(d) Military is very respectful of personal property rights and seldom does an infringement occur.

"(e) Impossible to say."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	1	4	22	65	9
Time Period 3	0	1	25	63	11
Time Period 2	0	9	15	74	3
Time Period 1	1	5	21	65	9
Capital Military District	1	9	32	50	7
I Corps	0	0	4	65	31
II Corps	0	2	27	68	2
III Corps	0	0	15	79	6
IV Corps	0	0	19	73	8
Sector and Subsector Advisors	0	0	12	84	4
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	3	7	86	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	0	9	81	10

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QUESTION 7: "How responsive is GVN to the problems of the peasants?"

"(a) GVN is genuinely interested in the peasant's problems and offers considerable assistance.

"(b) GVN is interested in the peasant's problems but because of circumstances is unable to provide much assistance.

"(c) GVN has some interest in the peasant's problems and provides limited assistance.

"(d) GVN has no real interest, though there may be some lip service, and very little attempt is made to provide assistance.

"(e) GVN has considerable interest and will carry out long term development programs if provided US assistance.

"(f) Unable to answer."

DATA (percentages only):

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	3	23	35	16	9	14
Time Period 3	4	24	40	12	9	11
Time Period 2	3	26	35	18	9	9
Time Period 1	1	21	30	20	8	20
Capital Military District	0	21	32	15	11	21
I Corps	0	23	35	12	19	12
II Corps	4	22	35	20	4	13
III Corps	2	24	35	17	7	13
IV Corps	8	26	41	15	5	5
Sector and Subsector Advisors	4	30	42	10	12	2
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	7	17	43	10	20	3
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	3	31	38	5	15	8

QUESTION 19: "What should be the role of the informal provincial committee (Sector Advisor, USOM Rep, Province Chief) in pacification?"

"(a) It should be expanded to include USIS representation.

"(b) It should be expanded to include USIS and State representation.

"(c) It should be expanded to include (see: NOTE below).

"(d) It should be disbanded.

"(e) It should be formalized with one agency representative as senior advisor to the province chief.

"(f) It should develop into a small country team with control passing from MACV to State for long term development activity.

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DATA (percentages only):

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	27	13	7	3	27	24
Time Period 3	26	14	8	2	26	24
Time Period 2	33	8	8	6	22	22
Time Period 1	24	15	3	3	30	24
Capital Military District	22	7	2	6	28	35
I Corps	18	11	25	0	32	16
II Corps	31	19	2	0	26	21
III Corps	29	18	4	2	24	24
IV Corps	32	9	9	6	28	35
Sector and Subsector Advisors	28	13	8	2	33	15
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	10	10	10	0	47	23
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	24	11	18	0	13	33

NOTE: Remarks filling in the blank are varied. The largest number of responses suggest including a CAS representative on the committee; others suggest including the local senior ARVN advisor, a Vietnamese Information Service representative and a JUSPAO representative. In addition, a police advisor, the local National Police chief, leading citizens and local religious leaders are also mentioned. Ten specific comments also reiterate the need for a USIS representative. The inclusion of the district chief and his senior US advisor are also recommended.

QUESTION 22: "Resources to carry out pacification should be:

- "(a) Retained at Saigon level?
- "(b) Decentralized to corps level?
- "(c) Decentralized to province level?
- "(d) Controlled by US advisors at all levels and passed to Vietnamese counterparts at level of utilization?"

DATA (percentages only):

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	4	8	34	54
Time Period 3	2	8	31	58
Time Period 2	7	0	48	45
Time Period 1	6	10	33	52
Capital Military District	5	13	28	53
I Corps	4	7	21	68
II Corps	5	2	30	63
III Corps	4	8	45	43
IV Corps	3	6	42	50
Sector and Subsector Advisors	0	0	44	56

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NOTE: This question was changed for address by advisors in SVN since January of 1965 by inserting, as a new selection (d), the item "Decentralized to province level." Old item (d) was retained as selection (e) in the new version. Current advisors responded as follows:

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	6	49	14	31
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	1	5	29	30	35

QUESTION 28: "How could US-GVN plans be more effectively executed?"

"(a) Following existing GVN command and Ministerial organization lines.

"(b) Using the project manager concept. (A single individual follows program such as Chieu Hoi through to completion.)

"(c) 'Building' advisory leverage into plans.

"(d) Integrating efforts at national level by executing a single program jointly agreed upon by GVN and all US agencies.

"(e) Control of resources until utilization."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	8	6	24	33	30
Time Period 3	10	6	27	28	30
Time Period 2	7	7	18	39	30
Time Period 1	6	5	23	35	30
Capital Military District	7	6	21	33	34
I Corps	14	3	23	26	34
II Corps	8	10	31	23	29
III Corps	2	6	32	40	20
IV Corps	12	4	14	37	33
Sector and Subsector Advisors	11	2	24	30	32
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	10	3	31	33	23
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	8	15	24	26	27

QUESTION 29: "Was the Province Chief reluctant to execute nonmilitary 'IS-GVN programs?"

"(a) Due to lack of interest in the people.

"(b) Lack of knowledge of funds available.

"(c) Unwillingness to accept the program.

"(d) Fear of VC reprisal.

"(e) Province Chief was not reluctant."

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DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	10	13	11	4	62
Time Period 3	11	17	10	4	58
Time Period 2	5	18	9	5	64
Time Period 1	10	6	14	2	68
Capital Military District	5	15	11	15	53
I Corps	21	11	11	0	58
II Corps	15	18	15	0	53
III Corps	2	5	10	0	83
IV Corps	10	21	10	7	52
Sector and Subsector Advisors	10	19	9	0	64

NOTE: This question was changed for address by advisors in SVN since January of 1965 by inserting, as a new selection (e), the item "Lack of knowledge of desires of higher commanders." Old item (e) was retained as selection (f) in the new version. Current advisors responded as follows:

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	17	11	0	8	64
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	0	5	8	0	5	81

QUESTION 23: "What military techniques are most successful against the VC?"

- "(a) Area saturation.
- "(b) Large sweeps.
- "(c) Eagle flights.
- "(d) Stay behind operations.
- "(e) Others (List) (see: NOTE below).

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	29	3	27	21	21
Time Period 3	30	3	30	21	17
Time Period 2	35	0	28	13	25
Time Period 1	25	2	22	25	26
Capital Military District	26	3	31	20	20
I Corps	34	6	20	14	26
II Corps	20	2	23	32	23
III Corps	31	1	28	21	20
IV Corps	35	2	30	15	19
Sector and Subsector	37	1	21	24	16

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NOTE: This question was changed for address by advisors in SVN since January of 1965 by inserting, as a new selection (e), the item "Sweep with prolonged operations around the periphery." Old item (e) was retained as selection (f) in the new version. Current advisors responded as follows:

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	32	2	12	22	17	15
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	32	2	20	18	12	15

QUESTION 25: "To what extent should you advise your counterpart on political matters?"

"(a) Should stay away from political problems, if at all possible.

"(b) Should offer advice only when direct military implications exist.

"(c) Should offer advice only when specifically requested by counterpart.

"(d) Should become moderately involved with political affairs, sometimes offering advice even when no direct military implications exist and counterpart makes no specific request.

"(e) Should assume a very active role in advising counterpart about political matters regardless of counterpart's requests, but not to the point of jeopardizing the relationship with counterpart."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	30	22	17	23	8
Time Period 3	34	17	18	20	17
Time Period 2	30	30	15	21	25
Time Period 1	25	26	17	28	26
Capital Military District	29	16	15	29	11
I Corps	23	38	15	21	4
II Corps	43	22	16	16	3
III Corps	28	26	21	17	9
IV Corps	26	7	16	28	12
Sector and Subsector Advisors	19	28	21	23	10
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	21	26	12	29	12
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	32	20	19	23	6

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QUESTION 27: "How did you carry out your advisory duty to get plans executed?"

- "(a) By establishing a close personal friendship with my counterpart.
- "(b) By withdrawal of military resources.
- "(c) By control of funds.
- "(d) By bringing "pressure to bear" through the next higher US-GVN echelon."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	56	12	11	21
Time Period 3	51	14	10	24
Time Period 2	47	12	22	20
Time Period 1	68	7	8	18
Capital Military District	56	11	16	18
I Corps	53	13	13	23
II Corps	63	10	13	13
III Corps	51	11	8	30
IV Corps	56	15	8	20
Sector and Subsector Advisors	59	15	9	21
Sector Advisors (TP 4 only)	61	10	8	20
Subsector Advisors (TP 4 only)	68	5	12	15

QUESTION 30: "To what extent is Vietnamese language proficiency essential to an advisor at your level?"

- "(a) Should be able to speak Vietnamese fluently.
- "(b) Should be able to understand normal conversations without difficulty and have some speaking ability.
- "(c) Should be able to catch the gist of conversations and speak a few words.
- "(d) Need to understand and speak only a few words.
- "(e) Need not have any language proficiency."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	15	42	22	5	16
Time Period 3	16	42	25	3	14
Time Period 2	11	36	14	14	25
Time Period 1	16	43	21	4	17
Capital Military District	10	29	28	3	29

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	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>
I Corps	15	48	22	0	15
II Corps	18	55	11	5	11
III Corps	22	35	26	36	15
IV Corps	11	53	18	11	8
Sector and Subsector Advisors	22	54	14	4	6

NOTE: This question was changed for address by advisors in SVN since January of 1965 by inserting, as a new selection (e), the item "Not necessary but would be a valuable asset." Old item (e) was retained as selection (f) in the new version. Current advisors responded as follows:

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(d)</u>	<u>(e)</u>	<u>(f)</u>
Total Sample (TP 4 only)	25	38	17	1	19	0
Sector Advisors	21	24	21	0	33	0
Subsector Advisors	26	44	15	1	13	0

Examples of the remarks supporting the above follow: "Not being able to speak the language has limited my effectiveness by an estimated 50 percent"--"VN people look up to someone who can converse with them"--"All US advisors working at the Subsector level should be able to speak Vietnamese."

QUESTION 31: "Should you have had additional preparation of any sort for the military aspect of your advisory assignment?"

"(a) Yes.

"(b) No.

" If yes to above, indicate:

"(a) Nature of your preparation.

"(b) Nature of additional preparation required."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	53	47
Time Period 3	51	49
Time Period 2	49	51
Time Period 1	57	43
Capital Military District	52	48

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	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>
I Corps	62	38
II Corps	51	49
III Corps	58	42
IV Corps	43	57
Sector and Subsector Advisors	63	37
Total Sample (TP 4 only)	35	65
Sector Advisors	32	68
Subsector Advisors	37	63

QUESTION 32: "Should you have had additional preparation of any sort for the nonmilitary aspects of your advisory assignment?"

"(a) Yes.

"(b) No.

"If yes to above, indicate:

"(a) Nature of your preparation.

"(b) Nature of additional preparation required."

DATA (percentages only):

	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>
Total Sample (TP 1-3 only)	49	51
Time Period 3	48	52
Time Period 2	41	59
Time Period 1	52	48
Capital Military District	40	60
I Corps	58	42
II Corps	38	62
III Corps	51	49
IV Corps	61	39
Sector and Subsector Advisors	73	27
Total Sample (TP 4 only)	58	42
Sector Advisors	50	50
Subsector Advisors	62	38

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ANNEX H

LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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ANNEX H

LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

"The time has long since passed when a broader look at this situation should have been taken. I would like you to stand away from the problem and examine it from the broadest possible perspective."^{1/}

Long-Range World Developments

The world environment of the next two decades will be dominated by the growing economic and technological gap between the developed and the less developed countries. The resulting disparity in living standards will create widespread instability which will be compounded by continually increasing shortages of food in many areas, particularly in Asia. The effectiveness of international cooperation in meeting these problems will decline in the short run, but may increase in the 1970s as many developments combine to make the overall world situation more acute.

The fundamental cause of the anticipated growing disparity between the rich and poor nations is that high growth rates in population will continue to limit the net benefits of economic growth throughout the underdeveloped world.^{2/} Probably the most critical element in this situation will be the declining rates of per capita food production in many areas.^{3/} The impact of this worsening food problem will be felt most severely in the near future in Asia.^{4/} India and Communist China are becoming increasingly dependent on agricultural assistance from the United States and Canada, but it appears unlikely that the latter countries will continue indefinitely to be able or willing to make up the deficits in Asian food production.^{5/} Moreover, due to the magnitude of its own agricultural problems, the Soviet Union will be unable to export significant quantities of food.^{6/}

The failure of the United Nations, as a peace-keeping and issue-solving instrument, will be demonstrated repeatedly throughout the remainder of the 1960s. Disarmament negotiations and major peace-keeping efforts will be largely nonproductive. The increasing representa-


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tion and demands of the less developed countries are likely to jeopardize seriously the very existence of the organization and may even compel the industrial nations to seek a basis for international cooperation outside the UN.^{7/} If the UN survives, however, its effectiveness may be rejuvenated in the 1970s by urgent requirements for international solutions to meet an expanding array of world security problems (e.g., dispersal of nuclear capabilities, accelerated developments of the military uses of outer space and the advent of large-scale weather-modification testing activities).^{8/}

Figure H-1



Strategic Significance of Southeast Asia in the Decade Ahead

While the primary strategic significance of Southeast Asia in the short run lies in the ideological confrontation represented by the ongoing conflict in South Vietnam, the long-term significance of the area lies in its geographic and economic potential for contributing, on the one hand, to the expansion of Red Chinese world power, or, on the other, to the attainment of US objectives in the Asian region.

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SEA in general, and SVN in particular, has become the focus of the international struggle between the US and communism. The SVN confrontation also reflects the conflicting Sino-Soviet ideological concepts as represented by the Chinese-supported "people's wars" and the more subtle Russian-supported "wars of national liberation."^{9/} With mounting emphasis, the SVN conflict has been termed the testing round between US and communist ideologies, especially the Chinese variety; and, to a lesser extent, between the Moscow and Peking communist viewpoints. A communist victory in SVN would not only have a grave, adverse impact on US world prestige and leadership, particularly in the underdeveloped world, but would also give impetus to the CPR's violent revolutionary ideology. A communist defeat, on the other hand, would adversely impact the prestige of the communist nations, especially the CPR; it would demonstrate a positive US capability to defeat a communist insurgency, even at the very doorstep of Red China. The value of either Chinese or Soviet promises of aid and assistance for anti-United States insurgent movements elsewhere in the world would thus be called into question.^{10/}

The long-range strategic significance of SEA, however, needs to be viewed in the broader perspective of basic US foreign policy objectives and international interests. Geographically, the SEA mainland represents the most logical avenue of CPR expansion. History highlights the almost continuous Chinese surge in this direction. (See: ANNEX A) It is the only large area contiguous to CPR borders where no single major indigenous power exists to oppose them. With mainland SEA under its control, Peking would possess the significant springboard for further expansion toward eventual control over the important shipping lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, the underutilized lands of mainland SEA represent the most attractive area for Red Chinese expansion. The SEA rice bowl, if controlled by Peking, could produce agricultural surpluses needed to alleviate critical Chinese shortages in the years ahead.^{11/} With political stability and relatively simple improvements in agricultural methods, the region's rice production could be at least doubled, providing a surplus of 20 to 30 million tons.^{12/} This surplus would equal about one-sixth of the CPR's average grain production in recent years.^{13/}

By the same token, SEA holds the potential for becoming a significant asset to US and Free World interests in Asia; first, as a geographical buffer to CPR expansion and, secondly, as a source of food, raw materials and markets required for the economic development of non-communist Asian nations. ^{14/} Within the projected world environment, these factors can be expected to become increasingly significant in terms of US interests on into the 1970s.^{15/} The most fundamental US interest will remain the development of a peaceful, prosperous and open society of the free nations in the region.

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Projected National Objectives and Strategies Toward Southeast Asia

The Soviet Union. Moscow will pursue varying strategies toward SEA with the constant objective of limiting both US and Chinese influence in the region; but without risking the national security or economic development of the Soviet Union itself. If faced with a clear-cut choice, the USSR might prefer continued US influence to expansion of CPR dominance in SEA.

The objectives of Soviet foreign policy that are relevant to its strategy toward SEA follow:^{16/}

- (1) Maintain sufficient military power to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union.
- (2) Improve the performance of the Soviet economy.
- (3) Strengthen the Soviet position with respect to Communist China in the world communist movement.
- (4) Expand Soviet influence in the less developed countries by assisting "national liberation movements" and pro-Soviet governments.

From the Soviet point of view, the major external threats to the first and second objectives will most likely result from developments in the US and Western Europe.^{17/} An increased US military advantage, a revival of West German militarism, or a confrontation with the US involving the threat of general war can threaten Soviet national security and force increased diversion of resources from internal economic development to defense. It is highly doubtful that Soviet leaders would desire to jeopardize either of these two objectives over any issue arising from the conflict in SEA.^{18/} They will, however, probably attempt to exploit US or European weaknesses resulting from problems in SEA in order to reduce more direct threats to Soviet national security and economic development.

The USSR will pursue its third objective, strengthening the Soviet position in the world communist movement, by attempting to diminish the Chinese influence within the communist nations and parties world-wide. This objective could be furthered in SEA by such actions as: (1) providing sufficient political, economic and military assistance to make the USSR the dominant external influence over the communist movements in the region; (2) offering substantial Soviet aid to North Vietnam only on the condition that it support Moscow against Peking; (3) creating a situation in which the CPR would be blamed within the world communist movement for any communist failures in SEA; or, (4) offering

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Soviet military and economic support to the CPR if it would again accept Moscow as the leader of world communism.

In the long run, USSR interests would be optimally served by developments that would expand and intensify Moscow's politico-economic influence without, however, incurring the dangers of general war or of commitments that would detract from the economic development of the USSR itself. With this in mind, Soviet leaders in the years ahead will likely strive to improve relations with the governments and indigenous communist movements of SEA, in order to prevent both continued US influence and expanded CPR dominance in the region. Conceivably, Moscow could support Indian, Japanese or Indonesian ambitions to establish spheres of influence in SEA as an alternative preferable to either Chinese or US dominance in the region. On this basis, the USSR might be able indirectly to replace both US and CPR influence with its own.

The fourth objective, that of expanding Soviet influence in the less developed countries of the world, is being pursued through actions designed to improve relations between the USSR and those governments of South and Southeast Asia. Should the US suffer a defeat in SVN, Moscow would likely seek to expand its influence among the nations of SEA, presenting itself as better able to protect these countries against Chinese expansionism than the US.19/

The most difficult policy problem for Soviet leadership would entail a situation wherein a clear-cut choice had to be made between CPR and US dominance in SEA. If the USSR supported Peking, it would be following a correct course ideologically, but one which would likely diminish its chances of preventing CPR exploitation of the region's resources. On the other hand, while support of the US would be ideologically unsound, such a course of action would leave open the possibility of later removing US influence from the region. Moscow would likely have a better chance of increasing its influence in a SEA oriented toward the Free World than in one under Peking domination. The Soviet decision would, of course, depend on the world situation at the time, particularly on respective relations with the CPR and the US, but it appears probable that the attainment of Kremlin objectives would be handicapped more by the establishment of Chinese hegemony over SEA than by continued US influence there.20/

Communist China. During the next decade, the CPR can be expected to pursue a variety of different strategies aimed at the achievement of the constant major objective of establishing its hegemony over SEA. This objective would not change in the event of a communist defeat in SVN. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the present SVN conflict, Peking will probably continue to present a serious threat to SEA for at

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least the next two decades, barring an unlikely reversal of CPR foreign policy objectives (e.g., following the demise of Mao).

The CPR long-range aspiration is to become the major world power. In pursuit of this goal, the Red Chinese will strive to deprive the US and the USSR of allies and to demonstrate that no major world problem can be solved without Peking participation. Therefore, CPR leadership will endeavor to obtain economic and political ties with Western nations who may be at odds with the USSR and the US. By 1985, the CPR will occupy an important place in world councils, to include the UN. Moreover, Peking will continue to increase its own national power by developing its nuclear potential and by attempting to acquire control over additional natural resources.

The most obvious way for the CPR to increase its own natural resource base is to expand into SEA and exploit that region's underutilized agricultural and mineral resources. If properly developed, SEA could make a highly significant contribution to the CPR's overall economic development.^{21/} Since SEA is highly vulnerable to the types of strategies which are within Peking's capabilities, the region will represent the most logical avenue for Chinese expansion over at least the next two decades. The specific approaches of tactics may vary, but the objective of establishing CPR hegemony over SEA will in all probability remain paramount. A development which could alter this objective would be a radical reversal of Peking foreign policy, such as might follow the demise of Mao. Although many changes can be expected after Mao leaves the scene, the strategic significance of SEA to the CPR as a nation will remain. Hence, it is unlikely that the Red Chinese desire for control of SEA will lessen after Mao.^{22/}

The pursuit of dominance in SEA necessarily places Peking in opposition to all other external powers with interests in the region, most notably the US, India, the United Kingdom, Japan and the USSR. At the present time, the CPR is, in effect, challenging these powers simultaneously by, among other things, promoting the export of an ideology that not only conflicts with Soviet interests, but also encourages dissident elements within the less developed countries of the world to undertake violent revolutions which could distract the attention of the US and other powers and engage their resources elsewhere. Since the SVN conflict is the current testing ground for CPR ideology, a communist defeat would greatly reduce the future value of this particular psychological weapon.

A defeat might also cause the CPR to adopt more flexible foreign policies, designed to divide the external powers against themselves and to enlist the temporary support of one or more of them in furtherance of Red Chinese ambitions in SEA. Assuming that a communist defeat in SVN occurs in the late 1960s, this new strategy would become a possibility

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in the early 1970s, especially after Mao passes from the scene and a new Peking leadership elite emerges.

The CPR's major immediate interest in SEA lies in acquiring control over those countries with a surplus food potential (i.e., Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and SVN). ^{25/} Since control over any of these countries would benefit the CPR cause, Peking has the policy option of exploiting weaknesses that may develop anywhere in SEA due to an expanded US commitment in SVN which reduces US capabilities to react to aggression elsewhere. In the same light, a communist defeat in SVN would not block further Red Chinese intrusion into other parts of SEA. Indeed, Peking could conceivably embark on a major diversion elsewhere, perhaps Thailand or Burma, in order to prevent a defeat in SVN. ^{24/}

Peking leaders will also attempt, wherever possible, to divide the nations of SEA in order to weaken the region as a whole. They already have supported Cambodia against SVN and Indonesia against Malaysia; the future could readily include the encouragement of antagonism between Burma and Thailand or Cambodia and Thailand. In following this tactic, Red China may offer peace and economic aid to some countries, while threatening others with violent subversion and nuclear blackmail. Peking will experience great difficulty in raising its own ordinary living standards due to tremendous internal population pressure; but, its human energies will be enormous, and its use of science and technology will burgeon.

North Vietnam. Hanoi has its own vital stake in winning the ongoing conflict; success can mark achievement of the power base necessary to ensure a greater degree of independence from the CPR. If it fails, the DRV would probably completely lose its capability for national action independent of Peking.

Hanoi leaders appear to have fixed upon three fundamental and interrelated objectives: (1) to maintain and upgrade the independence of their own country with respect to the CPR; (2) to reunify Indochina under Hanoi leadership; and, (3) to establish Vietnam as the major power in SEA.^{25/} The communist leaders of NVN, like those of China, Yugoslavia and the USSR, seized power largely through their own hard efforts and thus have strong personal ambitions to protect and extend the power they so arduously acquired.

Lying next to the more powerful CPR, however, the DRV no doubt recognizes that its long-term existence as an independent political entity requires an extension of its own power base (i.e., a broadened economic and political foundation). As long as NVN remains small, overpopulated and poor, it will be highly vulnerable to Peking dominance. Hence, the DRV vitally needs to achieve some basis for reducing this

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great disparity of power between itself and the CPR.

The key to achieving this goal would appear to lie in the current SVN conflict. In the short term, a DRV victory in SVN without extensive Chinese involvement, or perhaps even a favorable negotiated settlement, would gain Hanoi significant prestige and leverage in its relationships with Peking. Over the long term, such could accord Hanoi much-needed economic resources as well as a strategic basis for reuniting Indochina under Hanoi control and expanding its influence both in SEA and among world Communists. By controlling Indochina, the DRV would more than quadruple the territory, double the population and triple the food production under its control. ^{26/} This would mean that in SEA, a communist Indochina would be second only to Indonesia in size and population and would possess a significant potential for agricultural export.

With this increased power, the DRV would have a much-improved chance of withstanding CPR pressure and of becoming the significant dynamism in SEA. On the other hand, a clear Hanoi defeat in SVN or extensive and direct Peking involvement in the conflict would probably result in the CPR gaining direct control over NVN. These circumstances demonstrate the vital stake Hanoi has in achieving its own victory in SVN or perhaps, second best, a favorable negotiated settlement without CPR participation.

The US presents the major obstacle to Hanoi's prospects for success in SVN. In such light, DRV basic strategy will likely hinge on the development of increasing international pressure to secure a reduced US commitment, or withdrawal, from SVN. However, except for creating diversions in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, Hanoi by itself holds marginal leverage with respect to the US, and may therefore have to seek both support from and accords with other nations hostile to the US. This would require some type of cooperation with Peking, Moscow or both. The DRV might also seek assistance from other anti-United States governments, such as Indonesia, Cuba or Egypt, which could create diversions by threatening US and other interests in Thailand, Burma, Latin America, Europe and elsewhere. Such tactics might create a world situation which would cause US Allies to press for a settlement of the present conflict on terms favorable to Hanoi. An increased Soviet threat to Europe, a Chinese invasion of Thailand or Burma, further exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split or West European fear as to US neglect of commitments in Europe are developments which would contribute to an international climate favoring DRV strategy.

Other Asian Nations. The non-communist nations of Asia all have a real or potential common interest in resisting communist aggression in any form and in achieving national economic development. Both of these interests would be served by regional cooperation aimed at developing the

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economic resources of SEA and maintaining security in that region. India and Japan are potential subregional and regional leaders; their future orientation is crucial to the balance of power in Asia and to US national security.

India has an obvious need for additional supplies of grain in order to satisfy not only its present but also the much greater future food deficits that are anticipated.^{27/} SEA is one of the few areas in the underdeveloped world that, if properly developed, could provide India with the additional food resources critically needed in the coming decade.^{28/} Conversely, in CPR hands, the resources of SEA would ultimately increase Red China's threat to India's national security.

Because of its location, Indonesia is not threatened by Chinese aggression in the near term; this assumes that the CPR does not intend to employ nuclear weapons against Indonesia. Indeed, Indonesia for the present appears to be more interested in expelling the US and the UK from the area in order to improve its own chances for establishing hegemony over insular SEA.^{29/} There is thus at least a temporary community of interest between Indonesia and the CPR and the USSR; Peking and Moscow also desire removal of the US from the region. If the CPR succeeds in attaining its objectives in SEA, however, it will then constitute a major threat to Indonesian ambitions and security. At present, Indonesia also faces severe economic problems and potential food shortages which could be alleviated by expanded trade with mainland SEA. Unless Indonesia makes a greater effort to settle its outlying islands, it may face food deficits as serious as those of India within a decade; Djakarta then will be as interested as anyone else in the import of food from SEA.^{30/}

The Philippines are threatened by Indonesian aspirations but probably to a lesser extent than Malaysia. Eventually, Peking's developing nuclear capability will also pose a threat to the Philippines. This should forge close American-Filipino ties, since the US would constitute a sole source of protection. On the other hand, however, it could impact adversely on continued cooperation between the Philippines and the US. By succumbing to CPR pressure and breaking relations with the US, however, Manila would risk serious damage to its own export economy. Present economic trends indicate a growing food deficit in the Philippines and a consequent need for increased trade within SEA.^{31/}

Japan, the most industrialized nation of Asia, is concerned with maintaining trade routes that pass through SEA. Tokyo will require increasing imports of raw materials, especially iron ore, that either originate in or are transported through SEA. In addition, Japan needs expanded exports and cannot be indifferent to the market potential of

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a developing SEA.^{32/} Although it is difficult to forecast at present, over the long run there may be a real possibility of establishing triangular trading arrangements among Japan, SEA and India.^{33/} The US must contemplate dealing with an increasingly powerful, confident, mature and dynamic Japanese nation.

Of greater importance to Tokyo, however, is the growing CPR nuclear threat.^{34/} Peking hegemony over SEA would not only deprive Japan of access to this region, but would also further increase Red China's power, something hardly in the long-range interest of Japan. Thus, it would seem that a basis will exist in the years ahead for Japan to become increasingly interested in both the containment of Peking and the economic development of SEA.

The interests of most non-communist Asian nations in the decade ahead would be served by maintaining SEA within the Free World and by developing the region's economic potential. Over the long term, this mutuality of interests can be expected to provide a favorable basis for regional cooperation.

Strategic Interests and Options of the United States. The long-term US strategic interests in SEA are to prevent the unilateral exploitation of the area's resources by a hostile CPR, and to develop these resources for the benefit of Asia in general through non-communist Asian leadership. Options available to Washington in pursuit of these interests, in declining order of acceptability, are:

(1) To promote and support Asian-sponsored, cooperative regional development of the economic potential of SEA in order to strengthen the capabilities of all Asian nations to withstand CPR aggression.

(2) To support the partition of SEA into economic spheres of influence in which the interests and capabilities of the larger non-communist Asian nations would be projected into SEA.

(3) To acquiesce to Hanoi domination in Indochina in the hope that a Tito-style communist government would develop to the point where it could thwart Peking aims in SEA.

(4) To permit increased Moscow influence in SEA as a buffer to CPR expansion.

Orienting the focus of non-communist Asian leadership on regional economic development would not only add strength to the nations of SEA in maintaining their independence against CPR aggression, but such could

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contribute significantly to the economies of India, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines and other Asian nations as well. Moreover, if properly exploited, the lands of SEA could produce enough food surpluses to eliminate half of the total world food deficit projected for the year 1970. Such developments eventually would create an environment permitting a reduction of US commitments in SEA.

There would appear to be four strategic options available to the US. The first entails following the present objective of establishing independent and viable nation states in SEA, an objective implying that the US will oppose any nation, communist or non-communist, which seeks to establish hegemony over part or all of SEA. This includes consideration of the possible latent aspirations of such countries as Japan, Indonesia and India.^{35/} Of immediate and paramount concern, however, is the need to confront closely and oppose the outward surge of a Peking regime that threatens US interests in Asia.

A second possible option follows from the first and from the US interest in eventually reducing its commitment to the region. This would involve the provision of encouragement and support to non-communist nations who, either now or in the future, may desire to develop spheres of influence in SEA and, in so doing, accept part of the burden of defending the region and developing its resources. Herein, the US might sustain India's reassertion of the cultural influence it once enjoyed in large parts of SEA and establishment of a sphere of influence covering Burma and perhaps Thailand, both producers of rice surpluses needed by India. Similarly, the US might support increased Japanese influence and assistance in Malaysia and Indonesia, countries that hold mineral resources needed by the Japanese economy and that control sea routes important to Japan. The Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand also offer significant promise in terms of promoting the achievement of Free World objectives in the area. If successful, in the long run this strategy would place the immediate burden of defending SEA on the larger Asian countries, all which are or will be threatened by Peking's nuclear capability and are therefore potential allies.

The third option amounts to accepting limited communist domination of SEA; it would require a major alteration of present US objectives. This would mean acquiescing in the establishment of an enlarged communist NVN to include South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The option assumes that Hanoi in the long term is less of a threat to US security than is either the USSR or the CPR and, that once possessed of sufficient resources and external contacts, NVN would strive to maintain itself as a communist power independent of both the CPR and the USSR. In this case, Washington would reduce its military commitment in former French Indochina, be prepared to include the enlarged Communist NVN in aid and

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trade programs supported by the US and the Free World, and at the same time improve the defenses of Thailand to the point where it would be able to defeat any Vietnamese attempts at invasion or subversion. Hopefully, the new Vietnam would recognize that the greatest threat to its security was represented by Peking and therefore would oppose CPR expansion into SEA and cooperate in general development of the area.

The fourth option would be least desirable. Recognizing that the USSR and Red China have conflicting national interests and that Moscow itself can derive little direct benefit from exploiting the resources of SEA, the US might encourage and permit the USSR to become the dominant external power in SEA. From the point of view of US security, this might come to be considered as preferable to CPR control of SEA. By accepting this situation, Moscow would improve its own standing among the less developed nations, to whom it could ship food from SEA, but would also find itself committed in an area distant from the USSR proper and with access to the region blocked by two hostile states, the CPR and the US. Thus, Soviet dominance of SEA would assist in the further expansion of USSR power among the less developed nations, but would also create a serious vulnerability that hostile states might exploit. Furthermore, Moscow would likely be required to divert sizable resources from its own economy to develop the potential of SEA in order to obtain maximum advantage from its new position. Japan, India, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and probably Indonesia would feel threatened by this course of events, and might in turn draw closer to the US in their search for national security. In view of the strong CPR interest in dominating SEA, this option would almost ensure continued hostility between the USSR and the CPR.

Strategic Implications for the United States

In light of the foregoing projections, five major implications stand out as essential in the development of US strategy toward the SVN conflict:

- (1) The nature and scope of both the regional and global significance of SEA will need to be fully appreciated and reflected in world-wide US national objectives and programs.
- (2) Attainment of US objectives in SVN will require US military and economic commitments in SVN and SEA through at least the 1970s.
- (3) To be successful, the US pacification and long-term

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development program in SVN will need to be an integral part of a broader Asian strategy.

(4) US strategy in Asia will need to focus not only on military containment of the CPK, but also on long-term economic and political development of the non-communist Asian nations as the ultimate US objective in the area.

(5) In order to be effective, US assistance for Asian security and development programs will need to be fully integrated, over the long term, with cooperative regional programs which are based on genuine indigenous leadership, interests and participation.

Long-Range US Involvement. Regardless of the short-term outcome of the SVN conflict, substantial US military, economic and political commitments will be required in SEA throughout the long-range planning period. Even a successful fracturing of communist military capabilities in SVN would constitute only a beginning step toward attainment of pacification and development in SVN. Likewise, a stalemate or negotiations (with or without settlement) would not decrease the need for long-term US commitments to the area. Finally, a communist victory in SVN would require a regrouping of US forces elsewhere in the region as insurance against continued communist advance.

The requirement for long-term US assistance is based primarily on three projected factors. First, if the Communists are defeated or contained in SVN, their relentless pursuit of the SEA region would no doubt continue in other forms or other places (e.g., a return to covert guerrilla tactics in SVN or some combination of covert and overt moves in Laos, Thailand or Burma). Second, a cessation of high-intensity conflict in SVN would not remove the need for long-term development of the country as the requisite to a climate of stability that will stick. Third, US strategic interests in the area will require continued US vigilance there to counter further manifestations of communist aggression.

Regional Perspective. The SVN conflict cannot be viewed by the US as a special problem, separate and distinct from the larger problems of Asia. The Peking and Hanoi threat is not limited to SVN. Communist strategies, including that of Moscow, are constant in their recognition of the world-wide nature of the confrontation with the US. While presently focused on SVN, these strategies allow for a wide range of alternative implementing tactics.

Moreover, the long-range development of SVN cannot be achieved independent of broader Asian problems confronting the US. A "showcase" strategy in SVN, even if successful, would create an artificial structure fully dependent on permanent US support. In addition, this form

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of development would make no real contribution to building broad-based cohesiveness throughout the region for long-term containment of Red Chinese expansionism.

Ultimate Objective: Political and Economic Development. Although the major immediate concern of the US in SEA is military containment of the CPR in its drive for world power status, Asian nations generally view Communist China in direct relation to their own national interests: political independence and economic development. That is, these nations tend to look at Peking and Washington in reference to what these power centers may do to help or hinder their own existence or progress, rather than in terms of the larger East-West confrontation. Hence, the US will need to go out of its way to stress and act upon an ultimate objective of assisting in the building of independent, viable nations in SEA. Much psychological advantage can be gained from establishing the US role in SEA as one of assistance in meeting SEA's development and modernization problems, rather than one of using SEA to solve a US security problem.

In addition to this psychological factor, free interdependent nations in SEA represent the only ultimate solution to the security problems of this region. Unless national and popular aspirations for political independence, economic progress and social justice are met with at least minimal satisfaction, little hope can exist for securing the area against communist exploitation. This means that even when US programs are of necessity heavily weighted toward military actions, as in SVN now, special efforts will need to be made to implement security and development programs on a concurrent basis. Without some progress in SVN, for instance, toward attaining long-range development goals even during the intensive military phase, a climate of order and secure environment may never become a reality.

In the broader regional context, the US needs to ensure against a preoccupation with the military situation in SVN which would jeopardize US political influence in the region. Indeed, the SVN military situation requires that even greater efforts be made to strengthen US-Asian political ties. To do so may mean that the US will have to develop fresh approaches to continuing Asian problems, to include even the CPR recognition problem.

Regional Cooperation. Although internal security and internal development support operations will require a substantial US presence in SEA for at least the next 10 to 20 years, it will become increasingly necessary for Washington to adjust toward international cooperative arrangements that are sustained directly by indigenous nations and the UN. This requirement is based on two principal factors: development of

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SEA nations in the future will necessitate grass roots cooperative actions by those nations themselves, and fundamental US national interests in the area will tend to be best served through such arrangements.

Regardless of various political conflicts among the SEA nations, recognition of their own common interests will grow in the future under the pressure of popular aspirations and demands for modernization in compacted time spans. This trend will need to be encouraged and utilized by the US primarily in connection with, and largely through, area development programs. Cooperative security programs may become possible on a gradual basis, but only at the direct initiation of the local nations. SEATO-type arrangements (i.e., largely lacking in indigenous support) will need to be avoided in the future.

As for serving direct US interests, SEA regional cooperation could build a fabric of interdependence among the various SEA nations, which would facilitate development and hence stability and security against communist exploitation of the area. Moreover, achievement of a cooperative community of interdependent nations in SEA represents the sole US hope for eventually extricating itself from large-scale commitments to the region.

Basic Requirements for the United States

As a result of the foregoing implications, the US needs to develop now, for long-term execution, a regional Asian strategy and a US program for SVN as an integral part of that broader strategy. The basic requirement that must be met by this strategy is to ensure that military security of the region is maintained in a way that will permit indigenous economic and political development to proceed toward achieving in-region capabilities for resisting communist aggression and for attaining development goals. The needed strategy should envision internal security support actions operative as its defensive component and internal development assistance operations functioning as its offensive component. The strategic foundation must include both continued US ability to apply appropriate defensive or retaliatory military power (when and where needed), and the persistent credibility of US resolve to do so.

The most immediate strategic planning problem for the US in connection with the SVN conflict is the development, for Asia as a whole, of a penetrating and clear recognition of the nature and scope of the significance of SEA to the communist and the non-communist nations of Asia. This is a prerequisite to the development of both our ultimate

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Asian strategy and the more specific long-range program of assistance to SVN that is required.

The fundamental requirement for such a broad-based strategy is that of maintaining at least the present level of non-communist military access and control in Asia. This may, particularly in the immediate future, demand an increase in the US military commitment as well as sufficient flexibility to respond to communist military aggression at any point at which it may be directed in SEA. Based on this, regional economic development plans aimed at strengthening the indigenous capabilities of the Asian nations to resist communist aggression can be facilitated.

The catalyst which is vital to success in both of these broad areas of endeavor is regional cooperation. Without it, the military and economic strength of the region can probably never be brought to a point which would permit US disengagement from substantial, long-range commitments in Asia.

Such regional cooperation will need to be supported by capital and technical assistance from the industrialized nations, including West European nations and not excluding the USSR.^{36/} This will require the development of a major power Asian strategy that recognizes the significance of the area to future world developments and integrates major power assistance in the area to meet mutual interests there.

Cooperative regional development in Asia will need also to take advantage of the impetus already under way in this direction (e.g., the Mekong Development Project, the Asian Development Bank and the UN programs). The types of specific projects undertaken in these programs will need to be evaluated for their applicability to specific popular needs and for their potential contribution to regional economic complementarity.

Projects offering genuine and practical utility for the respective nations may need to be placed ahead of grandiose technological or industrial undertakings which net little grass roots impact for the populace. In SVN, for instance, relatively simple but widespread agricultural improvements may produce an earlier and more meaningful payoff for SVN internal security than hydroelectric plants on the Mekong. In addition, expanded agricultural surpluses could provide a basis for Saigon participation in regional economic cooperation and in contribution to a SEA grouping of nations.

Finally, for executing regional development programs, a mechanism will need to be set up for generating development requirements,

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priorities and specific projects on an indigenous basis. The Committee for the Alliance for Progress, made up primarily of Latin representatives, should serve as a prototype for a similar group in Asia, perhaps reporting to an "Asian Development Association." In like vein, a multinational Asian security committee might be developed to initiate cooperative security activities in the region. Most important, however, US pursuit of such concepts will need to make full use of selected Asian leaders as the initiators and emissaries of the concepts.

Conclusions

The world environment of the next two decades will be dominated by the growing economic and technological gap between the developed and the less developed countries. The resulting disparity in living standards will create widespread instability which will be compounded by continually increasing shortages of food in many areas, particularly in Asia. The effectiveness of international cooperation in meeting these problems will decline in the short run, but may increase in the 1970s as many developments combine to make the overall world situation more acute.

While the primary strategic significance of Southeast Asia in the short run lies in the ideological confrontation represented by the conflict in South Vietnam, the long-term significance of the area lies in its geographic and economic potential for contributing, on the one hand, to the expansion of Red Chinese power or, on the other, to the attainment of US objectives in the Asian region.

Moscow will pursue varying strategies toward SEA with the constant objective of limiting both US and CPR influence in the region, but without risking the national security or economic development of the Soviet Union itself. If faced with a clear-cut choice, the USSR might prefer continued US influence vis-a-vis expansion of CPR dominance in SEA.

Peking can be expected to pursue a variety of different strategies aimed at the achievement of the constant major objective of establishing its hegemony over SEA. This objective would not change in the event of a communist defeat in SVN. Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the present SVN conflict, the CPR will probably continue to present a serious threat to SEA for at least the next two decades, barring an unlikely reversal of CPR foreign policy objectives.

Hanoi has its own vital stake in winning the SVN conflict in order to achieve the power base necessary to ensure a greater degree of independence from the CPR. If it fails, the DRV would probably lose completely its capability for national action independent of Peking.

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The non-communist nations of Asia all have a real or potential common interest in resisting communist aggression, in any form, and in achieving national economic development. Both of these interests would be served by regional cooperation aimed at developing the economic resources of SEA and maintaining security in that region.

The long-range US strategic interests in SEA are to prevent unilateral exploitation of regional resources by a hostile CPR and to develop these resources for the benefit of Asia in general through non-communist Asian leadership. Options available to the US in pursuit of these interests, in declining order of acceptability, are:

(1) To promote and support Asian-sponsored, cooperative regional development of the economic potential of SEA in order to strengthen the capabilities of all Asian nations to withstand CPR aggression.

(2) To support the partition of SEA into economic spheres of influence in which the interests and capabilities of the larger non-communist Asian nations would be projected into SEA.

(3) To acquiesce to Hanoi domination in Indochina in the hope that a Tito-style communist government would develop to the point where it could thwart CPR aims in SEA.

(4) To permit increased Moscow influence in SEA as a buffer to CPR expansion.

In light of the foregoing projections, five major implications stand out as essential to US strategy toward the SVN conflict:

(1) The nature and scope of both the regional and global significance of SEA will need to be fully appreciated and reflected in world-wide US national objectives and programs.

(2) Attainment of US objectives in SVN will require US military and economic commitments in SVN and SEA through at least the 1970s.

(3) To be successful, the US pacification and long-term development effort in SVN will need to be part of a broader Asian strategy.

(4) US strategy in Asia will need to focus not only on military containment of the CPR, but also on long-term economic and political development of the non-communist Asian nations as the ultimate US objective in the area.

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(5) In order to be effective, US assistance for Asian security and development programs will need to be fully integrated, over the long term, with cooperative regional programs which are based on genuine indigenous leadership, interests and participation.

As a result of these implications, the US needs to develop now, for long-range execution, a regional Asian strategy and a US program for SVN as a part of this strategy. The basic requirement that must be met by this strategy is to ensure that military security of the region is maintained in a way that will permit indigenous economic and political development to proceed toward achieving in-region capabilities for resisting communist aggression and for attaining development goals. The key to the success of such a strategy will be regional cooperation. Without it, the US will not likely be able to disengage itself eventually from inordinate commitments to the region.

The design of this strategy lies outside the PROVN Charter. However, the need for its urgent development and test is underscored by the nature of certain opportunities which may materialize during the short-range period. The US must be prepared to apply positive measures and thereby extract maximum advantage from:

- (1) The aftermath of inevitable successions to power in Hanoi, Pyongyang, Djakarta and Peking.
- (2) Periods of certain and severe economic failure in Communist Asian nations.
- (3) Decisive US-GVN defeat of PAVN and Main Force VC units in SVN.

Successful execution of this ultimate strategic design will entail: (1) deterring or defeating communist aggression; (2) countering communist subversion and disruptive diplomacy; (3) reinforcing the stability of areas threatened by Asian communism and thereby enabling their preservation of a national integrity and achievement of economic-political-social modernization; and, (4) demonstrating to Asian Communist regimes the practicality of moderating and ultimately abandoning expansionist policy.

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Notes

1. Memorandum from the Chief of Staff, US Army, to Colonel J. J. Wilson, no subject, dated 3 May 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).
2. US State Dept Bulletin, 22 Nov 65, pp. 816-819; Kenneth Boulding, "US Policy and the Developing Nations: Population and Poverty," Correspondent, Autumn, 1965, pp. 38-40; US Dept of Agriculture, "FAO Sees World Food Gain Wiped Out by Population Rise," Foreign Agricultural Service, Foreign Agriculture, 25 Oct 65, p. 6.
3. US Dept of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Changes in Agriculture in 26 Developing Nations -- 1948 to 1963, p.v; Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, The State of Food and Agriculture, 1965: Review of the Second Postwar Decade, Rome, 1965, pp. 5-12; "World Food -- The Malthusian Decade," The Economist, 9 Oct 65, p 194. Congressional Record (14 Jan 66), Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 267-84.
4. US Dept of Agriculture, Foreign Regional Analysis Division, Supply and Demand for Selected Agricultural Products in India: Projections to 1975-76, 1965; US Dept of Agriculture, "India Again Hit by Food Shortage," Foreign Agricultural Service, Foreign Agriculture, 25 Oct 65, pp. 3-5.
5. US Dept of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, "Canadian Exports of Wheat and Flour Largest in History," World Agricultural Production and Trade -- Statistical Report, Sep 65, pp. 18-22.
6. Donald F. Lynch, "The Role of Soviet Agriculture in the Coming Internal Crisis," RAC-SACSA, Appendix A, Part III, 1965 (unpublished); "Grain Woes Beset Eastern Europe," New York Times, 14 Nov 65, p. 12.
7. Kenneth Boulding, "US Policy and the Developing Nations: Population and Poverty," Correspondent, Autumn, 1965, pp. 38-40. Whether the UN is the agency to solve the world's problems is still an open question.
8. R. N. Rosecrance (Ed). The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics, Columbia Univ Press (NY, 1964), pp. 293-314; "Why the Space Race is a Defense Problem," US News and World Report, 13 Sep 65, pp. 36-38; Robert O. Slagle and Donald F. Lynch, Weather Modification: Implications for International Security (U), Sep 65, RAC IR-212 (CONFIDENTIAL).
9. The Chinese doctrine of the "People's War" is based on the assumption that widespread violence, in one form or another, is the

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sine qua non of a successful revolution. The Russian doctrine of "wars of national liberation" is far more flexible and recommends violence only when the situation is very favorable. Indeed, Russian-supported radicals (notably the World Marxist Review) give considerable attention to communist defeats in attempts at violent revolution, arguing (on the basis of historical experiences) that blind obedience to the Chinese doctrine will result in disaster. The Russian point of view is far more realistic and, in the long run, may well represent a greater danger to the US than the Chinese.

10. The USSR has consistently promised to provide aid and support to national liberation movements and has in addition promised that it would help prevent the export of counterrevolution, by which is meant US attempts to overthrow established communist governments. For a recent such promise to North Vietnam, see the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet, 9 Dec 65 in Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 Dec 65, p. 3. See also the Joint Communique of the East German and Soviet Governments, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 Sep 65, p. 1.

11. Since 1962, China's grain production has leveled off at about 180 million tons annually. The prospects for making substantial increases in grain production are dim because most of the cultivatable land is already in production and output is now "near the maximum permitted by the present level of soil fertility." There is little prospect that fertilizer production will increase sufficiently in the next five years to permit a significant increase in total production (See: John R. Wernohs, "China's Agriculture," US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture, 22 Nov 65, pp. 3-4, 15). Under these circumstances and faced with increasing population, the CPR must either increase its food imports above the present level of 5 to 6 million tons annually, decrease per capita consumption, or obtain control over food-surplus-producing regions.

12. Although present data are not sufficient to permit a precise determination of the potential productivity of Southeast Asia's rice bowl (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam), most authorities agree that production can be increased substantially. See, for example: US Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agriculture in the Southeast Asia Rice Bowl and its Relation to US Farm Exports, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 26, Jun 65, p. 1. At the present time, this region produces about 25 million tons of rice annually, 5 million tons of which are exported to form almost two-thirds of the rice entering international trade (Ibid., p. 16). Surplus production can be increased merely by expanding the area under cultivation. At the

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present time, Burma's cultivated area could be doubled, raising its total production to about 10-16 million tons, and Cambodia's cultivated land could be increased fourfold (See: C. A. Fisher, South-East Asia, London, Methuen and Co., 1964, p. 450-569). Substantial arable land is presently uncultivated in Thailand, and total production could be significantly increased by improving the irrigation system so as to permit double cropping. In Laos, the potentially cultivatable land exceeds the area presently farmed by a factor of between four and six (See: NIS 43B, Sep 61, Chapter VI, pp. 61-68, CONFIDENTIAL). An old, but probably still correct, estimate for South Vietnam is that the cultivated area could be expanded by about 2.5 million acres (NIS 43, Sec 61, 1955, pp. 61-63, CONFIDENTIAL). In addition, rice yields in these countries are low by Asian standards and could be increased by the use of additional labor. At present, these countries are underpopulated by Asian standards, and an influx of trained farmers from China could raise production substantially. Moreover, modest improvements in technology could also cause substantial increases in yields. For example, using more selectivity in the use of seeds obtained on the farms, could raise yields significantly (See: D. H. Grist, Rice, Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1959, pp. 107, 364). In Burma, improved seed selection would raise yields by an average of at least 10 percent (See: Fisher, p. 452). It seems highly likely that total production could be increased from 25 to 50 million tons by expanding the area under cultivation and by adopting Chinese techniques of cultivation. At present consumption levels, this would increase the exportable surplus to about 30 million tons. Improvements in seed selection, modest use of chemical fertilizers, and particularly irrigation programs permitting double cropping similar to that practiced in North Vietnam would raise total production even further, perhaps leading to as high a figure as 75 to 100 million tons.

13. China's present grain production is about 180 million tons (See: Note 4 above). SEA's potential surplus of 30 million tons would constitute 16 percent of China's production. This percentage would be greater if the higher estimate of the potential surplus (indicated in note 13 above) is accepted. Certainly, possession of the rice bowl region would obviate Chinese grain imports that are presently consuming scarce foreign exchange.

14. Of particular importance here is India which, even on the basis of optimistic projections, will require increased food imports by 1970 (See: US Dept of Agriculture, The World Food Budget 1970, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 19, Oct 64, p. 54).

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15. A world food deficit of at least 54 million tons is projected for the year 1970 (See: The World Food Budget 1970, p. iii). With effective use of Southeast Asia's food potential, this deficit and the resulting calamities could be largely eliminated, especially as far as India is concerned.

16. The primacy given to national security is constantly reiterated (e.g., in a lead article in Kommunist, Aug 65, p. 9). The goal of improving the performance of the Soviet economy is indicated in the source cited in note 8 above, and also in lead articles in Izvestiya, 29 Sep 65, and Pravda, 2 Oct 65. The goal of restoring the unity of the world communist movement is frequently discussed. See, for example, Brezhnev's speech to the Plenum of the CPSU on 29 Sep (Pravda, 30 Sep 65, p. 2) and the attack on Communist China entitled "The International Duty of Communists of All Countries," Pravda, 28 Nov 65, p. 1. The desire to expand Soviet influence in the less developed countries is also frequently discussed, for example, in a lead article in Izvestiya, 29 Sep 65.

17. This point is expressed very clearly in A. A. Gromyko's statement to the Supreme Soviet, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 Dec 65, p. 2.

18. Although a difficult point to prove, Soviet statements like those cited in note 17 above have consistently stressed the desire of the Soviet leadership to avoid general war and to improve the growth rate of the economy, giving these primacy over supporting "wars of national liberation." In the attack on Communist China (Pravda, 28 Nov 65, p. 1), the Soviet Government blames China for the Soviet failure to provide sufficient military aid to North Vietnam, suggesting that the USSR itself is not willing to go to war over Vietnam. Soviet national interests are not deeply involved in SEA, and it is doubtful that they will ever be.

19. The USSR has already supported India against the CPR and may be offering similar support to Burma. (See the communique ending discussions between Ne Win and the Soviet leadership, Izvestiya, 26 Sep 65, p. 1; and, Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and her Neighbors," Foreign Affairs, Jan 65, pp. 312-330). Because of its long common frontier with China, the USSR is in a position to exert military pressure on areas that are vital to China -- i.e., Manchuria and Sinkiang (See, for example: Henry G. Schwarz, "The Chinese Army in Sinkiang," Survival, Vol. VII, No. 4, Jul 65, pp. 160-165. In addition, the USSR has a nuclear force fully capable of destroying vital Chinese installa-

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tions. Since the USSR is also being challenged by the CPR, there would appear to be good reason for the smaller countries of SEA to seek Soviet protection against the CPR. In the case of a US defeat in SVN, the Soviet leadership would not likely ignore the opportunity thus created to expand its own influence, to the detriment of both the US and the CPR. Whether or not the USSR would actually defend nations of SEA against the CPR is, of course, another question, one that would obviously depend on the circumstances involved.

20. A continuation of the present situation in SEA obviously offers the USSR greater opportunities for expanding its own influence than would Chinese dominance in the region. Moreover, the most logical avenue for Chinese aggression after absorbing SEA would likely be the Soviet Far East; and, for this reason, the long-run interests of the USSR would not be favored by a Chinese conquest of SEA. This line of reasoning would indicate that long-run Soviet interests may be best served by a conflict between the CPR and the US that would prevent either from posing a threat to the USSR.

21. As indicated in notes 11 through 13 above, CPR conquest of the rice bowl countries would eliminate the need for Chinese food imports from the Free World and would increase China's total food resources by 20 or more percent. CPR conquest of SEA would also provide China with badly needed petroleum and iron ore reserves, as well as tin, natural rubber, aluminum and other light metals.

22. An important factor here is that the Chinese have been applying pressure on SEA for centuries. The underlying motive has been a Chinese move toward nations that offer "large areas of unexploited agricultural and mineral lands. ..." (Harold J. Wiens, China's March Toward the Tropics, Shoe String Press, Hamden, Conn., 1954, p. 1.) Since China's population problem is likely to get worse in the next decade, there is little hope that China's desire to exploit the resources of SEA will change, even after Mao passes from the scene (See: Fisher, pp. 9-10, 769-770).

23. See note 12 above. Note that the five countries (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam) cover an area more than twice as large as France and West Germany combined and contain twice as many people as France.

24. Increased communist activity in Thailand has been reported recently. A Chinese diversion through Thailand would follow the historical precedent of the North Vietnamese Communists who compelled the French to divert resources by an invasion of Laos. (See: Oliver E.

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Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1962, p. 41; and, Otto Heilbrunn, "Another Dienbienphu?," Army, Oct 65, pp. 35-39.) Although the nature of such a diversion in Thailand cannot be predicted, one should note that the shortest distance from China to Saigon is through Thailand, and that such a move would avoid Hanoi objections to the stationing of Chinese troops in NVN. In view of the shattered overland communications system of NVN and SVN, it might be that Peking could move troops more easily through Thailand than through Vietnam. An argument against such a move by the CPR, however, is its past strategy not to initiate a direct US-CPR confrontation.

25. The North Vietnamese objective of maintaining the independence of NVN would appear to be self-evident. The goal of reunifying Indochina is demonstrated by the presence of communist troops in Laos, Cambodia and SVN. The third objective follows logically from the first two because, once Hanoi dominates all of SEA, it will be the largest and most populous (and probably the most powerful) state in mainland SEA. In this context, it should be recognized that historically the Vietnamese people, both North and South, have been the most vigorous inhabitants of SEA (See: Fisher, pp. 762-763), and it would be questionable to expect Hanoi's aggressiveness to stop at Thailand's border after successfully reuniting Indochina. It is the fear of Vietnamese aggressiveness that explains much of Cambodia's foreign policy (see: B. K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Where Foreign Policy Counts," Asian Survey, Sep 65, pp. 433-448).

26. This can be seen from the following table extracted from public domain sources:

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Rice Production</u>
North Vietnam	16.2 million	62,000 sq. mi.	4.5 million tons
Indochina			
(including NVN)	39.1 million	286,000 sq. mi.	13.0 million tons
Burma	23.7	262,000	7.5
Thailand	28.8	200,000	10.2

27. Under optimistic assumptions, the US Department of Agriculture estimated that India's grain imports would rise from some 4.3 million tons in 1959-61 to 5.8 million tons in 1970 (See: World Food Budget, p. 55). In 1965, however, Indian grain imports are expected to reach 8 million tons and import requirements may reach 14 million tons in 1966 because of drought (See: New York Times, 9 Dec 65, p. 3). Indian grain production reached an all-time high of 88 million tons in 1964 (The Christian Science Monitor, 19 Nov 65, p. 4). Faced with a

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population that is expected to exceed 536 million by 1970, Indian food deficits can be expected to continue growing even if 1964 production levels are attained again.

28. The rice bowl's potential surplus of 30 million tons (see note 5 above) could satisfy India's potential deficits in the early 1970s even assuming no improvement over present Indian production.

29. For a good discussion of Indonesia's objectives. see: Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia's Grand Design in Southeast Asia" (U), RM-4080-ISA, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif., May 64 (CONFIDENTIAL). There is no indication as yet that the new leadership in Indonesia has renounced or will renounce these objectives.

30. Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1964, p. 288; Fisher, pp. 337, 339. As yet, the Indonesian Government has failed to give adequate attention to improving agricultural production in the outlying islands, and there is no available evidence to indicate an increase in production in Java. With a continued increase in population, this situation can only result in large food deficits within the next decade.

31. With population increasing, there has been no improvement in the production of rice, the basic staple in the Philippines, since 1958 (See: UN Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. XV, No 3, Dec 64, p. 79). At the present time, the Philippines is a net importer of rice and unless present trends change this situation is likely to continue.

32. Japan's total imports of iron ore are expected to rise from 22 million tons in 1962 to 41 million tons in 1970. By the late 1960s, 7.6 million tons will be obtained from India, 7.3 million tons from Malaysia and additional quantities will be imported from the Philippines and Australia (UN Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1963, Bangkok, 1964, p. 137).

33. The possibility here is for expanded Japanese imports of raw materials (notably iron ore and bauxite from India) and increased Japanese exports of manufactured goods to SEA. India would then use its export earnings to import food from SEA.

34. Premier Eisaku Sato has officially recognized the Chinese nuclear threat to Japan, New York Times, 28 Nov 65, p.18.

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35. Regarding Indonesian aspirations, see note 18 above. Fisher discusses past and future Indian ambitions to be influential in SEA (See: Fisher, pp. 9-10, 574). One logical answer to the developing Indian food crisis is Indian expansion into the potential rice surplus areas of Burma and, perhaps, Thailand. Japanese desires to become influential in SEA may be latent at present, but both the present and potential economic importance of the region could cause a change in Japan's foreign policy, especially were the US to be removed from the area.

36. Congressional Record (18 Jan 66), Vol. 112, No. 6, pp. 437-38. The Asian Development Bank Project now is almost totally subscribed. Pledges include Japan's \$200 million (equal to the US) and West Germany's \$30 million.

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ANNEX I

COHESIVE SOCIETY

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ANNEX I

COHESIVE SOCIETY

"Not only did the Viet Cong understand what the people really wanted, what would count with them now, but in most cases the wants were so simple that even the VC guerrillas had the means to fulfill them immediately. The US, by contrast, had spent some \$4 billion in Vietnam, but failed to find a way to straighten the path at Binh Yen Dong."1:88/

Introduction

The cited indictment is American in origin and dated 1964. It highlights the keystone of our central problem in SVN and exposes the foundation for any consideration of nation building in the face of an avowed and able enemy. The US is neither allied with, nor providing assistance to, any semblance of a cohesive society in SVN. Although ultimate achievement of some form of social consolidation is generally recognized as an important but necessarily long-term goal, no concerted effort is being made to employ US assistance with a view toward ultimately attaining it among the peoples of SVN. The need to straighten the village "path at Binh Yen Dong" in response to peasant aspirations must be recognized as one prime factor in the molding of a cohesive society.

The decision to assist in establishing cohesion within an alien society is momentous; the task would be fraught with difficulties even when undertaken in an environment of peace. Just the thought has been deemed un-American or naive in most official quarters. Yet, the loss of rapport between Americans and South Vietnamese constitutes an evident vulnerability and threat to achievement of our aims. Successful US assistance in such situations as that in SVN demands the utmost in capacity to work through the indigenous population. This requirement, in turn, necessitates a sound understanding of how the society presently functions. It further implies that we possess some ideas as to both the objective of the social change desired and the society's possible future form. At the very minimum, the ability to influence Vietnamese evolutionary development of a social environment wherein freedom and independence can flourish depends upon the availability of three essential ingredients:

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(1) An integrated, current body of knowledge describing Vietnamese society and identifying those elements within the political, economic, military and other subsystems which must be stabilized through induced social change.

(2) The knowledge of how to influence social change in a direction commensurate with stated objectives.

(3) A group of US representatives who understand the methods used to produce change and who are able to bring these methods to bear on the problem in the field.

Today's behavioral sciences can provide only a smattering of knowledge about either Vietnamese society or ways of influencing social evolution. Little of practical value is recorded as to techniques of applying such knowledge to current problems (See: ANNEX K); this research field is blanketed with claims and counterclaims of success with almost no attention paid to the fact that failure also sustains the learning process. Hence, US representatives are left to develop skills essential to the task in trial-and-error fashion and grossly unaware of the process in which they are involved. Present lack of knowledge, however, should neither deter nor absolve us from directly entering the problem-solving process in SVN; rather, it should serve as a stimulus for generating a means to compete with that of the Communists in SVN and elsewhere. The present state of the behavioral sciences, however primitive, is sufficient to permit US initiation of social change support operations by other than pure chance.

Socio-Cultural Analysis. At present, the US is not well prepared to assist the passage of SVN's people through a social revolution even they themselves cannot fully understand. Intensive additional research must be undertaken to determine the motivations, perception, aspirations, hopes and fears of these people. Detailed analysis, which increases knowledge, will better enable us to destroy the psychological advantage that the VC initially achieved and still possess; we must begin now by exhibiting a more responsible, intelligent interest in the people of SVN.

Those major ideas, ideals, values and attitudes that contribute to any modern cohesive society, and which we believe form the real basis for Western democracy, can be identified; the subtle techniques of transferring them to a foreign counterpart can be learned by US representatives. The US must become sufficiently sophisticated to support far more than GVN enunciation of an anti-communist diatribe which has little meaningful appeal to the peasant in SEA. Having stated as our objective a "free and independent" Vietnam, we are obligated to set forth what this phrase means and to ensure its understanding throughout SVN and SEA. This basic postulate must be articulated, if we are to develop a significant and "winning" alternative to the "wars of national liberation."

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A Vietnamese View of US Support

SVN essentially is a peasant society where kinship and other local ties predominate. Social values and institutions are slowly changing, however, under the duress of destructive VC activities and the impact of American personnel. Although fundamentally the Vietnamese are ethnically and culturally a relatively homogeneous society, recent events have intensified the impacts of divisive elements within that society. No single influence capable of coalescing its factions toward common goals has emerged. Clearly, three major influences bear upon the current social situation. First, the VC provide positive and hourly evidence of their intent to achieve social change within SVN. Second, there is an ongoing social revolution that reflects a worldwide change. Third, there is the influence of the concurrent US assistance effort.

All three of these have been analyzed by both Americans and Vietnamese. The Vietnamese analysis, however, is most sobering. An article by Dang Van Sung was published in 1963, when Diem was still in power. Sung's insights remain both timely and valuable; they constitute at least one means whereby the American can "look at the central issues of social change through Vietnamese eyes." Key passages from this document, and from the statements of other Vietnamese, are submitted for the record; they do not necessarily constitute US position statements.

On Nonintervention:

"The American respect for the recipient people's 'self-determination' can no longer be guaranteed by a negative policy of 'nonintervention' which, practically speaking, may lead to just the contrary. In order to make sure that an emergent people really control their own destiny, the US is expected to make positive efforts helping them develop control of themselves. In other words, American aid ought to be devised so as to help their legitimate aspirations come true through the achievement of their political revolution. This cannot be done without getting to the bottom of the revolutionary situation and taking sides in it, not only for anti-Communism but also for democracy."2:32/

"A psychological factor seems to have some effect upon the American officials in the emergent countries. The US has felt proud of not having been a colonialist power. This pride, natural and well justified by itself, becomes an insuperable, bureaucratic personality complex characterized by an almost physical fear of being mistaken for imperialists."2:35/

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"Another sore point of the American policy of 'non-intervention' is in the relationship between the US and the recipient people. As an inevitable result of the policy, the relationship is limited to that between respective governments. As a result, the recipient country may, practically speaking, be limited to the local political group in power with which the US is generally identified in the eyes of the local population. With it, the US shares the popular love or hatred -- perhaps more hatred than love. ... In short, in its aid to the underdeveloped world in the midst of a revolution for emancipation, the US has never yet fought against the Communists with ideas of freedom and justice, but, at least until now, only dollars and bombs."2:33/

"Do not be afraid to interfere in the internal affairs of a country when it is done deliberately. And here is the form under which one can intervene: impose conditions which favor the little people before giving any aid. For example, fix the minimum price of sugar cane, and the maximum price of sugar before advancing funds for a sugar refinery. Make these conditions public, both to prevent abuses and to gain the support of the little people. Or fix the maximum price of a cubic meter of water before lending funds to build a water-works."3/

On Democracy:

"Of course, our peasants do not know democratic theory and even have little notion of what their rights and duties should be in a democratic regime. But they do hate the anti-democratic measures now plaguing their daily life; and, their aspirations are what democracy would give them."2:12/

On Communism:

"By ignoring our revolution and the intra-national aspect of our anti-Communist fight, the US has jeopardized such a solution instead of helping work for it. As a high ranking American official put it, the anti-Communist fight in Vietnam is seventy-five percent political and twenty-five percent military. Yet, everything American is directed to the twenty-five percent and nothing to the seventy-five percent. ... It is the same with anti-Communism. As we said before, our anti-Communist fight in its intra-national and revolutionary character, is political before it is military. Too militarist a concept of fight has limited our weapons to only military means while the enemy has extended his influence in all fields. By emphasizing anti-Communism rather than positive

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revolutionary goals and from lack of a better adaptation to the local situation, the US has reduced its anti-Communist efforts in Vietnam solely to the maintenance of an administrative machine and the army ... while the situation keeps on deteriorating because no effort has been made to solve the local revolutionary problem."2:25-38/

On Counterproductive Military Activity:

"The population and the enemy are intimately mixed with each other and the population are generally pushed to the front to serve as a shelter for the diabolic enemy! How many innocent people are killed in a bombardment; how many of the real enemy? No Vietnamese can be indifferent to so distressing a situation."2:42/

On American Myths About Vietnam:

"Generals and Ministers (i.e., Cabinet Members) are good men in the United States. In Vietnam where the spirit of factionalism reigns, they can be rogues without shame whose only care is their personal interests. Such men can also be found among judges and top administrators.

"Do not trust those that seem to be good, who gain confidence of Americans by going to cocktail parties and speaking good English. Rather you must mix intimately with the Vietnamese, learn their language, encourage them to criticize in order to learn to distinguish the good men from the bad. Thus it is necessary to search in order to discover worthy men and then to elevate them to posts of responsibility. Bad officials must be cleaned out."3/

On US Policy Toward Minority Groups:

"Here we see the error of 'universal military service' in a backward country. In Vietnam we have numerous ethnic groups as well as many religious groups such as the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, etc. These groups fight well only in their own territory and in their own groupings. It is insane to put young Cao Dai recruits to fight on the high plateaus against races which are still primitive.

"This is explained by the fact that the patriotism of these groups does not extend to the abstract idea of patriotism which permits an American from Texas to feel at home among other Americans from New York or from Illinois. The patriotism of these groups is related to regionalism. One

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should let the Hoa Hao or Cao Dai fight in their own province or at the very least in their own groups, where they are strong with solidarity of their group. We must make well-organized partisans of them." 3/

On Conditions for a Valid Revolution:

"The requirement for winning popular support in a common fight does not change with the time. ... The indifferent or hostile attitude on the part of those for whom one fights is a basic sign of failure whether it be in the accomplishment of a social revolution or in the struggle against Communism. Revolution is in that category of fights made on behalf of a group of people with the support of that group as an essential requirement for success." 2:24/

The foregoing presents a not too charitable evaluation of US support efforts to date. Subsequent sections will examine the inner working of Vietnamese society to improve our grasp of the key factors influencing, and to be influenced by, the US support effort.

Dominant Vietnamese Institutions

A cohesive society occurs largely as a result of the feeling that the society is reasonably well attuned to member expectations and aspirations. This cohesion is, in turn, reflected in a sense of commitment by its members to the purposes of the society. Such commitment eventually turns into a tangible ideology. This ideology consists of the voiced notions of the people as to their purposes, objectives and values in life as such become strongly and inextricably woven into the social fabric. This process has been interrupted in SVN.

SVN reflects a curious admixture of organization and disorganization operating simultaneously and sponsored by two competing societies, VC and GVN. Vietnamese institutions, long dominated by the French, were unable to change and produce change rapidly enough to cope with the society's needs. Normally, such social change is produced within the society's institutional framework under the guidance of its elites.

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A selection of the dominant Vietnamese institutions (family, economic, political and military) are hereinafter examined, in turn, with a view toward providing both planning parameters and a forecast for change.

The Family Institution. As the core of Vietnamese society, family tradition permeates all facets of social life. The family continues to perform roles in other social activities such as those of earning a livelihood, raising and educating children and ministering to the sick and aged. 4:II-8/ These roles, central to life in any environment, constitute the foundation stones for any program designed to win familial allegiance. Individual loyalty rests with the family and not to any set of immutable principles, abstract ideas or subdivisions of government. Whole families can be swayed (e.g., from loyal GVN supporters to accomplices of the VC) through the disaffection of a single family member. In addition, many families are divided in loyalty with sons serving in both GVN and VC forces.

Diem also realized the necessity to challenge this central role of the family in rural SVN and achieved limited success by both organizing families into groups of five for political purposes and by altering the village power structure. Later, repressive measures of the Diem regime, coupled with VC activities propagandizing the need to reinforce family ties, retarded the progress of this program as it was gaining momentum.

The rural family is not amenable to rapid or extensive allegiance shifts. Its political reorientation, in terms of VC versus GVN support, toward the GVN could result from marked progress in solving the internal security situation and clear-cut evidence of better opportunities to provide for the family under GVN administration. It is not sufficient to simply separate the peasant from the VC. The continued presence of a highly motivated and well-trained cadre in rural areas offers the most promise of an enduring, positive and ultimately successful GVN short-term impact on the family's political allegiance.

Noticeable social change has been manifested in urban areas; increased contact there with growing Western, primarily European, influence has loosened family ties and challenged the elder's status.

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"The introduction and partial acceptance of Western culture has greatly changed the family structure and loyalties. The younger Vietnamese are beginning to challenge the loyalty of the hierarchy. There are also tendencies toward greater freedom and equality for women and for individual family autonomy rather than clan rule."4:78/

Education offers the greatest potential in extending this effect to produce desired long-term change. Unrelenting pursuit of the short-term goals established for the current US-GVN educational program will produce two significant impacts:

- (1) The exposure of younger family members to a better and more varied style of life through attendance at district and province schools.
- (2) The provision of youth with the technical skills essential to long-term development programs. Increased demand for such skills will cause younger family members to move and thereby splinter the relatively tight and large kinship groupings.

In addition to formal education, service in the GVN military forces has had substantial impact on the traditional way of Vietnamese life; it has provided direct exposure to different living patterns. To date, the GVN has failed to capitalize on this fact. Military service provides a captive audience for nation-oriented indoctrination, as well as for training programs designed to develop technical skills as an important alternative to returning to the paddy field.

The Oriental conception of family unity remains deep-seated throughout rural Vietnam, frequently transcending political loyalties or intellectual principles. No abrupt change in this orientation is foreseen through the mid-range planning period.

The Economic Institution. The economic base of Vietnamese society continues to be rice agriculture. Its harvesting and marketing impacts on all aspects of rural life and an important share of urban life.

The US has been able to influence the urban economic system considerably through the manipulation of massive financial and

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material aid without accompanying commitment to social change. Such assistance, however, has yet to be felt to the degree of its intent among the rural population. Evidence indicates that the VC, in lieu of a comparable influence on the economic institution at Saigon, have elected to divert US inputs to VC use by controlling the distribution system in an attempt to sustain their war efforts and to become the true "benefactor of the people."

The need to be more selective in dispensing our aid, and to accompany this selectivity with a positive emphasis on the fundamentals of responsive government, is mandatory. Economic development plans hold the marked capacity either to win or lose support with enduring impact. If an economic development program does not achieve its objective in the hamlet, if the VC can effectively divert its thrust, the reliability of the GVN and its supporting agent is destroyed. More appropriate internal security safeguards, coupled with greater reliance on US monitorship at lower levels, is mandatory to ensure that promised economic development items reach designated recipients throughout the course of all assistance stages. The rural population will accept assistance but resist change. Hence, rural improvement programs must be so designed as to induce some input, however modest, from the peasant for whatever goods or benefits are provided. Above all, basic needs and aspirations must be addressed. American presumptions and assumptions should be related to basic Vietnamese wants. Not until 25 January 1966, has there been a concerted US attempt at Washington level to collate and report on the "primary needs and attitudes of rural population" throughout SVN.10/

The urban South Vietnamese display both a real willingness and a marked aptitude to organize economic activity. They have always been receptive to economic assistance and its accompanying social impact; however, they have not accepted responsibility for extending this opportunity outward to the rural village level. The urbanite must be brought to recognize the need for his support in nation building at the village level. The receipt of less direct US assistance, backed by clear US-GVN policy statements, can reinforce his awareness and appreciation of the need to make the rural village the principal focus for aid throughout the short-range period. US-GVN policy should encourage direct urbanite participation in all aspects of rural construction, primarily as incremental supplements to local cadre. The inducements of higher cadre wages, for physically demonstrated worthwhile effort, and of

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available GVN political posts, following completed pacification, could reinforce urban personal involvement at the crucial norm level.

The Political Institution. Political activity of national rather than local orientation is manifested almost solely in urban areas; the prerequisite social awareness does not exist today in rural SVN. A 1963 prediction concerning the political picture in 1966 appears to have been correct:

"There might indeed be changes in personalities but not in structure. A military coup might be instigated, but after the flags were changed, the facts of Vietnamese life will be the same essentially, and the same apparatus for carrying on that life would be overhauled a bit and then put back to work. Structural analysis cannot predict whose picture will appear in the bureaucrats' offices in 3 years, but it can tell us that bureaucrats will be there doing about the same kinds of things as were done in 1963."

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Such overhaul has proved to be more frequent than predicted. The Vietnamese politician or bureaucrat does not stand on principle but, instead, concerns himself with self-aggrandizement and extending family power and prestige. Consequently, Vietnamese officials are quite accepting of, and vulnerable to, manipulation techniques. A reservoir of talent is available to fill key political positions, but the list of those politically "not eligible" increases with successive coups. Though an unexpected by-product, a source of high level managerial talent has thus been created in on-shelf status. This political out-group could well serve to bolster critical apolitical leadership positions throughout Vietnamese society.

Strong and deeply rooted religious and political schisms create dissension even within government agencies and must be considered a major divisive influence. This impedes both the execution and supervisory follow-up of GVN directives. These cleavages reinforce and sustain official appointment practices based on political "reliability" at the expense of competence; more often than not, cleavage and practice have combined to force the

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removal of qualified and experienced personnel. This continual contest for political power and prestige within the GVN vitiates the forcefulness and speed with which it can act. Cautious officials patently dodge aggressive enforcement of such controversial measures as population and resources control. Interpretation of directives more often coincides with personal status designs than with the achievement of national objectives. Intelligence and security units, perhaps, are most seriously subjected to political machination; they constitute forces traditionally and actually capable of ensuring persona' power and rising prestige. Compromise of purpose, inefficiency and corruption are the hallmarks of governmental machinery split by dissension. Within the context of the current situation, this condition demands that maximum US influence be extended to minimize its disruptive impact on critical short-term programs.

This divisive factor has been further magnified by the concentration of administrative and financial authority at the Saigon ministerial level. Such centralization has hampered the development of local responsive government; in extension, it has often provided an excuse for inactivity on the part of GVN leadership who should be dealing directly with people at the rice roots. The shaping of political support from among the various coteries in SVN is not the answer; the GVN has yet to register a lasting short-term societal achievement meriting political party support. Province and district are emerging as the critical political levels in SVN through which social change must flow. Each of these levels must be accorded greater authority in carrying out nonmilitary programs.

The Saigon military elite can be expected to resist any efforts targeted on broadening the base of the political power structure. To them, the needed foundation means both loss of authority and threat to prestige. Such a decentralization, however, must be accomplished; other segments of the society in SVN must be represented more adequately in the national decision-making process. (See: Chapter III for action program)

The Religious Institution. Historically, the Vietnamese have manifested a general tolerance toward all religions. (See: ANNEX B) Recently, bitter and intense Catholic-Buddhist antagonism dominated the scene. This antipathy is of political, rather than religious, derivation; it reflects primarily Buddhist determination to eradicate the residual Catholic influence of Diem and pre-Diem society.

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Both Catholics and Buddhists devote considerable time in the development of lay organizations to perpetuate their own conceptions on the course that social change should take. The Buddhists, in particular, appear dedicated to the unseating of any government not responsive directly to them; however, they share with the Catholics the desire for an early return to civil government. Their status is such that they wield considerable power within SVN as a whole, and this is reflected in the 1962 estimate of 1,000,000 lay members of the Unified Buddhist Association.6:1/ Thus far little more than lip service has been paid to the need for religious cooperation under the threat of VC philosophy and terror. Each group contends in exerting pressure on both the US and GVN to perpetuate its particularized interests. Jealousy, ambition and self-interest stir antagonism among them in a form and substance that is detrimental to group and state interests as well as damaging in the struggle for survival.6:1/

Though political ploys and plots are the rule and can be expected to persist throughout 1971, several cohesive influences appear consistent across churchly boundaries: (1) anti-communist sentiment and desire for a free Vietnam; (2) desire for social justice; and, (3) support of US efforts. Religion is a powerful, motivating force among Vietnamese and, given direction, could provide the basis for social cohesion in the mid-term. US efforts to assist change should be overt and directed toward minimizing the internal political activity of religious groups. The sponsorship of activities requiring group interaction, such as the World Council of Religions should not be discounted. In addition, GVN should be discouraged from continuing to manipulate religious groups in conjunction with its internal political activities.

The Military Institution. Military and political institutions are enmeshed in today's SVN with military occupying most of the critical political positions. This fact of life is actively decried by leaders of other social groups; plainly, distrust of continued military involvement in government is growing. Several cultural factors merit consideration in connection with any interpretation of the current military role in Vietnamese society: (1) a long history of waging protracted guerrilla warfare against apparently superior forces; (2) a distinct tendency to regard the soldier's profession as inferior; (3) a pattern of secret society and private army formations; (4) a tradition inveighing against regimented training; and, (5) a general tendency to avoid assuming the initiative, to side-step decisive action and to accept responsibility only with some reluctance.5:18/

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Many senior officers exhibit the worst traits of two worlds, the French and the Vietnamese. When this combination is merged with an almost patent disregard for the rural populace, slim prospects exist for relying on their ability to function as agents of positive social reform. Vested interests of these senior officers are also at stake, and their resistance to change can take extreme forms in terms of inhibiting progress at lower echelons. Most military personnel, particularly at province and district levels, feel ill-prepared to perform the civil-administrative duties thrust upon them by the circumstances of war. Yet, it is at these levels that there exists both a fundamental understanding of, and the most frequent request for, additional US assistance.

The potential and actual private armies (e.g., the Hoa Hao) must be relied upon to wage war against the VC within their local areas over the short term; their activities must be monitored carefully by US representatives. The RVNAF have mistreated the rural population of SVN in the past (See: ANNEX G), but this stigma can be erased. Above all, ARVN units must be positioned among the people on a long-term basis in positive, obvious and physical support of Rural Construction. The GVN paramilitary forces and police, however, must be recognized and supported in terms of provision of that form of basic daily contact that shapes and sizes rural village-level attitudes toward the GVN and the US. These forces must be changed with the provision of obvious support to Rural Construction.

In spite of its many shortcomings, the military institution forms a nucleus around which short-term social change must evolve in SVN. The military elite also offers the greatest promise of serving as a catalyst for integrating the diverse elements of Vietnamese society.

The lower military echelon, in particular, stands as a source of local leadership that is slowly emerging from peasant culture and, thus, is more sensitive and more sympathetic to popular aspirations. Junior ARVN officers, particularly some district chiefs, have now developed both sufficient talent and the degree of dedication essential to be relied upon for the execution of US-GVN programs at the SVN level most crucial to achieving social change. The early identification of these qualified officers, coupled with their subsequent assignment to positions of increased authority, is critical to both the rate at which US-GVN objectives are achieved and the permanence of progress made. The US presence must recognize the requirement to serve as a buffer between senior officers with vested interests and those who are motivated to

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undertake social reform. Simultaneously, workable arrangements for US assistance in the process of "weeding out" those lacking motivation for the task must be established.

The dominant SVN institutions can be expected to endure, largely as presented, throughout the short term; the results of American-sponsored education should be manifested on the scene throughout the 1970s. In addition the US should assist GVN to revitalize a functioning legal system, thereby creating an atmosphere of respect for law and order through their just administration. The expansion of the formal legal institution to the rural area is essential to replace fear and terror by rule of law. (See: ANNEX D) Change will be slow; however, Americans must not disregard the fact that the Vietnamese individual supported by the US today is a product of present institutions, more so than a reflection of those of the future.

Vietnamese Social Stratification

Class Structure. Traditional Vietnamese society was essentially a two-class system: the aristocracy and the peasantry. The country was ruled by a small class of aristocrats: the Emperor, the noblemen and the mandarins. (See: ANNEXES A and D) Early social distinctions reflected the doctrine of Confucianism, and class lines were drawn on the basis of intellectual achievement, heavily influenced by wealth. Later, Vietnamese society was repeatedly altered by the domination of foreign cultures with subsequent changing of class distinctions. Under French colonialism, Vietnam began its transformation into a three-class hierarchy; foreign economic and political elite was added and blended together with the native landed class. The gradual emergence of a meaningful middle class was retarded by the advent of the Viet Minh; this retardation has been sustained by the VC who initially gained and maintained peasant and lower class popular support by exploiting existing social differences.

General. Vietnamese society is undergoing a dramatic class transformation. The press of protracted war and of the modernization process are its prime stimulants. The psychological aspects of the society (i.e., attitudes, values and beliefs), however, are far less susceptible to change via such pressures; discernible change in the conceptual perspective of the Vietnamese may not be manifested for several generations. In general, short-term efforts should be devoted to altering behavioral patterns of the present generation through reliance on the more forceful methods

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of persuasion, simultaneously with education of the follow-on generation. It is in this second generation -- 25 years beyond today -- motivation will have replaced the application of sanctions to produce results. An examination of the social inputs to Vietnamese individuals and groups permits some insight into the social milieu within which US-GVN programs compete with the VC for influence. The following categorization of the Vietnamese population, into a three-class hierarchy, is an amalgamation of the two stratification systems as they existed in 1964.4:II-8/

The upper class in SVN resides mainly in the cities of Saigon, Hue and Dalat where its membership serves as transmitters of Vietnamese culture. This class represents about three percent of the total population and includes military officers, top echelon personnel, bureaucrats, large landowners, wealthy businessmen, professional people and intellectuals. The middle class (approximately seven percent of the population) is relatively new and has yet to surface meaningfully; it consists now mainly of military field grade officers, second-level bureaucrats, school teachers and small landowners. Contact with Western influence is restricted largely to the military group. This is particularly true in the rural areas. The 90 percent of the population included in the lower class is composed of peasants, artisans, regular and paramilitary soldiers and urban laborers. The peasant has been least exposed to Western influence, and the limited peasant contacts are confined to areas adjacent to troop cantonment sites or are experienced within the context of military operations.

Social Mobility. Vietnamese society always has been considered "open." Theoretically, a peasant's son could rise through the mandarin system to become Emperor. Because of the expanded kinship system, it is not unusual for members of a single family to be represented throughout the social class spectrum. Nevertheless, true social mobility has not been a recognizable or acknowledged characteristic of Vietnamese society, even though no caste lines exist to prevent it. The chaos and increased movement generated by the war has greatly increased the individual's opportunity to improve his social position, particularly within military ranks. In a real sense, a substantial part of the VC appeal to youth has been promoted by the offer of mobility to followers. However, education continues to offer prime promise as the vehicle most likely to guarantee upward movement through the social structure of SVN.

Urban-Rural Conflict. The traditional and fundamental gulf between the peasant and the urban elite remains. The war is

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temporarily reinforcing and broadening the disruptive impact of this division; it is here that the VC extend the preponderant effort and exert the most influence over the rural social segment. The small and relatively well-established urban population has insulated itself from the rural population, even perceiving the recent refugee influx as both a threat to urban security and an actual competitor for US aid. The larger population segments remaining in the countryside either ignore the totality of Vietnamese society or grudgingly accept the VC counterpart. The VC continue to drive and seat a wedge of infrastructure between what are essentially two social systems. Rural SVN thus is sustained in turmoil by exacerbating differences.

The rural system, essentially provincial in character, is composed of basic agriculture, primary attitude-forming and local power systems that form a reasonably connected whole. 5:43/ Superimposed on this system is the province chief who presides over the pacification effort by employing paramilitary forces against VC local guerrillas in what are primarily defensive operations. The objective of this "province war" is to gain both control of, and support from, the rural population. The "dirty war," as it is referred to at this level, is representative of the social base in which it operates. Predominantly peasant forces are pitted against one another in frequent outpost clashes that disrupt what might be termed as "the war of accommodation" which has become a way of life for GVN and VC regional forces. In the provincial system, the VC predominate both in power and in continuity of presence among the rural populace; seemingly, the root motive force of the VC here is communist ideology. (See: ANNEX C) The VC above all, however, make expert use of sophisticated (though intensely simplistic) measures of social control and influence; these impacts burgeon, based upon a combination of face-to-face VC contact with the peasant and VC-forced inactivity of local GVN officials.

The Saigon-urban element of society, to include the regular military forces (primarily positioned in and around the cities), identifies its enemy as the Main Force VC units and pursues the achievement of a "kill Viet Cong" objective under the guidance of an essentially urban military elite. Non-communist political opposition is exercised almost wholly at a national level, is desirous of political reform and has proved to be completely ineffectual from the standpoint of coping with the VC rural effort. Effort to change attitudes through appeals to the rural population are heavily dependent upon mass media and regarded largely unnecessary.

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When the US advisory element is introduced into these two systems, unfortunately the existing social breach is widened. This American presence (since 1955 largely located at Saigon and at RVNAF major command levels) tends to identify with the military elite, or Saigon, segment of society. The US sector and subsector advisors identify with the provincial element. Thus, the Saigon war versus province (or "forty-three") war concepts exist, not in conflicts between personalities on either US or the GVN side, but as a directed reflection of the differences in social reality. This split outlook, of necessity, must be dealt with as a major factor influencing (and to be influenced by) US plans, programs and subsequent command arrangements. A unified perspective-activity pattern is essential. Other social stratification lines can be drawn, but these are considered of lesser significance to US-GVN pacification and long-term development efforts.

Vietnamese Societal Groups. One of the marks of a cohesive society is the proliferation of both formal and informal groupings of the general population. Such groups cut across class lines, subjecting attitude and value systems to constant challenge and modification. This process has not occurred in SVN. Existing social groups either are now undergoing, or are in the process of recovering from, the experience of having their value systems shattered through a series of crises. In the past, they have been manifested in the form of such voluntary organizations as farmers groups, farmers cooperative unions and student-parent associations. Nearly all have been government creations directed by GVN representatives in the village council platforms. Few informal groups have extended organizations outside the village or downward through the system. How successful the VC have been in exerting this particular form of social control is questionable; however, their internal techniques demonstrate keen understanding of the group processes involved.

Figure I-1 displays the major roles and groups within Vietnamese society as of 1963 -- it is submitted merely as an example of the complexities inherent in the societal situation of SVN. The predominance of VC organizational bulk below district level stands out in sharp contrast to GVN organizational positioning. The rice farmer thus serves as prime target for the VC effort. The GVN province chief, a crucial figure in terms of administration and the exercise of political power below national level, served as the link between rural and urban social systems by acting upon orders received directly from President Diem. The US advisory effort did not extend below the province level with the exception of the Special Forces teams operating primarily with the Montagnards in areas remote from GVN influence.

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
Figure I-2 shows the major social roles and groups as they existed in 1965. The Republican Youth Movement National Revolutionary Movement and Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party (Can Lao) have ceased to function as key social control mechanisms of the GVN. The Combatant Youth, primarily a military organization, exists as the major group in contact with the rural population on a continuous basis similar to the VC. However, note the sharp increase in the US role in 1965. The creation of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office and subsequent assignment of field representatives to sector level bolstered the lagging psychological operations effort.

Figures I-3 and I-4 compare the pre-Diem and current societal groups involved in attitude formation. The addition of the sub-sector team further decentralized the US effort, but the current dearth of GVN organizations impacting at village level is all too apparent. Also evident is the resultant social vacuum within which the VC infrastructure operates, relatively unchallenged by any facet of the GVN system. Recent efforts to activate People's Action Teams and consolidate Rural Construction cadres should address this critical situation.

The intellectuals of SVN should constitute its most significant group in terms of both initiating and sustaining social change. However, French colonial development of this group appears to have blocked the parallel growth of qualities required for responsible leadership. Seventy years under foreign domination have all but destroyed the traditional intellectual sense of duty and sacrifice. Actual and potential Vietnamese leaders have fled the country. Information received from OACSI dated 7 December 1965 provides substantiating data. An unnamed French official estimated that there are 20,000 Vietnamese living in France, with over 15,000 of that number having applied for French citizenship. Some 6,000 of this group are students and perhaps 700 are intellectuals and professional people. A number of remaining intellectuals have turned to the perpetuation of self-interests, slowly divesting themselves of social responsibility and either tacitly denying or openly refusing to support GVN programs. The central thrust of this position during 1965 was manifested in the desire not to be identified with the corrupt elite which the US supports. This group must be addressed specifically by the US support effort; its penchant for sidelines criticism must be subordinated to an active participant role in the planning and delivering of social reform in SVN. In addition, the GVN must change significantly in attitude and behavior toward this group before the intellectuals can play a constructive role.

FIGURE 1-1

ROLES AND GROUPS OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY



1-21



VILLAGE


DISTRICT


PROVINCIAL

NATIONAL

HOA

ROLES AND GROUPS OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY (1965)






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FIGURE 1-3

PRINCIPAL ROLES AND GROUPS OF THE ATTITUDE-FOR




1-23




FIGURE 1-4

PRINCIPAL ROLES AND GROUPS OF THE ATTITUDE - FORM



ROLES AND GROUPS OF THE ATTITUDE - FORMING ASPECTS (1965)



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Youth groups rank second only to the in-country intellectuals as potential transmitters of the stimulus required for social change; as in many societies, they have been frequently overlooked and rejected by the GVN. In general, the youth of SVN are receptive to new ideas, including those espoused by the VC. Appeals to nationalism and social protest over real and imagined GVN injustices receive ready audience. Youth are apprehensive lest the increased American military presence impair Vietnamese sovereignty. On the other hand, they hope that increased US commitment will mean undertaking greater responsibility for the war, eventually enabling Vietnamese to be relieved of most combat duty. 6:G-1/ Youth programs should be underwritten by the US to stimulate involvement and contact with social reform programs for the rural population.

The growing refugee population (680,000 in 1965) can now become a lucrative target of group change. Though most refugees still identify with what they once were, rather than what they have become, many will return to their previous homes when security permits. 6:D-11/ This temporary disruption of individual and family life produces a social vacuum that offers an excellent opportunity for political and social action programs designed to alter attitudes toward the GVN. Refer to Chapter IV for a more complete background and a proposed course of US-GVN action to return refugees to their homes as part of an expanded, well-planned land development program.

No minority group has yet been integrated into Vietnamese society. The Khmer (Cambodians), perhaps, are the only ethnic group which can be integrated into the national fabric in the short-range period. Such groups as the Chinese and Montagnards remain cultural islands, set apart from the Vietnamese social structure. Previous efforts of GVN to integrate the Chinese into the national system proved only marginally successful because of the magnitude of the task and the solidarity of the Chinese. The process of integrating diverse ethnic groups must proceed slowly to avoid placing excessive stress on a Vietnamese society. Short-term efforts should be directed toward increasing and extending both formal and informal group influence outward to the provinces to enlist the support of the peasantry for the GVN.

Vietnamese Attitudes. In sharp contrast to the American view, the Vietnamese do not consider an attitude as a learned tendency to behave positively or negatively toward persons and situations. Even the intellectuals view most attitudes as in-born rather than acquired. Consequently, it is difficult for the Vietnamese to accept that the attitude of any individual is subject to change, hence deserving of the effort required.

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Although overcoming such an outlook will further complicate the slow process of altering individual overt behavior, the US should move to reinforce actions serving this purpose. A first step emerges from knowledge that institutional groups, such as the family, are most significant in crystalizing attitudes. This is particularly important in societies such as that in SVN where the beginnings of an educational institution exercise limited influence over early learning.

Suspicion, a salient Vietnamese characteristic, accentuates the relationship between Southerners and Northerners within the general population. The southern people of the Delta do not share the anti-communist sentiments of their northern and central compatriots in SVN. The Northerner considers himself culturally superior, while the Southerner particularly resents northern and French-trained ARVN officers occupying key political positions (e.g., province and district chiefs) in the South. Throughout Vietnam, the military is regarded as a somewhat inferior profession; to a significant degree, the Vietnamese have adopted the traditional Chinese disdain which is manifested by sending "the worst son to be a soldier." Countering this, however, is the fact that historic military heroes of the people (e.g., the Trung sisters, Tran Hung Dao and Le Loi) have been widely venerated.

"Attentisme" is an attitude found, in varying degrees, in all Vietnamese. Generally, it takes the following forms in terms of overt behavior and is, perhaps, best reflected in the Vietnamese saying, "The bending reed survives the storm which breaks the strong unyielding oak."

(1) Appropriate behavior in any situation is assessed in light of individual self-interest, rather than in terms of such abstract principles as right and wrong.

(2) An ambiguous situation calls for indecision rather than the decisive selection and execution of a course of action. When the process of decision cannot be further prolonged, the "oriental gate" offers a way to withdraw from the situation.

(3) If a plan fails or the situation changes, their action is postponed until the next critical event occurs. 5:37/

Gambling is a national pastime. Chance taking is not, however, characteristic of Vietnamese behavior in other areas;

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apparently the interaction of a difficult current situation with the individual's personality traits minimizes achievement motivation.

Graft and corruption are widespread and exist as an institutionalized form of reward for those who can claim it. 5:26/ Graft and corruption, in the sense used here, means the "kick back" or "squeeze" (not gross misappropriation) for expected income supplement.

The peasant demonstrates a distinct set of attitudes which have been identified by the VC and the GVN. The VC response alone, however, has impacted most significantly on both peasant attitude formation and resultant overt behavior. In general, the peasant is tradition-bound and apathetic toward social change. At times, he appears totally disinterested in the course of the war about him, avoiding commitment to anything other than personal survival on the land he tills. The peasant no doubt wants change and expects change, but his traditional Confucianist outlook inhibits him from seeking it. Change and its benefits initially must come to the peasant, not the reverse. The VC have recognized and exploited this basic premise. Past GVN promises of social change failed to materialize and were transmitted largely by government and military officials distrusted by the peasant. This legacy of failure to produce change constitutes the most difficult problem to overcome in the future US-GVN programs.

The upper class and urban Vietnamese also possess a distinct set of attitudes which can be assessed. Most deleterious to the US support effort is their negative attitude toward the peasant who is considered backward, ignorant, naïve and deserving of his lot in life. Montagnards are regarded as savages; Cambodians are viewed as culturally and ethnically inferior and less deserving of GVN support. The Chinese, however, are covertly admired for their cultural superiority apparent from Cholon to the most remote village of the Delta. Their hold on economic activity serves as the primary source of such anti-Chinese feeling as exists in urban SVN. Many urbanites regard the VC with tacit admiration and reflect it via noninvolvement in US-GVN programs open criticism of GVN military leadership and thinly veiled resentment over nonreceipt of equal attention in the US support effort. The prevalent urban attitude toward the war is one of withdrawal and its consideration as primarily between the military and the VC. Central to this perspective is the hope that the conflict can be confined to the countryside with minimum disruption to urban life.

Vietnamese urban intellectuals exhibit a particularly negative attitude pattern toward the GVN military. Mr. Tran Quang

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Thuan, former Deputy Prime Minister in the Quat government, demonstrated it in discussion with Dr. Henry Kissinger which set forth the following prediction for 1966: (1) the intellectuals will "make trouble" for projected programs because of a genuine distaste for current political authorities; (2) they will withdraw to private concerns and maintain indifference to public matters; and, (3) individuals who serve GVN do so only because they have been, in effect, "paid off." All of these attitudes are forecast to endure unless a government comes into being that makes some attempt to bring about the desired social revolution.^{7/}

It is a safe conclusion that civilian, rather than military, government is received more favorably by the majority of the South Vietnamese. A number of the foregoing attitudes have assumed the proportions of values within Vietnamese society and are acknowledged by all social groups.

Vietnamese Values. Although closely related to attitudes, values additionally possess motivational properties; since they are indicative of what people will strive to achieve, values virtually defy quantification. Knowing the dominant values of groups within Vietnamese society and where these values conflict could provide the US with a foundation for determining positive social changes for accomplishment with minimum individual resistance and social disruption. The US does not possess these data in sufficient detail; as such, today's Vietnamese values are extremely difficult to assess with reasonable assurance. The discrepancy between expressed values and overt behavior obviously has been enlarged by pressures of the current conflict. Some group and individual behavior today appears chaotic or, at best, capricious, thus defying prediction. Our current knowledge here provides merely a base whereby these values can be inferred and presented only as they are apparent in society as a whole and largely within a Caucasian frame of reference.

Filial piety must be rated as the strongest value in Vietnam. Consequently, nepotism and petty graft (or "kick-back") are viewed as ethical behavior reflecting devotion to the objective of furthering one's family position. Face (or appearance), another crucial value at the family and village level, is viewed as the means of maintaining individual appearances. Fear provides the motivational basis for "saving face" and operates as a powerful force contributing to village harmony. The threat of expulsion from, or social ostracism by, the village acts as a deterrent to behavior reducing "harmony" in day-to-day living. These social

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sanctions may be employed by either family or village notables and sustain a form of fear that exceeds punishment by law. It is this tight social control that is both the basis of village cohesion and the target of VC infrastructure.

Patriotism is a relatively new phenomenon in Vietnam; it may eventually challenge family loyalty in value status. Previously, patriotism existed solely as a negative motivational force which was targeted against foreign intervention, mainly Chinese and French. In SVN, respect for the feelings of individuals outside the family is subordinated and considered less important than is the case in Western society. Vietnamese are not apt to respond with overt concern at personal injustice, nor will they become emotionally involved in assisting the less fortunate.

Frequently, however, the Vietnamese assert the strong aspiration to Nhan Dao (rough translation: "humanity and social justice"). In a very real sense, this form of hope should be translated into a "what not to do" catalogue for US-GVN representatives operating in rural areas:

- (1) Driving at excessive speeds through villages.
- (2) Stealing chickens and other means of peasant livelihood.
- (3) Aerial bombing and artillery firing (particularly harassing and interdiction fires at night).
- (4) Condoning the payment of taxes to multiple collection agencies (VC and GVN).
- (5) Failing to provide relief from VC or GVN terrorization.
- (6) Remaining aloof from practices denying legitimate indemnification payments for combat operations losses.
- (7) Permitting forceful relocations in the face of such abuses as collection and personal use of allocated funds by corrupt officials.
- (8) Requiring the provision of transportation without reimbursement.
- (9) Maintaining a "hands off" posture with respect to such forms of official extortion as: (a) buying MEDCAP basic drugs; (b) sale of identification photos; and, (c) ransoming husbands under arrest for having failed to carry ID cards to the paddy field.

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However petty and unimportant such counterproductive practices may seem individually or collectively, they form the roots of social revolution in the rural areas of SVN; each practice, and perhaps many more, must be addressed by specific US-GVN efforts to cope with a "war of rising frustration." The VC "three basic rules and eight fundamental remarks" deportment are clearly attuned to these hopes. (See: ANNEX C, p. C-24)

Vietnamese Beliefs. The Vietnamese have their own standard, and generally shared, answers to life's questions. Their decisions to support or object, act or not to act, are made on the basis of culturally influenced judgments. These judgments serve as the amalgam holding all of the parts together in a reasonably predictable social order. Belief systems are well developed within the separate religions and demonstrate a definite pattern. Though they are not subject to direct manipulation or influence, their understanding more fully explains Vietnamese behavior. (See: ANNEX B)

The pervasive influence of Buddhism has created a societal value system sharply counter to that of Western individualism. Materialism and preservation of the individual are largely meaningless; both are transcended by a form of superspiritualism that demands earthly tranquility and predestination.

Belief in the destiny concept of inevitability imposes highest value on personality traits of patience, stoicism, adaptation and courage in the face of adversity. Contrary to the Western belief that man manipulates nature, the Vietnamese believe in achieving harmony through adaptation to nature. When acts such as death or sickness occur in nature, reliance is placed upon soothsayers and diviners to interpret these events. Vietnamese also are quite superstitious and attach great value to the acknowledgment of lucky numbers, spirits and historical events; these are controlling guides to personal and professional activities. Actually, such forms of preoccupation with the occult is rife throughout SEA, especially in Thailand.

Fatalism, to the extent that there are conditions in life about which man's efforts are of little avail, exists as a central belief in Vietnamese society. It is reflected in several forms. Among the peasants, for example, the war has reinforced fatalism by demonstrating that there are real conditions over which he has no control and for which adaptation poses problems. In a sense, the basic peasant beliefs are now being challenged by direct confrontation with Western manipulation of nature. These basic beliefs, together with Confucianism, form the religious and philosophical bases of Vietnamese society.

Vietnamese Personality.^{8/} As a social product, "the" Vietnamese personality should mirror the influence of institutions, groups,

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attitudes, values and beliefs as they interact in SVN to influence behavior. Whether stemming from an Oriental or Occidental social base, this fundamental should hold true. However, it is particularly vulnerable when an attempt is made to arrive at a model personality description of the "Vietnamese individual" based upon the simplistic interaction of such factors. In rural areas, the peasant exists with little idea of a greater Vietnamese society, frequently reflecting differences due to diverse ethnic background and variations in village life. It is doubtful that the peasant has developed a "social personality" with a frame of reference exceeding the village scene. His most recent concern is with the cessation of a disruptive war, whose vague objectives are not amenable to his intellect; other than this forced interest, his participation in society appears to be minimal.

However, the more urban Vietnamese appear to have sufficiently developed, and internalized, social attitude and value systems to a point where their "personality" will permit subjective assessment for the determination of salient traits. This assessment is most valid as a description, however, only of the Vietnamese with whom Americans are in most frequent contact.

Psychologically, and when compared to Westerners, Vietnamese are realists who are working pessimists. Vietnamese pessimism is reflected in the personal and official behavioral traits of wait -- endure -- persist -- avoid judging. The war has induced a primary concern with survival; as such, the Vietnamese seem reluctant and exceedingly difficult to motivate. The realities of the current situation are reinforced by a tradition of noncommitment as a basis for normal individual behavior. Essentially, this connotes antithesis of aggressive achievement; the individual who demonstrates initiative thereby places himself in a position to be held responsible if things go wrong. This traditional passive regard for action and achievement, in a conflict situation so demanding the display of just such characteristics, poses a problem of considerable magnitude for anyone cast in a role of "advising" Vietnamese. Influencing their thought and action processes demands the application of considerable force if traditional attitudes toward activity and achievement are to be overcome.

A description of the VC, who are also Vietnamese, presents a paradox. For VC behavior seemingly demonstrates the opposite of a pessimistic framework. The secret may well be in the motivation which the VC passes for their cause which permit them to override the negative aspects of their cultural heritage.

Recent history in SVN is replete with failure blanketing virtually every segment of society. The present generation, experiencing the impact of this history, must view much of life pessimistically; there is

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ample evidence of readiness to accept the fact that life can be bitter and mistakes are to be made. However, this permeating awareness of failure could also serve as an important cohesive factor in SVN. The Vietnamese readily accept candid and frank appraisals as to what is wrong with their country and what needs to be done. To be less than frank, within the pattern of extended politeness, is to reveal a blatant form of ignorance to the Vietnamese. In fact, many of them view the current situation as so utterly hopeless that US claims of success tend to be considered as clear-cut validation of this basic lack of understanding by their ally.^{8/} A Vietnamese views disorder arising in society as the result of improper conduct on the part of individuals in it. He does not conceive of such disorder stemming from inadequacies within social institutions. Vietnamese contend that all social relationships can be reduced basically to five in number: father and son; husband and wife; ruler and subject; elder brother and younger brother; and, junior and senior. If these relationships are governed by filial piety, then harmony exists. To him, social disorder demands adaptation to the situation; the Western approach of manipulating society in resolution of social conflict is beyond comprehension. Thus, harmony with both the physical and the social environment is maintained,

The Vietnamese experienced their first major disintegration of national unity while the US was fighting its Civil War. The constant social disruption and continuous display of destructive force since that time have produced an enduring influence upon Vietnamese behavior. This holds true particularly among individuals occupying responsible leadership positions. The Vietnamese continue to experience difficulty in conceptualizing constructive activity; they apparently are unable to conceive of the successful result of a positive effort, particularly without the application of force. This is evident within military ranks; many RVNAF leaders must have resolved under French tutelage that, should a situation offering opportunity for equivalent social status and power materialize, they would behave like the French. The Vietnamese military professional is quick to deprecate the French for the benefit of his American counterpart; however, his admiration of French methods and the French way of life is apparent behind this thin veneer of deprecation.

Such vulnerabilities, however, serious in the short range, can serve as a foundation for US action to assist social evaluation in SVN. Because of a reluctance to stand on principle, the Vietnamese are quite vulnerable to manipulation within the framework of an appropriate social reward and punishment system. Consequently, a Vietnamese official can be expected to endure a US representative and consistently respond in a fashion totally at variance with his personal convictions or social preferences. This is particularly significant in light of the paramount need to obtain a positive response from Vietnamese officials toward the rural population; although he may question or even detest the act, it will be performed. Thus, most Vietnamese will not be torn by having to

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"live a lie" for a firm counterpart, particularly if assured of tenure and not afforded an opportunity to escape the situation. Psychologically, and to survive, he must endure whatever life has forced upon him, even an advisor. Hopefully over time, many Vietnamese could be brought to accept this form of "lie" as a new and workable system of social values. Realistically, the coming generation, less ingrained with the traditional social values, presents our major long-term target for influence.

The American In-Country

Vietnamese Interpersonal Relationship with Americans. Most Vietnamese civil and military officials have been exposed to an increasing procession of US advisors while serving in several positions of responsibility. Consequently, these Vietnamese are quite aware of what Americans consider to be the most sensitive Vietnamese values and exclusion areas within which advice is not to be offered. Fear of loss of face, the need for advisor rapport and nonintervention in politics fall within this category. At times, the US has failed to accord credit for social learning to the Vietnamese. Quite apparently, however, they have now included the apolitical character of the US military and the fear of prestige loss as central to their interpersonal defense mechanisms; both are manipulated actively to insulate against either the receipt of, or action upon, unwanted advice. In essence, US sensitivity to these Vietnamese behavioral facets may have become inordinately self-defeating when weighed against the need to achieve US-GVN objectives. This is particularly critical when coupled with the need to maintain rapport on strictly an "advisory" basis.

Fundamentally, the American optimist is dealing with the Vietnamese. When the American feels obliged to buoy the spirits of a Vietnamese by lauding some form of minor achievement (a normal American cultural response), he is viewed as misunderstanding both the Vietnamese individual and the enormous hopelessness of the situation in SVN. In addition, when an American praises a Vietnamese publicly (as is our obliging custom) and then criticizes him privately, the Vietnamese is no longer capable of comprehending what to do, particularly publicly. Rather than view this as an indication of polite American concern in the complex area of face-saving, it is judged as a combination of factual misrepresentation and of failure to understand the Vietnamese people. These bits of social reality are not among the established subjects of US advisor training, but they are crucial to understanding and influencing both the thinking and behavior of a GVN counterpart. Despite the magnitude of our military build-up, Vietnamese distrust the sincerity and firmness of the American commitment. Concern is voiced that US interests are self-seeking and by no means oriented solely on assisting SVN for its own sake. In spite of seemingly negative personality characteristics and the status of the situation in their country, Vietnamese regard themselves as culturally superior beings and expect to be treated accordingly. They know the

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value of being counted on the winning side and, at the last moment, will pick up the banner only when convinced that the winner has indeed materialized. For the short term, Americans can best appear to Vietnamese officialdom on the basis of "professionalism" in their job; this is the one general eventuality to which all apparently aspire.

A New US Role. If there is any single factor which now can energize and assist in polarizing Vietnamese society, it is the United States presence in SVN. Americans must be prepared to recognize their role as social innovators and respond to Vietnam's request for assistance on a society-to-society, rather than on primarily a military-to-military, basis. This requirement, as forecast in Senator Mansfield's January 1966 report on Vietnam, must be recognized and met across the board:

"Under present concepts and plans, then, what lies ahead is, literally, a vast and continuing undertaking in social engineering in the wake of such military progress as may be registered. And, as for many years to come, this task will be very heavily dependent upon US foreign aid." 9/

The penetrating form of social change needed in SVN cannot be initiated and sustained solely by massive US military intervention. Essentially, the activities of a select group of US representatives (USREPs) who are identified with the very inner workings of Vietnamese society can do most in the "agent of social change" role. General Lansdale, currently Special Assistant to the Ambassador, possesses the capacity and experience to pioneer such an effort. As a first step, the "advisor" title and its implied relationship should be scrapped. Within the "new role" framework, USREPs and GVNREPs would confront each other and the issues squarely and not in a tiered posture of involvement. The potential support that the US Army could provide in such undertaking is considerable; the cumulative experience of US personnel assigned in SVN since 1954 forms a solid foundation for developing a prototype organization to fulfill the task. (See: ANNEX J) In this day of admittedly rapid and vast change, Americans believing deeply in its value, should not fear an innovative change of individual mission in any agency charged with the execution or support of US foreign policy.

The operation of USREPs in Vietnam, located at the key points of social change (province and district) attest to the fact that more resources are available to accomplish this task than perhaps have been realized heretofore. In a sample of 50 US Army sector and subsector advisors serving in SVN, 88 percent considered their tours as extremely rewarding and as preparing them for the future Army role in counterinsurgency. Eighty-five percent of the same group indicated a desire to serve a second tour in the identical capacity; 73 percent indicated

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a desire for additional preparation with respect to the nonmilitary aspects of such an assignment. (See: ANNEX G) In short, the US does possess a number of officers who have faced the complexities of the problem and remain convinced that the job can be done -- 86 percent stating a willingness, given all resources, to remain on the job until completion. The implication is clear. Americans have identified with the strengths and aspirations of the Vietnamese people, primarily the peasant.

To exert maximum influence in SVN imposes new requirements upon USREPs. The motivation of men, as every soldier knows, presents problems. It is far more difficult to achieve such motivation within an alien culture -- in a people who possess different attitudes, values and beliefs -- and inside groups exhibiting puzzling patterns of both social and individual behavior. In a very real sense, future USREPs must have a complete understanding of the particular social milieu in which they will be assigned to operate. Forearmed with such knowledge, they will be enabled to revise programs and to initiate proposals that will work within the social parameters characteristic of their areas of influence.

A more realistic approach by the US, recognizing these realities and frailties of Vietnamese social character, will increase the probability of both individual and unified effort successes. The obstacle which reinforces a now unacceptable degree of tolerance toward inactivity and corrupt practices in SVN must be surmounted as a prerequisite to the achievement of social cohesion.

The Outlook for Social Change

Obstacles to Change. There are very serious obstacles which total out as resistance to change and, of necessity, must preface any forecast as to the efficacy of assisted change in SVN. The first such obstacle is leadership. Crusaders for a social cause in Vietnam are rare, and existing behavioral codes offer adequate excuses to protect leaders from making such firm personal commitments. If commitments are stated firmly, this by no means necessarily results in action; in Vietnam, one cooperates with whom one must strictly according to the dictates of the situation. In addition, many of the military elite through which the US now is forced to work are motivated almost completely in terms of personal gain. They respond from a French "colonial" type of condoning, if not encouraging, moderate graft and corruption; in the context of the current situation, their traditional disdain for the rural population constitutes a most serious vulnerability. On the other hand, the VC opposition has demonstrated significantly less restraint with respect to employing sanctions. There are no indications of VC remorse over applying the extreme in negative sanctions against all who evidence intent to disrupt accommodation. This has placed a severe damper on

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GVN corrective action.


The men who must translate the stated policy of GVN leadership into action, and thus carry out social reform in the villages, also have their limitations. In SVN, the soldier who fights for the GVN -- like the peasant upon whom he depends for support -- has not been conditioned by years of loyalty to a recognized national government. He is not enticed by the prospect of glory and conquest. The paramilitary soldier, a key ingredient in the projected Rural Construction Program, is a peasant himself. His cultural traditions have not yet transcended his own village site; as such, these traditions have neither prepared him for a passionate devotion to abstract ideas nor encouraged him to identify as an individual with the plight of the less fortunate.


Change, when it occurs, will be difficult to root deeply in SVN. The belief that all in life is transitory has many followers, and it will require a massive effort to convince the Vietnamese that substantive positive change has occurred in their version of reality. This difficulty, in turn, will be aggravated by the gnawing suspicion among the intellectuals that the motivation underlying our commitment involves perpetuating self-interests in SEA rather than defeating communism within the boundaries of SVN. Protracted failure of US-GVN follow-through on social reform programs, when linked to a preoccupation with predominantly US military actions, can deepen Vietnamese distrust significantly. The repeated failures of nonmilitary programs appear to have inured many Vietnamese to the prospect for success against the VC. The effort to break the chain of reorganize, rename, refund and fail on a yearly basis presents, perhaps, the greatest motivational challenge to the US presence.


The VC continue to exacerbate dissatisfactions with life in SVN and to accelerate the process of social change to revolutionary proportions. In general, the VC have been more successful in articulating the peasants' aspirations and satisfying their expectations of social reform through the selective application of terror against corrupt village officials than has the GVN in producing credible benefits at village level. In a very basic and physical sense, the VC have tailored their efforts for maximum impact in rural SVN as social innovators and agents of change within a social framework of communist design. (See: ANNEX C) Consequently, the VC still control the geographic bulk of the country by virtue of a well-developed, relatively unchallenged infrastructure deeply entrenched at village level.

The situation and the cross current of subtle influences impinging on the totality of Vietnamese society are presented graphically by Figure I-5. The VC and US-supported GVN efforts will continue to compete among

FIGURE 1.5







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existing divisive factions of Vietnamese society. The most critical divisive factor, that of the urban-rural conflict, is most amenable to change through US-GVN efforts, hence merits immediate attention. The integration of attitudes, values and beliefs into a tangible ideology capable of sustaining a cohesive system is possible. But it exists as a long-range goal which in reality can be achieved and sustained only through Vietnamese motivation to the task.

Outlook for the Future:

(1) Rural. No significant acceptance of Western attitudes and values is apparent in rural areas. In general, the Vietnamese peasant accepts his way of life because he has been offered no other in conjunction with credible acts toward attainment. New ways might be accepted, however, if they offered positive promise of meeting the essential needs of rural life in SVN. Attitudes and values will continue to be influenced and shaped by the existing competitive systems -- the urban economic and the provincial VC. The possibility exists that the US presence can influence evolutionary change in this crucial sector of Vietnamese society. A change in the US method of operations to direct specific attention toward influencing counterparts to respond positively toward the rural population is a first step.

(2) Urban. The urban population must be disabused of the view that US and GVN forces are positioned solely to guarantee the safety of urban centers. The urbanite must identify with, and move to solve, the rural problem in SVN; today, he is not convinced that, failing this identification and movement to solution, he will suffer the consequences of an ultimate VC purge. The rudimentary beginnings of an urban middle class are evident, and the importance of economic considerations in determining social status has increased. The increasing US presence has stimulated an aura of impending military success among these urban residents; as such, the tendency will be to associate security with US, not GVN, capabilities. Their hopes for fulfillment of positive programs will rise, and increasing numbers not now openly supporting US-GVN efforts can be expected to make a final and personal commitment. The efficacy of dodging commitment to assure survival under any turn of events could fade abruptly; therefore, US-GVN plans must provide for such a contingency to ensure that there is substance available to absorb the commitment. There are positive indications of South Vietnamese who are committed to the building of their country rather than solely furthering themselves and their families within an opportunistic frame of reference. Family welfare, thus, must be inextricably braided with a similar positive concern for the future of Vietnam as a country.

(3) The US Effort. The achievement of a free and independent SVN, a basic US objective, continues to be subverted by a GVN political

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outlook targeted on exploitation of the rural and lower class urban population. Though US rational intent remains clear, GVN inaction has doomed a long succession of programs aimed at social reform. Undertaken by GVN officials primarily for the dollar support involved, these programs were but vaguely related to a sincere interest in bettering the lot of the Vietnamese public. Social change within SVN, at this point in time, hinges on US provision of an institutional scaffolding capable of assisting -- and, if necessary, assuming a primary agent role -- in the introduction of needed change. The presence of such an effort, coupled with the already existent military scaffolding, could provide motivation consistent with the degree of pressure required to produce change. There must be some substantive alteration of the current political stand-off wherein Vietnamese leadership is neither motivated nor capable of accomplishing the task. The US has evidenced a strong aversion to embark upon such an effort, and any overt US seizure of leadership in this critical area would be resisted by GVN leaders. Directed social change, discreetly applied through a select US advisory system, offers at least a middle alternative for consideration consistent with the need to win in SVN.

Conclusions

(1) The US-supported GVN military elite is not well accepted by the general public. The military tend to see themselves as masters, not servants, of the Vietnamese people. Maximum US effort must focus on achieving recognition within this military elite that they must demonstrate people concern and people interest rather than remaining aloof and permitting the failure of "people-oriented" programs.

(2) A reorganization of the US support effort, by creating an effective management mechanism for emulation by an evolving GVN counterpart mechanism, is fundamental to the total issue of social change. Until the US effort is coordinated and manifests responsible cohesion within itself, it is futile to attempt to influence or to force coordination of the US-GVN effort.

(3) The US lacks a positive philosophy to accompany advice and technological support, and the GVN lacks a sense of revolutionary purpose; both must be achieved and communicated to the Vietnamese people. Reliance upon an almost exclusively negative, anti-communist philosophy must be replaced by a US physical presence representing the epitomy of values, attitudes and norms associated with responsible government of, by and for the people. This does not connote "selling" democratic institutions but supporting Vietnamese responses that evidence true concern for the dignity of the individual peasant.

(4) The Vietnamese have become skilled in the manipulation of Americans, more so than Americans have become skilled in manipulating Vietnamese. They play on American sensitivities regarding the imperialist

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or colonialist label, the sanctity of Vietnamese sovereignty, the preservation of Vietnamese "face" and the need to sustain "rapport." Consequently, elaborate interpersonal stratagems have been devised to get what they want and to forget what we want. A change in the training of USREPs with respect to dealing with Vietnamese is critical if the effectiveness of the US presence is to be increased.

(5) Student groups and young district chiefs offer the greatest potential source of leadership in terms of influencing the Vietnamese social system toward change.

(6) The Vietnamese can be talked to frankly and honestly about the situation in their country. Creating a facade of success destroys the credibility of the US support effort by casting Americans as either insincere or ignorant of local conditions.

(7) The Vietnamese people are basically pessimistic and remain unconvinced as to the firmness of US resolve and commitment in SVN. They are also very resilient and can be expected to "bandwagon" to the winning side once convinced that the end of the war is at hand and that here is "an object that lies beyond the war."

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Notes

1. Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment. New York, 1965.
2. Sung, Dang Van. "Dilemmas in Vietnam." Saigon, 1963. (Unpublished MS)
3. This information, received from a second-level GVN ministerial representative, was presented to a friend as a Vietnamese analysis of American myths, Saigon, 1965.
4. US Army Broadcasting, and Visual Activity Pacific. Psychological Warfare Estimate, Republic of Vietnam. Okinawa, 1963.
5. Sorenson, John L., and Pack, David K. Unconventional Warfare and The Vietnamese Society. China Lake, California, 1964.
6. Special Operations Research Office. Social Groups in Vietnam. Washington, 1965. The 1,000,000 lay membership figure for the United Buddhist Association is based upon a 1962 estimate of membership of the General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists.
7. Saigon conversations between Mr. Thun, Dr. Tuyen (former Deputy Prime Minister in the Quat government) and Dr. Henry Kissinger held in October, 1965; presents a view commonly held by the Vietnamese intellectual.
8. Lecture, 8 December 1965, by Mr. Drogue, USIA Vietnam Desk Officer for Voice of America. Mr. Drogue has field experience in Vietnam and close daily contact with emigre Vietnamese who may distort the "Vietnamese individual" image somewhat; however, the case presented is sufficiently consistent with USA advisor experience to warrant consideration.
9. Taken from the text of Senator Max Baucus' report on Vietnam as printed in the Washington Post, 9 Jan 65.
10. DEPTSTATE Message No. 2142, DTG: 25 1929 R Jan 65, DA IN 249344 (SECRET).

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ANNEX J

DELTA PROVINCE PACIFICATION: KIEN HOA CASE

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ANNEX J

DELTA PROVINCE PACIFICATION: KIEN HOA CASE

Introduction

General. The principles of pacification are too general in scope to sharpen understanding of all that is involved in their application to the village level of the war in SVN. A close look at the relatively successful pacification programs and organizations, in being as well as in concept, for the important Delta province of Kien Hoa is presented here to further US understanding.

Purpose and Scope. This Annex presents the provincial pacification effort in terms of existing programs and organizations; of modifications to these programs for increasing progress; and, of programs and organizations proposed to supplement the current effort. Its scope includes a discussion of the province environment; a brief consensus of the major obstacles to pacification; a treatment of the existing operational programs; proposals for a recommended Rural Construction organization; and, a far projected phasing of the pacification effort as well as of progress within the system. It represents one US Army sector advisor's view.

The Area

Background. Kien Hoa Province has been a communist stronghold for nearly 20 years. A lush coconut jungle and rice-rich province, it was one of the last Viet Minh areas "evacuated" in 1955. Historically, Kien Hoa (still called Ben Tre Province by the VC) has played an impressive role in Vietnamese history. Some of the country's most famous leaders were born there. It has been said that, in Kien Hoa, one sees a microcosm of almost all of Vietnam's problems as well as the frustrations in trying to solve them. Long a high priority VC province for liberation, it is important for its food and manpower resources both to the VC and GVN.

Physical Description

Location, Size, Geography. Kien Hoa is located in the Mekong Delta approximately 75 kilometers southwest of Saigon. Divided into three major islands by tributaries formed by the Mekong River as it empties into the South China Sea, its area approximates 840 square miles. With

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an average elevation 3 meters above sea level (maximum of 5 meters), almost one-half of the province is cultivated rice land. The remainder is divided, more or less equally, into cultivated coconut and banana forests and mangrove swamp and wasteland. Of the some 34,000 hectares of cultivated coconut jungle in SVN, over 64 percent lie in Kien Hoa. The entire province is criss-crossed with canals and waterways which are tide-dependent, major traffic arteries. Gravity irrigation is common, but salt water intrusion of the rice paddies is a problem only during the dry season.

Communications. Kien Hoa has an extensive surface communication system, connected by bridges and ferries, to most outlying districts. Although frequently mined by the VC, most of these roads still are maintained in trafficable condition. There are sections of the province, however, which are completely isolated; routes have been cut and have been neither re-secured nor repaired. The only main, all-weather road connects Kien Hoa with Dinh Tuong Province via the My Tho ferry. The prime arteries are the waterways; these include some 40 kilometers of coastline on the South China Sea, approximately 300 kilometers of major inland waterways and over 1,000 kilometers of small rivers, canals and streams navigable by sampans. Main air traffic uses Son Dong airfield, a 1,100-meter laterite runway, outside Ben Tre. Two 500-meter dirt strips were being constructed and repaired late in 1965 in Binh Dai and Ba Tri; construction of a third strip (Thanh Phu) was planned.

Economy. The economy is predominantly agricultural with approximately 110,000 hectares of paddy producing approximately 200,000 tons of rice annually. Exports of rice have decreased in recent years. Other major crops are coconuts, sugar cane, tobacco and tree fruits (e.g., bananas and oranges). There are 89 rice mills and 22 ruoc mam facilities, as well as several soap, ice, brick and coconut oil extraction factories.

Population Distribution

Civilian. There are as many population estimates as there are US agencies operational in SVN. No one really knows how many people reside in Kien Hoa. Estimates based on the last census, with current birth-death rate adjustments, place the average at 600,000 plus or minus 50,000. This figure is divided into approximately 150,000 family groups occupying 854 hamlets in the 115 villages of Kien Hoa's nine districts. The bulk are of Vietnamese origin with only a sprinkling of Hoa Hao, Chinese and a few Cambodians. About 80 percent of the population is of a Confucian, ancestor worshipper or Buddhist

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faith; some ten percent are Cao Dai, and seven percent are Christian (mostly Catholic); the remainder are Hoa Hao and miscellaneous. Farming is the major occupation; significantly, approximately 65 percent of the farmers rent their land without contract.

Currently, US-GVN pacification reports place approximately one-half of the population under VC control (or, at least not under GVN control). Optimistic Vietnamese feel that about 85 percent of the people are mentally opposed to the VC (i.e., VC control is transient, necessary under the circumstances, but not desirable). There are signs to support this contention -- not to the percentage extent aforementioned, but certainly greater than 50 percent.

Military. Excluding ARVN in-Province, strength levels of roughly 6,000 PF and 3,000 RF members constitute authorized defense manning. A small "ghost" army exists for employment by Kien Hoa district chiefs, but actual paramilitary "present for duty" strength probably shades 85 percent of authorized strength. Again, the actual versus reported numbers cannot be attested by US advisors. As of late 1965, ARVN units consisted of one under strength Infantry regiment; one Ranger battalion; as well as, 6 platoons of 105mm howitzer and 1 platoon of 155mm howitzer artillery. VC military strength varies from month to month but, in general, reports average out at 600 confirmed Main Force, 1,500 Provincial Force, 3,600 guerrillas and 18,000 hamlet self-defenders -- of the latter, only some one-third are armed.

Major Obstacles To Pacification

The major obstacles to pacification fall into four readily identifiable categories: the VC organization, the GVN organization, US involvement and other continuing problems.

Viet Cong Organization. In Kien Hoa, the VC organization has served as the most obvious single deterrent to cumulative pacification. The infrastructure is deep-rooted and firmly buttressed throughout the province. Through fear, terrorism, bribery, taxation and constant harassment, the VC sustain a predominant position in the humble life of the average peasant.

The GVN Organization. GVN organization is basically inefficient in terms of meeting and dealing with the realities of the VC threat and ranks second only to VC organization as a major obstacle to pacification. This inability stems mainly from the structure itself; facets of

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the Vietnamese character with respect to organizational relationships; the caliber of Vietnamese serving at the various province and district echelons; administrative relationships with headquarters outside province; and, the provincial security situation. While no basic alterations would likely improve this situation, changes to improve unity of command channels, control of budget programming and expenditures, as well as the assignment of higher caliber officers and civilians to posts of responsibility would greatly improve province-level GVN organization.

(1) Sector (Province) Level. GVN structure at sector level is commanded by the military and staffed mainly by civilians who are career civil servants. However inefficient, the civil servants of Kien Hoa have provided the single persistent element of continuity in a coup-ridden national government. It is possible that their apparent resistance to change, or slow response to the changes in government, has largely been responsible for what measure of GVN stability persists in the countryside. These civil servants respond primarily to the Saigon ministries and thus dilute the province chief's authority. Although probably aware of peasant problems, they exhibit no outward concern about them. Most do not fulfill their obligations and duties out of fear of traveling outside the province town. Consequently, the district officials do not receive the support they should. More important, the people do not readily recognize their Kien Hoa officials.

The military staff at Sector is generally understrength and manned by officers of lower caliber or potential than those which crowd the staffs at division, corps and Saigon echelons.

(2) Subsector (District) Level. District chiefs, when possible, are selected by the Province Chief and, hopefully, with approval from Corps. To remove inefficient district chiefs is difficult but replacing them is more difficult. The failure to post better qualified officers at district level looms as a major hinderance to pacification. The district government constitutes the first level of appointive GVN officialdom that the people of SVN see.

(3) Village Level. Village officials and the village organization are the most important and most neglected entities in pacification. Though most US-GVN officials do not like it this way, there appears to be no activity underway to improve the situation. Village officials are underpaid; hence, lesser-qualified and marginally productive individuals are attracted to such posts. Lack of skill, motivation and experience in helping the people improve their living standards is not uncommon. Resources from Province and from outside Kien Hoa are either limited to the support of specific projects or are too minimal for application, as required, area-wide.

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US Involvement. The US "organization" in the province is fragmented into as many agencies as are operating in Vietnam. That no official chain of command and coordination exists is one of the greater obstacles to the conduct of a more successful GVN support effort. Generally, a spirit of cooperation has been cultivated among the many US agencies, however, individual agency prerogatives were left intact. This condition has generated within each US agency representative the feeling that he must serve as "the" advisor to the province chief in "his" particular field of endeavor and expertise. Once a province chief is categorized as "cooperative" in US eyes, he is literally deluged by intensely personalized components of support. Once he refuses the virtually continuous and time-draining audiences involved, he is tabbed as "uncommunicative" or reported as "uncooperative." A realignment of the US agencies operative at sector level, under some form of positive single manager supervision, could alleviate "situational stress" and increase efficient operation overall. At district level, the sole US representation on a continuing basis was the MACV Subsector Advisory Team. Until September 1965, it held no resources with which to support the district chief. A 50,000 piaster emergency fund for US advisor use was made available and, if properly used, this resource can markedly increase the impact of US-GVN efforts. Actually more US input to this level is required.

Persistent Province Problems. Problems of a continuing nature form a final major obstacle to pacification in Kien Hoa. Most of them were generated as a result of the inability of the US-GVN organizations-in-being to cope adequately with them. Their critical elements follow:

(1) Pacification. Planning, programing and control of financial resources are over centralized outside Kien Hoa. This condition severely hampers operational flexibility at all levels -- especially in terms of being restricted in its role by Saigon impositions even when complete unanimity prevails within the committee.

(2) Pay. The relatively, and unrealistically, low pay and allowance scales of village officials in Kien Hoa not only fail to attract capable people but foster disinterested, unmotivated effort. Inadequate security, lack of essential sickness or wound allowances and low death compensations are prevalent indications of GVN disinterest. The peasant citizenry is keenly aware of such GVN disinterest in the village and its officials. The same low pay and allowances problem applies to paramilitary forces who continually bear the brunt of VC attack. A lack of care, compensation and response to widows, to orphans, to invalids, as well as to the war-wounded and crippled is the rule rather than the exception. The VC exploit these facts of the village "real world" practically and psychologically.

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(3) Cadre. Trained cadre voids in critical skills are extant. Motivation among the cadre to work with the people is often half-hearted. Too often, cadre trained in Saigon adopt an indifferent attitude toward the peasants. They have not been as well-trained and motivated as the VC cadre in working with the people.

(4) Political. The populace of Kien Hoa is not sufficiently aware of the national political situation. Not enough effort is put forth by the GVN to publicize the political situation. This condition may persist owing to GVN instability during 1965, however, it is probably more likely another indication of GVN disinterest.

(5) Draft. The draft of 1965, which supposedly excluded no one, inflicted heavy damage on province government, i.e., skilled, key civil servants were drafted. The Province Chief had virtually no means, except by breaking the law, to retain trusted and efficient assistants or service chiefs. In addition, many young men who were willing to fight the VC "in-province" either contributed to GVN "deserter statistics" or joined the VC to evade abrupt departure from their home area. The draft imposed by GVN leaders, presumably with US backing, was misapplied to the countryside. Where the people willingly contested VC control, critical manpower was either bodily transported out or personally selected one of several alternatives tending to reinforce a yardstick titled "defected over to the VC." In any case, the VC won and the GVN lost in Kien Hoa. The US military view of how a draft should work apparently did not take into account the mentality and mores of a country people.

(6) Chieu Hoi. The Chieu Hoi (open arms) program is grossly inadequate. Not only are Kien Hoa facilities lacking but the meager funding is mismanaged. No real support, guidance or centralized effort has emanated from Saigon. This form of program demands a skilled cadre, adequate funding and a full-focus psychological training effort. Not only are returnees not rewarded adequately when they "vote for the GVN with their feet," but they do not receive proper orientations, briefings or guidance. When they depart the center, they are not monitored. It is not likely that high-ranking VC officials will ever defect in Kien Hoa, because their professional potential to the GVN could not, and would not, be recognized under the present system.

(7) Population and Resources Control. This major problem also demands trained GVN personnel and facilities. Inadequate police force strength, equipment shortage, the weak motivational base of the National Police and a patent lack of enforcement as well as supervisory control preclude the imposition of effective measures for controlling either the population or valuable resources. The VC are able to tax commercial

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enterprise and traffic as well as move freely with their own supplies. This is unfortunately more serious in Kien Hoa because of its many water routes. The inadequacy of the police, lack of control over land distribution and use, poor control over resources, as well as an incomplete census, provide the matrix of a most substantive obstacle to pacification.

(8) Refugees. No provisions for the immediate and emergency care of a large influx of refugees from bombings or VC attacks exist in Kien Hoa on a substantial scale. The GVN does not authorize funds for refugee housing construction in advance, and the Ministry of Social Welfare does not respond with the alacrity required to impact positively upon emergency needs.

Pacification Programs and Organizations

General. To cover pacification adequately and as it should progress in Kien Hoa, an understanding of the required programs, executing organizations and time phasing is presented herewith. Many of the programs and executing organizations covered have been in existence for longer than one year. Other programs and executing organizations are proposed to hasten and stabilize the pacification effort. It is assumed that modifications to the existing GVN structure at hamlet and village level are possible. It is further assumed that there are basically three village categories of pacification, each differing slightly. These are: (1) pacification of villages under VC control; (2) pacification of villages in contested areas; and, (3) pacification of villages in predominantly GVN-secure areas. The organizations and programs are modified as a village passes through these various phases.

Operational Programs and Organizations. Certain key programs and organizations, when coordinated and integrated into a pacification program, are critical to the progress of rural construction in Kien Hoa. These programs are:

(1) Census Grievance. This program has been in operation for over a year. It was established primarily with US assistance provided through its Controlled American Source (CAS) representative. The program responds to three essentials of pacification in Kien Hoa: (a) determination of the people's complaints against GVN and its officials; (b) determination of the people's needs, or what they think they need; and, (c) detection and identification of the VC infrastructure at hamlet level. The basic program requirement -- highly trained, well-motivated cadres possessing the necessary facilities for a census-taking operation. The program is established at hamlet level with either two or three

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cadres constituting a hamlet team. It envisions that each member of each Kien Hoa family will be interviewed in confidence by the cadre on a periodic, continuing basis. One member of each family is interviewed approximately every 15 days. All families, including VC families, are required to be interviewed on-call. As a routine part of the interview, the cadre solicits answers to the following essential questions:

- What do you know of any problems or difficulties with officials, cadres or servicemen?
- What do you, your relatives or your neighbors require from the government; or, how can the government help this community?
- What do you know of any VC activities?

As the cadres become "hamlet-established," information received increases in quantity and reliability; all respondents know that their answers can, and will, be cross-checked. Only information on VC activity is reported to the local administrative office or district for timely exploitation. The other information is screened by the cadre and forwarded immediately to the Kien Hoa Province Chief through the Census Grievance Chief at Province. The cadre continue to follow up on all information until results are obtained and recorded.

(2) People's Action Teams (PATs). This program commenced in August 1965 and has expanded rapidly. The PAT employs cadre trained in various skills needed at hamlet level. They are equipped and organized into 40-man platoons. The platoon is a highly motivated, well-armed and equipped team which assists peasant families and can provide some security while they work. They are misused when employed as a military force, a bodyguard or on any other form of purely security mission. They do not deplete Kien Hoa military manpower, because their members are recruited from below and above the draft ages. (In many instances, the skills of discharged veterans, wounded or handicapped ex-servicemen and physically-exempt persons are thus brought to bear.) Female platoons are also organized and perform appropriate functions in assisting peasant women. The pay, allowances, privileges and benefits are made as attractive as possible and compare favorably with those of the military. It should be pointed out that such group members can transition to responsible peacetime community posts without the residual stigma of military control. The training program and PAT employment doctrine generally provide direct labor assistance in construction, agriculture and irrigation; medical assistance; homemaking, sanitation, land and property development; together with other civic action tasks sorely required by the peasant family. They also initiate people's organizations and prepare as well as assist in the conduct of local

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elections. The platoon further provides entertainment and counseling services, coupled with disseminating propaganda and waging psychological warfare against the VC. A major contribution of this program could be the establishment and training of a "People's Self-Defense Force." This overall PAT program in Kien Hoa requires close control and supervision to preclude misuse of the platoons by district chiefs.

(3) Armed Propaganda Teams (APAs). This program needs expansion to perform the functions below. Consisting of from five to ten cadresmen skilled in organizing hamlet citizens into people's organization, the APAs are charged with educating and preparing people for the conduct of elections and with supervising both the conduct and functions of people's organizations. Such organizations should include women's groups, teenage groups, refugee groups, civil defense groups and occupation groups. Representatives of these organizations are elected to the Hamlet and Village People's Council under the supervision of the APA and PAT. APAs often precede the PATs into VC-influenced areas to prepare the people psychologically for liberation by GVN cadres. The APAs, though understrength, were successful in psychological exploitation. Their efforts in promoting elections was minimal.

(4) Chieu Hoi Program. The "open arms" returnee program in Kien Hoa presently falls far short of requirements. To make it effective at province level, additional funds are required to expand operations in several critical areas. First, the program must encompass VC families living in GVN-secure areas. Families disposed toward the GVN, but with VC members, must be exploited to achieve the VC member's transfer of allegiance to the GVN. The property of families strongly opposed to the GVN should be confiscated, and the families resettled with others of their type based on decisions of the village People's Council. Second, the program must offer opportunities for the returnee to make an honorable living under the GVN. VC returnees with professional training should be subsidized by the GVN, at province level, to continue professional work after orientation and re-education at the Chieu Hoi Center. Doctors, teachers and skilled laborers should be integrated directly into the society. Military leaders should be paid on an ARVN-equivalent basis by the GVN and organized into a returnee unit for the provision of direct military support either to ARVN or other provincial forces. "Special Chieu Hoi Cadres" should select and carefully prepare reliable returnees for immediate redeployment to their former VC units as penetration agents. Rewards for accomplishments should be substantial. Third, unskilled Chieu Hoi returnees should be provided training in needed local skills at the Center, re-integrated into the community and monitored as to status on a periodic basis.

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(5) Agrarian Reform. A small but active Agrarian Reform Program was started in mid-1965 but has lacked cadre strength. Agrarian Reform Cadres must be trained and assigned by the Province Chief but work under the direct control of the Village Administrative Office. Presently, only a limited effort in this direction is underway. A land survey and census is being conducted to prepare village maps, to legalize the ongoing illegal form of cultivation and to suspend the cultivating rights of uncooperative or illegal croppers. Insofar as is known, any agrarian reform activity is accomplished solely on provincial initiative. The purpose of the land survey and census is to determine such critical data as who owns the land, the land boundaries, who occupies the land, who cultivates the land, who rents the land, who receives the rent and how much the rent. Upon completion, illegalities are screened out and treated. Land given by the VC to an individual is re-offered by its rightful owner as a means of legalizing transaction status. This is intended to show the tenant that, despite GVN recognition of his best interests, he must recognize and pay the rightful owner. When the contract is completed, the tenant rents legally; the owner, if available, is counseled by the cadre as to fair rent collections and the VC is established as illegal in the mind of the peasant farmer. In this way, the peasant can still work on or acquire land legally thus refuting false VC promises; moreover, population and resources control progress is boosted materially. Such a program, in its infancy within Kien Hoa, has realized considerable success throughout the limited areas of cadre operation. It shows that the VC gain much support from the peasant by giving him land and then coercing its rightful owner or tenant manager. It marks a purposive attack against this form of VC hold on the peasant who, heretofore, gained a substantial manifestation of VC recognition even though he must have realized that he would be heavily taxed on such a "contribution" later.

Proposed Programs and Organizations

People's Conventions. The extent to which peasants have organized conventions is not known, but they are proposed here as a pacification tool. This forum would provide for the active participation of all village residents. The convention should be established to ensure that all residents know of and agree as to their village responsibilities, rights and duties. The organization, facilities and regulations to realize such conventions are prompted by the APA or PAT cadre. If scheduled by the GVN in province, People's Conventions can serve as the fundamental prelude to elections and mark realization of both GVN involvement in, and development of, community spirit. Reinforcing the results of such conventions should be accomplished

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by activities of Agrarian Reform cadre, PAT cadre, the People's Self-Defense Force and integrated VC defectors.

Relief Assistance. A requirement exists, on a continuing basis in each province, to assist victims of the war. Refugees or evacuees normally cannot transport their complete subsistence requirements from home areas. Widows, orphans, invalids and the wounded often are victims of an apparently disinterested GVN bureaucracy. The capability to assist emergency victims, on an immediate basis, should be maintained in province. Normally, requirements will be: (1) temporary refugee center or funds to build them; (2) permanent refugee resettlement center; (3) prestocked food supplies; (4) prestocked medical supplies; (5) advance funds; and, (6) cadres to document, classify and process large refugee groups. Timeliness is of utmost importance in assisting, transporting, sheltering and processing refugees. In each district, a social committee should be responsible for processing.

People's Self Defense Force. This is a controversial program and is proposed here for consideration as a means to increase security in the countryside. In most VC-controlled areas, there are residents who do not desire VC control. Nor do they desire to be drafted by ARVN and leave their land to the VC. No provision exists to exploit the potential of such a people's force for the defense of its own community. The draft laws and lack of authority in province to recruit, train and equip PF presents a dilemma. If young men in VC areas come to side with the GVN, they must abandon both their families and land to the VC. If they do not, they are forced to cooperate with, or serve in, the VC force for lack of self defense weapons. The condition, in fact, constitutes a case of the GVN taking the "people" out of the "people's war." This proposed program envisions a provincial authorization and capability to arm, equip and maintain people's forces, or counter-guerrillas, selectively and under GVN coordinating control. As Rural Construction progresses, the need for such Self Defense Forces will diminish; local police security ultimately should be capable of discharging this individualized form of physical security responsibility.

Education Program. A requirement exists for intervention of the GVN into the educational system on a massive scale. Secondary schools especially are needed. The age-population statistics indicate that the youth of high school age will nearly double over the ensuing three to five years. Government-provided boarding schools and dormitories for high school age youth, now residing in VC-dominated areas, constitute one significant means of drawing the upcoming generation into GVN areas. Teachers must be trained and sufficiently well paid to resist VC pressure. Draft laws must be altered to obviate degradation of even the present, inadequate school system. Sound education for today's youth may well be the sole hope for tomorrow's free nation in SVN.

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
Proposed Action Groups. Coordinating and executing groups for Rural Construction involve nation level organizations above, as well as established or modified government echelons below, province level.

(1) Hamlet Administrative Organization. This group, headed by the hamlet chief, should consist of the Hamlet People's Council (elected by the People's Convention and other people's organizations), the Information Service, the People's Self Defense Force Leader and the Rural Health cadre (to be recruited).

(2) Village People's Council. Should consist of the Chairmen of the Hamlet Councils, the Village Temple Representative, the Teachers' Representative and the Religious Group representative (must be legislated into effect). The Chairman should be elected by the members above.

(3) Village Administrative Organization. (See: Figure J-1) In addition to the prescribed organization (Chairman, Civil Affairs, Economics-Finance, PsyOps-Chieu Hoi, Youth, Police and PF members), three assistants should be provided to the village chief. They should be a Direct Special Assistant, a Census Grievance Assistant and an


Figure J-1



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Agrarian Reform Assistant. To commence pacification of a village under VC control, an "Administrative Committee-in-Exile" is formed. (See: Figure J-2) Such a committee will differ in that mobile cadres under the chairman will serve as contacts with the village people; the PsyOps-Quy Chanh functions will divide into two memberships, and there will be no PF member of Agrarian Reform Assistant initially. As the village progresses through pacification, the committee will organize. This committee is responsible for processing refugees and other individuals requiring relief assistance.


Figure J-2



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(4) Pacification Group. (See: Figure J-3) This group (not presently in being) would operate under an appointed leader (with an assistant) and direct the activities of the Census Grievance Teams, APAs, PATs and Mobile Administrative Teams. A representative of the Village Administrative Office, as a member of the group, provides for direct participation and coordination. The mobile administrative teams constitute an organization in being although presently under-strength and not well coordinated in focus of effort.

Figure J-3



(5) District Rural Construction Council. (See: Figure J-4) The District Rural Construction Council (not presently in being) being chaired by the district chief (supported by a personal staff and a US advisory element), would supervise the seven groups involved in Rural Construction:

-- District Intelligence Coordinating Center (DICC): consists of village police members, national police representatives, intelligence representatives, Census Grievance members and other intelligence and counterespionage elements.

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Figure J-





Figure J-5



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-- Military Affairs Group: consists of RF and PF leaders, outpost chiefs, attached units and mobile training teams.

-- People's Force Group: consists of village and hamlet People's Self Defense Force leaders, mobile training teams, youth members and village and hamlet youth officers.

-- Combined PsyOps Group: consists of PsyOps staff members, village and hamlet PsyOps officers, Quy Chanh cadres, propaganda media coordinators (e.g., radio, leaflets).

-- Social and Resettlement Group: consists of village economic-finance members and others who deal with related problems.

-- New Life Group: consists of persons heading "new life" programs and economic projects (supported by USOM).

-- Administration, Economy, Finance Group: consists of village economic-finance members and others who deal with related problems.

(6) Province Rural Construction Council. (See: Figure J-5)
The province echelons of the Rural Construction Council organization (not presently in being) is similar to the district level council. Each group is staffed by personnel performing related tasks. Differences noted are:

-- Province Intelligence Coordinating Center: consists of DICC, Sector S-2, Military Security Service (MSS), as well as RF-PF intelligence units.

-- Military Affairs Group: consists of attached ARVN commanders as well as RF-PF unit leaders.

-- People's Self Defense Force Group: consists primarily of PAT and APA representatives.

-- Combined PsyOps Group: consists of district-combined PsyOps groups, as well as all other groups operative in the PsyOps field, to include the Sector S-5 and the mobile entertainment group.

-- Social and Resettlement Group: consists, in addition, of district groups, as well as the social service and war indemnification committees.

-- New Life Bloc: consists of district "new life" blocs and provincial chiefs of services (reconstruction, public works, PAT, agricultural credit and cooperative, animal husbandry, agrarian reform, health, education services).

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-- Administration, Economy, Finance Group: consists of deputy district chiefs, administrative, finance, economic and tax collection services.

Pacification Phasing

General. The phasing of pacification efforts is based on the accepted categorization of GVN control (or VC control) of populated areas (i.e., GVN-secure, contested and VC control). Treatment here will phase from the worst condition (nearest to VC control) to the best condition (GVN-secure). Phases will not correspond to the area categories but to completion of conditions of cadre work or accomplishment of organizations.

(1) Phase I. (Under VC control or intimidation). During this phase, the village committee is organized "in-exile" utilizing cadre to assist in functions where qualified persons from the village or hamlet are not available. The village-in-exile administrative committee may initially represent all VC villages in a district with subsequent committees formed as pacification progresses. During this phase, committee members closely coordinate planning of all operations in the areas of the hamlet or village to be pacified. The district chief is responsible for organization of the "in-exile" committee. The success of this phase and future phases is dependent to some degree on the infiltration of agents for intelligence purposes.

(2) Phase II. During this phase, the following operations are carried out by the cadres indicated: (a) population and resource census operations -- mobile Census Grievance cadres; (b) relief assistance, resettlement and development of better living standards -- mobile administrative cadres with district Rural Construction Committee assistance; (c) psychological preparation and organization of people into liberation force units -- APA cadres; (d) Chieu Hoi publicity and infiltration of select "cadres" into the area -- special Chieu Hoi cadres; and, (e) collection of information on such data as VC situation, local populace and terrain -- Census Grievance cadre.

(3) Phase III. In conjunction with cadre operations, in-exile committee functions and district military affairs, the province chief plans, conducts and supervises military operations to reoccupy physically the hamlet or village to be pacified.

(4) Phase IV. (Contested area). During this phase, GVN offices are physically installed in the village or hamlets, and military installations (outposts and watchtowers) are erected as necessary under the control of the district chief using PF. Other operations conducted

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during this phase and the responsible cadre are: (a) conduct census operations and establish relations with local populace -- Census Grievance teams and police; (b) form people's organizations, elect hamlet and village councils -- PATs and APA cadre; (c) conduct work and construct buildings of public interest planned in Phase II (e.g., maternities, aid stations, schools) as well as re-establish economic projects -- mobile administrative cadres and PATs; (d) organize People's Self Defense Force -- PATs; (e) conduct land census and execute agrarian reform policies -- Census Grievance cadres and Agrarian Reform cadres; (f) conduct people's conventions -- APA cadre; and, (g) execute Chieu Hoi program -- Chieu Hoi cadre.

(5) Phase V. During this phase, military outposts and watch towers are gradually withdrawn as the People's Self Defense Force, Census Grievance Program and village organizations become operational. When security of the village or hamlet is transferred to the police, People's Self Defense Force as well as GVN forces are withdrawn and the village or hamlet is considered GVN-secure.

(6) Phase VI. (GVN-secure). During this phase, the major change from Phase V operations is the "shift in responsibility" for some of the listed functions "from cadre to village committee members." This requires that the mechanism: (a) continue to organize people's organizations, conduct and monitor elections for People's Councils -- youth member and PsyOps member; (b) conduct work and construct facilities of public interest, re-establish economic projects -- economic-finance member, PsyOps member, and administrative committee; (c) conduct people's conventions -- village people's council and chairman; and, (d) Chieu Hoi program -- PsyOps member.

It is necessary that cadres continue to perform other functions. Defense of the hamlet or village has transferred successively from the military, to the PF, to the People's Self Defense Force and to the Police. Phase VI is open-ended in that the established programs continue to be improved, expanded and furthered to stabilize the political, social and economic situations. It should be noted that most villages and hamlets reported as pacified at present in Kien Hoa are, at best, in a Phase V security situation; most of the overall total are probably ready for Phase IV-type functions.

Summary

It is emphasized that this approach to pacification and pacification phasing was not being used in its entirety. As of late 1965 in Kien Hoa, those functions assigned to cadres or teams indicated as

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operational were being performed within the constraint of personnel available. The Census Grievance Program was well established and producing excellent results. The APAs and PATs were undergoing changes, retraining and familiarisation training; only minimal results were observable, but a high potential could be attributed to both programs. Agrarian reform cadres and special assistants programs, only in their infancy, had produced some excellent results in their limited operational areas. Most of the programs, in being and proposed, were originated by the Vietnamese Province Chief. However, also in late 1965, the Province Chief was transferred. It is not known how well his replacement has conducted the in being programs.

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ANNEX K

INFLUENCING NATIONAL CHANGE: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ASSISTANCE

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ANNEX K

INFLUENCING NATIONAL CHANGE: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ASSISTANCE

Introduction

Change is a natural requirement of societies, and especially that most complex human society -- the nation. If a society or a nation cannot change, it will not survive. Just as with biological organisms, societies that are overspecialized for existence in a specific environment cannot survive when that environment is changed. History records that the dinosaur has its analogues in nations throughout the world.

Because of the pervasiveness of social change, its early students were attracted to the theoretical conditions that made for the growth, change and decline in societies and their institutions. More recently, with the end of West European colonial empires and the inception of communist attempts to subvert less developed nations, interest in social change has shifted to the more applied level. The phenomena of social change are no longer things to be understood for their own sake. They now must be understood because of the capabilities they may give us to influence or direct social change toward specific goals more congruent with our own national interests.

Participation by behavioral scientists in directed change projects has increased rapidly since the end of World War II. Sociologists, political scientists and economists have made particularly notable contributions; by no means have anthropologists and psychologists been inactive. Such participation has developed a body of social change literature in which a large variety of findings, conclusions, hypotheses, theories and techniques are presented in bewildering -- and often contradictory -- complexity. Claims and counterclaims as to successful accomplishment of directed change have tended to distort the intrinsic value of these contributions.

Although few, if any, responsible scientists claim for social science the ability to provide "the" answer to current problems, planners should be cautious of extravagant claims of overly enthusiastic individuals who promise miraculous results if only social science knowledge will be utilized. Such dangers in relying on individual judgements can be avoided by the use of such established facilities as the National Academy of Science. The results of a detailed and critical survey of the literature of applied anthropology, economics, political science, psychology and sociology sustain this position. As arranged with the USA Combat Developments Command, a multidisciplinary team of behavioral scientists accomplished this research. The ensuing summary appraisal sets forth their primary

findings through objective evaluation of contributions from the various disciplines. The aim: to assist national planners considering the potential for influencing national change.^{1/}

Some Cautions

Up to the present date, very little assistance has been sought from the behavioral and social sciences, in spite of the existence of a considerable amount of theoretical knowledge that as yet has not been translated into operational usefulness. Although these sciences cannot provide methods that inevitably will lead to specified results, they can offer a general list of "do's" and don'ts" for planners and administrators which can be of assistance.^{2/} In this respect, there must be a differentiation between utilizing the results of scientific investigation versus seeking the consultative advice of professional scientists. In the latter roles, individuals who have devoted their careers to the behavioral and social sciences are in a position to provide insights which cannot be obtained from other sources.

Theory. There is no body of behavioral science theory that satisfactorily relates all of the diverse aspects of directed change into a coherent whole. The complexity of human behavior makes it extremely difficult to combine social, economic, and other theories into a comprehensive theory that is useful to national planners.

Example. The divergence of theoretical positions is shown by contrasting two development programs followed by the Government of Mexico. One was designed by C. Erasmus, an anthropologist; the other was developed by the staff of the National Indigenous Institute of Mexico (NIIM), an anthropological branch of the government. Erasmus contends that environmental control projects (e.g., dams and irrigation systems) offer the most certain path to general development; he decries "social welfare" projects. On the other hand, the entire NIIM program of directed change amounts to a "social welfare" effort featuring literacy, agricultural assistance, consumer cooperatives and health services. Both programs apparently are successful in the same kinds of environmental settings.

Laws. Studies of social change have resulted in the compilation of a body of findings about change in general.^{3/} This information is of a highly conceptual nature; its content is stated in very broad generalities. As such, its practical use is limited to provide very broad guidance for the assessment of change conditions and the progress of programs of change.

Techniques. The methods developed by the social or behavioral sciences to date, have not been properly evaluated. Most methods so far identified appear to have been used both successfully and unsuccessfully on different occasions. The selection of appropriate techniques

for use in a specific case is of crucial importance, yet there is no systematic objective method for making this selection.

It is a truism that change introduced in one segment of a social system will have repercussions in all other aspects. However, there is no objective method for determining what these impacts will be, how far they will go and what the overall end results will be. Hence, the results of directed change programs often turn out quite different from those intended. Knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships between and within social, political, economic and psychological phenomena is not sufficiently developed at present to sustain claims to the contrary.

The Guidelines and Techniques

Social change will be more likely to succeed when it follows these five guidelines, and is:

--Motivated from within a society, rather than externally. Communist subversion in Vietnam, for example, does not make use of great numbers of foreign agents or operators; rather, it employs indigenous personnel who focus their programs on issues of real national concern -- abstract issues or issues not directly impinging on national consciousness are patently avoided.

--Introduced in a period of social disorganization. An example of directed change in a period of social disorganization is that of post-World War I Germany. A crushing military defeat, the abolition of monarchy, severe peace terms and an economic depression created great disorganization. The Communist Party seized on this disorganization to build a strong political-subversive organization which was quite at variance with pre-World War I German culture. The Nazi Party arose primarily as a response to the perceived communist threat, requiring even further departures from tradition. These changes were felt to be necessary to combat the increasing disorganization of German life and restore "order."

--Introduced slowly. The attitudes and reactions of the American southern population, for example, with respect to recent civil rights legislation indicate the kinds of problems that can arise from rapid change produced by legislative fiat.

--Does not impinge on central or emotionally loaded aspects of culture. Despite the strong antireligious campaigns of the Soviets, the Russian Orthodox Church still exists as a functioning organization. This example demonstrates the power of a deep-rooted institution. This operative function is a result of its role in satisfying the emotional needs of a sizable segment of the Soviet population.

--Is introduced via urban groups and by socially marginal, but not lower-class, groups of younger educated people. The example of the Russian

Revolution and the Chinese Communist movement verify this finding. Both directed changes were begun and maintained by urban dwelling people of marginal disaffected groups among whom were, for example, Lenin and Mao.

Techniques that have proved successful in assisting change include the following:

Problem Solving. A major obstacle may arise in a social system through a lack of cognitive and perceptual skills and techniques for identifying and solving problems. The group may be poorly equipped to find out about its own group functions and/or its external environment. In such a situation, the agents of change should attempt to transfer their own skills at diagnosis and manipulation to members of the social system -- usually selected elite, or opinion makers -- and teach the use of these skills in collecting information on the internal and external environment, interpreting it properly and then acting on it.

By way of example, the problem-solving technique has been used by the University of Michigan in offering assistance to communities engaged in development programs.^{4/} Upon request, groups are sent to these communities to help in the identification, discussion and development of solutions for community problems through the use of democratic procedures. Seven states of planned change of the problem-solving type have been identified: (1) discovery of a need for change; (2) development of a working relationship between the change agent and the key members of the target audience; (3) identification and clarification of the problem to be attacked; (4) investigation of alternative solutions and the establishment of goals and intentions of action; (5) initiation of change efforts; (6) stabilization of change efforts; and, (7) termination of working relationship coupled with the definition of any continuing relationships.

The University of Michigan groups also provide local organizations with lectures, extension courses and area conferences as part of their services. The change agent thus plays the role of a resource to the client group. The group used in such organizations must be multidisciplinary in nature in order to provide sufficient breadth of knowledge and experience to the spectrum of community problems.

Power Distribution. A major problem in a social system may arise from improper distribution of social power within the system, or between the system and other systems in the environment. If problems of maldistributed social power are diagnosed, two general approaches to directed change are possible:

(1) Create a new social power center within the system or systems that is either antagonistic to the existing centers of power or is separate from them.

(2) Change the function of the existing centers of social power so that distribution of power will be equalized.

The goal of this approach is broadening of the power base to increase the amount of participation of all parts of the social system in any kind of decision-making process. An example of power distribution that involves the creation of new social groups to oppose those already in existence is the tactic used successfully by Saul Alinsky, a professional organizer for civil rights, labor and low-level political causes.^{5/} Alinsky achieves directed change by organizing small grass root groups that do not represent any of the established pressure groups, categories or classes. The principle initial motivation for these groups is a "zeal for betterment." The motivation is further developed by the members of the groups, and their emergent leaders, who locate common goals and mobilize their antagonisms toward the existing power structure.

Goals and Values. The objectives and values of a social system may not be those which are maximally effective for the environment in which it exists or for its efficient internal functioning. Changes in such goals and values are sometimes produced by changing the behavior patterns in the social system under consideration. These behavioral changes are designed to lead the social system into new patterns which will undermine previously held obstructive values and attitudes and alter them in a favorable fashion. In other cases, goals and values are attacked directly through indoctrination or other psychological techniques; this will also result in behavioral changes.

Manipulation of goals and values by social techniques is exemplified by the "holy cunning" technique used with considerable success by Jesuit missionaries, Fathers Ricci and De Nobili, to gain entry into Chinese and Indian society.^{6/} These missionaries approached the ruling indigenous hierarchies in their respective target countries as scholars who were seeking enlightenment. For all practical purposes, they were willing and able to become natives of the country. Once their familiarity with native culture and language had been acquired and a high position in the hierarchy attained on intellectual merit (Ricci was advisor to the Emperor), the infiltrators then began slowly to exert influence in the direction desired. They attempted to change basic goals and values of the society that were contrary to Christian dogma, but they preserved those that were not contrary to their Christian objective.

Energy Mobilization. Social malfunctions may occur due to the inability of a social system to efficiently utilize those resources available to it in fulfillment of the functions necessary for its survival. A situation of this type may develop through the persistence of conflict in the social system, the displacement of resources into irrelevant activities, or the investment of energy in social activities bringing negative

results. When a condition of inefficient energy utilization has been diagnosed, the change approach should be educational. A contrast must be established between the productive and the nonproductive uses of energy for the society to be changed. Then, new ways of more efficient energy utilization must be developed.

This energy mobilization approach to directed change superficially resembles that described above for the power distribution technique. The difference is that the power distribution approach creates new power centers and enables them to mobilize their resources; the energy mobilization techniques work with already-existing social groups.

An example of directed social and economic change through energy utilization is provided by a program of community development in western Montana.⁷⁷ The problem in this area was identified as declining population and community disintegration resulting from a depletion of mining and lumbering resources. The approach taken was to mobilize the energy available in the communities and turn it to productive ends, such as community improvement and family stabilization. The change agent instituted university extension courses, traveling plays, lectures and pageants in order to motivate the development program by inducing pride and appreciation of the locality among the inhabitants.

Communication. Difficulties of communication within and between social systems are extremely common. This situation is particularly characteristic within and between complex social systems composed of numerous ethnic, racial and religious factions with highly developed social-economic stratification. In such systems, communications within segments may be good, but communications between segments may be poor; considerable social disfunction results. When communications problems have been diagnosed, the directors of change may use several methods of bringing about change. They may, themselves, become intermediaries between the noncommunicating segments of the population. Or, they may stimulate the flow of communications indirectly, either by establishing new indigenous communications channels or by working directly to remove the barriers to communication that have been identified in the diagnostic process.

An example of a technique of communications manipulation from the field of anthropology is the interaction approach which has been developed and used in industrial settings in the US.^{8/} This approach is based upon the operational theory that attitudes, emotional reactions and productivity are functions of the human interaction situation. Thus, the phenomena of human relations are reducible to human interaction patterns. The approach is based upon an analysis of formal and informal interaction processes and patterns in the social units under study; the actual content

of interaction is not studied. These analyses permit the identification of erratic patterns of interaction, bottlenecks and friction points. Such problem areas then are remedied by a revision of the formal and informal interaction schemes and shuffling of personnel.

The various techniques outlined above are not mutually exclusive; they have been, and should be, used in varying combinations as the situation requires. In some cases, all might be helpful; in others, only one approach may be indicated. The choice of which to use will rest upon intensive study of the problem -- the cornerstone of all successful attempts at directed change.

An example of an approach to directed change utilizing a mixture of four of the five techniques for manipulation described above is illustrated by the program to modify attitudes of US troops overseas toward indigenous personnel -- and vice versa.^{9/} This program has been successfully conducted in Italy and Turkey, and presently is in use in Korea.

The program consists of an attempt to modify attitudes through indoctrination. Briefings, seminars and discussion groups provide the media for mobilizing energy, developing new problem-solving skills, establishing new goals and values and facilitating communication. Such a program is universally applicable and consists of seven steps:

- (1) Identify and make comparative measurements of specific attitudes which form barriers to the establishment of good working relations between US troops and indigenous personnel.
- (2) Classify attitude barriers according to the following: (a) problems of personalized mission motivation; (b) political and economic problems; (c) economic-philosophical problems; and, (d) problems of culture shock or conflict.
- (3) Obtain documentary materials providing answers to all the specific negative attitudes held by US troops, from which orientation lectures then can be developed. For example, a commonly held attitude is that the people of Country-X are innately inferior, as shown by their low level of technological development. Orientation material to overcome this attitude barrier would be drawn from data on raw materials and resources in Country-X as compared to resources in the poorest versus the wealthiest state in the US. Comparison of this information, performed by individual participants in a seminar, forces home the point that the people of Country-X are technologically backward because of a lack of resources, rather than the result of hereditary mental incapacity.
- (4) Organize informal program teams including medical personnel, lawyers, chaplains and servicemen with appropriate feelings for the problems of relationships between US and host country personnel.

(5) Conduct orientation sessions using the teams on either a formal or informal basis depending on authorization, resources and need.

(6) Evaluate attitude changes within the group under indoctrination at intervals of six months or less.

(7) After the orientation program has taken hold and favorable attitudes develop, a community relations program is begun in which face-to-face contacts between US and host country personnel are promoted and maintained.

Lessons From Communist Case Histories

The national development programs of Moscow and Peking represent the most all-inclusive and far-reaching efforts of directed change on a national level yet to be undertaken. Their primary goal is communization according to the theories and principles laid down by Marx, Lenin and Stalin. A secondary goal is that of developing strong national feeling. It is true that the applications of Western behavioral science have yet to approach the skill of Communists in planning and carrying out directed change. But this is due to Western aversion to the costs, in human and moral terms, of communist-type change programs.

In order to obtain the main goals, a number of intermediate goals must be reached. The most significant of these are:

(1) Communization. Establishment of the supremacy of the Communist Party in all realms of life; state control and organization of production, distribution, communication and transportation; organization of the masses along social, political and economic lines; ideological control by the state; development of extensive police systems.

(2) Nationalism. Integration of national minorities; standardization of national language; extensive social reform; development of military forces; artificial elaboration of national traditions.

(3) Prerequisites (to those listed above). Expansion of the industrial base with emphasis on heavy industry, mechanization of agriculture; educational development; development of technical manpower pool; extensive military and civil intelligence systems in foreign countries.

The achievement of these goals was attempted, and in many cases realized, by the employment of a wide range of techniques. Although these techniques were not scientifically developed, they display a high level of sophistication concerning the behavioral sciences. The techniques used by the Soviets and Chinese Communists, described below, are

organized according to the classification of directed change techniques that was set forth in the preceding section.

Problem Solving. An approach to change through development of problem-solving skills lies in the cadre system used by Soviet and Chinese Communists. The cadre are relatively highly-trained and well selected personnel whose task it is to impart skills, techniques and that general communist point of view with which all pertinent phenomena are to be interpreted. The cadre system has proved particularly effective as a means of control and direction of change in all areas of society. In the military field, for example, it is the cadre in the cell structure of the military unit who carry the burden of political indoctrination, maintain surveillance for deviation and sustain a high level of military efficiency on the part of the individual soldiers.

The cadre also offer a handy scapegoat. The Communist Parties cannot make mistakes; neither can the masses, since the will of the masses is supposedly represented in Party dogma. Hence, the cadre provide that "generalized other" upon whom the blame for all failures can (and must) be heaped.

An example of a psychological approach to change through manipulation of problem-solving skills is provided by situations in a social group in which there is a difference between their view of reality and the actual facts of the situation. In such cases, the Western change agent must attempt to alter their view of reality to make it better accord with the objective situation. But communist nations have worked this technique in reverse in their mass media. They have achieved some success in creating an image of the West which accords with Marxist doctrine but not with reality. This distorted Chinese Communist image of the West constitutes a stumbling block to the Chinese themselves in attempting to communicate with the West; the attempted communication is submitted in terms of the perceived image of Western intentions rather than objective reality.

Power Distribution. Moscow and Peking leaders have employed a variation of this technique by organizing Party and governmental hierarchies according to the principles of dualism: key figures in the government hold posts at analogous levels in the party; thus, in terms of personnel, the structures of the two groups are much the same.^{10/} In this system of interlocking directorates, the Communist Party is used as a second center of power, superior to the governmental center but resident within it. This ensures efficient control throughout all phases of the ruling hierarchy, making certain that the goals and the means used to attain them are always the same. The results of this technique have permitted rapid planning and effective implementation of programs of all kinds which would not have been possible had the governmental and party structures been two distinct bodies.

Power distribution techniques working in the opposite direction (to destroy existing power centers) are used in the Soviet and Chinese minority integration programs. The Communists have been confronted with the monumental task of integrating into a cohesive national structure large numbers of alien ethnic groups who occupy large and strategically important land areas. These groups represent elements of a power structure that must be weakened and ultimately destroyed for the good of the Communist nation. Methods used differ from country to country but include the following features:^{11/}

- (1) Suppression of such cultural characteristics of ethnic groups as religion, art, literature, family structure and kinship systems.
- (2) Suppression of local languages.
- (3) Deportation and extermination.
- (4) Extensive and intensive political organization.
- (5) Extensive and intensive organization of the means of production.
- (6) Infiltration of politically reliable elements into all indigenous organizations.
- (7) Intensive propaganda.
- (8) Encouragement of interethnic marriages.

Goals and Values. Communist regimes provide the best examples of this technique; propaganda, indoctrination and "agitation" always have been major stimulants of communist programs. The importance of developing goals and values congruent with Communist aims was recognized at the outset of the communist movement.

An example of goal and value change is provided by hsi nao, the "thought reform" technique of the Chinese Communist.^{12/} This process attempts to instill in individuals and small groups the "people's viewpoint" to support the overall program of Chinese Communist psychological organization. The "people's viewpoint" consists, among other things, of looking at all of the traditional values, goals and behavior patterns of pre-Communist Chinese society from the point of view of the lowest underprivileged Chinese peasant. From that point of view, the symbols of prestige of old Chinese society, the land tenure and farming systems, the patriarchal family and Confucianism appear to be manifestations of a system for exploiting the peasant. Therefore, the Communists say, they can be rejected; a new system of values and goals, compatible with the overall aims of the Peking regime, can be installed in their place.

Energy Mobilization. The collective production organizations of the Soviets have achieved some success after a long period of trial-and-error

development.^{13/} These are designed to mobilize the energy of the peasants for the support of the state through increased efficiency of production. Previously, the Russian peasant was devoted to self-maintenance or, in Czarist days, to support of the landlord class. The collective organizations serve the auxiliary purpose of social, and political, control systems for the rural population. The kolkhoz and sovkhoz collective farms, the artel (occupational guild) and kul'tbas (civic action center) all help to mobilize and focus the attention and energies of the rural population on the goals and programs of the state. In like fashion, Soviet youth organizations, particularly the komsomol, serve to focus the attention and mobilize the energies of the younger segment of the population. The support of youth is important in breeding revolutionary movements. Organization of activities to occupy their time renders it much more difficult for them to engage in activity possibly deleterious to the regime.

In contrast to Soviet success in directed change through organization of production is the unsuccessful Chinese example -- the "Great Leap Forward" -- which resulted in many steps backward. This program attempted to overcome difficulties arising from economic overcontrol. Although it was aimed at satisfying industrial and political goals, it also had political overtones. Previous policy was reversed by decentralizing authority and giving regional and local authority to party committees. These committees could hire, fire and transfer all except a few high ranking personnel.

The state set only four targets: purchase goals, sales figures, employee strength and profits. A system of profit sharing between the central government and the provinces was to be developed. All allocations of working capital, formerly made directly by the state to industrial enterprises, would be transferred into bank loans drawn on local branches of the people's branch. The image of the ideal worker was changed from that of the skilled worker to that of a multifaceted worker.

The result was overall disorganization, characterized by overproduction, overinvestment in unsound projects, shortages, breakdown in transport, decline in budgetary revenues and associated social and political consequences. Cadres were blamed, but failure stemmed from the fact that these resources of skills, knowledge and labor that Peking counted on mobilizing simply did not exist. There was not, for example, sufficient knowledge, skill and materiel on the local level for the "Backyard" steel furnace program to succeed.

Communications. The political and economic organizations of both the Soviets and the Chinese provide examples of directed change through the establishment of additional channels and systems of communication. The North Vietnamese regime has forged the same forms of linkage throughout Vietnam. (See: ANNEX C)

The normal channels in a pre-Soviet peasant village were few and unreliable: the landlord(s), their relations and laborers, and a few governmental functionaries (whose role was passive) constituted the structure's entirety. The Communist Party organization now reaches into all villages. Communal production organizations interlock with the political party apparatus. In addition, security agencies, youth groups of various types, military and paramilitary organizations, technical training institutions and mass media are furnished through the party. The result is a series of parallel lines of communication through which information can rapidly be collected and disseminated to serve the purposes of the regime.

An example of directed social change through communications manipulation is provided by the communist national literacy programs to facilitate the absorption and control of the numerous, large and strategically placed ethnic minorities within both nations.^{14/} The ethnic language barriers in both China and Russia have constrained communication and the development of nationalism. Therefore, the use of standard national languages, Great Russian and Mandarin Chinese, has been promoted by a number of techniques. All mass media of communication are in the national language; all primary instruction in schools is in the national language. Access to higher education -- or positions in the Party, government or military hierarchies -- is open only to those proficient in the national language. The use of minority languages in literature and music is kept to a minimum.

Planning to Influence Change

What positive approach to planning can be developed from this analysis of our present state of behavioral sciences knowledge and lessons learned from Sino-Soviet Communist experiments?

A procedure for planning directed change programs was developed by this study, as presented below. It should be noted that, in planning directed change, there are no criteria that may be used to determine when various steps in the procedure have achieved the proper degree of completion. Overplanning is entirely possible, although underplanning is the most common characteristic noted to date. Naturally, the specific elements of analysis will differ considerably from situation to situation; this suggested procedure represents a general guide.

Analysis of the Situation. As in any military or action situation, this is the most basic and important step in the entire process. An intensive analysis of the nation, region or community under consideration for change must be made in terms of:

(1) Problems - define the specific problem or problems confronting the society.

(2) Resources - list the total social, political, economic and military resources.

(3) Needs - set forth the spectrum of social, political, economic and military needs in terms of their perceived importance to the recipients of change.

(4) Operational factors - analyze the essential geographical, political, social, economic and psychological conditions of the environment.

Development of Objectives. Objectives should be developed on the basis of requirements of the case and resources available; they should be arranged by short, mid and long-term sub-objectives, following an orderly sequence.

Formulation. A plan should set forth detailed techniques to be used in the directed change project. Three phases may be distinguished:

(1) Development of a tentative plan. This should be a complete, detailed proposal for directed change, based on information obtained in the intensive analysis.

(2) Pretesting the tentative plan. The plan should be thoroughly tested for feasibility by the following, singly or in combination: (a) operations research techniques; (b) exposure to selected judges; (c) pilot projects; and, (d) exposure to the subject public or to the public of the directing government.

(3) Development of the master plan. In addition to specifying the techniques to be used in the program, a plan should include the following sections:

(a) Public relations or propaganda. The concept of operations, techniques, operational procedures, manning and equipment requirements of the propaganda program supporting changes to be introduced.

(b) Organization. A detailed presentation of the organization required to administer the change program.

(c) Finance. A complete costing breakdown for manpower, materiel and training.

(d) Supply. A detailed statement of all supplies required.

(e) Manpower. Qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements for indigenous and donor country personnel.

(f) Evaluation system. A plan for developing a system for evaluating progress of the program during and after the active phases. This should include complete specifications for a system of data collection, processing and periodic reporting.

(g) Training. Requirements for training indigenous and donor country personnel including specification of types and amounts of training, instructional materials to be used and personnel required.

(h) Implementation of the program.

(i) Stabilization. Following termination of the action phase of the project or program, measures developed previously are again employed to ensure that the changes introduced in the program have actually "taken."

Requirement for Future Research

Any research that leads to the development of theory or method makes a positive contribution to behavioral science development; in turn, this lends increased capability in the area of assisting change. But, in addition to theoretical and methodological problems confronting the advancement of our present low-level capability in the field of directed change, there are a number of more general problems. These are related to the planning of research and the dissemination of research results; they have a direct bearing on the advancement of the state of knowledge of directed change. The following areas of research will contribute most to development of the capability to assist directed national change.

Measurement. The most crucial area for further research is the development of quantitative measurements that may be substituted for the present, essentially qualitative, measures of behavior of human individuals and groups. With increased quantification, mathematical methods can be applied to behavioral data to assist in making more precise, higher level synthesis and analysis. Without this development, methods of algebra and calculus cannot be applied to behavioral data to enable us to arrive at higher levels of synthesis and analysis. The measurements must reflect the behavior of objects, not only their effects on each other, or some other operationally defined quantity. Further, the measurable behavior should be directly related to a theory or the hypothesis concerned, not behavior theoretically related to or derived from it. The development of such measurement techniques could increase the ability of behavioral scientists to describe, to generalize, to construct theories and to predict.

Description. One of the most serious problems now confronting the directed change agent is the lack of good data for areas in which he is to work. This is true in the US despite the fact that various government agencies routinely collect large numbers of different types of data. However, the condition is most prevalent in underdeveloped nations where governments lack skilled personnel, resources and interest in collecting behavioral data. Such data is prerequisite to the analysis and planning process. Until measurement techniques such as those discussed above have been developed, descriptive data may not provide all the answers. Nevertheless, a great deal can be done with such enumerative kinds of information as are developed in demographic studies and straight forward "natural history" studies of human behavior in various contexts within a culture.

Once a national change program is to be considered for an area, it is usually too late to begin collecting behavioral data; the lag of time between consideration of the program and initiation of the planning process is usually too short. Therefore, it is of considerable importance to have such data on hand prior to the time when it is needed. Data for the various nations receiving aid from the US should be collected and stored in order of priority established in terms of our own national security.

It is important that the data collection effort be mission-oriented. Data collecting agencies should be guided by operational considerations as to the most likely forms of directed change desired for the specific country involved and as to the types of data needed for planning such forms of directed change. Further, the data should represent an adequate cross-section of the country; it should not be geographically, ethnically or economically limited in any way that might hamper planning. The data should be presentable in a compact and preferably quantitative form. Descriptive presentations must be free of the jargon of the behavioral sciences and accessible to directed change personnel at all levels -- from AID desk men to USA Special Forces medical NCOs.

Research Planning. A number of points concerning the planning of behavioral research are relevant to the topic of directed change.^{15/}

There is a tendency to conduct research with considerable potential relevance to directed change in laboratory situations under conditions so stringently controlled that the results have little applicability for real life. Work in many areas of psychology has been done almost exclusively on US college student populations, yielding results and theories that may not be applicable to other social groups in the US much less other countries. Concentration of research effort in current fad areas (e.g., Festinger's, "Theory of Cognitive Dissonance") tends to slight research in other promising areas. Geographical concentration of overseas research appears to depend largely on convenience, prestige, aesthetics

and other nonscientific factors. This in fact seriously hampers progress in the acquisition of data on foreign nations and social change situations in such nations.

Concentration of research in specific technical, theoretical, geographical or disciplinary areas should be better controlled by the administration of funds (much of which are dependent upon government sources); Western bias in data and theory should be compensated by increased use of cross-cultural testing.

Reporting. One of the first problems encountered in any study of directed change is the paucity of useful reports on specific projects and the lack of good secondary sources. Most of the literature seems to be based on consideration of relatively small numbers of cases; rather far-reaching interpretations are based thereon. Those projects which are reported upon are often described in such a way as to suggest that unfavorable aspects are being omitted. There is almost no data available on unsuccessful attempts at directed change -- by no means few in number. Therefore, there is a requirement for detailed and objective reporting of those directed-change projects undertaken with government support. Reporting should follow a standard format which presents information in proper detail and permits identification of inaccurate reporting.

Conclusions

The behavioral sciences offer some assistance for planners of national change. This assistance is not prescriptive or detailed. Assistance must be based on an intensive analysis of the specific case and the application of techniques appropriate both to the needs of the case and to the resources on hand. Five general techniques have been identified, each aimed at bringing about directed change by manipulation of some aspect of the social, political, economic or psychological structures of society. The techniques are labeled as: problem solving, power distribution, goals and values, energy mobilization and communication.

The procedure, and the techniques involved, are subject to many limitations. They cannot be applied with any significant presumption of success. Directed or assisted social and national change work is an art in its present state of development; science has provided a number of findings and general methods for use in such efforts, but interpretation of the findings and application of the methods still depend heavily on the skills and judgment of the planner. Although there are serious gaps in our behavioral and social science theories, the knowledge that is available has been inefficiently used. In addition to a systematic program to better utilize existing knowledge, an increased effort should be made to close the gaps in behavioral science theories and knowledge.

Notes

1. Working papers produced by the Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) in support of PROVN include:

- a. Preliminary drafts:

Alderson D. J. "The Applicability of Political Science to Problems of National Development in the Less Developed Countries." Ft. Belvoir, Va.: 15 November 1965.

Combat Operations Research Group Staff. "Economic Development Theory and Methods for Influencing Social, Political and Economic Change." Ft. Belvoir, Va.: 15 November 1965.

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- b. Intermediate draft:

Suggs, R. C.; Johnson, L. B.; Wolak, B. M.; and McIntosh, A. K. "Behavioral Science Methods of Directed Change." Ft. Belvoir, Va.: 15 January 1966.

- c. Memoranda:

Sanger, R. "Creation of New Departments." Rosslyn, Va.: Technical Operations Research, 11 January 1966.

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- d. Results of previous CORG research relevant to the mission of PROVN are:

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Volume I: Introduction and Discussion (U). (NOFORN-SECRET)

Volume II: Government Sponsored Nonmateriel Research on Special Warfare and Civil Affairs (U). (SECRET-NOFORN)

Volume III: Government Sponsored Social Science Research Applicable to Special Warfare and Civil Affairs (U). (SECRET-NOFORN)

Volume IV: Government Sponsored Social Science Research on Southeast Asia (U). (SECRET-NOFORN)

Volume V: Private Research on Special Warfare and Civil Affairs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Volume VI: Private Social Science Research Applicable to Special Warfare and Civil Affairs. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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13. See: Coleman, J. S. Introduction to Mathematical Sociology.
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14. See: Wolak, B. M. Ibid. pp. 34-35, 56-59.
15. For more detailed discussions of the research management and planning problems, see: Alderson, D. J., Suggs, R. C., and Ney, V. Guide to Nonmateriel Research on Special Warfare and Civil Affairs. Vol. I (U).
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

Abbreviations

ALC - Area Logistics Command
APACL - Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League
APA - Armed Propaganda Team
ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CAP - Country Assistance Program
CAS - Controlled American Source (CIA Field) (C)
CASS - Country Assistance Strategy Statement
CAT - Civil Affairs Team
CGT - Census Grievance Team
CI - counterintelligence
CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
(CINCPAC)USFV - (Commander-in-Chief) US Forces Vietnam
CIP - Commodity Import Program
CMD - Capital Military District
COSVN - Central Office of South Vietnam
CPR - Chinese Peoples Republic
CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone
Dai Viet - Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party
DEPSTATE - Department of State
DRCD - Director of Rural Construction and Development
DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
DTA - Division Tactical Area

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FULRO - United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Montagard dominated)

FW - Free World

FWMAF - Free World Military Assistance Forces

GAVB - General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists

GBA - General Buddhist Association

GVN - Government of Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) (South Vietnam)

ICP - Indochinese Communist Party

(C) JGS - (Chairman) Joint General Staff

JUSPAO - Joint US Public Affairs Office

KKK - Khmer Kampuchea Krom - Cambodian Government-sponsored politico-military organization

KATUSA - Korean Army Troops with the US Army

MEDCAP - Medical Civic Action Program

MR - Military Region

MSS - Military Security Service

NACO - National Agricultural Credit Office

NIA - National Institute of Administration

NLDT - New Life Development Team

NLF - National Liberation Front

NP - National Police

NPFF - National Police Field Force

NRM - National Revolutionary Movement

NSAM - National Security Action Memorandum

NVN - North Vietnam

(

PAT - People's Action Team

PAVN - People's Army of North Vietnam

PF - Popular Force

PSD - Public Safety Division (USOM)

PSO - Presidential Survey Office

RC - Rural Construction

RCC - Rural Construction Cadre

RCG - Rural Construction Group

RCP - Rural Construction Program

RF - Regional Force

RLG - Royal Laotian Government

RVNAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

(

RYM - Republican Youth Movement

SEA - Southeast Asia

SI - Special Intelligence

SOIC - Sector Operations and Intelligence Center

SSOIC - Subsector Operations and Intelligence Center

SUSREP - Senior US Representative

SVN - South Vietnam

TAOR - Tactical Area of Responsibility

UBA - Unified Buddhist Association

US AMB - US Ambassador

US-FWMAF - US-Free World Military Assistance Forces

USIS - United States Information Service (USIA Field)

(COM)USMACV - (Commander) US Military Assistance Command Vietnam

(

USOM - US Operations Mission (AID Field)
USOMREP - USOM Representative
USREP - US Representative
VBF - Vietnamese Buddhist Forces
VC - Viet Cong
VHD - Vien Hoa Dao (The UBA Institute for the Execution of the Dharma)
VIS - Vietnamese Information Service
VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force
VNCC - Vietnam Coordinating Committee
VNMC - Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN - Vietnamese Navy
VNQDD - Vietnamese Nationalist Party
VTT - Vien Tang Thong (High Clerical Council of UBA)

Terms

Attitude. A learned tendency to behave positively or negatively toward persons and situations.

Census Grievance. The use of Vietnamese terms to solicit grievances from the local population, primarily at village level, using open-end question techniques. Grievances are then collated and presented to the lowest administrative level.

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

Institutions. Organized way of solving societies' problems, each institution possessing an underlying concept set for societal survival.

Internal Security. The state of law and order within a nation as determined by the government's capability to cope with violence, subversion and lawlessness and the prevailing public confidence in that capability.

Irregular Forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces.

Leverage. The use of resources in such a manner that action is initiated or that a greater result is achieved with minimum input of effort.

Military Civic Action. Civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment and resources in cooperation or on behalf of host government civil authorities, agencies or groups.

Military Unit Team. US military representatives assigned to advise and assist RVNAF regular units as opposed to US representatives assigned to further US-GVN objectives at subnational levels.

Propaganda. Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behavior of any group, in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

Psychological Operations. The planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of hostile, neutral or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

Responsible Cohesion. The social condition that exists when institutions have achieved a degree of success in coping with problems that is acceptable to society members. An institutionally controlled society in which individuals and groups are able to make fairly successful adjustments to changing conditions in time. Responsible cohesion is in turn reflected in members as a sense of commitment to societies' purpose.

Rural Construction. Rural Construction encompasses all civilian, military and police actions to eliminate organized VC military activity; to detect and eliminate the overt and covert VC political apparatus; and, to nurture the economic, political and social development of a viable economy. (Agreed to by MACV, USOM, USIS and USEMB, Saigon April 1965.)

Social Change. Producing primary alterations in the non-material culture such as values, attitudes, institutions and social behavior.

Social Cohesion. The quality of the interdependence of component institutions of society.

Social Mobility. Absence of strict class lines permitting a person to "move upward" within society.

Societal Analysis. The intensive and detailed study of a society to include its component institutions, groups and members to provide a basis for counterinsurgency operations.

Society. A complex, interdependent system of institutions.

Subversion. Action, principally clandestine or covert, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale or political strength of a regime.

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2. ANNEX E (Nation Building in South Vietnam) is the product of an ad-hoc committee of officers at the United States Military Academy. It was conceived for use as a form of independent research control-check against PROVN findings. Developed strictly from an unclassified source foundation, the sole link of this endeavor with PROVN was a common statement of the study problem and identical terms of reference. Its principal author is Colonel Amos Jordan, Professor of Social Sciences, who is responsible for the final form and language in which it is cast. Other committee members were Lieutenant Colonel James Buck, FSO James Rosenthal, Majors Sam Sarkesian, Melville Wier, Oliver Combs, Richard Hobbs, Allen Raymond and Captain John Sewall (Department of Social Sciences); Lieutenant Colonel Charles Nulsen (Department of Tactics); and, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Braim (Department of Military Art and Engineering).

3. ANNEX H (Long-Term International Perspective) synthesizes contributions from the ongoing total strategic studies work program of the

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4. ANNEX J (Delta Province Pacification: Kien Hoa Case) represents the contribution of Major Andrew Simko, Infantry, who prepared the paper extra-curricular to his duties with the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA). Until 8 November 1965, he served as the USMACV Sector Advisor in Kien Hoa Province (long recognized as an area most susceptible to the trial of US-GVN political action and pacification programs). His counterpart, ARVN Colonel Chau, has since been named Rural Construction Plans Officer in Prime Minister Ky's administration.

5. ANNEX K (Influencing National Change: Behavioral Science Assistance) is the contribution of the Combat Operations Research Group (CORG) as arranged with the US Army Combat Developments Command. This paper is supported by eight detailed working documents covering the behavioral sciences spectrum.

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Abstract: PROVN examines the situation in South Vietnam within the context of history and in broad perspective. Courses of action which can lead to accomplishment of US aims and objectives are proposed. The ultimate objective: a free and independent, non-communist nation. The US must restructure, better manage and integrate its support effort; provide positive political guidance, under provisos for applying leverage and constraints; redirect the GVN-Free World military effort to better achieve security; focus nonmilitary assistance to achieve responsible cohesion within Vietnamese society; and, orient socio-economic program support to exploit geographic areas offering realistic promise of strategic objectives attainment.
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